From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7A4647F for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f178.google.com (mail-ig0-f178.google.com [209.85.213.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7CCBF115 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igk11 with SMTP id 11so11992522igk.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 07:25:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=8AHMYeJSWYYqueWuVd35uocmFFraI39e5RGQspJ/L2o=; b=vMtHMXJUXwZ0U5X/QzFSPFl0pXME3CSipZvnQMYW1OwfMsXBLJtDcgFFPybtuGtEzF IXbtOWrThnPqdMrZNKwHc7wycT4G84ArgWmCuZAH4IHExVdEzgnBUvM/7/v2LvF2eUNR ASKoGIX0FCcv3qnkznCckJV7tPYhq585MbzISKPxX0RPpNSr06Isw7zyhrmtSTuZKZov qtbk4tOmSDCkehkxU0ZWtmLETl6/LpQAR7pYkphI66sAaC3kAHsGCvJYtgwyTONbFYWu cdBFjuaY0pnKnuLBJ4kCu/EfMcLTeD7qFHft4dX7TkLmv1/BnqvNT6oYqwymY72Gw2iM WAvQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.60.68 with SMTP id f4mr5733212igr.94.1438266302964; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 07:25:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 07:25:02 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:25:02 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0160b63e14acff051c1878a9 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:25:04 -0000 --089e0160b63e14acff051c1878a9 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hello all, here is a proposal for long-term scalability I've been working on: https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop checking after the hard fork. Comments? -- Pieter --089e0160b63e14acff051c1878a9 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello all,

here is a prop= osal for long-term scalability I've been working on: https://gist.github.com/sipa/c6= 5665fc360ca7a176a6

Some things are not included yet, such = as a testnet whose size runs ahead of the main chain, and the inclusion of = Gavin's more accurate sigop checking after the hard fork.

= Comments?

--
Pieter

--089e0160b63e14acff051c1878a9-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 77DD4482 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:05:16 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f171.google.com (mail-ig0-f171.google.com [209.85.213.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F35291F0 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:05:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbpg9 with SMTP id pg9so12800401igb.0 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 08:05:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=2RE+wRwfkI3oc8vLBuWVo2FjwI0vd3kD86e31QqIjYk=; b=QSeXF74BDURc7nQyACmejewEN9fMkOieo5AfrCvjAzKQspQ8eIn6rmWH7vyqJPuTmX iLZQaVqRQoD2gagila4YqnpFO6QheUgtFzz5vXom4VWHjYGpczWGv4Kgm5pFQPKnrNS/ xiA8HrCCawpDztWiF6dYbc+U+sK3K1c2QKQCMqAz6ZC0ZW95AsupQdOH/NBYGKb9vnw4 IfcFF7M1WDz1Alc48V9SDP/Hl3kjqPUrl8aptDQ9d9FssMvozoAnEOczcvj1y2DdLrjP kXZA1zsgLXf8e4dqN+MDrZilgRWbRGf9cX3NaP6xboF2aVQFGXmM2Zd146bIsWNFHZCx PKHQ== X-Received: by 10.50.13.34 with SMTP id e2mr5775273igc.23.1438268707534; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 08:05:07 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.64.15.164 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 08:04:47 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Greg Sanders Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 11:04:47 -0400 Message-ID: To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01182d04677ea6051c1907a1 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT,FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:05:16 -0000 --089e01182d04677ea6051c1907a1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 What, if any, methods would be used for miners to communicate their upgrade? Greg On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Hello all, > > here is a proposal for long-term scalability I've been working on: > https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 > > Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead > of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop > checking after the hard fork. > > Comments? > > -- > Pieter > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --089e01182d04677ea6051c1907a1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
What, if any, methods would be used for miners to communic= ate their upgrade?=C2=A0

=
Greg

On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wui= lle via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation= .org> wrote:
Hello all,

here is a proposal for long-= term scalability I've been working on: https://gist.github.com/sip= a/c65665fc360ca7a176a6

Some things are not included yet, s= uch as a testnet whose size runs ahead of the main chain, and the inclusion= of Gavin's more accurate sigop checking after the hard fork.

Comments?

--
=
Pieter

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--089e01182d04677ea6051c1907a1-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BD1D0481 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:12:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f174.google.com (mail-wi0-f174.google.com [209.85.212.174]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0FF1D1F7 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:12:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibud3 with SMTP id ud3so25222640wib.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 08:12:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=/Lzeb8/HeANtyUyBoNph4U7cnXJ2g3LjmWS5NnJ7IyY=; b=W220nMIgNpgUzpPhCdawlx1ggAlv2QF9jLt7V/26z+OSDtocWSeE6wfX5hbu6dMB82 M81qMm91yRqovMIWhcuIWrkgAz25FqqEzshr55eojtMyRh+zTN71ZrTMw0we1TKPWzPI plc7m01y6r0LIPDrg5L9oE2c9DG20xB2vwdiik4QyjLvkxQtg+8Ge36sDRPJll8y/Qup HNdKUhWzxeaD7df4H1cpwmtg2uXfbPFw2UXhTpJxv0VnNbm4HzQsm4u6BJY/YTJus0Te TH7ymJLIfMf+6TuoKT5QGUDq7ngmEfZKidx//TuFsY4wuNiyN4RSb+fEgcfm1nP3He2Z Oz4w== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQme4aCjeSczfCZl+qfRQjYmroopqvxYSkXqKw+XEt+pGMxeNg16naTlirlLN+zNRwlmpVNP MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.37.74 with SMTP id w10mr6938485wij.92.1438269139497; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 08:12:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 08:12:19 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:12:19 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:12:21 -0000 1) Unlike previous blocksize hardfork proposals, this uses median time instead of block.nTime for activation. I like that more but my preference is still using height for everything. But that discussion is not specific to this proposal, so it's better if we discuss that for all of them here: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.htm= l 2) I think uncontroversial hardforks should also take miner confirmation into account, just like uncontroversial softforks do. We cannot make sure other users have upgraded before activating the chain, but we can know whether miners have upgraded or not. Having that tool available, why not use it. Of course other hardforks may not care about miners' upgrade state. For example "anti-miner hardforks, see https://github.com/jtimon/bips/blob/bip-forks/bip-forks.org#asic-reset-= hardfork But again, this is common to all uncontroversial hardforks, so it would probably better to discussed it in http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-June/008936.htm= l (gmaxwell assigned to bip99 to my bip draft). 3) As commented to you privately, I don't like to make any assumptions about technological advancements (much less on economical growth). I don't expect many people to agree with me here (I guess I've seen too many "peak oil" [or more generally, peak energy production] plus I've read Nietzsche's "On the utility and liability of history for life" [1]; so considering morals, technology or economics as "monotonic functions" in history is simply a ridiculous notion to me), but it's undeniable that internet connections have improved overall around the world in the last 6 years. I think we should wait for the technological improvements to happen and then adapt the blocksize accordingly. I know, that's not a "definitive solution", we will need to change it from time to time and this is somewhat ugly. But even if I'm the only one that considers a "technological de-growth" possible, I don't think is wise to rely on pseudo-laws like Moore's or Nielsen=E2=80=99s so-called "laws". Stealing a quote from another thread: "Prediction is difficult, especially about the future." - Niels Bohr So I would prefer a more limited solution like bip102 (even though I would prefer to have some simulations leading to a concrete value (even if it's bigger) rather than using 2MB's arbitrary number. Those are my 3 cents. [1] https://philohist.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/nietzsche-uses-history.pd= f On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 4:25 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hello all, > > here is a proposal for long-term scalability I've been working on: > https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 > > Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead= of > the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop checking > after the hard fork. > > Comments? > > -- > Pieter > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 75FEE4A5 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:20:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f53.google.com (mail-la0-f53.google.com [209.85.215.53]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D66C2214 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:20:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lagw2 with SMTP id w2so28290274lag.3 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:20:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=aQjv0cvXKPJot52bFV16+lfYpUvw/96318SZ2D6r5dI=; b=vkckuRSbFP1YvfVMZ79g8Db/zXjKULEgRrusxirkSoGo19bCYTA9V5BHgzvuY7Bzo0 AQjZeFTYF28UNT2+qxuxyVwweuvA/0uvemPNGKVnPL0ipQ/6yEK8pdE9otCSKxtoB0eB RNwAVNEDAOwthZmEaDpEsJD9qgZzbY+Q5+TPymGesebUtPfTOSraeXZrvGAGSWP8eCMz N1KJE6KPoCwbol93o/HVM79c6BKLCHCoydHHoJIqQaRb/gX2KxjlpJ8/NLaEwA8S9N9Y AON56h3lCmwf3ThF3MJbJQmNELpn+fnsw9j/37GgekkUgy3Wa5yIdYa4qFDiNMYQS5Y6 g2WQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.199.133 with SMTP id jk5mr46261958lbc.32.1438273230104; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:20:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.18.228 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:20:30 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 12:20:30 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c264bef87130051c1a14f7 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:20:32 -0000 --001a11c264bef87130051c1a14f7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead > of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop > checking after the hard fork. > > Comments? > First, THANK YOU for making a concrete proposal! Specific comments: So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much too conservative, and the most likely effect of being that conservative is that the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, affordable only for large-value transactions. I don't think your proposal strikes the right balance between centralization of payments (a future where only people running payment hubs, big merchants, exchanges, and wallet providers settle on the blockchain) and centralization of mining. I'll comment on using median time generally in Jorge's thread, but why does monotonically increasing matter for max block size? I can't think of a reason why a max block size of X bytes in block N followed by a max size of X-something bytes in block N+1 would cause any problems. -- -- Gavin Andresen --001a11c264bef87130051c1a14f7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Some things are not includ= ed yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead of the main chain, and the = inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop checking after the hard fork.<= br>
Comments?

First, THANK YOU f= or making a concrete proposal!

Specific comments:<= /div>

So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I = think that is much too conservative, and the most likely effect of being th= at conservative is that the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, a= ffordable only for large-value transactions.

I don= 't think your proposal strikes the right balance between centralization= of payments (a future where only people running payment hubs, big merchant= s, exchanges, and wallet providers settle on the blockchain) and centraliza= tion of mining.



I= 9;ll comment on using median time generally in Jorge's thread, but why = does monotonically increasing matter for max block size? I can't think = of a reason why a max block size of X bytes in block N followed by a max si= ze of X-something bytes in block N+1 would cause any problems.
<= div>
--
--
Gavin Andresen
--001a11c264bef87130051c1a14f7-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E6418282 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:23:19 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f173.google.com (mail-wi0-f173.google.com [209.85.212.173]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A407A15B for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:23:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so251882119wib.0 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:23:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=+eC3r3oqcBrAgiPRvVPmzmBuGQ3bay3Ts+MyOWNUIq4=; b=fIQpwiigeGl1FQu1v+L/LHHdLvgXBpzRpyPpPhIQG23a4WAaGLK3AJod2cTmLWt89h ZN0eiB3CJfxy7O27wQBQtFiUrP2/VdrXP/U362cPy7c/xjS67QVUYLFlqLYH2ridK0GP V2UyOY8SKHuTKfWPtC9Zm0CXHTvvYK2AlTrKW64jwIoqrFa/Ol4WwvGUVd4B5icTTbLd 1lCp09Kx88G40hyI7Mv58OvILE0hkNhaWrzROSB0Gepleu9KB4MzZBTdpOt9BuA1G4FM gXEiwVtKjboVnN9FlbVQ3BVgFg483mxw3dXqJA2zD9CecQS7gSMCVbTwZmXz2f4CMb+o 03eQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.218.195 with SMTP id pi3mr7707619wic.71.1438273397380; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:23:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.27.171.138 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:23:17 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 12:23:17 -0400 Message-ID: From: Jameson Lopp To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1134ce04f0dda5051c1a1e52 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:23:20 -0000 --001a1134ce04f0dda5051c1a1e52 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I find it to be an admirable goal to try to keep node operation costs low and accessible to the average user. On the other hand, if we are able to keep the resource requirements of nodes at the level of, say, whatever the latest Raspberry Pi model on a residential Internet connection can handle, I'm not sure how helpful it will be if the demand for inclusion in blocks results in transaction fees prices out more users. Stated differently, if the cost or contention of using the network rises to the point of excluding the average user from making transactions, then they probably aren't going to care that they can run a node at trivial cost. If we're approaching the block size from a resource usage standpoint, it seems to me that someone is going to be excluded one way or another. Not raising the block size will exclude some users from sending transactions while raising the block size will exclude some users from running nodes. The latter seems preferable to me because more users will grow the ecosystem, which should increase the value of the ecosystem, which should increase the cost that entities are willing to pay to run nodes. I see two primary points of view / objectives clashing in this debate: 1) Decentralization and stability even if it retards growth of the ecosyste= m 2) Push the system's load as far as we are comfortable in order to accommodate the growth it is experiencing It's clear to me that Core developers have a responsibility to maintain a stable platform for the ecosystem. I think it's less clear that they have a responsibility to grow it or ask node operators to expend more resources in order to support more users. As an operator of several nodes, I can anecdotally state that I find their resource usage to be trivial and I welcome more load. - Jameson On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 11:12 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > 1) Unlike previous blocksize hardfork proposals, this uses median time > instead of block.nTime for activation. I like that more but my > preference is still using height for everything. But that discussion > is not specific to this proposal, so it's better if we discuss that > for all of them here: > > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.h= tml > > 2) I think uncontroversial hardforks should also take miner > confirmation into account, just like uncontroversial softforks do. We > cannot make sure other users have upgraded before activating the > chain, but we can know whether miners have upgraded or not. Having > that tool available, why not use it. Of course other hardforks may not > care about miners' upgrade state. For example "anti-miner hardforks, > see > https://github.com/jtimon/bips/blob/bip-forks/bip-forks.org#asic-reset-ha= rdfork > But again, this is common to all uncontroversial hardforks, so it > would probably better to discussed it in > > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-June/008936.h= tml > (gmaxwell assigned to bip99 to my bip draft). > > 3) As commented to you privately, I don't like to make any assumptions > about technological advancements (much less on economical growth). I > don't expect many people to agree with me here (I guess I've seen too > many "peak oil" [or more generally, peak energy production] plus I've > read Nietzsche's "On the utility and liability of history for life" > [1]; so considering morals, technology or economics as "monotonic > functions" in history is simply a ridiculous notion to me), but it's > undeniable that internet connections have improved overall around the > world in the last 6 years. I think we should wait for the > technological improvements to happen and then adapt the blocksize > accordingly. I know, that's not a "definitive solution", we will need > to change it from time to time and this is somewhat ugly. > But even if I'm the only one that considers a "technological > de-growth" possible, I don't think is wise to rely on pseudo-laws like > Moore's or Nielsen=E2=80=99s so-called "laws". > Stealing a quote from another thread: > > "Prediction is difficult, especially about the future." - Niels Bohr > > So I would prefer a more limited solution like bip102 (even though I > would prefer to have some simulations leading to a concrete value > (even if it's bigger) rather than using 2MB's arbitrary number. > > Those are my 3 cents. > > [1] > https://philohist.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/nietzsche-uses-history.pdf > > On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 4:25 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > Hello all, > > > > here is a proposal for long-term scalability I've been working on: > > https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 > > > > Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs > ahead of > > the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop checki= ng > > after the hard fork. > > > > Comments? > > > > -- > > Pieter > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --001a1134ce04f0dda5051c1a1e52 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I find it to be an admirable goal to try to keep node oper= ation costs low and accessible to the average user. On the other hand, if w= e are able to keep the resource requirements of nodes at the level of, say,= whatever the latest Raspberry Pi model on a residential Internet connectio= n can handle, I'm not sure how helpful it will be if the demand for inc= lusion in blocks results in transaction fees prices out more users. Stated = differently, if the cost or contention of using the network rises to the po= int of excluding the average user from making transactions, then they proba= bly aren't going to care that they can run a node at trivial cost.
=
If we're approaching the block size from a resource usag= e standpoint, it seems to me that someone is going to be excluded one way o= r another. Not raising the block size will exclude some users from sending = transactions while raising the block size will exclude some users from runn= ing nodes. The latter seems preferable to me because more users will grow t= he ecosystem, which should increase the value of the ecosystem, which shoul= d increase the cost that entities are willing to pay to run nodes.

I see two primary points of view / objectives clashing in = this debate:

1) Decentralization and stability eve= n if it retards growth of the ecosystem
2) Push the system's = load as far as we are comfortable in order to accommodate the growth it is = experiencing

It's clear to me that Core develo= pers have a responsibility to maintain a stable platform for the ecosystem.= I think it's less clear that they have a responsibility to grow it or = ask node operators to expend more resources in order to support more users.= As an operator of several nodes, I can anecdotally state that I find their= resource usage to be trivial and I welcome more load.

=
- Jameson

On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 11:12 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
1) Unlike previous blocksize hardfork proposals, = this uses median time
instead of block.nTime for activation. I like that more but my
preference is still using height for everything. But that discussion
is not specific to this proposal, so it's better if we discuss that
for all of them here:
http://lists.linuxfounda= tion.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.html

2) I think uncontroversial hardforks should also take miner
confirmation into account, just like uncontroversial softforks do. We
cannot make sure other users have upgraded before activating the
chain, but we can know whether miners have upgraded or not. Having
that tool available, why not use it. Of course other hardforks may not
care about miners' upgrade state. For example "anti-miner hardfork= s,
see https://github.co= m/jtimon/bips/blob/bip-forks/bip-forks.org#asic-reset-hardfork
But again, this is common to all uncontroversial hardforks, so it
would probably better to discussed it in
http://lists.linuxfounda= tion.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-June/008936.html
(gmaxwell assigned to bip99 to my bip draft).

3) As commented to you privately, I don't like to make any assumptions<= br> about technological advancements (much less on economical growth). I
don't expect many people to agree with me here (I guess I've seen t= oo
many "peak oil" [or more generally, peak energy production] plus = I've
read Nietzsche's "On the utility and liability of history for life= "
[1]; so considering morals, technology or economics as "monotonic
functions" in history is simply a ridiculous notion to me), but it'= ;s
undeniable that internet connections have improved overall around the
world in the last 6 years. I think we should wait for the
technological improvements to happen and then adapt the blocksize
accordingly. I know, that's not a "definitive solution", we w= ill need
to change it from time to time and this is somewhat ugly.
But even if I'm the only one that considers a "technological
de-growth" possible, I don't think is wise to rely on pseudo-laws = like
Moore's or Nielsen=E2=80=99s so-called "laws".
Stealing a quote from another thread:

"Prediction is difficult, especially about the future." - Niels B= ohr

So I would prefer a more limited solution like bip102 (even though I
would prefer to have some simulations leading to=C2=A0 a concrete value
(even if it's bigger) rather than using 2MB's arbitrary number.

Those are my 3 cents.

[1] https://philohist.files.= wordpress.com/2008/01/nietzsche-uses-history.pdf

On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 4:25 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@li= sts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hello all,
>
> here is a proposal for long-term scalability I've been working on:=
> https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a17= 6a6
>
> Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ah= ead of
> the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop c= hecking
> after the hard fork.
>
> Comments?
>
> --
> Pieter
>
>
> __________________= _____________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@l= ists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--001a1134ce04f0dda5051c1a1e52-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B805D5AA for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:36:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7606E214 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:36:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BB7AF20B46; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:38:02 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55BA5283.2000405@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 23:36:19 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= , Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: OpenPGP: id=1CF07D66; url=pool.sks-keyservers.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:36:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/30/2015 10:12 PM, Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev wrote: [snip] > But even if I'm the only one that considers a "technological > de-growth" possible, I don't think is wise to rely on pseudo-laws > like Moore's or Nielsen’s so-called "laws". Stealing a quote from > another thread: You raise a good point: "de-growth" Assuming linear (or exponential) growth without sympathetic contraction at some time in the future would make our future selves look back and smile at the youthful exuberance. The pseudo-laws you mention (Moore's etc) do not cater for contraction and, you're right, scaling UP plans should also wisely make provision for scaling DOWN, for when the need arises. > > So I would prefer a more limited solution like bip102 (even though > I would prefer to have some simulations leading to a concrete > value (even if it's bigger) rather than using 2MB's arbitrary > number. I just had a look your existing Size N testnet code https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6382 and i'll set up a node over the weekend and post its address in that PR's conversation. Do you or anyone else already have a node running? what blocksize? > > Those are my 3 cents. > > [1] > https://philohist.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/nietzsche-uses-history.pdf Thanks, > will broaden my horizon soon! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVulKBAAoJEGwAhlQc8H1mUSAH/Rmlek3uitGyIritwyDO4Kf7 BfynlztWmPbnWl7aFYQCS+aIPgS+BvQWIiA0dTI633yj071DWEvcGDzhtcVrk0KT //Ty8bp8yqsJRdd+SWgnqUzSmB6TI31F3ssxjDfSZhKiy8YF4+pKqjerQmBqlgLY sKts3md8N8qWV5Onjd7ea+7SoFjhJ6GOm2UFgxO27LCeDH5Ax5fG4MsolNg3MBTT 5y7Hfo1YeFXRwRRSy5uCSSR0afBb8Wauqi/EnSYDuMe5HBcLztc7icXa6oLTlvBC sfYswasmLRbvHLs4Vy51g75+k60QBjgFKtVlPXJXGN2trbcedF0UbDmenxGqJaI= =rJPX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7E4DB5AE for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:36:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f169.google.com (mail-lb0-f169.google.com [209.85.217.169]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32589211 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:36:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbyj8 with SMTP id yj8so30720103lbb.0 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:36:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=bBFzooy8QcmLzHzV4nAl4X7J0fb4auje9IVPM6pjmw4=; b=dFV/Pn/CdJPlPq6XC0c0pB+OyNF42Vgk4i4TmZPnAFYKTrPpt2+P/8RderUOgd8rZ3 aXPwMqH/kNl2wYb62dQt6OwDHpYfWHZYkeH/Dsz0RC6cFKJxK3KOd6qm5lQQJo/Mhsl0 78imNOdRbhwdGqGUIkGuGoDeQYfqR0WslkdqPFpgPm3IxMd+gYZfO1vrHmCLdRZib9Fu pcLslty8Wl99oSgFKkWUvN6l4kTW0Kz0pqDKcIhMdLRX8L9m59kcVrFcXrXF7acr1YPp GVFeI9AgO74mKePlp1Rx1pCXUo8pG0Ryt8AgLz9hFHtasERxiyM13zAB0KptVuyxAo1M t1Iw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.13.97 with SMTP id g1mr45454351lbc.52.1438274189604; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:36:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.152.18.166 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:36:29 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 11:36:29 -0500 Message-ID: From: Bryan Bishop To: Jameson Lopp , Bryan Bishop , bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c3b208293d9b051c1a4e69 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:36:32 -0000 --001a11c3b208293d9b051c1a4e69 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Stated differently, if the cost or contention of using the network rises > to the point of excluding the average user from making transactions, then > they probably aren't going to care that they can run a node at trivial cost. That's an interesting claim; so suppose you're living in a future where transactions are summarizing millions or billions of other daily transactions, possibly with merkle hashes. You think that because a user can't individually broadcast his own personal transaction, that the user would not be interested in verifying the presence of a summarizing transaction in the blockchain? I'm just curious if you could elaborate on this effect. Why would I need to see my individual transactions on the network, but not see aggregate transactions that include my own? - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 --001a11c3b208293d9b051c1a4e69 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, Jul 30, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Stated differently, if the cost or contention of u= sing the network rises to the point of excluding the average user from maki= ng transactions, then they probably aren't going to care that they can = run a node at trivial cost.

