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From: "Russell O'Connor" <roconnor@blockstream•com>
To: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY - discussing and opcode that invalidates a spend path after a certain block
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 14:35:41 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMZUoK=1Rw-rzYPh24VLaH2HmmEO-B2ipf_9ymPb1RQQGUzjvw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGpPWDYRcR1U-zwmM_jUA_49LRMsAC5h+DpNFjn5nGniQpN29w@mail.gmail.com>

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This is a continuation of the thread at
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-April/018760.html
on this topic.

I still remain unconvinced that we ought to give up on the "reorg safety"
property that is explicitly part of Bitcoin's design.

On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 1:56 PM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi Everyone,
>
> I'd like to open a discussion of an opcode I call OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY
> (OP_BBV) which is similar to ones that have been discussed before (eg
> OP_BLOCKNUMBER). The opcode is very simple: the it takes as a parameter a
> number representing a block height, and marks the transaction invalid if
> the current block the transaction is being evaluated for is greater than or
> equal to that block height, the transaction is invalid. I wrote up a bip
> for OP_BBV here
> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-efficient-bitcoin-vaults/blob/main/bbv/bip-beforeblockverify.md>
> .
>
> The motivation for this opcode is primarily to do switch-off kinds of
> transactions. Eg, an output that contains both a spend path that uses
> OP_BBV and a spend path that uses OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY so that before a
> particular block one person can spend, and after that block a different
> person can spend. This can allow doing things like expiring payments or
> reversible payments in a cheaper way. Currently, things like that require a
> sequence of multiple transactions, however OP_BBV can do it in a single
> transaction, making these applications a lot more economically feasible.
>
> The particular application I'm most interested in is more efficient wallet
> vaults. However, wallet vaults requires other new opcodes, and I've been
> given the (good, I think) advice to start off this discussion with
> something a bit more bite sized and manageable. So I want to keep this
> discussion to OP_BBV and steer away from the specifics of the wallet vaults
> I'm thinking of (which are more involved, requiring other new opcodes that
> I think makes more sense to discuss in a different thread).
>
> The main thing I'd like to discuss is the historical avoidance of and
> stigma toward opcodes that can cause a valid transaction to become invalid.
>
> It seems there are two concerns:
>
> 1. that an opcode like might create a DOS vector where a malicious actor
> might be able to spam the mempool with transactions containing this opcode.
> 2. that an opcode like this could cause "bad" reorg behavior, where in a
> reorg, transactions that were spent become not spend and not spendable
> because they were mined too near their expiry point.
>
> While I don't want to claim anything about opcodes that can cause spend
> paths to expire in general, I do want to claim that *some* opcodes like
> that are safe - in particular OP_BBV. In the context of OP_BBV
> specifically, it seems to me like item 1 (mempool handling) is a solvable
> problem and that point 2 (reorg issues) is not really a problem since
> people should generally be waiting for 6 confirmations and software can
> warn the user to wait for 6 confirmations in relevant scenarios where a
> 6-block reorg might reverse the transaction. I discuss this in detail in
> the Design Tradeoffs and Risks
> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-efficient-bitcoin-vaults/blob/main/bbv/bip-beforeblockverify.md#transaction-expiry> section
> of the document I wrote for OP_BBV. I'd love to hear thoughts from others
> on here about these things and especially the discussion of these issues in
> the document I linked to.
>
> Thanks,
> BT
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-10 18:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-10 17:35 Billy Tetrud
2021-06-10 18:35 ` Russell O'Connor [this message]
2021-06-10 22:19   ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-10 23:20     ` Russell O'Connor
2021-06-11  5:59       ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-11 11:12         ` James MacWhyte
2021-06-11 11:43           ` Russell O'Connor
2021-06-12  7:59             ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-12 15:58               ` Russell O'Connor
2021-06-12 18:48                 ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-13 22:12                   ` Billy Tetrud

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