Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"

From: "Russell O'Connor" <roconnor@blockstream•com>
To: martl.chris@proton•me,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 10:47:18 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMZUoKnO5zyjGx9DoBUom=E+8vG_UuOCh9wO=2OUPKwAdxtVCg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ri0Obd5AcQ2or-gzsFQVqblzEJK7KtEsV3U-bItN8ZsRD47PvurPyR5Vl3CH0Xs-ndSWSxlaiQJ0xvbduTnwwD4dMtOxp-4MMCUyqBCbuZE=@proton.me>

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It's been said before, but I'll say it again:

If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys.  Public
key data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing
to pad the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be
no way to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key
or whether it is encoding an inscription or some other data.

When certain governments try to censor certain internet protocols, users
respond by tunnelling their protocol through something that appears to be
innocent HTTPS (see Tor bridge nodes).  This works because, after a
handshake, the remaining HTTPS stream, like public keys, is
indistinguishable from random data, and can be used as a communications
channel for arbitrary data.  If we attempt to ban "arbitrary data", those
users will simply respond by "tunneling" their data over innocent-looking
public key data instead.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Counterparty has, in the
past, encoded their data within public key data, so this concern is not
hypothetical.

On Sat, Aug 19, 2023 at 10:29 AM Chris Martl via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> It is already more than a half year since the probably mayor Bitcoin
> script exploit started.
>
>
> These exploits are nothing new in the Bitcoin history and mostly are due
> to the loose flexibility of the system in regards of processing
> predicatives (Bitcoin script). The very first mayor bug; if you wish,
> vulnerability, was the CVE-2010-5141, which still engages us without end
> even after 14 years.
>
>
> Subsequent Bitcoin historical events let to build more “improvements” upon
> this wobbly basis exposing even more ground for exploits.
>
>
> As long as this loose flexibility is not modified in a way its exposure
> for exploits is eliminated remains nothing else than to pursue other
> strategies; and ones which are compatible with the current status quo and
> furthermore, with a permission-less system.
>
>
> Here a strategy proposal:
>
>
> Let’s name it: #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow.
>
>
> Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less
> system.
>
>
> #Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to
> opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of
> his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current
> affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness
> structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the
> mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the
> witness structure.
>
>
> #Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or
> not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her
> integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to
> the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of
> aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This
> coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block,
> unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least
> a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>
>
> Chris_______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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