That's an interesting= claim; so suppose you're living in a future where transactions are sum= marizing millions or billions of other daily transactions, possibly with me= rkle hashes. You think that because a user can't individually broadcast= his own personal transaction, that the user would not be interested in ver= ifying the presence of a summarizing transaction in the blockchain? I'm= just curious if you could elaborate on this effect. Why would I need to se= e my individual transactions on the network, but not see aggregate transact= ions that include my own?

= - Bryan
http://heybry= an.org/
1 512 203 0507
--001a11c3b208293d9b051c1a4e69-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C4A95282 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:41:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-oi0-f54.google.com (mail-oi0-f54.google.com [209.85.218.54]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 66083ED for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:41:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by oibn4 with SMTP id n4so24847165oib.3 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:41:55 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=W7WEkDqfiHL7P0EL5nw0Sx0AhY/nZZQWJrqH5r0yMZk=; b=EeQYa0vrZ2yoj0EyO+hhko3CfPYjGRmRLNbLBjUrZRV3AoLWBk+74B2y658a6/Vefk k6F87GM9Wdm5MgEhWX+rrFykzNCAc9h76WbjMth/K//Sa1k8bJvN9uuQz2p55cY5mkyX w2h6LbWmQkGYw8ysfdVo5KgywC1CHS2mU4nDxW/DBag4DiebMXgQJT8xDDTsung1LGUG D3oYlEJqhWxxjdUTc+gMZogxVy6ccLIJilDtF1qGpqduhEyCWIOy9ozfZOB4bjCbbtja k21EzvP9peHWIDmNdkBfl6+m8BCgHUTwBFXBbnnUzDqiT2udyQlUF8VaqYQ6HsfyyNe8 UOHw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.202.196.18 with SMTP id u18mr41681289oif.58.1438274515850; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:41:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.202.87.215 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:41:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 12:41:55 -0400 Message-ID: From: Suhas Daftuar To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113e38509b5b62051c1a6139 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:41:56 -0000 --001a113e38509b5b62051c1a6139 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:20 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much too > conservative, and the most likely effect of being that conservative is that > the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, affordable only for > large-value transactions. > While that may be true I think that's okay -- if it turns out that this is too conservative, and we succeed in scaling the system so that it's non-controversial to increase these limits later via another hard fork, we would still be free to do so. It seems to me that everyone who has been arguing recently to increase the block size limit ought to find this proposal to be a strict improvement over where we are now, and this proposal seems like it's reasonably likely to be non-controversial enough to be worth proposing as a hard fork in Bitcoin Core -- thank you Pieter for putting this together. For my part, I'd give this a concept ACK, pending hearing further thoughts from others. Suhas Daftuar --001a113e38509b5b62051c1a6139 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:20 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021.= I think that is much too conservative, and the most likely effect of being= that conservative is that the main blockchain becomes a settlement network= , affordable only for large-value transactions.

While that may be true I think that's okay= -- if it turns out that this is too conservative, and we succeed in scalin= g the system so that it's non-controversial to increase these limits la= ter via another hard fork, we would still be free to do so.

<= /div>
It seems to me that everyone who has been arguing recently to inc= rease the block size limit ought to find this proposal to be a strict impro= vement over where we are now, and this proposal seems like it's reasona= bly likely to be non-controversial enough to be worth proposing as a hard f= ork in Bitcoin Core -- thank you Pieter for putting this together.

For my part, I'd give this a concept ACK, pending hear= ing further thoughts from others.

Suhas Daftuar
--001a113e38509b5b62051c1a6139-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B1944A7 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:43:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f174.google.com (mail-wi0-f174.google.com [209.85.212.174]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 839A6ED for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:43:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicgb10 with SMTP id gb10so251839917wic.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:43:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=Ka75a2W8XLM5p87wKbFkHWAYo1o+6vopYtvZIUwV2O4=; b=yiP6H2d860L1Fc5crxPUeNcHfkOmVL2M3ziwOiCldSODN3jLRA2X9/ghfkwGhXtonS vwA8Tp3MYRmvUnyxXNwDM7HO3oLU1j7bX2EUqQNtzezLT50ifddfref/MSCeQRt96WJk EOtKoAAVZamz8lXHKdptETOxo/U2yzxe5EL+3KmLHRmEOLbExfsnCydZXmqHG6H/xIBr BArm+gVTyrnZ7/HckMMZ4WNpScxUry7lRTxp9y8jCF9MXHzFAQULoi8KNi4eXbkfMJVP Niiz7FNHwjHX6NSVNs2xp0PZ27B9x+AE/sJHHej5B2pYnMB56sef6JI4FT+oyP6rBUig LDkQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.209.167 with SMTP id mn7mr86329181wjc.64.1438274636987; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:43:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.27.171.138 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:43:56 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 12:43:56 -0400 Message-ID: From: Jameson Lopp To: Bryan Bishop Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3a8954d3c524051c1a6885 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:43:59 -0000 --047d7b3a8954d3c524051c1a6885 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I fully expect that new layers will someday allow us to facilitate higher transaction volumes, though I'm concerned about the current state of the network and the fact that there are no concrete timelines for the rollout of aforementioned high volume networks. As for reasoning behind why users will still need to settle on-chain even with the existence of high volume networks, see these posts: http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34119233/ http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34113067/ Point being, the scalability proposals that are currently being developed are not magic bullets and still require the occasional on-chain settlement. Larger blocks will be necessary with or without the actual scalability enhancements. - Jameson On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:36 PM, Bryan Bishop wrote: > On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Stated differently, if the cost or contention of using the network rises >> to the point of excluding the average user from making transactions, then >> they probably aren't going to care that they can run a node at trivial cost. > > > That's an interesting claim; so suppose you're living in a future where > transactions are summarizing millions or billions of other daily > transactions, possibly with merkle hashes. You think that because a user > can't individually broadcast his own personal transaction, that the user > would not be interested in verifying the presence of a summarizing > transaction in the blockchain? I'm just curious if you could elaborate on > this effect. Why would I need to see my individual transactions on the > network, but not see aggregate transactions that include my own? > > - Bryan > http://heybryan.org/ > 1 512 203 0507 > --047d7b3a8954d3c524051c1a6885 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I fully expect that new layers will someday allow us to fa= cilitate higher transaction volumes, though I'm concerned about the cur= rent state of the network and the fact that there are no concrete timelines= for the rollout of aforementioned high volume networks.

As for reasoning behind why users will still need to settle on-chain even = with the existence of high volume networks, see these posts:

=
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34119233/


Point being, the scalability proposals= that are currently being developed are not magic bullets and still require= the occasional on-chain settlement. Larger blocks will be necessary with o= r without the actual scalability enhancements.

- J= ameson

On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:36 PM, Bryan Bishop <kanzure@gmail.com>= wrote:
On Thu, Jul 3= 0, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <bit= coin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Stated differently, if the cost or contention of using the = network rises to the point of excluding the average user from making transa= ctions, then they probably aren't going to care that they can run a nod= e at trivial cost.

That's an interesting c= laim; so suppose you're living in a future where transactions are summa= rizing millions or billions of other daily transactions, possibly with merk= le hashes. You think that because a user can't individually broadcast h= is own personal transaction, that the user would not be interested in verif= ying the presence of a summarizing transaction in the blockchain? I'm j= ust curious if you could elaborate on this effect. Why would I need to see = my individual transactions on the network, but not see aggregate transactio= ns that include my own?


--047d7b3a8954d3c524051c1a6885-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1AE0F4A8 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:48:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mout.perfora.net (mout.perfora.net [74.208.4.197]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EE008F2 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:48:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-qk0-f169.google.com ([209.85.220.169]) by mrelay.perfora.net (mreueus003) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0M3kt5-1Z3b8N4BNZ-00rGfq for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:48:19 +0200 Received: by qkfc129 with SMTP id c129so20131300qkf.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:48:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.55.15.20 with SMTP id z20mr70615311qkg.16.1438274898215; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:48:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.96.226.68 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:48:18 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:48:18 +0200 Message-ID: From: Adam Back To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Provags-ID: V03:K0:cSIhUvNBt8FA6ibFk0NYCa69f1QXN9TvrHPWupeW/o41J7dRGoQ 4e+2gOHLpBeBRw+ZlxtaQhyr68yLnNNXyWQXJ2jK/XatEoQrCSv+S1+vASvo3rh5fEs/02j lgxkMzbqy8vaz2QjHEtMV0Y6GY0xLwVHhdXEtE2uNf9t98mjO07x+UtWa/QmwEgxdH1NWFn GoAig8iG44dN2YYJK+b5g== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V01:K0:sjTwkGasLOg=:jJvdYS5Ir430X3gMoloOtR FIAY5hovqTTUgWe23wlfcIYeoQUfO0N4CBNEENhmZI0ZHBVOCTGkVQrOu8YPTXFmsNsZ47wOE lp1k04K4ucyrtdkkXydsDb86ULs3c+Qv59PIPZOijWWIKHkw1c683oaGJUci8b5BLAhLli79A KLVQUsNsao4HLjoXmE57lvF9j0H6zNauRkryBJ6ku66fMTAUkILOtT5g8KEdMJpW6NyTlXRup SaHAuXcZTqD1fr0sat5Aek0At8LYbI4ekKqHALMXgo5P1Oy4adpvfv0hcsZgnDiz1h2nK2WHl 2qfl0Q0pzsMwg6vBpfVDxS5b/Vz8qNV9avwba3sffLf5e+VK5XBkU++xQByO2FmU/CkR1zKRm vAcEfBhgB0ubO5pvajTOeUGGuAhpNypydTZlgPyB756uS960e46GTVXR61+GVHf299qDTnMdD 71I+rhsoZnTAxkjR+S1ekyDx4TzLJIpU9MgVr0wFLX2cbfFJvvDvZvHwobqy/xWQOkjKpHKg8 U+EKwg5qfzDFiJBM6fr60GK+LZh8JsWIXaBIBv9ie2M7IVd0ANRdJtoQA10wUVl9ySB4km6Dj +9iQFxB/dqQXGbgp3szBu7ZqdqxE6GTdg7ZoVg+277yKfnQHlgoTBdc0iENUpgLWGbj2/4fxJ mB4iJ5vUph79IOKJngH/QxongVNjMIkII/hWxS0m6mGuMbA== X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:48:21 -0000 That's what is nice about proposals, they are constructive and help move the conversation forward! On 30 July 2015 at 18:20, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Specific comments: > > So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much too > conservative, and the most likely effect of being that conservative is that > the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, affordable only for > large-value transactions. But, if we agree that 17%/year is consistent with network improvements, by arguing this is too conservative, does that not mean you are actually going beyond suggesting throughput increases to benefit from bandwidth improvements, and explicitly arguing to borrowing from Bitcoin's already very weak decentralisation to create more throughput? (Or arguing to subsidise transaction fees if borrowing so deeply that excess capacity pushes beyond demand). I think the logical implication of this would be that we should be first focussing on improving decentralisation, to make security room to reclaim extra throughput. (To be clear there are concrete things that can be done and actually are being done to improve decentralisation via ecosystem education and mining protocol improvements, but it's safer to wait a few months and see if those things take effect well). Secondly in this assumption are you considering that lightning will likely be online for many years by 2021 and the situation will be hugely different? I think an incremental and conservative approach is safer. People can probably get a lightning prototype running about as fast as a hard-fork could be safely rolled out. I do think it is normal to be conservative with security and with $4b of other peoples money. It's no longer an experimental system to consider fail fast experiments on. > I don't think your proposal strikes the right balance between centralization > of payments (a future where only people running payment hubs, big merchants, > exchanges, and wallet providers settle on the blockchain) and centralization > of mining. What criteria should we be using in your opinion to balance? I think throughput increases trading off decentralisation would be more reasonable if decentralisation wasnt in very bad shape. Adam From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 736364A8 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:49:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CE4110A for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:49:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioii16 with SMTP id i16so59649571ioi.0 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:49:53 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=VjUx52X4e3lM0b11kPwkv4B3uPZbryG4dndVVAE0Jp0=; b=kz/yAWf28mXk5N5atUtse3Jf/V27p5eDUi7fAEjzG3TGCZ22r1jU7/dSkcXpZ/jIVJ 3f1jOwlrr7v+m/zW9M9hmcn60RSwrII3VgC2QhEHs4SVMQqy7eAZ246aaMl1tyzELZ48 mjuX8JfGIsfnWhYK+gt0PP+oHxR3faNp8Y0RM3H/8Ih/GR4QV3hGoU/dJfWfJMhk9Q/V o9y5muKbqBDcUYbJ0xsyPiwqndt7tRUKxGvcunQTg/O8ClSeb2LQ02byKfcOox0+pOPD 3TUsW8TnJ4YiFuVT/Q0x6udm+dR7YFzvFRSugWXSFlSj+WFns6VUobvJLRZLOyaAFUmr Oung== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.9.137 with SMTP id 9mr12486315ioj.50.1438274993030; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:49:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:49:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:49:52 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:49:52 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f8f140c8ff2051c1a7e84 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:49:54 -0000 --001a113f8f140c8ff2051c1a7e84 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Jul 30, 2015 6:20 PM, "Gavin Andresen" wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >> Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop checking after the hard fork. >> >> Comments? > > > First, THANK YOU for making a concrete proposal! You're welcome. > Specific comments: > > So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much too conservative, and the most likely effect of being that conservative is that the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, affordable only for large-value transactions. If there is demand for high-value settlements in Bitcoin, and this results in a functioning economy where fees support the security of a transparent network, I think that would be a much better outcome than what we have now. > I don't think your proposal strikes the right balance between centralization of payments (a future where only people running payment hubs, big merchants, exchanges, and wallet providers settle on the blockchain) and centralization of mining. Well, centralization of mining is already terrible. I see no reason why we should encourage making it worse. On the other hand, sure, not every transaction fits on the blockchain. That is already the case, and will remain the case with 2 MB or 8 MB or 100 MB blocks. Some use cases fit, and others won't. We need to accept that, and all previous proposals I've seen don't seem to do that. Maybe the only ones that will fit are large settlements between layer-2 services, and maybe it will be something entirely different. But at least we don't need to compromise the security of the main layer, or promise the ecosystem unrealistic growth of space for on-chain transactions. If Bitcoin needs to support a large scale, it already failed. > I'll comment on using median time generally in Jorge's thread, but why does monotonically increasing matter for max block size? I can't think of a reason why a max block size of X bytes in block N followed by a max size of X-something bytes in block N+1 would cause any problems. I don't think it matters much, but it offers slightly easier transition for the mempool (something Jorge convinced me of), and validation can benefit from a single variable that can be set in a chain to indicate a switchover happened, without needing to recalculate it every time. I assume you're asking this because using raw nTime means you can check what limits a p2p message should obey to by looking at just the first bytes. I don't think this matters: your p2p protocol should deal with whatever limits the system requires anyway. An attacker can take a valid message of far in the chain, change a few bytes, and spam you with it at zero extra effort anyway. -- Pieter --001a113f8f140c8ff2051c1a7e84 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Jul 30, 2015 6:20 PM, "Gavin Andresen" <gavinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.li= nuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size run= s ahead of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate s= igop checking after the hard fork.
>>
>> Comments?
>
>
> First, THANK YOU for making a concrete proposal!

You're welcome.

> Specific comments:
>
> So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much t= oo conservative, and the most likely effect of being that conservative is t= hat the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, affordable only for l= arge-value transactions.

If there is demand for high-value settlements in Bitcoin, an= d this results in a functioning economy where fees support the security of = a transparent network, I think that would be a much better outcome than wha= t we have now.

> I don't think your proposal strikes the right balan= ce between centralization of payments (a future where only people running p= ayment hubs, big merchants, exchanges, and wallet providers settle on the b= lockchain) and centralization of mining.

Well, centralization of mining is already terrible. I see no= reason why we should encourage making it worse. On the other hand, sure, n= ot every transaction fits on the blockchain. That is already the case, and = will remain the case with 2 MB or 8 MB or 100 MB blocks. Some use cases fit= , and others won't. We need to accept that, and all previous proposals = I've seen don't seem to do that.

Maybe the only ones that will fit are large settlements betw= een layer-2 services, and maybe it will be something entirely different. Bu= t at least we don't need to compromise the security of the main layer, = or promise the ecosystem unrealistic growth of space for on-chain transacti= ons.

If Bitcoin needs to support a large scale, it already failed= .

> I'll comment on using median time generally in Jorg= e's thread, but why does monotonically increasing matter for max block = size? I can't think of a reason why a max block size of X bytes in bloc= k N followed by a max size of X-something bytes in block N+1 would cause an= y problems.

I don't think it matters much, but it offers slightly ea= sier transition for the mempool (something Jorge convinced me of), and vali= dation can benefit from a single variable that can be set in a chain to ind= icate a switchover happened, without needing to recalculate it every time.<= /p>

I assume you're asking this because using raw nTime mean= s you can check what limits a p2p message should obey to by looking at just= the first bytes. I don't think this matters: your p2p protocol should = deal with whatever limits the system requires anyway. An attacker can take = a valid message of far in the chain, change a few bytes, and spam you with = it at zero extra effort anyway.

--
Pieter

--001a113f8f140c8ff2051c1a7e84-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CF01A514 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:57:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yk0-f180.google.com (mail-yk0-f180.google.com [209.85.160.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9F990ED for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:57:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykax123 with SMTP id x123so38990354yka.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:57:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=nXwo/zgjTWngypPR+b4He1G0eWcQnqL0b6Kec3+B8WM=; b=ttpWrITwPo6OZZ99J2478zwrAfMEl9ligHxu8hkyyUOyv07WChvgbxrF3R5NxCFmu2 uMReQZ+Ht3b7mXG4f/ro7vs1drF9LE67yjYO5zfkJitaG8p0IwIwxz56qCupnMfTAOj9 y0luh+8lQ2bCKIsltBqOOnKaSVPtfRlTDmyeKlr33VBJ3eY2B5eQUDijYkPytQWcvfXG fPHeU/3xN+UT32LtOi83Wr4k+ygKUfKWren8qhbDfpMHpQXhqsnWsBoV6vEljhL7DSEm jscLO2X9ateG3cVQFh2haaOE92uCS/mVFKW00p0d8axObajiw1bvFD+pOnjUPSgvc1we o/0Q== X-Received: by 10.13.204.150 with SMTP id o144mr52859464ywd.54.1438275423023; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:57:03 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.129.74.8 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:56:23 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Gary Mulder Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:56:23 +0100 Message-ID: To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114e43a6adb56c051c1a9766 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 16:57:06 -0000 --001a114e43a6adb56c051c1a9766 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 30 July 2015 at 16:12, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > 1) Unlike previous blocksize hardfork proposals, this uses median time > instead of block.nTime for activation. I like that more but my > preference is still using height for everything. But that discussion > is not specific to this proposal, so it's better if we discuss that > for all of them here: > > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.h= tml Note that a "median" is a special case of a 50% percentile. If you desire to apply a more stringent criteria you can use the 75th or even 90th percentile. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percentile Perhaps if a statistician (i.e. not me) could be found to offer her services, she could become a resource for helping selecting the most appropriate statistical algorithms on request (and implemented Integer math as per Gavin, from memory), considering the consequences of learning post-fork that a "bad statistical model" was chosen. e.g. an exponentially weighted moving average is usually much less volatile and harder to manipulate than a simple moving average, but still can "respond" to short term drivers. Regards, Gary --001a114e43a6adb56c051c1a9766 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On 30 July 2015 at 16:12, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n=C2=A0<bitcoin-dev@lists.li= nuxfoundation.org>=C2=A0wrote:
1) Unlike previous blocksize hardfork pr= oposals, this uses median time
instead of block.nTime for activation. I = like that more but my
preference is still using height for everything. B= ut that discussion
is not specific to this proposal, so it's better = if we discuss that
for all of them here:
http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-d= ev/2015-July/009731.html

Note that a= "median" is a special case of a 50% percentile. If you desire to= apply a more stringent criteria you can use the 75th or even 90th percenti= le.


