From: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99•net>
To: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@bitpay•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] deterministic transaction expiration
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2014 20:54:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANEZrP0AXvF5EYvsdpYxGUi5yV9eD_8qUge80XCoaeyekfd67Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJHLa0O2wFq2Vs5Bes_8x1q_j0VC+U4DQkx=6GqT8w5e8Lh5Qg@mail.gmail.com>
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>
> The user experience of unconfirming transactions setting around in limbo
> is just horrible. Bitcoin software by necessity has gotten better about
> attaching fees so this sort of behavior is uncommon, but that does not
> eliminate the problem.
>
Yes, indeed. I suspect there's a quick hack that could make this problem a
lot better though.
I think I brought up this idea before, but can't quite remember. Anyway I'm
willing to bet that if we analysed the data some more, we'd discover that
most "legitimate" i.e. non-DoS unconfirmed transactions that sit around for
ages are linked back to the block chain within two hops and not more. That
is people send a transaction that uses up their coin age, and then
immediately those coins are immediately respent again, but then those final
new coins are not spent.
On the other hand DoS attacks look like bouncing your coins around over and
over forever, i.e. more than two or three hops back to the chain.
So I wonder if making priority look back two or three transactions but not
more would help real users a lot, whilst not opening up any significant new
potential for DoS.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-08-05 18:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-08-01 0:58 Kaz Wesley
2014-08-01 1:06 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-01 1:37 ` Kaz Wesley
2014-08-01 1:38 ` Matt Whitlock
2014-08-01 2:28 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-08-01 3:26 ` Matt Whitlock
2014-08-01 3:31 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-08-05 18:01 ` Alex Mizrahi
2014-08-02 0:36 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-05 17:02 ` Flavien Charlon
2014-08-05 17:48 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-05 18:54 ` Mike Hearn [this message]
2014-08-05 19:08 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-05 19:10 ` Kaz Wesley
2014-08-05 19:36 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 4:01 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-06 12:55 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 13:54 ` Mike Hearn
2014-08-06 14:44 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-06 15:08 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 15:17 ` Christian Decker
2014-08-06 15:42 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-06 16:15 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 17:02 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-06 17:21 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-08-06 17:34 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-06 17:24 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 16:31 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-08-06 17:20 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-06 17:30 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-08-06 17:38 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-08 17:38 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-08 18:13 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-08 18:42 ` Kaz Wesley
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