From: Greg Tonoski <gregtonoski@gmail•com>
To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Revisiting secp256r1 signatures (i.e. P256, mobile HSM support)
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 10:49:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMHHROzaOap8d8gJ+zOcSQ5t9f7u_MQ5M=5abebkWpqkM7tprQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8fbe1fe3-425d-4056-8387-993f6ecc1been@googlegroups.com>
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I can see another attempt to re-open the vulnerability OP_CAT which had
been closed in Bitcoin long time ago. It's pushed under the guise of
secp256r1 which has nothing to do with the OP_CAT. Also, HSM and other
technobabble is irrelevant. For example, mobile users already have "mobile
HSM support" - see Samsung Blockchain Keystore.
--
Greg Tonoski
On Wed, 23 Jul 2025, 00:03 Josh Doman, <joshsdoman@gmail•com> wrote:
> A brief search on gnusha.org
> <https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/?q=secp256r1> suggests that it's been
> over 10 years since the Bitcoin community last discussed adding secp256r1
> support (also known as P256). The most in-depth discussions I found were on
> BitcoinTalk in 2011 <https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=2699.0> and 2013
> <https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=151120.0>.
>
> Since then, P256 has gained widespread adoption across the modern internet
> and on mobile. Most notably, millions of users now possess mobile devices
> capable of generating and storing private keys in secure enclaves (see
> Apple iCloud Keychain and Android Keystore). Millions of users might be
> able to immediately use this to start self-custodying bitcoin, except this
> hardware only supports P256 signatures, which is incompatible with the
> secp256k1 curve that Bitcoin currently uses.
>
> Reading through old discussions, it appears that the primary concern the
> community had with P256 is the possibility of a NIST backdoor. Putting the
> likelihood of this aside, it seems reasonable to me that in 2025, users
> should at least have the option of using P256, if they wish. Native HSM
> support would significantly improve the onboarding experience for new
> users, increase the security and accessibility of hot wallets, and
> potentially reduce the cost of collaborative multisigs. Meanwhile, the
> community can continue to use secp256k1 as the ideal curve for private keys
> secured in cold storage.
>
> At a technical level, Tapscript makes P256 mechanically straightforward to
> adopt, because it has built-in support for new types of public keys. For
> example, we could define a 33-byte public key as one requiring a P256 ECDSA
> signature, while continuing to use 32-bytes for keys requiring Schnorr
> signatures over secp256k1.
>
> A secondary concern that I came across is that P256 can be 2-3x slower to
> validate than secp256k1. Assuming this cannot be improved, we can account
> for slower validation by doubling or tripling the validation weight cost
> for a P256 signature. Users can then pre-commit in their script to this
> additional weight or commit to it in the annex, as intended by BIP341
> <https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki>.
>
> P256 support would grant apps the ability to use platform APIs to access
> the secure HSM on user's mobile devices, but alone, P256 is insufficient
> for non-custodial WebAuthn / passkey-based wallets. To verify a WebAuthn
> signature, we'd additionally need CSFS and CAT, so we can compute a
> WebAuthn message from a sighash and the necessary WebAuthn data on the
> stack. Alternatively, we could create a dedicated WebAuthn opcode to verify
> a WebAuthn message without enabling recursive covenants. Regardless, the
> ability to verify a P256 signature would be an important primitive.
>
> In summary, *given the widespread hardware adoption and industry usage,
> is it worth revisiting adding P256 support to Bitcoin?*
>
> Josh Doman
>
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>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-25 17:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-22 21:44 Josh Doman
2025-07-23 8:49 ` Greg Tonoski [this message]
2025-07-23 15:40 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
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