Perhaps if a statistician (i.e. not me) c= ould be found to offer her services, she could become a resource for helpin= g selecting the most appropriate statistical algorithms on request (and imp= lemented Integer math as per Gavin, from memory), considering the consequen= ces of learning post-fork that a "bad statistical model" was chos= en.

e.g. an exponentially weighted moving ave= rage is usually much less volatile and harder to manipulate than a simple m= oving average, but still can "respond" to short term drivers.=C2= =A0

Regards,
Gary
--001a114e43a6adb56c051c1a9766-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A29AA415 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:13:15 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f172.google.com (mail-io0-f172.google.com [209.85.223.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 05236253 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:13:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodd187 with SMTP id d187so60269427iod.2 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:13:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=TkspycX4j7UsBjoR46sd8Ai2cii2WH/7DoUR8oKUOBY=; b=L2PF8Dj06xy81ajlWpgv6gL1pkcgTcXTjkUU+02S4UoIDhsBNwjQioeYX/eNGu+eGY j/Vt0kYBNy2NPCVerxAkO55iLVmQe9kneXbHvjfkme5SWoKzEtRmmEydyG3R1FhLsJ+d UXE6rZ1QKpZ+5JioGZiQOUPFYFmq5h46MKaN3FB7kQJhKvkgvggboAdRAhOIMukKkMVR JctXqodxHqYPyTIMq440FyokBOajBBKCWH8rnE0ymrwWfyqfAa7qnbP7AE8d0odZeNbO Vf6vctFyUjcqwWKa6IcOnfT7BTVZqQMUCrJwtMifVmBDLgw3bgQmARIGMyI95j+P4C03 rvww== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkd8oTJXdBVId02RY7N6GMLs70N0naaadPNcWHSZsprkNbmItQHtEaq2aTIeFJurhE6eCAF MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.130.166 with SMTP id m38mr13569421ioi.77.1438276393442; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:13:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.107.158.140 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:13:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [172.56.17.151] Received: by 10.107.158.140 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:13:13 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:13:13 -0700 Message-ID: From: Mark Friedenbach To: Gary Mulder Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113eb9c88552a1051c1ad18e X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:13:15 -0000 --001a113eb9c88552a1051c1ad18e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable The median is used here because that is the consensus rule -- a block cannot have a timestamp older than the median time of the last 11 blocks. By linking the changeover to this rule we avoid perverse incentives about miners lying in their timestamps, or the threshold being crossed, then reverted, then crossed again, etc. Maybe a different percentile would have been a better choice, but that ship sailed in 2009. The rule is what it is right now, and we benefit the most from using the same rule as consensus for the threshold. On Jul 30, 2015 9:57 AM, "Gary Mulder via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On 30 July 2015 at 16:12, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> 1) Unlike previous blocksize hardfork proposals, this uses median time >> instead of block.nTime for activation. I like that more but my >> preference is still using height for everything. But that discussion >> is not specific to this proposal, so it's better if we discuss that >> for all of them here: >> >> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.= html > > > Note that a "median" is a special case of a 50% percentile. If you desire > to apply a more stringent criteria you can use the 75th or even 90th > percentile. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percentile > > Perhaps if a statistician (i.e. not me) could be found to offer her > services, she could become a resource for helping selecting the most > appropriate statistical algorithms on request (and implemented Integer ma= th > as per Gavin, from memory), considering the consequences of learning > post-fork that a "bad statistical model" was chosen. > > e.g. an exponentially weighted moving average is usually much less > volatile and harder to manipulate than a simple moving average, but still > can "respond" to short term drivers. > > Regards, > Gary > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a113eb9c88552a1051c1ad18e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The median is used here because that is the consensus rule -= - a block cannot have a timestamp older than the median time of the last 11= blocks. By linking the changeover to this rule we avoid perverse incentive= s about miners lying in their timestamps, or the threshold being crossed, t= hen reverted, then crossed again, etc.

Maybe a different percentile would have been a better choice= , but that ship sailed in 2009. The rule is what it is right now, and we be= nefit the most from using the same rule as consensus for the threshold.

On Jul 30, 2015 9:57 AM, "Gary Mulder via b= itcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On 30 July 2015 at 16:12,= Jorge Tim=C3=B3n=C2=A0<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>=C2=A0wrote:
1) U= nlike previous blocksize hardfork proposals, this uses median time
inste= ad of block.nTime for activation. I like that more but my
preference is = still using height for everything. But that discussion
is not specific t= o this proposal, so it's better if we discuss that
for all of them h= ere:
http://lists.lin= uxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.html

Note that a "median" is a special case o= f a 50% percentile. If you desire to apply a more stringent criteria you ca= n use the 75th or even 90th percentile.


Perhaps i= f a statistician (i.e. not me) could be found to offer her services, she co= uld become a resource for helping selecting the most appropriate statistica= l algorithms on request (and implemented Integer math as per Gavin, from me= mory), considering the consequences of learning post-fork that a "bad = statistical model" was chosen.

e.g. an exp= onentially weighted moving average is usually much less volatile and harder= to manipulate than a simple moving average, but still can "respond&qu= ot; to short term drivers.=C2=A0

Regards,
=
Gary

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--001a113eb9c88552a1051c1ad18e-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9121747F for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:46:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f170.google.com (mail-wi0-f170.google.com [209.85.212.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D059F262 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:46:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so1869276wib.0 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:46:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=U/2xZnOY0lzyPGaJqMDNWhSyVNEE/DLBcjZ1ueVGVwA=; b=dqsSiXmnosy78IJwg/ezRQhVsrIydO6G/o9uXw0u+7PpEtmvJZP3pQxXuGDmpChBfP 0GPgZc/qmKJL2d5ArVoSnktp+3Sv0fI++4XAX/w2UM07v4kzSOflWcjv5Dizv79n3ObK 6DDcZT6vgAC0WSIRMzwMsErKM2tsRELOzHRnLpZU3rIlLsbQQXUYDqY7cJKQeBblO/uA 94pH07hK/SBWa6Kj1L+Abn5Dk9qnZX+Zo4xs6KSAk2zl8eORJI6CakIiTmh43hM4U5bw KocQ/4S8nyXKBGvjTqfz+7sYgt/X4jw5tW8QZXsSWzoCDCmlFyKKov2WCrTzTIGMCz/S 07LA== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmjwuQvBR1hv/BvhFP/q5brxb/Dp9l+hZOIx/GwfPDCVp2NWPsJb7W6yK7fv+AIqaetZuT3 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.186.35 with SMTP id fh3mr8596067wic.7.1438278390437; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:46:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:46:30 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 19:46:30 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:46:32 -0000 On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 6:20 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much too > conservative When considering "too conservative" options, let's not forget that, say, scheduling 2MB for 2020 doesn't preclude us from deciding that was too conservative and schedule, say 4MB for 2018 later. The first hardfork would be "useless", but it would set a "minimum increase" that would have been useful if the second one never happened. > I'll comment on using median time generally in Jorge's thread, but why does > monotonically increasing matter for max block size? I can't think of a > reason why a max block size of X bytes in block N followed by a max size of > X-something bytes in block N+1 would cause any problems. To be clear, for this concrete case block.nTime would just work just fine. I just want us to decide on one of the options and uniformly recommend that options for all cases in BIP99 [just renamed the file, https://github.com/jtimon/bips/blob/bip-forks/bip-0099.org ]. But, yes, please, let's discuss this in the other thread. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 06B5F48A for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:51:15 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f178.google.com (mail-wi0-f178.google.com [209.85.212.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 62C64170 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:51:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so1912777wib.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:51:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=VxT/b3gAUF5QrpITI2piHkAqINylE2Ctd2JpLLu8ugE=; b=SFwNnjMZ+js6ss0z7rNXvRByzl9w1xtjvfpWbeR1BfZaX2hbni/q/gXp1M1eFo6OiX JDXPrjT+iLk2AADd5q7QvPdsFFH7knpBDFr3eUybioc73zfamgeuCjuMxwnJ9QDLqzHy ukGSfdxt8nZmufvUw6WhRfz8RbAyVRjVK3QYVaC8nImdW4sQG8mS35k7hOl69dDtCosP NMTQF/Ljz/sRBSsWviuSrkXOMYtJDkRAkTj5QwYisFfM6aFXqwcyNWbl6cVyqtqrcs9u QOIgc4JfRXhxpP77os5LqMYe7MPXojx9SIQfpAN8DfCIS1vM/FpMotCXGyFQ3hWGSBgo lsvg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQm0H8p85JVf9yL/Av6cIVVv7OWD8KuvLwn+h3un8cLeQmj15pjODdFqOnmXpjrtOsX24yrX MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.238.39 with SMTP id vh7mr17805821wjc.109.1438278673056; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:51:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:51:12 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <55BA5283.2000405@mail.bihthai.net> References: <55BA5283.2000405@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 19:51:12 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 17:51:15 -0000 On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 6:36 PM, Venzen Khaosan wrote: > I just had a look your existing Size N testnet code > https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6382 > and i'll set up a node over the weekend and post its address in that > PR's conversation. Do you or anyone else already have a node running? > what blocksize? Great! No, I'm not running any node right now at any size. Take into account that it's not a regular testnet (ie like testnet3), it's a regtest-like testnet to make mining and simulations cheap. That also means that anybody can trivially create reorgs, so it is expected to be used in a controlled environment (you can control which node creates a new block and when). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D5C13499 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:00:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA93B172 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:00:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibud3 with SMTP id ud3so30580522wib.1 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 11:00:21 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=QtCptDDgIDLmESS5B9U46FzmCBiGteIjvlzbRRTCLf4=; b=abivQkbt1vtb9kMKCgCbhEA3wdwBW9JF2bvkuC9lfHTYwKx9yKORRd5/GaWzz+4YQj riOtWGMlVNtZocQimWUTctrEO8VtthoZ/ENKYJ+YUrw2VsaAUD8WP3r6UMNqwbT2bnuF cCevrj9shfa+jD5MJLhyTPHi0/boE/XtMxqe0jS7ZDMhL+MWCKkCpfgyTx8/4mVnqIsy RAjqlihGN3UlsyYnM6BZTBDcsB169KyRa/mzRIhK50s4uysogXWKo0208a97LNodAlEZ VX90rK2TQ879ft5jD/emaXqSMaAo8xD0apS0d+T5ud1XCYvbnI+evMHYVWtLgKDKD4rt vPzw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnB1M+FEcBQ0qq2S1SIunuqejYBd7p+G3WtS6IvcFyuB54nQGiledUJs38Kcx/ZAjcoEhqj MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.120.198 with SMTP id le6mr90048653wjb.133.1438279221664; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 11:00:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 11:00:21 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55BA5283.2000405@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 20:00:21 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 18:00:24 -0000 Gavin, Pieter, Mark, Gary, can we move the median time discussion to its own thread? http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009731.htm= l I really don't want to fill this thread with that discussion. On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 6:36 PM, Venzen Khaosan = wrote: >> I just had a look your existing Size N testnet code >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6382 >> and i'll set up a node over the weekend and post its address in that >> PR's conversation. Do you or anyone else already have a node running? >> what blocksize? > > Great! No, I'm not running any node right now at any size. > Take into account that it's not a regular testnet (ie like testnet3), > it's a regtest-like testnet to make mining and simulations cheap. > That also means that anybody can trivially create reorgs, so it is > expected to be used in a controlled environment (you can control which > node creates a new block and when). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AAA04491 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 20:20:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from pmx.vmail.no (pmx.vmail.no [193.75.16.11]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F30D7ED for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 20:20:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pmx.vmail.no (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (pmx.isp.as2116.net) with SMTP id 2A4BA5FA9E; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 22:20:45 +0200 (CEST) Received: from smtp.bluecom.no (smtp.bluecom.no [193.75.75.28]) by pmx.vmail.no (pmx.isp.as2116.net) with ESMTP id ED2E05F13D; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 22:20:44 +0200 (CEST) Received: from coldstorage.localnet (unknown [81.191.185.32]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.bluecom.no (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D52D31F54B; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 22:20:44 +0200 (CEST) From: Thomas Zander To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Pieter Wuille Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 22:20:43 +0200 Message-ID: <25710699.lX8S1tS4UG@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 20:20:47 -0000 On Thursday 30. July 2015 16.25.02 Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hello all, > > here is a proposal for long-term scalability I've been working on: > https://gist.github.com/sipa/c65665fc360ca7a176a6 > > Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead > of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop > checking after the hard fork. > > Comments? Maybe this part could use a bit more rationale, it looks like its a sudden and unexplained. > No hard forking change that relaxes the block size limit can be guaranteed > to provide enough space for every possible demand - or even any particular > demand - unless strong centralization of the mining ecosystem is expected. -- Thomas Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F5C5405 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 10:16:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F092FEE for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 10:16:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioii16 with SMTP id i16so80744972ioi.0 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 03:16:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=vinumeris.com; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=3vxxKpGRqLr/ki9mCTgQGyeCbUoWt2z0v5kby2ZBLAE=; b=pm+X5IogYfIvLtj1yuDlqqUFaxTuD2t0Mk2BScGp0pPtOyDjWUfPcqlc2gBP6b3+2o uNu+PJrUjFCJOcLpMSINhQESlsGmZhomYDm75MJrYCKGPLeg3Ddpp7YupX3+vRK/zwQC 2LASyllTBSghOs3LJ9Iq7q4/kEG5kFhKV1RwM= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=3vxxKpGRqLr/ki9mCTgQGyeCbUoWt2z0v5kby2ZBLAE=; b=GLq5EeMiE8DOvA+PeoR2ts05AcrOg1f+p59QZC1MF8Ke02xzUCkNWDvMkyY451PshQ uHRbDxitbRUmzDtkPGknJFrIC2JOghaaZlz7V3KjewPBCdSdCBzcZt59F2+1ICydFrDZ Iu6zvuJhxpujqa5dFQNAWB79Zn5lkwhTbY/PjuIBtAEwL+O+UEje3z7dw81dkGjz06H6 TR4WQyo7URXuuB+STsfXGFftKbrwWU9FcvtMF9f911bk8jAvYdbslteWJn2Au241fSCK RijpFZnW00wszAgf1ZqSy5NYcbnFL533KwR32HGwml2pRwGOMWG3qNEWUeE5p6BioABS xWFw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkcFwBbpGAiJ+tR5AwP+MCzJKGFYTarH4shdKJ7Fn0KHwVtZ3mEjL6k1JmlsG4ZB2p51QCf MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.135.193 with SMTP id r62mr3198481ioi.29.1438337806445; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 03:16:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.50.108.111 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 03:16:46 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 12:16:46 +0200 Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113eceb2054cb8051c291e9f X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_40,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 10:16:48 -0000 --001a113eceb2054cb8051c291e9f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I agree with Gavin - whilst it's great that a Blockstream employee has finally made a realistic proposal (i.e. not "let's all use Lightning") - this BIP is virtually the same as keeping the 1mb cap. > Well, centralization of mining is already terrible. I see no reason why we > should encourage making it worse. > Centralization of mining has been a continual gripe since Slush first invented pooled mining. There has never been a time after that when people weren't talking about the centralisation of mining, and back then blocks were ~10kb. I see constant assertions that node count, mining centralisation, developers not using Bitcoin Core in their own businesses etc is all to do with block sizes. But nobody has shown that. Nobody has even laid the groundwork for that. Verifying blocks takes milliseconds and downloading them takes seconds everywhere except, apparently, China: this resource usage is trivial. Yet developers, miners and users even outside of China routinely delegate validation to others. Often for quite understandable technical reasons that have nothing to do with block sizes. So I see no reason why arbitrarily capping the block size will move the needle on these metrics. Trying to arrest the growth of Bitcoin for everyone won't suddenly make Bitcoin-Qt a competitive wallet, or make service devs migrate away from chain.com, or make merchants stop using BitPay. We need to accept that, and all previous proposals I've seen don't seem to > do that. > I think that's a bit unfair: BIP 101 keeps a cap. Even with 8mb+growth you're right, some use cases will be priced out. I initiated the micropayment channels project (along with Matt, tip of the hat) specifically to optimise a certain class of transactions. Even with 8mb+ blocks, there will still be a need for micropayment channels, centralised exchange platforms and other forms of off chain transaction. If Bitcoin needs to support a large scale, it already failed. > It hasn't even been tried. The desperately sad thing about all of this is that there's going to be a fork, and yet I think most of us agree on most things. But we don't agree on this. Bitcoin can support a large scale and it must, for all sorts of reasons. Amongst others: 1. Currencies have network effects. A currency that has few users is simply not competitive with currencies that have many. There's no such thing as a settlement currency for high value transactions only, as evidenced by the ever-dropping importance of gold. 2. A decentralised currency that the vast majority can't use doesn't change the amount of centralisation in the world. Most people will still end up using banks, with all the normal problems. You cannot solve a problem by creating a theoretically pure solution that's out of reach of ordinary people: just ask academic cryptographers! 3. Growth is a part of the social contract. It always has been. The best quote Gregory can find to suggest Satoshi wanted small blocks is a one sentence hypothetical example about what *might* happen if Bitcoin users became "tyrannical" as a result of non-financial transactions being stuffed in the block chain. That position makes sense because his scaling arguments assuming payment-network-sized traffic and throwing DNS systems or whatever into the mix could invalidate those arguments, in the absence of merged mining. But Satoshi did invent merged mining, and so there's no need for Bitcoin users to get "tyrannical": his original arguments still hold. 4. All the plans for some kind of ultra-throttled Bitcoin network used for infrequent transactions neglect to ask where the infrastructure for that will come from. The network of exchanges, payment processors and startups that are paying people to build infrastructure are all based on the assumption that the market will grow significantly. It's a gamble at best because Bitcoin's success is not guaranteed, but if the block chain cannot grow it's a gamble that is guaranteed to be lost. So why should anyone go through the massive hassle of setting up exchanges, without the lure of large future profits? 5. Bitcoin needs users, lots of them, for its political survival. There are many people out there who would like to see digital cash disappear, or be regulated out of existence. They will argue for that in front of governments and courts .... some already are. And if they're going to lose those arguments, the political and economic damage of getting rid of Bitcoin must be large enough to make people think twice. That means it needs supporters, it needs innovative services, it needs companies, and it needs legal users making legal payments: as many of them as possible. If Bitcoin is a tiny, obscure currency used by drug dealers and a handful of crypto-at-any-cost geeks, the cost of simply banning it outright will seem trivial and the hammer will drop. There won't be a large scale payment network OR a high-value settlement network. And then the world is really screwed, because nobody will get a second chance for a very long time. --001a113eceb2054cb8051c291e9f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I agree with Gavin - whilst it's great that a Blockstream employee has= finally made a realistic proposal (i.e. not "let's all use Lightn= ing") - this BIP is virtually the same as keeping the 1mb cap.

Well, centralization of mining = is already terrible. I see no reason why we should encourage making it wors= e.

Centralization of mining has been a continual gripe= since Slush first invented pooled mining. There has never been a time afte= r that when people weren't talking about the centralisation of mining, = and back then blocks were ~10kb.=C2=A0

I see const= ant assertions that node count, mining centralisation, developers not using= Bitcoin Core in their own businesses etc is all to do with block sizes. Bu= t nobody has shown that. Nobody has even laid the groundwork for that. Veri= fying blocks takes milliseconds and downloading them takes seconds everywhe= re except, apparently, China: this resource usage is trivial.=C2=A0

Yet developers, miners and users even outside of China ro= utinely delegate validation to others. Often for quite understandable techn= ical reasons that have nothing to do with block sizes.

=
So I see no reason why arbitrarily capping the block size will move th= e needle on these metrics. Trying to arrest the growth of Bitcoin for every= one won't suddenly make Bitcoin-Qt a competitive wallet, or make servic= e devs migrate away from chain.com, or mak= e merchants stop using BitPay.

We need to accept that, and all previous proposals I&= #39;ve seen don't seem to do that.

I think that= 9;s a bit unfair: BIP 101 keeps a cap. Even with 8mb+growth you're righ= t, some use cases will be priced out. I initiated the micropayment channels= project (along with Matt, tip of the hat) specifically to optimise a certa= in class of transactions. Even with 8mb+ blocks, there will still be a need= for micropayment channels, centralised exchange platforms and other forms = of off chain transaction.

If Bitcoin needs to support a large scale, it already fail= ed.

It hasn't even been tried.=C2=A0

The desperately sad thing about all of this is that th= ere's going to be a fork, and yet I think most of us agree on most thin= gs.=C2=A0 But we don't agree on this.=C2=A0

Bi= tcoin can support a large scale and it must, for all sorts of reasons. Amon= gst others:
  1. Currencies have network effects. A currency t= hat has few users is simply not competitive with currencies that have many.= There's no such thing as a settlement currency for high value transact= ions only, as evidenced by the ever-dropping importance of gold.

  2. A decentralised currency that the vast majority can't use doe= sn't change the amount of centralisation in the world. Most people will= still end up using banks, with all the normal problems. You cannot solve a= problem by creating a theoretically pure solution that's out of reach = of ordinary people: just ask academic cryptographers!


  3. G= rowth is a part of the social contract. It always has been.=C2=A0

    Th= e best quote Gregory can find to suggest Satoshi wanted small blocks is a o= ne sentence hypothetical example about what might happen if Bitcoin = users became "tyrannical" as a result of non-financial transactio= ns being stuffed in the block chain. That position makes sense because his = scaling arguments assuming payment-network-sized traffic and throwing DNS s= ystems or whatever into the mix could invalidate those arguments, in the ab= sence of merged mining. But Satoshi did invent merged mining, and so there&= #39;s no need for Bitcoin users to get "tyrannical": his original= arguments still hold.


  4. All the plans for some kind of u= ltra-throttled Bitcoin network used for infrequent transactions neglect to = ask where the infrastructure for that will come from. The network of exchan= ges, payment processors and startups that are paying people to build infras= tructure are all=C2=A0based on the assumption that the market will grow sig= nificantly. It's a gamble at best because Bitcoin's success is not = guaranteed, but if the block chain cannot grow it's a gamble that is gu= aranteed to be lost.

    So why should anyone go through the massive has= sle of setting up exchanges, without the lure of large future profits?
    <= br>
  5. Bitcoin needs users, lots of them, for its political surviv= al. There are many people out there who would like to see digital cash disa= ppear, or be regulated out of existence. They will argue for that in front = of governments and courts .... some already are. And if they're going t= o lose those arguments, the political and economic damage of getting rid of= Bitcoin must be large enough to make people think twice. That means it nee= ds supporters, it needs innovative services, it needs companies, and it nee= ds legal users making legal payments: as many of them as possible.

