Oops, you are right. We need the bribe to be the output of the coinbase, but due to the maturity rule, it isn't really a bribe.
Too bad coinbases cannot take other coinbase outputs as inputs to bypass the maturity rule.
I guess that means the bribe has to be by leaving transactions in the mempool.
Also your point about centralization pressure is well taken.
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 05:36:52PM -0400, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 04:35:02PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > > What happens after that I'm not sure.
> > >
> >
> > Miners will learn to create anyone-can-spend outputs to bribe other miners
> > to build on their block rather than reorg it. (Due to the coinbase
> > maturity, this will require some amount of floating capital.)
>
> ...and that's a disaster for mining centralization, because the smaller miners
> need to pay larger bribes than larger miners. Not to mention having to keep
> capital around to do it.
Also, note how from a practical point of view, we'll need to add a new type of
tx that's only valid in a specific block, or other miners will just reorg those
anyone-can-spend outputs to steal them. It's not all that trivial to actually
do that... you'd have to have a signature that commits to the non-segwit part
of the coinbase outputs. Ugh.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org