Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of Bitcoin, but as Jeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunately an economic policy that has to be chosen somehow.  Enabling users to incentivise the voting process is an interesting tool to have in the toolbox, but I think it would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only voting system behaves on its own.

If, for example, the hashing majority tended to favour a move towards centralization (big blocks), user preferences could potentially hasten this move by further punishing marginal miners through reduced fees.  On the other hand, if user preferences tended to oppose the preferences of miners, then such a system might function well in keeping a balance between usability and security (although it's not clear how this balance might change over time as the block subsidy drops).

In short, I think it's wise to keep it simple and implement one mechanism at a time.

On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:11 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed
entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by
hashing power.

This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions
themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included
in a block casting a specific vote.

We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
fees to vote according to user wishes.

Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an
additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
mechanism such as replace-by-fee.


See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:

https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html

--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development