    I= f Bitcoin is a tiny, obscure currency used by drug dealers and a handful of= crypto-at-any-cost geeks, the cost of simply banning it outright will seem= trivial and the hammer will drop. There won't be a large scale payment= network OR a high-value settlement network. And then the world is really s= crewed, because nobody will get a second chance for a very long time.
  6. <= /ol>


--001a113eceb2054cb8051c291e9f-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E68DC268 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:44:08 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C5427C for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:44:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 78C2D20CA7 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:45:42 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55BB5F7E.2020604@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 18:43:58 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_05,NO_DNS_FOR_FROM, RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:44:09 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Mike Hearn, I might be a nobody to you, but you know i talk with skill, so let me tell this Friday... On 07/31/2015 05:16 PM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I agree with Gavin You would, of course. > Bitcoin can support a large scale and it must, for all sorts of > reasons. Amongst others: > > 1. Currencies have network effects. A currency that has few users > is simply not competitive with currencies that have many. There's > no such thing as a settlement currency for high value transactions > only, as evidenced by the ever-dropping importance of gold. References are imperative if you want to appeal to intelligence in this list. Studies. Impirical evidence. The above sounds like a a mainstream precis of how money works - an over-simplistic precis. It's more complex than that. Besides, all we know for a fact is that currencies come and go. That's not me being down on Bitcoin - that is the historical record. > > 2. A decentralised currency that the vast majority can't use > doesn't change the amount of centralisation in the world. Most > people will still end up using banks, with all the normal > problems. You cannot solve a problem by creating a theoretically > pure solution that's out of reach of ordinary people: just ask > academic cryptographers! Conjecture. And assumption. Banks might not accept most people forever. Or banks' credibility might not survive the next credit contraction, for example. > > 3. Growth is a part of the social contract. It always has been. > Half the story. Casual observation shows that growth and contraction alternate at every level of existence. Just because the present fiat-era credit expansion has lasted 40 years does not mean that the economy will keep expanding forever. > The best quote Gregory can find to suggest Satoshi wanted small > blocks is a one sentence hypothetical example about what /might/ [snip] yes, anyway, Greg Maxwell was justified in bringing you down a few notches from your "I am Satoshi's rep on earth" history revision, you were spinning there. > 4. All the plans for some kind of ultra-throttled Bitcoin network > used [snip] > The network of exchanges, payment processors and startups that are > paying people to build infrastructure are all based on _the > assumption_ that the market will grow significantly. The assumption (my emphasis). You've seen that movie Pulp Fiction: "Assume makes an "ass" of "U" and "me". Business + assumption = gambling and potential loss of funds. The ass-U-me cannot be laid at the doorstep of those developers who prioritize security, decentralization and conservative, tested progress of scaling. > So why should anyone go through the massive hassle of setting up > exchanges, without the lure of large future profits? > Their SWOT analysis includes risks from the banking sector, too. Plus competition from other exchanges. A sapling 0.x Bitcoin community is not responsible for nannying anyone's lucrative business model at the expense of security. How would that make the developers look in relation to their duty of custody of the protocol? To this and future generations: Not Good. > > 5. Bitcoin needs users, lots of them, for its political survival. > There are many people out there who would like to see digital cash > disappear, or be regulated out of existence. Nonsense, and again that assumption about "how things work" you like to high horse so. Bitcoin's political survival is guaranteed by its censorship resistance and its array of innovative and unique utility functions. What's more, the caliber of developer working on Bitcoin is not just pulled out of a hat and harnessed for an arbitrary altcoin. Sometimes the fire of moral incentive overrides monetary reward. The Fed, Nasdaq, IBM, and every other company whose trusted authority is being threatened by this flagship are developing blockchains in a hurry. How is that "many people out there who would like to see digital cash disappear"? Why would you even type such a blatant falsehood? > If Bitcoin is a tiny, obscure currency used by drug dealers and a > handful of crypto-at-any-cost geeks, the cost of simply banning it > outright will seem trivial and the hammer will drop. There won't be > a large scale payment network OR a high-value settlement network. > And then the world is really screwed, because nobody will get a > second chance for a very long time. > That is a low estimation of Bitcoin. Your framing does not honor Bitcoin or the hard work - your _own_ hard work - on this project. If you noticed, there has been an increase in technical discussion in this list in recent days - with the goal of comparing and testing the various blocksize proposals. Mike Hearn, I am sorry to say that your pronouncements sound like jazz - - but jazz without rhythm. "So what?" - Miles Davis -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVu199AAoJEGwAhlQc8H1mkCMH/iWnFDXAGc5GEjLi81dRLUnz 3UfciwOiby8r+7pvyDsuMYR/9RQZv2RlFoMFjUBkJxwvdUh3eXY5tsQ6F209O+gk QleFaTKCZLVuZg5UBbwBttGfK3MmejueGWNhExYnlbm6yXpBa2jt0i5n0tr++zVw RN+zAejOy2OEBjs7jkodgVdy7kfCXsfsn/DKGdSO7nE9m5q0ocuUFBLEf/PJErBw NncLSDhd2SfVz3Q7L9UrGqKIgQTJT1nR9kJmSPCasIRoLWJzfNemH6RL3XcmiACn xIQBN19FPnKLv1OY3GlFLlmIlq0mu6MeidJsPl80yyI2h4SciCp39T1Ah/tCnf4= =2uWe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 843ED3C8 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:51:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f172.google.com (mail-wi0-f172.google.com [209.85.212.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ADD0A7C for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:51:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicmv11 with SMTP id mv11so55124846wic.0 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 04:51:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=OsTiQgbevT7zDmtYHdQJW/MgF9t62xO/gkx2t+tVZ68=; b=SJ6IcUYkxEQqXLhVmaomCphVDLGW3TDAdVtZqDyeN9fhcZm7XgV1wIlHAOnzGsWy5X +jIFMaG46uwX5V3WflBh5js7JDQO0XYlnCw2pbaCoLsXSR452iOxabGfXvLAW2sU69aJ XkDLao+ymbeUflTkE63yndVIg70oFWjPL054ZKmbu+oogc6fvbToEEAbb9XEyrlHSseU ar8WtAAlmWAezc1wPiZio3puUQcZ6YFBjxdtGxX4tIUZ/0hIGe+61r5Lc6++B4MaP/q8 gpUeR9wjZKBCYPpxpoWsShAOD08OUNYR4VS86L3PhD+LULgDDi/zPJh3KNFjcHjOHWnP rO2Q== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQk5Nn3WLWBCvt74uHGxyiIqQ40AgNYNcNZH8wyz9wQkkms0khM35UBMOTrATPwLE8OiRO+y MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.109.106 with SMTP id hr10mr6375725wib.58.1438343464314; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 04:51:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 04:51:04 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:51:04 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 11:51:06 -0000 On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> Well, centralization of mining is already terrible. I see no reason why we >> should encourage making it worse. > > I see constant assertions that node count, mining centralisation, developers > not using Bitcoin Core in their own businesses etc is all to do with block > sizes. But nobody has shown that. Nobody has even laid the groundwork for > that. Verifying blocks takes milliseconds and downloading them takes seconds > everywhere except, apparently, China: this resource usage is trivial. He is not saying that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it is obvious that increasing the size won't help. In the best case, it will only make it slightly worse. How big of a "slightly worse" are we willing to risk to increase the size is the open question. > So I see no reason why arbitrarily capping the block size will move the > needle on these metrics. Trying to arrest the growth of Bitcoin for everyone > won't suddenly make Bitcoin-Qt a competitive wallet, or make service devs > migrate away from chain.com, or make merchants stop using BitPay. As far as I know, people just want to change an arbitrary number for another arbitrary number. But this arbitrary cap is a cap to centralization, not a tool to make Bitcoin-Qt more important or to attack concrete Bitcoin companies like you seem to think. If you don't think the blocksize cap helps limiting centralization and you think it would be fine to completely remove it, then it would be better for the conversation that you said that directly instead of supporting other arbitrary caps like 8GB (bip101). I think it would be nice to have some sort of simulation to calculate a "centralization heuristic" for different possible blocksize values so we can compare these arbitrary numbers somehow. Even if the first definition of this "centralization heuristic" is stupid, it would be better than keep rolling dices and heatedly defend one result over another. To reiterate, If you don't think the blocksize cap helps limiting centralization, please, say so. If we can't agree on what the limit is for, we will never be able to agree on whether 1MB (current situation) or 8GB (bip101) is the most appropriate value to have at a given point in time. >> We need to accept that, and all previous proposals I've seen don't seem to >> do that. > > I think that's a bit unfair: BIP 101 keeps a cap. Even with 8mb+growth > you're right, some use cases will be priced out. I initiated the > micropayment channels project (along with Matt, tip of the hat) specifically > to optimise a certain class of transactions. Even with 8mb+ blocks, there > will still be a need for micropayment channels, centralised exchange > platforms and other forms of off chain transaction. Lightning is nothing more than a better design for trustless payment channels, but it's really good that you agree that if we want to scale not everything can be broadcast in-chain. >> If Bitcoin needs to support a large scale, it already failed. > > It hasn't even been tried. What he means is that if Bitcoin needs to support a scale that is only feasible with high degrees of centralization (say, supporting 1 M tx/s right now), then it has already failed in its decentralization goals. In fact, with only a few miners, I'm not sure regulators will still agree Bitcoin transactions are irreversible... But you are right, we haven't tried to destroy bitcoin by removing the only available consensus tool to limit centralization yet. I don't want to try, do you? > A decentralised currency that the vast majority can't use doesn't change the > amount of centralisation in the world. Most people will still end up using > banks, with all the normal problems. You cannot solve a problem by creating > a theoretically pure solution that's out of reach of ordinary people: just > ask academic cryptographers! Let's go to "most people use bitcoin" first and then think about "many people ONLY use Bitcoin" later, please. I believe everybody here thinks that the more people are able to use Bitcoin, the better. But that doesn't > All the plans for some kind of ultra-throttled Bitcoin network used for > infrequent transactions neglect to ask where the infrastructure for that > will come from. The network of exchanges, payment processors and startups > that are paying people to build infrastructure are all based on the > assumption that the market will grow significantly. It's a gamble at best > because Bitcoin's success is not guaranteed, but if the block chain cannot > grow it's a gamble that is guaranteed to be lost. Risking destroying Bitcoin through centralization to be able to keep free transactions for longer it's a very risky gamble. Doing so explicitly against the will of some of the users by promoting schism hardfork, and thus risking to economically destroy both Bitcoin and Bitcoin_new_size (different currencies) in the process is also a very risky gamble. So may want to give some example of responsibility yourself to make these calls to responsibility more credible. You certainly cannot know what "all the payment processors and startups plans" are based on, and spreading conspiracy theories about the evil secret plans of Blockstream (or any other Bitcoin company) doesn't help in keeping this discussion civilized, contaminates bitcoin development in general and unhealthily polarizes the whole Bitcoin ecosystem. Also, I believe is doing a disservice to your reputation among technical people, but since you don't seem worried about that, why should I be? > So why should anyone go through the massive hassle of setting up exchanges, > without the lure of large future profits? Are you suggesting that bitcoin consensus rules should be designed to maximize the profits of Bitcoin exchanges? I assume not, but I'm really having troubles trying to read the question with another meaning. Can you rephrase this, please? From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 11759407 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 12:15:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f177.google.com (mail-ig0-f177.google.com [209.85.213.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B69AFA for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 12:15:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbij6 with SMTP id ij6so15052674igb.1 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 05:15:05 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=vinumeris.com; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=iywlwQzDlW5LRDxS/df1DgowTnvP386SP1N2uFzs8GE=; b=b6BZOCvpLwHEdJgvS890xcRIy4I65XzqI5KaI2bdQbYnniBuxX7ABoBKOkctBZ37sw WaLeAbMBrYNfLQPRNUTpPiqKKrrvKQdWBGWWncID27SN3MV1lh3d6z/Xg+kLAK9pCpGd EOm9jlt5rEwfo95jQTyVe5HbKT1+LSGttH78s= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=iywlwQzDlW5LRDxS/df1DgowTnvP386SP1N2uFzs8GE=; b=ZLH55c2fbsyG2QOHfakZXdNSVq6ATflbPJE1Mryeyeb1oKLOzPA4He25aoT8tMtY6D UB7g0VtmmJBTuaqN7IiuygQMck/vX0Gc4YO4HC43mBmtcYMFmoI+KgrFQymeXYONPsVL zVo9zJ8EAyR4Atbhn2sPFWPVolwYb9Wgw6W7Zj1i+ByOUxTO5H0kb1CM5xZ5Ovf7avbM edAE0aTeuR0ODI1jRZBLh5sZ6MyphwhSKEI1zTc28cEZQ17tEQnh5aD6WbE+ZtMd+OQ3 ljP1O2mE/8T8zRCFIvHnoVtsXYAlWzoMXan+hf2d58KlXlK7bcPzbUzxv3WyEN9svkTl hLPQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkh55TijjvKfBUwXkDtPPtnXqbInG4arqYuwHihWiIKoIVJGLTxn04JkKMomOO9xs+AzzbV MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.45.41 with SMTP id j9mr5415013igm.34.1438344904865; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 05:15:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.50.108.111 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 05:15:04 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:15:04 +0200 Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0111ba961e973d051c2ac582 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 12:15:06 -0000 --089e0111ba961e973d051c2ac582 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hey Jorge, He is not saying that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it > is obvious that increasing the size won't help. > It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks == more users == more nodes and more miners. To repeat: it's not obvious to me at all that everything wrong with Bitcoin can be solved by shrinking blocks. I don't think that's going to suddenly make everything magically more decentralised. The 8mb cap isn't quite arbitrary. It was picked through negotiation with different stakeholders, in particular, Chinese miners. But it should be high enough to ensure organic growth is not constrained, which is good enough. I think it would be nice to have some sort of simulation to calculate > a "centralization heuristic" for different possible blocksize values > so we can compare these arbitrary numbers somehow. Centralization is not a single floating point value that is controlled by block size. It's a multi-faceted and complex problem. You cannot "destroy Bitcoin through centralization" by adjusting a single constant in the source code. To say once more: block size won't make much difference to how many merchants rely on payment processors because they aren't using them due to block processing overheads anyway. So trying to calculate such a formula won't work. Ditto for end users on phones, ditto for developers who want JSON/REST access to an indexed block chain, or hosted wallet services, or miners who want to reduce variance. None of these factors have anything to do with traffic levels. What people like you are Pieter are doing is making a single number a kind of proxy for all fears and concerns about the trend towards outsourcing in the Bitcoin community. Everything gets compressed down to one number you feel you can control, whether it is relevant or not. > So why should anyone go through the massive hassle of setting up > exchanges, > > without the lure of large future profits? > > Are you suggesting that bitcoin consensus rules should be designed > to maximize the profits of Bitcoin exchanges? > That isn't what I said at all Jorge. Let me try again. Setting up an exchange is a lot of risky and expensive work. The motivation is profit, and profits are higher when there are more users to sell to. This is business 101. If you remove the potential for future profit, you remove the motivation to create the services that we now enjoy and take for granted. Because if you think Bitcoin can be useful without exchanges then let me tell you, I was around when there were none. Bitcoin was useless. --089e0111ba961e973d051c2ac582 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hey Jorge,

He is not saying that. Whateve= r the reasons for centralization are, it
is obvious that increasing the size won't help.
It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks =3D=3D more= users =3D=3D more nodes and more miners.

To repea= t: it's not obvious to me at all that everything wrong with Bitcoin can= be solved by shrinking blocks. I don't think that's going to sudde= nly make everything magically more decentralised.

= The 8mb cap isn't quite arbitrary. It was picked through negotiation wi= th different stakeholders, in particular, Chinese miners. But it should be = high enough to ensure organic growth is not constrained, which is good enou= gh.

I think it would be = nice to have some sort of simulation to calculate
a "centralization heuristic" for different possible blocksize val= ues
so we can compare these arbitrary numbers somehow.

Centralization is not a single floating point value that is contro= lled by block size. It's a multi-faceted and complex problem. You canno= t "destroy Bitcoin through centralization" by adjusting a single = constant in the source code.

To say once more: blo= ck size won't make much difference to how many merchants rely on paymen= t processors because they aren't using them due to block processing ove= rheads anyway. So trying to calculate such a formula won't work. Ditto = for end users on phones, ditto for developers who want JSON/REST access to = an indexed block chain, or hosted wallet services, or miners who want to re= duce variance.

None of these factors have anything= to do with traffic levels.

What people like you a= re Pieter are doing is making a single number a kind of proxy for all fears= and concerns about the trend towards outsourcing in the Bitcoin community.= Everything gets compressed down to one number you feel you can control, wh= ether it is relevant or not.

> So why should anyone go through the massive hass= le of setting up exchanges,
> without the lure of large future profits?

Are you suggesting that bitcoin consensus rules should be designed t= o=C2=A0maximize the profits of Bitcoin exchanges?

=
That isn't what I said at all Jorge. Let me try again.
=

Setting up an exchange is a lot of risky and expensive = work. The motivation is profit, and profits are higher when there are more = users to sell to. This is business 101.

If you rem= ove the potential for future profit, you remove the motivation to create th= e services that we now enjoy and take for granted. Because if you think Bit= coin can be useful without exchanges then let me tell you, I was around whe= n there were none. Bitcoin was useless.
--089e0111ba961e973d051c2ac582-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 16643268 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:07:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yk0-f179.google.com (mail-yk0-f179.google.com [209.85.160.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 263AD1AC for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:07:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykdu72 with SMTP id u72so58448717ykd.2 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 06:07:43 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=5bhLQIrzQclFFpf11jo8VhY9ZU5liO4MM7n66lZMFvk=; b=R0DouLHv6z4/VEmdYUI7mUdOjVtrNJVg7EtLfswIOsj9d6K1gllWn97s7PpGOMzkVd TcyqjY7vSRjIMdGfxN65/k5VHDO24VaTZv5Y6iZzb/iJxLWNpU93onfc9D2wAMCfMGbA UiifOd6xQqDgn20/6Gg6N/HA3RlFs5kSc8noDSz6Qv8jOv1UW7+947pf5I7pFd2f2V8Q hb7XMMRxi8G5ut7cHgUqYNZiLlYlTpdsoIOZEo4WGksCwxhyroUDTjVI1hoIoUgujd4r FA8RrbZ6kF7E+dPBibB3EFjFw0pF7N5Rt3+lEW+1vzdOM62gePXYm6hEih8xP09xfx4/ gwTA== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmzFNU5i916Bz408GIOzMlC5egHLZIPBTgbkt+CedRR96WHfi3TgqqYpNI1UaAAxzKSp+TG MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.129.117.196 with SMTP id q187mr3050592ywc.15.1438348063047; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 06:07:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.13.224.69 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 06:07:42 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:07:42 +0200 Message-ID: From: Marcel Jamin To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1147f7285cb153051c2b81f9 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:07:45 -0000 --001a1147f7285cb153051c2b81f9 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > Quite possibly bigger blocks == more users == more nodes and more miners. I agree and would say that this is the only prediction of bitcoin's future we can be absolutely sure of: more users equals more decentralization as long as the cost of running a node is not prohibitively high. It's incredibly cheap today and won't be too high with any of the current proposals for the time being. If the "laws" of Nielsen & co suddenly don't apply anymore, we can always react to that with another hardfork reducing the rate of growth. Hardforks are way easier if the network is in danger and the necessary change is obvious and non-controversial (e.g. "reduce blocksize limit growth"). As long as hobbyists can participate in running the network and it's affordable for everyone to transact on it, bitcoin will grow and its decentralization with it, however you measure it. 2015-07-31 14:15 GMT+02:00 Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>: > Hey Jorge, > > He is not saying that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it >> is obvious that increasing the size won't help. >> > > It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks == more users == more nodes > and more miners. > > To repeat: it's not obvious to me at all that everything wrong with > Bitcoin can be solved by shrinking blocks. I don't think that's going to > suddenly make everything magically more decentralised. > > The 8mb cap isn't quite arbitrary. It was picked through negotiation with > different stakeholders, in particular, Chinese miners. But it should be > high enough to ensure organic growth is not constrained, which is good > enough. > > I think it would be nice to have some sort of simulation to calculate >> a "centralization heuristic" for different possible blocksize values >> so we can compare these arbitrary numbers somehow. > > > Centralization is not a single floating point value that is controlled by > block size. It's a multi-faceted and complex problem. You cannot "destroy > Bitcoin through centralization" by adjusting a single constant in the > source code. > > To say once more: block size won't make much difference to how many > merchants rely on payment processors because they aren't using them due to > block processing overheads anyway. So trying to calculate such a formula > won't work. Ditto for end users on phones, ditto for developers who want > JSON/REST access to an indexed block chain, or hosted wallet services, or > miners who want to reduce variance. > > None of these factors have anything to do with traffic levels. > > What people like you are Pieter are doing is making a single number a kind > of proxy for all fears and concerns about the trend towards outsourcing in > the Bitcoin community. Everything gets compressed down to one number you > feel you can control, whether it is relevant or not. > > > So why should anyone go through the massive hassle of setting up >> exchanges, >> > without the lure of large future profits? >> >> Are you suggesting that bitcoin consensus rules should be designed >> to maximize the profits of Bitcoin exchanges? >> > > That isn't what I said at all Jorge. Let me try again. > > Setting up an exchange is a lot of risky and expensive work. The > motivation is profit, and profits are higher when there are more users to > sell to. This is business 101. > > If you remove the potential for future profit, you remove the motivation > to create the services that we now enjoy and take for granted. Because if > you think Bitcoin can be useful without exchanges then let me tell you, I > was around when there were none. Bitcoin was useless. > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a1147f7285cb153051c2b81f9 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>=C2=A0Qui= te possibly bigger blocks =3D=3D more users =3D=3D more nodes and more mine= rs.

I agree and would say t= hat this is the only prediction of bitcoin's future we can be absolutel= y sure of: more users equals more decentralization as long as the cost of r= unning a node is not prohibitively high.

It's incredibly cheap today and won't be too hi= gh with any of the current proposals for the time being. If the "laws&= quot; of Nielsen & co suddenly don't apply anymore, we can always r= eact to that with another hardfork reducing the rate of growth. Hardforks a= re way easier if the network is in danger and the necessary change is obvio= us and non-controversial (e.g. "reduce blocksize limit growth").<= /span>

As long as hobbyists can participate in run= ning the network and it's affordable for everyone to transact on it, bi= tcoin will grow and its decentralization with it, however you measure it.

2015-07= -31 14:15 GMT+02:00 Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev <bitcoi= n-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
Hey Jorge,

He is = not saying that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it
is obvious that increasing the size won't help.
It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks =3D= =3D more users =3D=3D more nodes and more miners.

= To repeat: it's not obvious to me at all that everything wrong with Bit= coin can be solved by shrinking blocks. I don't think that's going = to suddenly make everything magically more decentralised.

The 8mb cap isn't quite arbitrary. It was picked through negoti= ation with different stakeholders, in particular, Chinese miners. But it sh= ould be high enough to ensure organic growth is not constrained, which is g= ood enough.

I think it would be nice to have some sort of simulation to calculate<= br> a "centralization heuristic" for different possible blocksize val= ues
so we can compare these arbitrary numbers somehow.

Centralization is not a single floating point value that is= controlled by block size. It's a multi-faceted and complex problem. Yo= u cannot "destroy Bitcoin through centralization" by adjusting a = single constant in the source code.

To say once mo= re: block size won't make much difference to how many merchants rely on= payment processors because they aren't using them due to block process= ing overheads anyway. So trying to calculate such a formula won't work.= Ditto for end users on phones, ditto for developers who want JSON/REST acc= ess to an indexed block chain, or hosted wallet services, or miners who wan= t to reduce variance.

None of these factors have a= nything to do with traffic levels.

What people lik= e you are Pieter are doing is making a single number a kind of proxy for al= l fears and concerns about the trend towards outsourcing in the Bitcoin com= munity. Everything gets compressed down to one number you feel you can cont= rol, whether it is relevant or not.

> So why should anyone go through the= massive hassle of setting up exchanges,
> without the lure of large future profits?

Are you suggesting that bitcoin consensus rules should be designed t= o=C2=A0maximize the profits of Bitcoin exchanges?

=
That isn't what I said at all Jorge. Let me try again= .

Setting up an exchange is a lot of risky and exp= ensive work. The motivation is profit, and profits are higher when there ar= e more users to sell to. This is business 101.

If = you remove the potential for future profit, you remove the motivation to cr= eate the services that we now enjoy and take for granted. Because if you th= ink Bitcoin can be useful without exchanges then let me tell you, I was aro= und when there were none. Bitcoin was useless.

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--001a1147f7285cb153051c2b81f9-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3DF0D481 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:33:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f176.google.com (mail-wi0-f176.google.com [209.85.212.176]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B401C1C9 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:33:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicmv11 with SMTP id mv11so60605329wic.0 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:33:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=kytUwBBsA4G2K339vEXdMXsyzXau+tEBFGjtS2SuO58=; b=P9NrS9zuQLFSZ6Zb0Ay4F5NUeqFlLIYqMQXAHNkDEcnOLdas4KybiD548rgDKUXfCK +2q5GzxOiB2L8xQ9lerPPVZ+w4VamOP1XROw3i3K7tW44UNiAbn0f5OxMr9DqILnO1Ds U5z8EPO98TwBMqRQr2om2I39gci4QQMn7YJ/AkMq+nT3nUdVVJ3MK13IIpzJK530gSkj auVLZYfEaGE9HL1RzBkPNU9WNhZIxmTKn7Yl9++nqhXpdp/+6j5VKwOkFDZOnHDJ5aob +q3cYaT6Ga24SXeYtb1IpsXtpZ6leEYvWTXtTgrcpAbEeNLLUFbCDBqhHaW3tkoOWN2P 28nw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQn9KVPW5t0RWyqb5rJoA1vVA/h9uOSYjYzFejUoECUaYCFpO7q1MSgnUlvhsHRBBVzQLvya MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.181.13.169 with SMTP id ez9mr6568263wid.92.1438353195082; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:33:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:33:14 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 16:33:14 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:33:18 -0000 On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 2:15 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: > Hey Jorge, > >> He is not saying that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it >> is obvious that increasing the size won't help. > > > It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks == more users == more nodes > and more miners. How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more importantly, improve mining decentralization? > To repeat: it's not obvious to me at all that everything wrong with Bitcoin > can be solved by shrinking blocks. I don't think that's going to suddenly > make everything magically more decentralised. I don't think anybody is defending that position so you can stop refuting it. > The 8mb cap isn't quite arbitrary. It was picked through negotiation with > different stakeholders, in particular, Chinese miners. But it should be high > enough to ensure organic growth is not constrained, which is good enough. Well, negatiations don't make the number less arbitrary. As far as I know, the sequence of events was this: 1) Gavin proposes 20MB to 20GB 2) Some chinese miners say they can securely handle at most 8 MB. 3) Gavin proposes 8 MB to 8 GB In any case, history is irrelevant for this point: if party 1 proposes arbitrary value A and party 2 proposes arbitrary value B, any "compromise" value between those 2 is still an arbitrary value. For example, A + ((B-A)/2) is still an arbitrary value. I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with different sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare them, I will consider any value arbitrary. A "I run this with blocksize=X and nothing seems to have broken" doesn't help here. We need to compare, and a criterion to compare. >> I think it would be nice to have some sort of simulation to calculate >> a "centralization heuristic" for different possible blocksize values >> so we can compare these arbitrary numbers somehow. > > > Centralization is not a single floating point value that is controlled by > block size. It's a multi-faceted and complex problem. You cannot "destroy > Bitcoin through centralization" by adjusting a single constant in the source > code. Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influence of the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equal or worse mining centralization. About the second sentence, yes, I could destroy Bitcoin by changing one single constant if I could somehow force users to adopt my version of the software. I'm sure I can actually find several examples if necessary. "Through centralization" is harder, but say we chose std::numeric_limits::max() as the maximum block size (in practice, entirely removing the block size limit), then the consensus rules don't have any rule to limit mining centralization. Sacrificing that tool, and doing so this early on could certainly turn Bitcoin into an effectively centralized system, destroying Bitcoin (or at least the "p2p currency" part of it, which is the most interesting one for many Bitcoin users including me). So, once it's clear that nobody is saying that centralization depends ONLY on the block size, can you tell us please if you think it's useful for limiting mining centralization or not? If you think the blocksize consensus limit does nothing to limit centralization then there's no tradeoff to consider and you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limit rather than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. Otherwise you may want to explain why you think 8 GB is enough of a limit to impede further centralization. > To say once more: block size won't make much difference to how many > merchants rely on payment processors because they aren't using them due to > block processing overheads anyway. So trying to calculate such a formula > won't work. Ditto for end users on phones, ditto for developers who want > JSON/REST access to an indexed block chain, or hosted wallet services, or > miners who want to reduce variance. Sorry, I don't know about Pieter, but I was mostly talking about mining centralization, certainly not about payment services. > What people like you are Pieter are doing is making a single number a kind > of proxy for all fears and concerns about the trend towards outsourcing in > the Bitcoin community. Everything gets compressed down to one number you > feel you can control, whether it is relevant or not. No, that's not what we are doing. It's good that you talk about your fears but, please, let other people talk about theirs on their own. >> > So why should anyone go through the massive hassle of setting up >> > exchanges, >> > without the lure of large future profits? >> >> Are you suggesting that bitcoin consensus rules should be designed to >> maximize the profits of Bitcoin exchanges? > > > That isn't what I said at all Jorge. Let me try again. > > Setting up an exchange is a lot of risky and expensive work. The motivation > is profit, and profits are higher when there are more users to sell to. This > is business 101. I can imagine a non-for-profit exchange but there's no point in finding edge cases: no general disagreement here. > If you remove the potential for future profit, you remove the motivation to > create the services that we now enjoy and take for granted. Because if you > think Bitcoin can be useful without exchanges then let me tell you, I was > around when there were none. Bitcoin was useless. My first post on the bitcoin forums (and vague hardfork proposal, I started reading in December 2010) was January 21, 2011 (vs yours Dec 14th 2010, as Greg pointed out in the other thread). I bought my first bitcoins (and also sold most of them shortly after, stupid me) using some web that used paypal and was closed down not too long after that. At first I couldn't participate in exchanges because I had no Liberty Reserve account... Look, I'm sure there's many stories about how we met Bitcoin that we can share having a beer in a bar or something. But probably most of the subscribers to this list don't really care, and if they care they can ask us privately, or you can create a new thread (probably better in bitcointalk or somewhere else than here): they are completely irrelevant in this technical discussion. So, back on-topic: do I agree that exchanges are extremely important for the Bitcoin ecosystem? Yes, of course I do. But that doesn't mean that their "potential for future profit" should be a primary concern when deciding consensus rules changes that affect ALL users. But even before that, I disagree with the premise that "not rising the consensus blocksize as soon as possible" will ruin the exchanges or "remove their potential for future profit". From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CE4D7414 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:52:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f178.google.com (mail-lb0-f178.google.com [209.85.217.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B8551AE for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:52:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbyj8 with SMTP id yj8so47791818lbb.0 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:52:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=0ZkjFs11S0nsHlDX97/N42PKx3w1tOv8Fk2W7P3CeK4=; b=HLHaQIHQfwhsAE+u9DY516byoZxqQYjKJR3AU2OLMPPDZ/rMD2jkhDKqfxH5PiU22J PDUOYF3MOlcTqhDDArKc0+sgu8Z6KVFCcXM18LOULKT7WK5EEa+xdRvB55wQq9CSQqZn 8YdcwWV/EbfrmdLLxgjyhH05yWMMixd9ycNVQuoHONdSoS5l5fpxdManCjXqIPlYyo2m eb+8mf3hFcLKD9lj8uiiZPwkGAYt/IqGouQ9YTfFlAUAg7nssQf2Pxglz5yVlqqBuJeD t+Yzb6EDCTgH2T2m3fg+H3CCE3XRznOWmHyUGRBHnbNq53lZbvp6XYrMlzn/W0T95hFF FEtg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.142.196 with SMTP id ry4mr3435391lbb.68.1438354377237; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:52:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.152.18.166 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:52:56 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 09:52:56 -0500 Message-ID: From: Bryan Bishop To: Mike Hearn , Bryan Bishop Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0112bf7eb76a9e051c2cf92e X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:52:59 -0000 --089e0112bf7eb76a9e051c2cf92e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 7:15 AM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > He is not saying that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it >> is obvious that increasing the size won't help. >> > > It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks == more users == more nodes > and more miners. > Well, even in a centralized scheme you can have more users, more nodes and more miners. Just having more does not mean that the system isn't centralized, for example we can point to many centralized services such as PayPal that have trillions of users. > To repeat: it's not obvious to me at all that everything wrong with > Bitcoin can be solved by shrinking blocks. I don't think that's going to > suddenly make everything magically more decentralised. > Nobody claimed that moving to smaller blocks would "solve everything wrong with Bitcoin". You cannot "destroy Bitcoin through centralization" by adjusting a single > constant in the source code. > Why not? That's exactly the sort of change that would be useful to do so, in tandem with some forms of campaigning. > The motivation is profit, and profits are higher when there are more users > to sell to. This is business 101. > I am confused here; is that idea operating under an assumption (or rule) like "we shouldn't count aggregate transactions as representing multiple other transactions from other users" or something? I have seen this idea in a few places, and it would be useful to get a fix on where it's coming from. Does this belief extend to P2SH and multisig...? - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 --089e0112bf7eb76a9e051c2cf92e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On F= ri, Jul 31, 2015 at 7:15 AM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev &= lt;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
He is not say= ing that. Whatever the reasons for centralization are, it
is obvious that increasing the size won't help.
It's not obvious. Quite possibly bigger blocks =3D= =3D more users =3D=3D more nodes and more miners.

Well, even in a centralized scheme you can h= ave more users, more nodes and more miners. Just having more does not mean = that the system isn't centralized, for example we can point to many cen= tralized services such as PayPal that have trillions of users.
= =C2=A0
To repeat: it's not obvious= to me at all that everything wrong with Bitcoin can be solved by shrinking= blocks. I don't think that's going to suddenly make everything mag= ically more decentralised.
Nobody claimed that moving to smaller blocks would "solve = everything wrong with Bitcoin".

You cannot "destroy Bitcoin through centralization"= ; by adjusting a single constant in the source code.

Why not? That's exactly the sort of c= hange that would be useful to do so, in tandem with some forms of campaigni= ng.
=C2=A0
<= div class=3D"gmail_extra">
The motivation is= profit, and profits are higher when there are more users to sell to. This = is business 101.

I = am confused here; is that idea operating under an assumption (or rule) like= "we shouldn't count aggregate transactions as representing multip= le other transactions from other users" or something? I have seen this= idea in a few places, and it would be useful to get a fix on where it'= s coming from. Does this belief extend to P2SH and multisig...?
<= br>
- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507=
--089e0112bf7eb76a9e051c2cf92e-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F417CFF for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:59:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f171.google.com (mail-ig0-f171.google.com [209.85.213.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 001131AE for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:58:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igk11 with SMTP id 11so33718960igk.1 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:58:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=vinumeris.com; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=6PqCgCNwu9OhLXcElrYqlkchKN2JMj26OFKRHFYpKWI=; b=Iai3y2hDnPWnRqDvMTZwsD2EHYH2h34rXiRiiy+utWtaKsrSk6CE4xV/hvpo425Syt AmjdDsHH4je/HdoHB32iU2VrbKlW0h9+b3YcOu+1RX0qaJ29WV0F/RsR2Da+m+Tf8pEh XEZtDJCDG0IRy4ttyW18LDO/4Tn4WrGGTaf5g= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=6PqCgCNwu9OhLXcElrYqlkchKN2JMj26OFKRHFYpKWI=; b=mSga0YX2MW0pd+lGOaO539Q6yc06WnTgVzx1LKygRGZUOPq/GnlwfsWujleEEejW7L Lgn8cjrl5JdV61wAjGaAf1jjFOYhy+3RnygOrE384K8fTXCGqPJPZc+Npdm8cZnH4VVj L3tdeBEsF8GWHRYJP7aQs54SCbN4pjH+D4fg9RNyAYuUGhHI0XdQ5QdxYg8nj0xMnpXt S3POy0Xsr5o/gweNF46V7q/gi89Q4thy459fbpI3VDAoSgKLyCJ6ZrB8kSZZYRdDP/p9 skoPuskv/nl4O6pqztwjJmGUogMELZfm7AKuxZXhFWuGS5Sx+788fykFRiKYTPJYhDML 3vRw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkqKpI9RpfGpE+T1jVNYxUtgjAPc0moRC20NFkfeeoTUq03e2UV/anjZaKy4C8FkSMZka3e MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.43.199 with SMTP id y7mr6267890igl.69.1438354739315; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:58:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.50.108.111 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 07:58:59 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 16:58:59 +0200 Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e011849e64c60a0051c2d0fcd X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 14:59:01 -0000 --089e011849e64c60a0051c2d0fcd Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > > How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more importantly, > improve mining decentralization? > Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in taking part? I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question. When Bitcoin was new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are millions of users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin. Surely the correlation is obvious? I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with different > sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare them, I wi= ll > consider any value arbitrary. > Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behind it was well documented here: http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-cen= tralized *I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabytes per month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month data cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty= good=E2=80=9D broadband plan.* Did you think 20mb was picked randomly? > Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influence of > the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equal > or worse mining centralization. > I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go from blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in this time the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge amount too. You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if a miner mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as the miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can switch between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. getblocktemplate), and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say there are many more miners than in the past. If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisation: 1) Lower block size 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more effective. > you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limit rathe= r > than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. > I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really be no limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and nodes would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time anyway. There is obviously a physical limit somewhere. But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is 8mb better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: I think Bitcoin adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase average usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for others, that's OK by me. > Sorry, I don't know about Pieter, but I was mostly talking about > mining centralization, certainly not about payment services. > OK. I write these emails for other readers too :) In the past for instance, developers who run services without running their own nodes has come up. Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider if you like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR manufacturers or whoever. My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only currency AND all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. It's a contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it. --089e011849e64c60a0051c2d0fcd Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
How more users or more nodes can bring more mine= rs, or more=C2=A0importantly, improve mining decentralization?

Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more intere= st there is in taking part?

I mean, I guess I don&= #39;t know how to answer your question. When Bitcoin was new it had almost = no users and almost no miners. Now there are millions of users and factorie= s producing ASICs just for Bitcoin. Surely the correlation is obvious?

I'm sorry, but until the= re's a simulation that I can run with=C2=A0different sizes' testcha= ins (for example using #6382) to somehow=C2=A0compare them, I will consider= any value arbitrary.

Gavin did run sim= ulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behind it was well document= ed here:

I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size t= o target because 170 gigabytes per month comfortably fits into the typical = 250-300 gigabytes per month data cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node fr= om home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty good=E2=80=9D broadband plan.

Did you think 20mb was picked randomly?
=C2=A0
Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that = the influence of
the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equal
or worse mining centralization.

I have = a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go from blocks= that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in this time the = number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge amount to= o.

You can argue that a miner doesn't count if= they pool mine. But if a miner mines on a pool that uses exactly the same = software and settings as the miner would have done anyway, then it makes no= difference. Miners can switch between pools to find one that works the way= they like, so whilst less pooling or more decentralised pools would be nic= e (e.g. getblocktemplate), and I've written about how to push it forwar= d before, I still say there are many more miners than in the past.

If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining dec= entralisation:

1) Lower block size
2) Fi= nishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a getblocktemplate= based decentralised mining pool

then I'd pick= (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more effective.
= =C2=A0
you should be=C2=A0consequently = advocating for full removal of the limit rather than=C2=A0changes towards b= igger arbitrary values.

I did toy with = that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really be no limit at all be= cause the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and nodes would just end u= p ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time anyway. There is obvio= usly a physical limit somewhere.=C2=A0

But it is e= asier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is 8mb better than= no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: =C2=A0I think Bitcoi= n adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase avera= ge usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for others,= that's OK by me.
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
Sorry, I don't know about Pieter, but I was mostly talking about=
mining centralization, certainly not about payment services.

OK. I write these emails for other readers too :) In = the past for instance, developers who run services without running their ow= n nodes has come up.
=C2=A0
Re: exchange profit. You ca= n pick some other useful service provider if you like. Payment processors o= r cold storage providers or the TREZOR manufacturers or whoever.
=
My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transaction= s only currency AND all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin communit= y is making. It's a contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitco= in ceases to be interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums= to use it.

--089e011849e64c60a0051c2d0fcd-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D73E4267 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:29:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D2A80163 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:29:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E576A20CC6; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 17:30:41 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55BB9438.3030309@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 22:28:56 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Mike Hearn , Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: OpenPGP: id=1CF07D66; url=pool.sks-keyservers.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,NO_DNS_FOR_FROM, RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:29:03 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/31/2015 09:58 PM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev wrote: > How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more > importantly, improve mining decentralization? > > > Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in > taking part? The logic just flows from one to the other does it? So because Islam is the biggest religious ecosystem in the world now you and me are just burning to take part? By your logic, most people in Asia would horde (or want to pay using) Chinese Yuan, only they don't. The Yuan and the Yen are the dominant currencies of large transaction settlement in the region, but try to use it on the street and you're met with puzzled bemusement, Mike Hearn. Bitcoin is not suitable as a currency for pervasive dominance, and ideals of pushing it into every heart and mind around the globe is no different from religious zealotry. Bitcoin has its place and we're only at the beginning of a gradual evolution. How can I say that? Because I'm looking across the rice paddy to where my neighbors have not adopted the innovation of the lightbulb, and burn candles for light and cook with gas. And they're not an anomaly around here or in Asia, Africa and South America. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVu5QvAAoJEGwAhlQc8H1m1DQH/i54c+ZBnk9tZK+0PfC2G0rT taLpqvmXGOHPaSqkfHOLjLOm9LxGAw3TZpFIkFSuSuiSlwDfii2VIlKsbYSCEbBe twCaZuNqam4r+61755ADrvPziPx3Tr2GXN7Zc635prN9uGoGCu58xxc7Iy8sTsrf vB430ZN5RhagpFG5LCqN4QmDGQlK+ceYh53jLQ5HpNP/8UsOJjGXdnZfb4V24EFW 0NPAWdmWVFVpEPxqbsmAGjzOPVdocSQuRTekOQHJ7e5XNmHaD3YGHI+hwBDKzcD+ tUuFh7v4C684172PwandfJGAtUJMeavdh+IA21fze3+trrcTOVOZMHr+HEfmWGs= =AToN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A75C0415 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 20:09:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f173.google.com (mail-io0-f173.google.com [209.85.223.173]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4635C11B for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 20:09:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioii16 with SMTP id i16so96091605ioi.0 for ; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:09:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=QGqkHYGJO4yYV7ScLnxfmk5nfCKUBRCw+tLF+nWd4AI=; b=zMCtG7nECyQEoEh1tA7F6ng+v3NA7PDHR9i3xRU6wC8LKdjgg86OYv3izAoxH+hr1m 76myeAewHnIKHsg/MwE1EcTwiF4sHrppwbw92HOZCb5XIHU88nNqj/cUZRqaPQS0a4Cb dbk4/o0ENmYRq9YjhUjIlwqpipN6n4wjvWoe+iw2TtXjwspAmKRFM62yHiiPIdo1bBtZ RCOyOVAl/kPgbC/Y5ksqVHXj+dIjwyNPEPUfqBaVT0nP3BQX9zQftqoA1JCyzrBFd+su 8+WtPcNLkLb7dALYafrRALAc4uCDyuP7p/DM42JBM0l++e1LRdtAIteMszeycyRfLjDC g0QQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.17.170 with SMTP id 42mr8395195ior.21.1438373398823; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:09:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.79.97.4 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:09:58 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 13:09:58 -0700 Message-ID: From: Elliot Olds To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113eca7e7dcb2f051c3167e8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 20:09:59 -0000 --001a113eca7e7dcb2f051c3167e8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 7:58 AM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is 8mb > better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: > People seeing statements like this might imagine that if you knew a change from 1MB blocks to 1GB blocks would ensure fees were 10 cents for the next two years instead of 30 cents over the next two years, you'd want to roll out 1GB blocks. Would you? Where is your cutoff? How large would you be willing to make the block size in exchange for moving fees from 30 cents to 10 cents for the next two years? How about $3 to 10 cents? $30 to 10 cents? How do you think Greg/Pieter/Wlad/Adam/Jorge would answer those questions? I find it very hard to guess, but I think knowing how people would make that specific tradeoff could be helpful in either starting a more productive discussion, or at least realizing how far apart people are in their weighing of the risks of large blocks vs. the benefits of low fees. Obviously the assumption that we have this two year stability period is unrealistic, but the hypothetical tells us how much of the disagreement comes from "if we increase the block size to lower fees, the low fees won't last" vs. "the low fees aren't worth it even if they last." --001a113eca7e7dcb2f051c3167e8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On F= ri, Jul 31, 2015 at 7:58 AM, Mike Hearn via bitcoin-dev &= lt;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
But it is easier to find common ground with others by co= mpromising. Is 8mb better than no limit? I don't know and I don't c= are much:=C2=A0

People seeing statements like this migh= t imagine that if you knew a change from 1MB blocks to 1GB blocks would ens= ure fees were 10 cents for the next two years instead of 30 cents over the = next two years, you'd want to roll out 1GB blocks. Would you? Where is = your cutoff? How large would you be willing to make the block size in excha= nge for moving fees from 30 cents to 10 cents for the next two years? How a= bout $3 to 10 cents? $30 to 10 cents?

