From: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99•net>
To: 21E14 <21xe14@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] A look back and a look forward
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2015 15:00:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANEZrP3VXnX7B7wQ4LOUCs+aifx747svyo5Gysw1SG0bgcT+WA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFZQHkFP81iYsAadejL1Si60FgtQSLvN==67ft2YRtsL9MqyDg@mail.gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1412 bytes --]
>
> This needn't be so, once an optional identity layer, modeled after the
> Internet itself, is provided, as proposed in late August of last year on
> this mailing list
>
I think the observation about Target vs Bitcoin exchanges is a sharp one,
but I'm not sure how your proposal helps. You say it's an optional identity
layer, but obviously any thief is going to opt out of being identified.
For things like the Bitstamp hack, it's not clear how identity can help,
because they were already doing KYC for all their customers. To take that
further at the protocol level would require* all* transactions to have
attached identity info, and that isn't going to happen - it wouldn't be
Bitcoin, at that point.
I think that long term, it's probably possible to defend private keys
adequately, even for large sums of money (maybe not bitstamp-large but
we'll see). You can have very minimalist secure hardware that would have
some additional policies on top, like refusing to sign transactions without
an identity proof of who controls the target address. Very tight hot
wallets that risk analyse the instructions they're receiving have been
proposed years ago.
No such hardware presently exists, but that's mostly because
implementations always lag behind a long way behind ideas rather than any
fundamental technical bottleneck. Perhaps the Bitstamp event will finally
spur development of such things forward.
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 1767 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-09 14:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-01-08 18:36 21E14
2015-01-09 14:00 ` Mike Hearn [this message]
2015-01-09 19:36 ` 21E14
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CANEZrP3VXnX7B7wQ4LOUCs+aifx747svyo5Gysw1SG0bgcT+WA@mail.gmail.com \
--to=mike@plan99$(echo .)net \
--cc=21xe14@gmail$(echo .)com \
--cc=bitcoin-development@lists$(echo .)sourceforge.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox