On 8 December 2013 19:25, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 11:16 AM, Drak wrote: > > BGP redirection is a reality and can be exploited without much > > You're managing to argue against SSL. Because it actually provides > basically protection against an attacker who can actively intercept > traffic to the server. Against that threat model SSL is clearly— based > on your comments— providing a false sense of security. Let me clarify. SSL renders BGP redirection useless because the browser holds the signatures of CA's it trusts: an attacker cannot spoof a certificate because it needs to be signed by a trusted CA: that's the point of SSL, it encrypts and proves identity, the latter part is what thwarts MITM. If there was an MITM the browser screams pretty loudly about it with a big threat warning interstitial. Regards, Drak