How do yo= u think Greg/Pieter/Wlad/Adam/Jorge would answer those questions? I find it= very hard to guess, but I think knowing how people would make that specifi= c tradeoff could be helpful in either starting a more productive discussion= , or at least realizing how far apart people are in their weighing of the r= isks of large blocks vs. the benefits of low fees.

Obviously the assumption that we have this two year stability per= iod is unrealistic, but the hypothetical tells us how much of the disagreem= ent comes from "if we increase the block size to lower fees, the low f= ees won't last" vs. "the low fees aren't worth it even if= they last."=C2=A0
--001a113eca7e7dcb2f051c3167e8-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C479774 for ; Sun, 2 Aug 2015 22:35:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f52.google.com (mail-pa0-f52.google.com [209.85.220.52]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 20E4E7D for ; Sun, 2 Aug 2015 22:35:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pabkd10 with SMTP id kd10so74277928pab.2 for ; Sun, 02 Aug 2015 15:35:53 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=sender:date:from:to:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=lbAe2IX+5Hr8I+iEWsQboDm7eMvJEIYAFEuRi0z/qmM=; b=sMd6zVMEwdLdR3O/Ua/ArGgLtoZyivBTog6koghj3GQsuxUK083A8zTo15OXqcv176 2o9/rFhSj4Q1eijnPFMuAyhIw4dVx2TENnyQGp1qlUh8A8B25XwqwY2j0dQw2TetrEnk UDmLVC7QgECtQG0iI1sWFOO8TygmDMH2ob7PjOaJXRrR61iOGvI25hIZ8At9D8PDj5BH uYIblDONHdHC0rSKZK2QYyA31e+L5GyhkK3S7YzlHCpDD+BO8HQQsPAxgACpcTRtBkRR HBHOBccEwv0oUXJ6XM3BF0Y8bo/etb0jv+DABj4GBQZ7DoHGpHu+bC+C73rBj7clYmTX BQzA== X-Received: by 10.66.253.170 with SMTP id ab10mr7160592pad.135.1438554953875; Sun, 02 Aug 2015 15:35:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from erisian.com.au (116.45.96.58.static.exetel.com.au. [58.96.45.116]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b4sm15246257pdn.42.2015.08.02.15.35.49 (version=TLSv1 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Sun, 02 Aug 2015 15:35:52 -0700 (PDT) Sender: Anthony Towns Received: by erisian.com.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Mon, 03 Aug 2015 08:35:45 +1000 Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 08:35:45 +1000 From: Anthony Towns To: Gavin Andresen , bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Message-ID: <20150802223545.GA14286@navy> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 02 Aug 2015 22:35:54 -0000 On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:20:30PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote: > On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev > > Some things are not included yet, such as a testnet whose size runs ahead > > of the main chain, and the inclusion of Gavin's more accurate sigop > > checking after the hard fork. > First, THANK YOU for making a concrete proposal! > So we'd get to 2MB blocks in the year 2021. I think that is much too > conservative, and the most likely effect of being that conservative is that > the main blockchain becomes a settlement network, affordable only for > large-value transactions. I haven't seen anyone do the (trivial) maths on this. Have I just missed it? By my count: - blocks in 25 btc in rewards and about 0.5 btc in fees per block - at ~$300 USD per btc, that's ~$7,650 per block - current hashrate is ~400 PH/s; so ~240,000 PH/block works out to having to spend about 30PH per dollar earnt. - for comparison, https://products.butterflylabs.com/cloud-mining-contracts.html quotes $1.99 per GH/s for 12 months, which by my count is 60*60*24*365 / 1.99 GH/$ = 15.8 PH per dollar spent - hashrate growth has slowed from about x4/quarter to x2/year: sep '13: ~1PH/s dec '13: ~4PH/s mar '14: ~20PH/s jun '14: ~80PH/s sep '14: ~200PH/s aug '15: ~400PH/s - so, as far as I understand it, miners don't make absurd profits compared to capital investment and running costs - presumably, then, miners will stop mining bitcoin if the revenue/block drops significantly at some point - less miners means a lower hashrate; a lower hashrate makes 50% attacks easier, and that's a bad thing (especially if there's lots of pre-loved ASIC mining hardware available cheap on ebay or alibaba) - in about a year, the block reward halves, cutting out 12.5 btc or ~$3750 USD per block. without an increase in fees per block, miners will just get ~$3900 USD per block - the last time the reward for mining a block was under $4000 per block was around oct '13, with a hashrate of ~2PH/s - 13 btc in fees per block compared to .5 btc in fees per block is a 25x increase; which could be either an increase in fee/txn or txns/block - with ~500 bytes/transaction, that's ~2000 transactions per MB - 13 btc in fees ($3900) per block means per transaction fees of about $2 for 1MB blocks $1 for 2MB blocks 25c for 8MB blocks 10c for 20MB blocks (assuming full blocks, 500 byte txns) - comparing that to credit card or paypal fees at ~2.5% that's: $2 -> minimum transaction $80 $1 -> minimum transaction $40 25c -> minimum transaction $10 10c -> minimum transaction $4 - those numbers only depend on the USD/BTC exchange rate in so far as the more USD for a BTC, the more likely the block reward will pay for hashrate without transaction fees, even with the reward reduced to 12.5 btc/block. otherwise it's just USD/txn paying for USD/hashrate - the reference implementation fee of 0.1mBTC/kB equates to about 3c per transaction (since it rounds up). Even 10c/transaction is more than a 3x increase on that. What the above says to me is that even assuming everyone starts paying fees, the lightning network works great, and so do sidechains and whatever else, you /still/ want to up the volume of bitcoin txns by something like an order of magnitude above what's currently allowed within a year or so. Cheers, aj From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32311844 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 10:35:10 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f178.google.com (mail-wi0-f178.google.com [209.85.212.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F0AD9161 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 10:35:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so159870312wib.0 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 03:35:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=l9vJO6hXmHPdhqxLE6egk03QxVJkNVzyNBq4t8tYIOI=; b=NfvrL4W4OBDiHesNpa4SHFOIp75k4uLqMg9CekD0q/ZvV3O0Bf8V1A3jU5hjr1HNM7 Z2WQe7OSoTtsD9ECmMKRmLUo0g6QS8EpqvpCq1LbMPYQFEZG7preV2YWkevFbT6mTE+0 RVN9GXVB7J9cmO2ht7+0LEax/yQwloekB3yTgSt1xjgrYTk5+w/y1VI09gbOv1oS65Pm vX/T700MpRBMRn6EwM/EYsylLBRV/N8WwpYoZvLdv6KfidWN/KsUQDjqW8inzK9yO0no N208b9EAwUjRC50e+fMEBmzY+dPqJ4eUJa0e/bTF7U4WWr8rNY2BXt5WftWur9bNAiJH wsdA== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmu9ulr8d0NK9gW4E5p0i9gEKMtBKiyjEa24CtMlx8MsoNPzDqKFZLgIbSWPpQc1CobEuZ3 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.181.13.195 with SMTP id fa3mr6613718wid.7.1438684506656; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 03:35:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 03:35:06 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:35:06 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Mike Hearn Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_40,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 10:35:10 -0000 On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: >> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more importantly, >> improve mining decentralization? > > > Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in taking > part? As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur. > I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question. I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the opposite question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been (consciously or not) consistently evading. But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few lines be= low. > When Bitcoin was > new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are millions o= f > users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin. The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized hardware production companies. Nothing surprising there. By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes can cause less mining centralization. > Surely the correlation is obvious? Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that... >> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with different >> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare them, I w= ill >> consider any value arbitrary. > > > Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behind it wa= s > well documented here: > > http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-c= entralized > > I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabytes p= er > month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month data > cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty go= od=E2=80=9D broadband plan. > > Did you think 20mb was picked randomly? No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with optimistic and by no means scientific expectations. But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning, what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size would be "too centralized" but another one isn't. I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB or 21 GB). A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less arbitr= ary. >> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influence of >> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equal >> or worse mining centralization. > > > I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go from > blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in this t= ime > the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge amo= unt > too. I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not about actual blocksize. Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to appear and get those profits. But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in the number of miners" or with mining decentralization. > You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if a mine= r > mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as the > miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can swi= tch > between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less > pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. getblocktemplate)= , > and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say there a= re > many more miners than in the past. > > If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisation: > > 1) Lower block size Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not putting words in your mouth, right? I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate. > 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a > getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool > > then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more effective. Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we're confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it. >> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limit rath= er >> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. > > > I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really be n= o > limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and nodes > would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time anyway. > There is obviously a physical limit somewhere. Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced your rejection of that idea at all? > But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is 8m= b > better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: I think Bitcoi= n > adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase average > usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for others, > that's OK by me. The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus limit or not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not caring about mining centralization at all. Is that your position? If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your "compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enough until the limit is completely removed. Is that your position? > Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider if y= ou > like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR > manufacturers or whoever. Yes, and I believe the same points stand. > My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only currency A= ND > all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. It's = a > contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be > interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it. You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like if non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobody really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about here so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this discussion. What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would (hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen, non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero). You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree. But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be use cases that will be eventually priced out. So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much more secondary concern. Do you agree with this? I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring more about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring about mining centralization at all". I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don't know what your position is. I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not (you just said that). Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with consensus rules at all? From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2F46283D for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:04:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f180.google.com (mail-lb0-f180.google.com [209.85.217.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 204EB153 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:04:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbpo9 with SMTP id po9so3691658lbb.2 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:04:23 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=R/qBeYmrL11QKFYWvNsi6EtK3AhFDV4nvdu4ra8hWa8=; b=lHHPDPK3Z2AtSPtMSDUxEILsG6MEIM3B+JfbVWlH4Qd359D+LZLfjKLfb8lL7CTSh5 +mwiGAqEpDF5exjxGpLM1ckrJCdh8sguJweLPq71dHs2Y+ti0uWR3LREFDVjvdOWRbMg eCv+0cosiTG4WwRBI6KETdyFNSh8BIEmQ1Qr/j2P4xG0Sj4310p6XsBT+78pkbQehM6K FbCbNf/vbtJj5eU8ENSNh8HCkK0FLJeDZ4YOCWJA5xsuJpgQuDgBeLKrWEWdfV48epY4 kX2gj7Wzj6O2W1Mr5XbBRiwnOY/WhxPTJsuJS3WTOCyCvue5fL/YKOG87HHkcBhEm/lQ Q/1A== X-Received: by 10.112.161.40 with SMTP id xp8mr2628302lbb.71.1438686263219; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:04:23 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 04:04:03 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Hector Chu Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:04:03 +0100 Message-ID: To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c25f52a99aa5051c7a3fab X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 11:04:27 -0000 --001a11c25f52a99aa5051c7a3fab Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Mike's position is that he wants the block size limit to eventually be removed. That is of course an extreme view. Meanwhile, your view that the block size should be artificially constrained below the organic growth curve (in a way that will penalize a majority of existing and future users) lies at the other extreme. The majority position lies somewhere in between (i.e. a one-time increase to 8MB). This is the position that ultimately matters. If the block size is increased to 8MB and things get demonstrably a whole lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to stand on. In that case we can always do another hard fork later to reduce the block size back to something smaller, and henceforth the block size will never be touched again. On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: > >> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more importantl= y, > >> improve mining decentralization? > > > > > > Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in takin= g > > part? > > As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur. > > > I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question. > > I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the opposite > question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been > (consciously or not) consistently evading. > But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few lines > below. > > > When Bitcoin was > > new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are millions > of > > users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin. > > The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional > miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized > hardware production companies. > Nothing surprising there. > By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes > can cause less mining centralization. > > > Surely the correlation is obvious? > > Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that... > > >> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with differen= t > >> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare them, I > will > >> consider any value arbitrary. > > > > > > Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behind it > was > > well documented here: > > > > > http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-c= entralized > > > > I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabytes > per > > month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month dat= a > > cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty = good=E2=80=9D broadband > plan. > > > > Did you think 20mb was picked randomly? > > No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd > party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the > so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with > optimistic and by no means scientific expectations. > > But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning, > what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size > would be "too centralized" but another one isn't. > I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and > 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB > or 21 GB). > A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less > arbitrary. > > >> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influence of > >> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equal > >> or worse mining centralization. > > > > > > I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go from > > blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in this > time > > the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge > amount > > too. > > I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not about > actual blocksize. > Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to > appear and get those profits. > But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in the > number of miners" or with mining decentralization. > > > You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if a > miner > > mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as the > > miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can > switch > > between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less > > pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. > getblocktemplate), > > and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say there > are > > many more miners than in the past. > > > > If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisation= : > > > > 1) Lower block size > > Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. > If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum > rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not putting > words in your mouth, right? > I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit > don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate. > > > 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a > > getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool > > > > then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more effective. > > Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we're > confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it. > > >> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limit > rather > >> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. > > > > > > I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really be > no > > limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and nod= es > > would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time anyway= . > > There is obviously a physical limit somewhere. > > Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size > maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced > your rejection of that idea at all? > > > But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is > 8mb > > better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: I think > Bitcoin > > adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase average > > usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for others= , > > that's OK by me. > > The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus limit or > not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule is a > tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not > caring about mining centralization at all. > Is that your position? > > If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit > transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your > "compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enough > until the limit is completely removed. > Is that your position? > > > Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider if > you > > like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR > > manufacturers or whoever. > > Yes, and I believe the same points stand. > > > My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only currency > AND > > all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. It'= s > a > > contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be > > interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it. > > You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like if > non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would > automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. > Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a > "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobody > really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie > bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment > channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value > higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about here > so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this > discussion. > > What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would > (hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop > being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen, > non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero). > > You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree. > But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be > use cases that will be eventually priced out. > So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization > should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much > more secondary concern. > Do you agree with this? > > I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring more > about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a > consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring > about mining centralization at all". > I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don't > know what your position is. > I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't > care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not > (you just said that). > Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or > because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with > consensus rules at all? > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --001a11c25f52a99aa5051c7a3fab Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mike's position is that he wants the block size limit = to=C2=A0eventually=C2=A0be=C2=A0removed. That is of course an extreme view.= Meanwhile, your view that the block size should be artificially constraine= d below the organic growth curve (in a way that will penalize a majority of= existing and future users) lies at the other extreme. The majority positio= n lies somewhere in between (i.e. a one-time increase to 8MB). This is the = position that ultimately matters.

If the block size is i= ncreased to 8MB and things get demonstrably a whole lot worse, then you wil= l have a solid leg to stand on. In that case we can always do another hard = fork later to reduce the block size back to something smaller, and hencefor= th the block size will never be touched again.

On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge T= im=C3=B3n <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org&g= t; wrote:
On Fri,= Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn <hearn@vinumeris.com> wrote:
>> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more import= antly,
>> improve mining decentralization?
>
>
> Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in taki= ng
> part?

As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur.

> I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question.

I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the op= posite
question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been
(consciously or not) consistently evading.
But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few line= s below.

> When Bitcoin was
> new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are million= s of
> users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin.

The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized
hardware production companies.
Nothing surprising there.
By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes
can cause less mining centralization.

> Surely the correlation is obvious?

Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that= ...

>> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run w= ith different
>> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare= them, I will
>> consider any value arbitrary.
>
>
> Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behin= d it was
> well documented here:
>
> http://gavin= andresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-centralized=
>
> I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabyte= s per
> month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month da= ta
> cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty= good=E2=80=9D broadband plan.
>
> Did you think 20mb was picked randomly?

No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the
so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with=
optimistic and by no means scientific expectations.

But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning,<= br> what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size
would be "too centralized" but another one isn't.
I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and<= br> 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB
or 21 GB).
A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less arbitr= ary.

>> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influen= ce of
>> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, eq= ual
>> or worse mining centralization.
>
>
> I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go= from
> blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in thi= s time
> the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge = amount
> too.

I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not abo= ut
actual blocksize.
Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to
appear and get those profits.
But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in= the
number of miners" or with mining decentralization.

> You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if= a miner
> mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as th= e
> miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can = switch
> between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less=
> pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. getblocktempla= te),
> and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say = there are
> many more miners than in the past.
>
> If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisatio= n:
>
> 1) Lower block size

Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum=
rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not puttin= g
words in your mouth, right?
I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit
don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate.
> 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a
> getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool
>
> then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more e= ffective.

Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we&= #39;re
confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it.

>> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limi= t rather
>> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values.
>
>
> I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really b= e no
> limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and no= des
> would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time a= nyway.
> There is obviously a physical limit somewhere.

Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size=
maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced=
your rejection of that idea at all?

> But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is= 8mb
> better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much:=C2= =A0 I think Bitcoin
> adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase av= erage
> usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for other= s,
> that's OK by me.

The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus l= imit or
not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule i= s a
tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not caring about mining centralization at all.
Is that your position?

If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit<= br> transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your
"compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enou= gh
until the limit is completely removed.
Is that your position?

> Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider i= f you
> like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR
> manufacturers or whoever.

Yes, and I believe the same points stand.

> My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only cur= rency AND
> all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. It= 's a
> contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be
> interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it.=

You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like= if
non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would
automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitco= in.
Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a
"high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobod= y
really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie
bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment
channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value
higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about her= e
so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this
discussion.

What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would
(hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop
being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen,
non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero).

You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree.
But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be
use cases that will be eventually priced out.
So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization
should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much
more secondary concern.
Do you agree with this?

I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring mor= e
about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a
consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring=
about mining centralization at all".
I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don'= t
know what your position is.
I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't=
care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not
(you just said that).
Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or
because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with
consensus rules at all?
___________________________________= ____________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--001a11c25f52a99aa5051c7a3fab-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 262BB26C for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:27:19 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f170.google.com (mail-ig0-f170.google.com [209.85.213.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 52E7B1A0 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:27:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igk11 with SMTP id 11so90519728igk.1 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:27:16 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=GwcMpK8KiuRIsp9StX9Wwm1vVUlZX7RQ3N0LeTpxVfc=; b=sa/9j3LEp3YGScYv+uijg4YW6/UdgoAVwZBkpqVkJyN+exjCh1SGMoYg+BmeIqaGmd MRqEBZ5oQmK2smaTh8n9h6BfS6JgXhpDXjX91FvpJjhu5vDQo2auL6ty1h8/4UTci03Q dnxeudP5omwRl3ZJdRhiAHROgKZ37CK9ZMxP2TWf+A0jIQPezdRjE9M98x1EXiX24yx1 d7qtWZEKYohSQ7X05UPTFqWpSheReHL3XbfDBgF3GQPAdPaVjvI/SHPmvK/ZNUuapbOY CHRXxAJpaaTqz5+U8Hc/GiCQYfL9uy2quOe/xQ5tHP3LEp/XH3uO1l7r923bGT7EKw4Y 0yqA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.60.68 with SMTP id f4mr3278297igr.94.1438687636733; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:27:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 04:27:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 04:27:16 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:27:16 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Hector Chu Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0160b63e87c91f051c7a9115 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 11:27:19 -0000 --089e0160b63e87c91f051c7a9115 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The mining landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depending on agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validation. Full node count is at its historically lowest value in years, and outsourcing of full validation keeps growing. I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, people would have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "things kept working". I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can "work" with gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few blockchain validation services, the same few online wallets, and mining is done by a cartel that only allows joining after signing a contract so they can sue you if you create an invalid block. Do you think people will then agree that "things got demonstratebly worse"? Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. --=20 Pieter On Aug 4, 2015 1:04 PM, "Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Mike's position is that he wants the block size limit > to eventually be removed. That is of course an extreme view. Meanwhile, > your view that the block size should be artificially constrained below th= e > organic growth curve (in a way that will penalize a majority of existing > and future users) lies at the other extreme. The majority position lies > somewhere in between (i.e. a one-time increase to 8MB). This is the > position that ultimately matters. > > If the block size is increased to 8MB and things get demonstrably a whole > lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to stand on. In that case we ca= n > always do another hard fork later to reduce the block size back to > something smaller, and henceforth the block size will never be touched > again. > > On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: >> >> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more >> importantly, >> >> improve mining decentralization? >> > >> > >> > Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in taki= ng >> > part? >> >> As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur. >> >> > I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question. >> >> I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the opposite >> question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been >> (consciously or not) consistently evading. >> But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few lines >> below. >> >> > When Bitcoin was >> > new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are million= s >> of >> > users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin. >> >> The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional >> miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized >> hardware production companies. >> Nothing surprising there. >> By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes >> can cause less mining centralization. >> >> > Surely the correlation is obvious? >> >> Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that... >> >> >> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with differe= nt >> >> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare them, = I >> will >> >> consider any value arbitrary. >> > >> > >> > Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behind it >> was >> > well documented here: >> > >> > >> http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-= centralized >> > >> > I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabyte= s >> per >> > month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month da= ta >> > cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty= good=E2=80=9D broadband >> plan. >> > >> > Did you think 20mb was picked randomly? >> >> No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd >> party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the >> so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with >> optimistic and by no means scientific expectations. >> >> But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning, >> what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size >> would be "too centralized" but another one isn't. >> I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and >> 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB >> or 21 GB). >> A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less >> arbitrary. >> >> >> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influence of >> >> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equal >> >> or worse mining centralization. >> > >> > >> > I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go fro= m >> > blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in thi= s >> time >> > the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge >> amount >> > too. >> >> I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not about >> actual blocksize. >> Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to >> appear and get those profits. >> But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in the >> number of miners" or with mining decentralization. >> >> > You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if a >> miner >> > mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as th= e >> > miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can >> switch >> > between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less >> > pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. >> getblocktemplate), >> > and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say ther= e >> are >> > many more miners than in the past. >> > >> > If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisatio= n: >> > >> > 1) Lower block size >> >> Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. >> If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum >> rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not putting >> words in your mouth, right? >> I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit >> don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate. >> >> > 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a >> > getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool >> > >> > then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more effective= . >> >> Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we're >> confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it. >> >> >> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limit >> rather >> >> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. >> > >> > >> > I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really b= e >> no >> > limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and >> nodes >> > would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time anywa= y. >> > There is obviously a physical limit somewhere. >> >> Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size >> maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced >> your rejection of that idea at all? >> >> > But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is >> 8mb >> > better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: I think >> Bitcoin >> > adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase averag= e >> > usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for other= s, >> > that's OK by me. >> >> The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus limit or >> not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule is a >> tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not >> caring about mining centralization at all. >> Is that your position? >> >> If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit >> transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your >> "compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enough >> until the limit is completely removed. >> Is that your position? >> >> > Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider i= f >> you >> > like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR >> > manufacturers or whoever. >> >> Yes, and I believe the same points stand. >> >> > My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only currenc= y >> AND >> > all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. >> It's a >> > contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be >> > interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it. >> >> You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like if >> non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would >> automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. >> Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a >> "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobody >> really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie >> bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment >> channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value >> higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about here >> so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this >> discussion. >> >> What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would >> (hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop >> being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen, >> non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero). >> >> You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree. >> But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be >> use cases that will be eventually priced out. >> So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization >> should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much >> more secondary concern. >> Do you agree with this? >> >> I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring more >> about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a >> consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring >> about mining centralization at all". >> I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don't >> know what your position is. >> I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't >> care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not >> (you just said that). >> Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or >> because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with >> consensus rules at all? >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --089e0160b63e87c91f051c7a9115 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. = The mining landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depend= ing on agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without valida= tion. Full node count is at its historically lowest value in years, and out= sourcing of full validation keeps growing.

I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, p= eople would have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "= ;things kept working".

I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can= "work" with gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few= blockchain validation services, the same few online wallets, and mining is= done by a cartel that only allows joining after signing a contract so they= can sue you if you create an invalid block. Do you think people will then = agree that "things got demonstratebly worse"?

Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.=

--
Pieter

On Aug 4, 2015 1:04 PM, "Hector Chu via bit= coin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Mike's position is t= hat he wants the block size limit to=C2=A0eventually=C2=A0be=C2=A0removed. = That is of course an extreme view. Meanwhile, your view that the block size= should be artificially constrained below the organic growth curve (in a wa= y that will penalize a majority of existing and future users) lies at the o= ther extreme. The majority position lies somewhere in between (i.e. a one-t= ime increase to 8MB). This is the position that ultimately matters.
If the block size is increased to 8MB and things get demonstrab= ly a whole lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to stand on. In that c= ase we can always do another hard fork later to reduce the block size back = to something smaller, and henceforth the block size will never be touched a= gain.

= On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <bitcoin= -dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn <hearn@vinumeris.com&g= t; wrote:
>> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more import= antly,
>> improve mining decentralization?
>
>
> Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in taki= ng
> part?

As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur.

> I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question.

I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the op= posite
question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been
(consciously or not) consistently evading.
But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few line= s below.

> When Bitcoin was
> new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are million= s of
> users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin.

The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized
hardware production companies.
Nothing surprising there.
By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes
can cause less mining centralization.

> Surely the correlation is obvious?

Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that= ...

>> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run w= ith different
>> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare= them, I will
>> consider any value arbitrary.
>
>
> Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behin= d it was
> well documented here:
>
> http://gavin= andresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-centralized=
>
> I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabyte= s per
> month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month da= ta
> cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty= good=E2=80=9D broadband plan.
>
> Did you think 20mb was picked randomly?

No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the
so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with=
optimistic and by no means scientific expectations.

But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning,<= br> what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size
would be "too centralized" but another one isn't.
I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and<= br> 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB
or 21 GB).
A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less arbitr= ary.

>> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influen= ce of
>> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, eq= ual
>> or worse mining centralization.
>
>
> I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go= from
> blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in thi= s time
> the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge = amount
> too.

I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not abo= ut
actual blocksize.
Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to
appear and get those profits.
But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in= the
number of miners" or with mining decentralization.

> You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if= a miner
> mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as th= e
> miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can = switch
> between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less=
> pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. getblocktempla= te),
> and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say = there are
> many more miners than in the past.
>
> If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisatio= n:
>
> 1) Lower block size

Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum=
rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not puttin= g
words in your mouth, right?
I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit
don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate.
> 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a
> getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool
>
> then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more e= ffective.

Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we&= #39;re
confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it.

>> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limi= t rather
>> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values.
>
>
> I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really b= e no
> limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and no= des
> would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time a= nyway.
> There is obviously a physical limit somewhere.

Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size=
maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced=
your rejection of that idea at all?

> But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is= 8mb
> better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much:=C2= =A0 I think Bitcoin
> adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase av= erage
> usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for other= s,
> that's OK by me.

The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus l= imit or
not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule i= s a
tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not caring about mining centralization at all.
Is that your position?

If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit<= br> transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your
"compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enou= gh
until the limit is completely removed.
Is that your position?

> Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider i= f you
> like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR
> manufacturers or whoever.

Yes, and I believe the same points stand.

> My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only cur= rency AND
> all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. It= 's a
> contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be
> interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it.=

You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like= if
non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would
automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitco= in.
Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a
"high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobod= y
really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie
bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment
channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value
higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about her= e
so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this
discussion.

What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would
(hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop
being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen,
non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero).

You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree.
But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be
use cases that will be eventually priced out.
So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization
should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much
more secondary concern.
Do you agree with this?

I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring mor= e
about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a
consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring=
about mining centralization at all".
I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don'= t
know what your position is.
I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't=
care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not
(you just said that).
Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or
because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with
consensus rules at all?
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--089e0160b63e87c91f051c7a9115-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C664889D for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:35:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f181.google.com (mail-lb0-f181.google.com [209.85.217.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8804183 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:35:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbud7 with SMTP id ud7so4089548lbb.3 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:35:18 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=6hj+fDHHfgAjSqD6LBJc5NBpmU+eazpGEOskkUtG6jU=; b=iUg46EIR3ChLGeooFKBEKSxsFuTncI22MAyDV9aHZVlBAxFT6D0+OO8gKxDkNZf/5r 6SLMMciH4zi884rLzBlPuhiU1hO2T9B9BcI/oR6v5sDIA5rz/YmSCelskjZfkLrECs+2 kjjP/rZEKu9YDWaLjZPYtFPh3oFu57owMdlvROyiRLSf4O8mRlj/lrXlxAYb0KTAfuK0 0fGg8ty48ucFPc67PiDbONfzzejll6Mgw5BePpuS4Zdct45kzFPIPQlpk5b6xg0QZHfA IQILo5gZNclo477jmKrtutaRgZJ18H6HMk3d9gqQ1yUznFZ1OczKxEZ+KJIDo274TELK CgHw== X-Received: by 10.112.144.69 with SMTP id sk5mr2875366lbb.6.1438688118132; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:35:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 04:34:58 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Hector Chu Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:34:58 +0100 Message-ID: To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3432f43957b6051c7aae24 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 11:35:21 -0000 --047d7b3432f43957b6051c7aae24 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Things apparently aren't bad enough to prevent the majority from clamoring for larger blocks. If the majority agreed that things had got worse till this point, and that this was to be blamed on the block size, they would be campaigning for the other direction. Even yourselves aren't asking for a reduction in the block size, as you know full well that you would be laughed out. On 4 August 2015 at 12:27, Pieter Wuille wrote: > I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The mining > landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depending on > agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validation. Ful= l > node count is at its historically lowest value in years, and outsourcing = of > full validation keeps growing. > > I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, people would > have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "things kept > working". > > I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can "work" with > gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few blockchain validatio= n > services, the same few online wallets, and mining is done by a cartel tha= t > only allows joining after signing a contract so they can sue you if you > create an invalid block. Do you think people will then agree that "things > got demonstratebly worse"? > > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. > > -- > Pieter > On Aug 4, 2015 1:04 PM, "Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev" < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Mike's position is that he wants the block size limit >> to eventually be removed. That is of course an extreme view. Meanwhile, >> your view that the block size should be artificially constrained below t= he >> organic growth curve (in a way that will penalize a majority of existing >> and future users) lies at the other extreme. The majority position lies >> somewhere in between (i.e. a one-time increase to 8MB). This is the >> position that ultimately matters. >> >> If the block size is increased to 8MB and things get demonstrably a whol= e >> lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to stand on. In that case we c= an >> always do another hard fork later to reduce the block size back to >> something smaller, and henceforth the block size will never be touched >> again. >> >> On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn wrote= : >>> >> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more >>> importantly, >>> >> improve mining decentralization? >>> > >>> > >>> > Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in >>> taking >>> > part? >>> >>> As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur. >>> >>> > I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question. >>> >>> I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the opposite >>> question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been >>> (consciously or not) consistently evading. >>> But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few line= s >>> below. >>> >>> > When Bitcoin was >>> > new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are >>> millions of >>> > users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin. >>> >>> The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional >>> miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized >>> hardware production companies. >>> Nothing surprising there. >>> By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes >>> can cause less mining centralization. >>> >>> > Surely the correlation is obvious? >>> >>> Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that... >>> >>> >> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with >>> different >>> >> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare them, >>> I will >>> >> consider any value arbitrary. >>> > >>> > >>> > Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behind i= t >>> was >>> > well documented here: >>> > >>> > >>> http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more= -centralized >>> > >>> > I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 >>> gigabytes per >>> > month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month >>> data >>> > cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cprett= y good=E2=80=9D broadband >>> plan. >>> > >>> > Did you think 20mb was picked randomly? >>> >>> No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd >>> party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the >>> so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with >>> optimistic and by no means scientific expectations. >>> >>> But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning, >>> what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size >>> would be "too centralized" but another one isn't. >>> I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and >>> 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB >>> or 21 GB). >>> A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less >>> arbitrary. >>> >>> >> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influence of >>> >> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, equa= l >>> >> or worse mining centralization. >>> > >>> > >>> > I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go fr= om >>> > blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in >>> this time >>> > the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge >>> amount >>> > too. >>> >>> I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not about >>> actual blocksize. >>> Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to >>> appear and get those profits. >>> But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in the >>> number of miners" or with mining decentralization. >>> >>> > You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if a >>> miner >>> > mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as t= he >>> > miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can >>> switch >>> > between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst les= s >>> > pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. >>> getblocktemplate), >>> > and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say >>> there are >>> > many more miners than in the past. >>> > >>> > If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining >>> decentralisation: >>> > >>> > 1) Lower block size >>> >>> Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. >>> If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum >>> rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not putting >>> words in your mouth, right? >>> I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit >>> don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate. >>> >>> > 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a >>> > getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool >>> > >>> > then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more effectiv= e. >>> >>> Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we're >>> confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it. >>> >>> >> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limit >>> rather >>> >> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. >>> > >>> > >>> > I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really >>> be no >>> > limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and >>> nodes >>> > would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time >>> anyway. >>> > There is obviously a physical limit somewhere. >>> >>> Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size >>> maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced >>> your rejection of that idea at all? >>> >>> > But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. I= s >>> 8mb >>> > better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much: I think >>> Bitcoin >>> > adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase avera= ge >>> > usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for >>> others, >>> > that's OK by me. >>> >>> The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus limit or >>> not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule is a >>> tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not >>> caring about mining centralization at all. >>> Is that your position? >>> >>> If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit >>> transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your >>> "compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enough >>> until the limit is completely removed. >>> Is that your position? >>> >>> > Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider >>> if you >>> > like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR >>> > manufacturers or whoever. >>> >>> Yes, and I believe the same points stand. >>> >>> > My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only >>> currency AND >>> > all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. >>> It's a >>> > contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be >>> > interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it= . >>> >>> You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like if >>> non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would >>> automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. >>> Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a >>> "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobody >>> really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie >>> bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment >>> channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value >>> higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about here >>> so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this >>> discussion. >>> >>> What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would >>> (hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop >>> being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen, >>> non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero). >>> >>> You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree. >>> But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be >>> use cases that will be eventually priced out. >>> So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization >>> should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much >>> more secondary concern. >>> Do you agree with this? >>> >>> I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring more >>> about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a >>> consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring >>> about mining centralization at all". >>> I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don't >>> know what your position is. >>> I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't >>> care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not >>> (you just said that). >>> Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or >>> because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with >>> consensus rules at all? >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> --047d7b3432f43957b6051c7aae24 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Things apparently aren't bad enough to prevent the maj= ority from clamoring for larger blocks.

If the majority = agreed that things had got worse till this point, and that this was to be b= lamed on the block size, they would be campaigning for the other direction.= Even yourselves aren't asking for a reduction in the block size, as yo= u know full well that you would be laughed out.

On 4 August 2015 at 12:27, Pieter= Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:

I would say that things already demonst= rately got terrible. The mining landscape is very centralized, with apparen= tly a majority depending on agreements to trust each other's announced = blocks without validation. Full node count is at its historically lowest va= lue in years, and outsourcing of full validation keeps growing.

I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, p= eople would have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "= ;things kept working".

I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can= "work" with gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few= blockchain validation services, the same few online wallets, and mining is= done by a cartel that only allows joining after signing a contract so they= can sue you if you create an invalid block. Do you think people will then = agree that "things got demonstratebly worse"?

Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.=

--
Pieter

On Aug 4, 2015 1:04 PM, "Hector Chu via bit= coin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Mike&#= 39;s position is that he wants the block size limit to=C2=A0eventually=C2= =A0be=C2=A0removed. That is of course an extreme view. Meanwhile, your view= that the block size should be artificially constrained below the organic g= rowth curve (in a way that will penalize a majority of existing and future = users) lies at the other extreme. The majority position lies somewhere in b= etween (i.e. a one-time increase to 8MB). This is the position that ultimat= ely matters.

If the block size is increased to 8MB and t= hings get demonstrably a whole lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to= stand on. In that case we can always do another hard fork later to reduce = the block size back to something smaller, and henceforth the block size wil= l never be touched again.

On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike= Hearn <hearn@v= inumeris.com> wrote:
>> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more import= antly,
>> improve mining decentralization?
>
>
> Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is in taki= ng
> part?

As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur.

> I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question.

I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the op= posite
question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been
(consciously or not) consistently evading.
But that's also fine because I believe you finally answer it a few line= s below.

> When Bitcoin was
> new it had almost no users and almost no miners. Now there are million= s of
> users and factories producing ASICs just for Bitcoin.

The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized
hardware production companies.
Nothing surprising there.
By no means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes
can cause less mining centralization.

> Surely the correlation is obvious?

Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at that= ...

>> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run w= ith different
>> sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to somehow compare= them, I will
>> consider any value arbitrary.
>
>
> Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process behin= d it was
> well documented here:
>
> http://gavin= andresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-centralized=
>
> I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 gigabyte= s per
> month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 gigabytes per month da= ta
> cap=E2=80=93 so you can run a full node from home on a =E2=80=9Cpretty= good=E2=80=9D broadband plan.
>
> Did you think 20mb was picked randomly?

No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the
so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with=
optimistic and by no means scientific expectations.

But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning,<= br> what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size
would be "too centralized" but another one isn't.
I haven't read any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and<= br> 9GB for a given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB
or 21 GB).
A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it far less arbitr= ary.

>> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the influen= ce of
>> the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with bigger sizes, eq= ual
>> or worse mining centralization.
>
>
> I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin go= from
> blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often full, and in thi= s time
> the number of miners and hash power on the network has gone up a huge = amount
> too.

I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not abo= ut
actual blocksize.
Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, economic actors tend to
appear and get those profits.
But don't confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in= the
number of miners" or with mining decentralization.

> You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But if= a miner
> mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software and settings as th= e
> miner would have done anyway, then it makes no difference. Miners can = switch
> between pools to find one that works the way they like, so whilst less=
> pooling or more decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. getblocktempla= te),
> and I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say = there are
> many more miners than in the past.
>
> If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining decentralisatio= n:
>
> 1) Lower block size

Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size maximum=
rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not puttin= g
words in your mouth, right?
I think many users advocating for an increase in the consensus limit
don't understand this, which is extremely unfortunate for the debate.
> 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a
> getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool
>
> then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more e= ffective.

Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that we&= #39;re
confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing it.

>> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the limi= t rather
>> than changes towards bigger arbitrary values.
>
>
> I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not really b= e no
> limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit into RAM/swap, and no= des
> would just end up ignoring blocks they couldn't download in time a= nyway.
> There is obviously a physical limit somewhere.

Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size=
maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" influenced=
your rejection of that idea at all?

> But it is easier to find common ground with others by compromising. Is= 8mb
> better than no limit? I don't know and I don't care much:=C2= =A0 I think Bitcoin
> adoption is a slow, hard process and we'll be lucky to increase av= erage
> usage 8x over the next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for other= s,
> that's OK by me.

The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus l= imit or
not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum rule i= s a
tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same time is by not caring about mining centralization at all.
Is that your position?

If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit<= br> transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your
"compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enou= gh
until the limit is completely removed.
Is that your position?

> Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service provider i= f you
> like. Payment processors or cold storage providers or the TREZOR
> manufacturers or whoever.

Yes, and I believe the same points stand.

> My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only cur= rency AND
> all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin community is making. It= 's a
> contradiction. And without the infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be
> interesting even to people who are willing to pay huge sums to use it.=

You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like= if
non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, would
automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" Bitco= in.
Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a
"high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobod= y
really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily (ie
bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless payment
channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted value
higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking about her= e
so it seems distraction that can only help further polirizing this
discussion.

What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would
(hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they stop
being irrational about free transactions. If both things happen,
non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, above zero).

You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree.
But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will be
use cases that will be eventually priced out.
So when rising this consensus limit, not increasing centralization
should be the priority and the potential impact in market fees a much
more secondary concern.
Do you agree with this?

I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring mor= e
about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a
consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring=
about mining centralization at all".
I really don't want to put words in your mouth, but I honestly don'= t
know what your position is.
I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you don't=
care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all or not
(you just said that).
Is it because you don't think it limits mining centralization or
because you don't care about limiting mining centralization with
consensus rules at all?
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--047d7b3432f43957b6051c7aae24-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FC8D83D for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:59:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f177.google.com (mail-wi0-f177.google.com [209.85.212.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D70CC89 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 11:59:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibud3 with SMTP id ud3so173723612wib.1 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:59:57 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=MgK/DtJTsqVAet98EJvk2N9WDpk/21JAz0YldoE4tiA=; b=O2SjDOCLaCs25E0es3KDIXDo4+2QAmYSh1jMMipKhDhYjYDtUnAy2Z2Xp28c98Ie+k /CMp7vYAVHi9QCv0w3jEsO8oyKv4eTht8N5SIZ0Iivt4xfzdI5oFvkYJoy7eGaEvEkqh PsoNJhNfoT1U4/n+ZUdcDOPGL46b0ORFzbnK82z3IuNzFoEyugy5jvxyNRYULDtzk2FM CuspiWXPJAiqWAPurOEkdypavTrKI+kDHM++3dnyqvLCLrl9doOb2X0wyFcP6IanZJS7 1JqGbolWPNEG13N2W0Ii8LYE0abStrG5i9oAxLBy2d2qzqgbAfPUbYpC8kwn6kWRECxv 822g== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmsP7B1qXWayZL6uZDQ8646Y/ezjrJHyXlxeHtlTgHDAdn/klPZEDSGohDRUHhU2KkWOgkU MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.186.35 with SMTP id fh3mr44832949wic.7.1438689597333; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 04:59:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 04:59:57 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:59:57 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Hector Chu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 11:59:59 -0000 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 1:04 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > Mike's position is that he wants the block size limit to eventually be > removed. That is of course an extreme view. I prefer to wait and let him talk by himself. > Meanwhile, your view that the > block size should be artificially constrained below the organic growth curve > (in a way that will penalize a majority of existing and future users) lies > at the other extreme. That is not my position. Again, I don't know what the right blocksize for the short term is (I don't think anybody does). But I know that the maximum block size limit consensus rule (no more artificial than any other consensus rule, like, say, the one that prohibits double-spends) serves to limit mining centralization. Therefore how the change can affect mining centralization must be the main concern, instead of (also artificial) projections about usage growth (no matter how organic their curves look). Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily harmful and if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB. > The majority position lies somewhere in between (i.e. > a one-time increase to 8MB). This is the position that ultimately matters. I don't know where you get your "majority" from or what it even means (majority of users, majority of the coins, of miners?) But there's something I'm missing something there...why my position doesn't matter if it's not a majority? How is what the the majority has been told it's best an objective argument? > If the block size is increased to 8MB and things get demonstrably a whole > lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to stand on. In that case we can > always do another hard fork later to reduce the block size back to something > smaller, and henceforth the block size will never be touched again. Yes. And if we can "break things" in simulations first before we "break things" in production, maybe we don't need the later hardfork to "fix things" (if it's still possible to fix them without completely restarting the ASIC market). The fact is that we don't have a single simulation that can tell you "too centralized/shouldn't affect mining centralization much" for a given block size. So if you say 8, I must ask, why not 9? Why 9 MB is not safe for mining centralization but 8 MB is? There is NO criterion based on mining centralization to decide between 2 sizes in favor of the small one. It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectively any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its decentralization goals. I think its the proponents of a blocksize change who should propose such a criterion and now they have the tools to simulate different block sizes. I want us to simulate many blocksizes before rushing into a decision (specially because I disagree that taking a decision there is urgent in the first place). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.linuxfoundation.org (smtp2.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.36]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B7BD8D4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:11:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp2.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A0AC81DAA4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:11:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 10DB720DEA; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:12:39 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55C0ABC6.1020406@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 19:10:46 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Hector Chu , Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: OpenPGP: id=1CF07D66; url=pool.sks-keyservers.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_50,RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp2.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 12:11:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/04/2015 06:34 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Things apparently aren't bad enough to prevent the majority from > clamoring for larger blocks. > > If the majority agreed that things had got worse till this point, > and that this was to be blamed on the block size, they would be > campaigning for the other direction. Even yourselves aren't asking > for a reduction in the block size, as you know full well that you > would be laughed out. > Hector, if you could provide data that convinces why 8MB is better than 6.18MB or 1MB then we'd get out of the realm of opinion and pointless rhetoric that threatens to keep this debate in a quagmire. We'd have actual figures to work with and projections to go by. But fetching "majority" agreement (where from?) does not cut it for setting Bitcoin on a future path. If we go by that then we'd soon be giving coinbase rewards to users for being "loyal supporters" because, as a majority, they think that's what they'd like to see. If a proposal is demonstrably, and provably, a good idea - and a developer consensus agrees - then it should go to testing, and eventually, code. Other than that it's just conjecture and words without a research paper and data. In the final analysis, do we want Bitcoin to be steered by an uninformed and fickle majority, or do we want to use this list as a forum to present research proposals containing repeatable, verifiable facts? A progressive process of convincing those most familiar with Bitcoin's code and operation so they may implement Good Ideas during the next century and after is surely preferable to Vote-my-code-Coin. :) > On 4 August 2015 at 12:27, Pieter Wuille > wrote: > > I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The > mining landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority > depending on agreements to trust each other's announced blocks > without validation. Full node count is at its historically lowest > value in years, and outsourcing of full validation keeps growing. > > I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, people > would have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and > "things kept working". > > I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can "work" > with gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few > blockchain validation services, the same few online wallets, and > mining is done by a cartel that only allows joining after signing > a contract so they can sue you if you create an invalid block. Do > you think people will then agree that "things got demonstratebly > worse"? > > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. > > -- Pieter > > On Aug 4, 2015 1:04 PM, "Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev" > > wrote: > > Mike's position is that he wants the block size limit to > eventually be removed. That is of course an extreme view. > Meanwhile, your view that the block size should be artificially > constrained below the organic growth curve (in a way that will > penalize a majority of existing and future users) lies at the other > extreme. The majority position lies somewhere in between (i.e. a > one-time increase to 8MB). This is the position that ultimately > matters. > > If the block size is increased to 8MB and things get demonstrably > a whole lot worse, then you will have a solid leg to stand on. In > that case we can always do another hard fork later to reduce the > block size back to something smaller, and henceforth the block > size will never be touched again. > > On 4 August 2015 at 11:35, Jorge Timón > > wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Mike Hearn > wrote: >>> How more users or more nodes can bring more miners, or more >>> importantly, improve mining decentralization? >> >> >> Because the bigger the ecosystem is the more interest there is >> in taking part? > > As explained by Venzen, this is a non-sequitur. > >> I mean, I guess I don't know how to answer your question. > > I don't know the answer either, that's fine. It's the opposite > question that I've been insistently repeating and you've been > (consciously or not) consistently evading. But that's also fine > because I believe you finally answer it a few lines below. > >> When Bitcoin was new it had almost no users and almost no >> miners. Now there are millions of users and factories producing >> ASICs just for Bitcoin. > > The emergence of a btc price enabled the emergence of professional > miners, which in turn enabled the emergence of sha256d-specialized > hardware production companies. Nothing surprising there. By no > means it consitutes an example of how a bigger consensus sizes can > cause less mining centralization. > >> Surely the correlation is obvious? > > Correlation does not imply causation. I will better leave it at > that... > >>> I'm sorry, but until there's a simulation that I can run with >>> different sizes' testchains (for example using #6382) to >>> somehow compare them, I will consider any value arbitrary. >> >> >> Gavin did run simulations. 20mb isn't arbitrary, the process >> behind it was well documented here: >> >> http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-centralized > >> >> > >> I chose 20MB as a reasonable block size to target because 170 >> gigabytes per month comfortably fits into the typical 250-300 >> gigabytes per month data cap– so you can run a full node from >> home on a “pretty good” broadband plan. >> >> Did you think 20mb was picked randomly? > > No, I think 20 MB was chosen very optimistically, considering 3rd > party services rates (not the same service as self-hosting) in the > so-called "first world". And then 20 MB goes to 20 GB, again with > optimistic and by no means scientific expectations. > > But where the number comes from it's not really what I'm demaning, > what I want is some criterion that can tell you that a given size > would be "too centralized" but another one isn't. I haven't read > any analysis on why 8GB is a better option than 7GB and 9GB for a > given criterion (nor one declaring 20 GB a winner over 19 GB or 21 > GB). A simulation test passing 20 GB but not 21 GB would make it > far less arbitrary. > >>> Agreed on the first sentence, I'm just saying that the >>> influence of the blocksize in that function is monotonic: with >>> bigger sizes, equal or worse mining centralization. >> >> >> I have a hard time agreeing with this because I've seen Bitcoin >> go from blocks that were often empty to blocks that are often >> full, and in this time the number of miners and hash power on >> the network has gone up a huge amount too. > > I'm of course talking about consensus maximum blocksize, not about > actual blocksize. Yes, again, when mining becomes profitable, > economic actors tend to appear and get those profits. But don't > confuse total hashrate improvements with an "increase in the > number of miners" or with mining decentralization. > >> You can argue that a miner doesn't count if they pool mine. But >> if a miner mines on a pool that uses exactly the same software >> and settings as the miner would have done anyway, then it makes >> no difference. Miners can switch between pools to find one that >> works the way they like, so whilst less pooling or more >> decentralised pools would be nice (e.g. getblocktemplate), and >> I've written about how to push it forward before, I still say >> there are many more miners than in the past. >> >> If I had to pick between two changes to improve mining >> decentralisation: >> >> 1) Lower block size > > Finally, I think you finally answered my repetitive question here. > If I say "Mike Hearn understands that the consensus block size > maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" I'm not > putting words in your mouth, right? I think many users advocating > for an increase in the consensus limit don't understand this, which > is extremely unfortunate for the debate. > >> 2) Finishing, documenting, and making the UX really slick for a >> getblocktemplate based decentralised mining pool >> >> then I'd pick (2) in a heartbeat. I think it'd be a lot more >> effective. > > Great! Maybe after 2 mining centralization improves so much that > we're confortable not only not lowering it but rather increasing > it. > >>> you should be consequently advocating for full removal of the >>> limit rather than changes towards bigger arbitrary values. >> >> >> I did toy with that idea a while ago. Of course there can not >> really be no limit at all because the code assumes blocks fit >> into RAM/swap, and nodes would just end up ignoring blocks they >> couldn't download in time anyway. There is obviously a physical >> limit somewhere. > > Did the fact that you "understand that the consensus block size > maximum rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" > influenced your rejection of that idea at all? > >> But it is easier to find common ground with others by >> compromising. Is 8mb better than no limit? I don't know and I >> don't care much: I think Bitcoin adoption is a slow, hard >> process and we'll be lucky to increase average usage 8x over the >> next couple of years. So if 8mb+ is better for others, that's OK >> by me. > > The only way that "not caring much whther we have a consensus > limit or not" and "understand that the consensus block size maximum > rule is a tool for limitting mining centralization" at the same > time is by not caring about mining centralization at all. Is that > your position? > > If you don't care about having a limit but you don't want to limit > transaction volume, then ++current_size will ALWAYs be your > "compromise position" and no blocksize increase will ever be enough > until the limit is completely removed. Is that your position? > >> Re: exchange profit. You can pick some other useful service >> provider if you like. Payment processors or cold storage >> providers or the TREZOR manufacturers or whoever. > > Yes, and I believe the same points stand. > >> My point is you can't have a tiny high-value-transactions only >> currency AND all the useful infrastructure that the Bitcoin >> community is making. It's a contradiction. And without the >> infrastructure bitcoin ceases to be interesting even to people >> who are willing to pay huge sums to use it. > > You keep talking about "high-value-transactions-only" like if > non-urgent transaction fees rising from zero to, say, 1 satoshi, > would automatically result in that "high-value-transactions-only" > Bitcoin. Please, stop talking as if someone was proposing a > "high-value-transactions-only" Bitcoin. That may happen but nobody > really knows. If it happens it may not be bad thing necessarily > (ie bitcoin microtransactions can still happen using trustless > payment channels and x is still cheaper than x% for any transacted > value higher than 100) but that's really not what we're talking > about here so it seems distraction that can only help further > polirizing this discussion. > > What we're talking about here is that hitting the limit would > (hopefully) make miners start caring about fees. Enough that they > stop being irrational about free transactions. If both things > happen, non-urgent transaction fees will likely rise (as said, > above zero). > > You think that would be a catastrophe for adoption and I disagree. > But (as Pieter has repeatedly explained) for any size there will > be use cases that will be eventually priced out. So when rising > this consensus limit, not increasing centralization should be the > priority and the potential impact in market fees a much more > secondary concern. Do you agree with this? > > I'm sure there are many intermediate positions between "caring more > about mining centralization than market fees when deciding about a > consensus rule that limits mining centralization" and "not caring > about mining centralization at all". I really don't want to put > words in your mouth, but I honestly don't know what your position > is. I don't really know how else can I ask the same question: you > don't care the consensus maximum blocksize rule being here at all > or not (you just said that). Is it because you don't think it > limits mining centralization or because you don't care about > limiting mining centralization with consensus rules at all? > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev > mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev > mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev > mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVwKvEAAoJEGwAhlQc8H1m2g4H/i3jcap3C1mt5hG964EWlF42 MC6/P23MWI6o5AO7Ugz6m35IDO+ZfegY3VlAmAaq0KSwKEoZSWV/FIPQPpVOCGeP CdIGw4M+Q//kRBaxNEnfC3gM7IYHRFfOEwZtVsda5vriem+Yjb4Fk+YoXyONI2j1 0GqmPAIJ5+eA1H/t541/lUDHVzLyymlsWX34MIjX1BWnKQaap+eaMHucu+DrcRHd GltkKrqRQ/Hngv7PtaQGTPjUHrQglHISl6BMXNMbmxoEHg2RfrRwifiJGnDmEty6 l/Yve6slLtaQA+SIyAun79SUU5+QJOOWDxU2PlXQTRldx+0YQJ60L0GanQ5CHc8= =EarG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D9C5D8C7 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:19:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f54.google.com (mail-la0-f54.google.com [209.85.215.54]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ACB4412A for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 12:19:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labsr2 with SMTP id sr2so5863749lab.2 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 05:19:38 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=qTkAHf8Mx0OhO5ywQ80keceuTgtkTvcbLWxATTRdNIA=; b=hKts86MoE8+EF1c9ooct+89MlGHEFcZKr3ZQ6RmJt5YaNIhPkVTJngzjywYgciPGQ9 XDrTt4+1ovlEBiA48FA8B6yP5KwVD/EBTl/gfH5wVgJCM8DCRwTc9mj9Hz9FVxdB7FEm uTATDArVZmpx3Ldmfxh91ZwJdeqhexMxDQSEQpx5VVvlx/YvNwiLZSx3s8+j4TL6BXLk yMq0udPoWTCxJuime5fzXApPEA8JnsFwV412YU6wNHreBbVC8wvVl8iVrfG+7FjzVxfa a3oLltzs8nvkhfTeqbPXW0jZiTevw3T5+FioWbdK4auEwzGOBJlTrUlGv3ifWJLdy2i2 8ZmA== X-Received: by 10.152.10.148 with SMTP id i20mr2986947lab.63.1438690777986; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 05:19:37 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 05:19:18 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Hector Chu Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:19:18 +0100 Message-ID: To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11331df0c37d6e051c7b4c66 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 12:19:41 -0000 --001a11331df0c37d6e051c7b4c66 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 4 August 2015 at 12:59, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > That is not my position. Again, I don't know what the right blocksize > for the short term is (I don't think anybody does). > You have no position (i.e. neutral). In other words, keeping the existing limit. > Therefore how the change can affect mining centralization must be the > main concern, instead of (also artificial) projections about usage > growth (no matter how organic their curves look). > The degree of mining decentralization is only one of many concerns. Users' main concern is timely confirmation of low-fee transactions. Miners' concern is the amount of profit they make. > Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily harmful and > if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more > harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB. > The limit won't even get to be hit, because all the users that get thrown out of Bitcoin will have moved over to a system supporting a larger block size. I don't know where you get your "majority" from or what it even means > (majority of users, majority of the coins, of miners?) > The majority which the miners are beholden to is the economic majority. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Economic_majority > But there's something I'm missing something there...why my position > doesn't matter if it's not a majority? > Your position is only one of many and it does not carry excess weight to the others. Individually it won't matter, because you can't control the implementation that other people run. > How is what the the majority has been told it's best an objective argumen= t? > Don't fight the market. The way the system is designed, the miners will follow along with what the economic majority have decided. So if you say 8, I must ask, why not 9? > Why 9 MB is not safe for mining centralization but 8 MB is? > 8MB has simply been the focal point for this debate. 9MB is also safe if 8MB is, but I suppose the opponents will be even less happy with 9 than with 8, and we don't want to unnecessarily increase the conflict. It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and > the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining > centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are > willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectively > any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its > decentralization goals. > A one-time increase to 8MB is safer than a dynamically growing limit over time for exactly this reason. Admittedly whenever the next debate to increase the block size over 8MB happens it will be even more painful and non-obvious, but that is the safety check to prevent unbounded block size increase. --001a11331df0c37d6e051c7b4c66 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On 4= August 2015 at 12:59, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> wr= ote:
That is not my position. Again, I do= n't know what the right blocksize
for the short term is (I don't think anybody does).

You have no position (i.e. neutral). In other words, keepi= ng the existing limit.
=C2=A0
Therefore how the change can affect mining centralization must be the
main concern, instead of (also artificial) projections about usage
growth (no matter how organic their curves look).

=
The degree of mining decentralization is only one of many concer= ns. Users' main concern is timely confirmation of low-fee transactions.= Miners' concern is the amount of profit they make.
=C2=A0
Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily ha= rmful and
if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more
harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB.

=
The limit won't even get to be hit, because all the users that get= thrown out of Bitcoin will have moved over to a system supporting a larger= block size.

I don't= know where you get your "majority" from or what it even means (majority of users, majority of the coins, of miners?)

The majority which the miners are beholden to is the econom= ic majority.
=C2=A0<= /div>
But there's something I'm missing something there...why my position=
doesn't matter if it's not a majority?

Your position is only one of many and it does not carry excess weig= ht to the others. Individually it won't matter, because you can't c= ontrol the implementation that other people run.
=C2=A0
How is what the the majority has been told it's best an objective argum= ent?

Don't fight the market. The wa= y the system is designed, the miners will follow along with what the econom= ic majority have decided.

It seems like= the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and
the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining
centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are
willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectiv= ely
any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its
decentralization goals.

A one-time incr= ease to 8MB is safer than a dynamically growing limit over time for exactly= this reason. Admittedly whenever the next debate to increase the block siz= e over 8MB happens it will be even more painful and non-obvious, but that i= s the safety check to prevent unbounded block size increase.
--001a11331df0c37d6e051c7b4c66-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6CA7589F for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:12:39 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f47.google.com (mail-la0-f47.google.com [209.85.215.47]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 567ED195 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:12:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labgo9 with SMTP id go9so6897145lab.3 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:12:36 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=8S4tO5pIWzH90rw2XSssKIB6ZkZty9J3tK7Dym5HJn4=; b=kCYX+3ie9xWIFt41sQT+SPAqPgVphJIo/zkNIUC4+NuDN+/HPqqY/qJDdLqK9QXzKd m7Mjq3Jv3jstfLgRwV9CiJocSPwIY5p9+IUffnIRk3VZrpu+0QtdBqeL50RRY+JlUr/w jzWyGGwUtx2gk1B7pDMndAVZFIE2ckbfI98xgWFIG5822A60RMo0xpStrGEemQMlXuCK dMrbNv+tuKJsYsP8wuNL3HXdPkOxtBKS4K0tB3EQn2XDuM/NrI7rpVshJSMLKOylF7jm wP6KFJaTxI7s55p3d7ZircdkJhqz0eNGHg/IGWGFOCGn3/FvbfQGONrac9/0ncfL0N+/ P6aA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.139.131 with SMTP id qy3mr3415321lbb.4.1438693956380; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:12:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 06:12:36 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 09:12:36 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c33ffa35ed61051c7c0a6d X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:12:39 -0000 --001a11c33ffa35ed61051c7c0a6d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The mining > landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depending on > agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validation. > And that is a problem... why? As far as I can tell, nobody besides miners running old and/or buggy software lost money due to outsourced mining validation (please correct me if I'm wrong-- I'm looking forward to Greg's post-mortem). The operators of bitcoin.org seem to have freaked out and pushed the panic button (with dire warnings of not trusting transactions until 20 confirmations), but theymos was well known for using an old, patched version of Core for blockexplorer.com so maybe that's not surprising. As Bitcoin grows, pieces of the ecosystem will specialize. Satoshi's original code did everything: hashing, block assembly, wallet, consensus, network. That is changing, and that is OK. I understand there are parts of the ecosystem you'd rather not see specialized, like transaction selection / block assembly or validation. I see it as a natural maturation. The only danger I see is if some unnatural barriers to competition spring up. > Full node count is at its historically lowest value in years, and outsourcing of full validation keeps growing. Both side effects of increasing specialization, in my opinion. Many companies quite reasonably would rather hire somebody who specializes in running nodes, keeping keys secure, etc rather than develop that expertise themselves. Again, not a problem UNLESS some unnatural barriers to competition spring up. > I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, people would > have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "things kept > working". > > I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can "work" with > gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few blockchain validation > services, the same few online wallets, and mining is done by a cartel that > only allows joining after signing a contract so they can sue you if you > create an invalid block. Do you think people will then agree that "things > got demonstratebly worse"? > > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. > > Why is what you, personally, find interesting relevant? I understand you want to build an extremely decentralized system, where everybody participating trusts nothing except the genesis block hash. I think it is more interesting to build a system that works for hundreds of millions of people, with no central point of control and the opportunity for ANYBODY to participate at any level. Permission-less innovation is what I find interesting. And I think the current "demonstrably terrible" Bitcoin system is still INCREDIBLY interesting. -- -- Gavin Andresen --001a11c33ffa35ed61051c7c0a6d Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= ue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

I would say that things already demo= nstrately got terrible. The mining landscape is very centralized, with appa= rently a majority depending on agreements to trust each other's announc= ed blocks without validation.

And that is a problem...= why?

As far as I can tell, nobody besides miners = running old and/or buggy software lost money due to outsourced mining valid= ation (please correct me if I'm wrong-- I'm looking forward to Greg= 's post-mortem). The operators of bitcoi= n.org seem to have freaked out and pushed the panic button (with dire w= arnings of not trusting transactions until 20 confirmations), but theymos w= as well known for using an old, patched version of Core for blockexplorer.com so maybe that's not surpris= ing.

As Bitcoin grows, pieces of the ecosyste= m will specialize. Satoshi's original code did everything: hashing, blo= ck assembly, wallet, consensus, network. That is changing, and that is OK.<= /div>

I understand there are parts of the ecosyste= m you'd rather not see specialized, like transaction selection / block = assembly or validation. I see it as a natural maturation. The only danger I= see is if some unnatural barriers to competition spring up.

=
> Full node count is at its historically lowest value in year= s, and outsourcing of full validation keeps growing.

Both side effects of increasing specialization, in my opinion. Many comp= anies quite reasonably would rather hire somebody who specializes in runnin= g nodes, keeping keys secure, etc rather than develop that expertise themse= lves.

Again, not a problem UNLESS some unnatural b= arriers to competition spring up.
=C2=A0

I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, p= eople would have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "= ;things kept working".

I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can= "work" with gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few= blockchain validation services, the same few online wallets, and mining is= done by a cartel that only allows joining after signing a contract so they= can sue you if you create an invalid block. Do you think people will then = agree that "things got demonstratebly worse"?

Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.=

Why is what you, person= ally, find interesting relevant?

=
I understand you want to build an extremely dece= ntralized system, where everybody participating trusts nothing except the g= enesis block hash.

I think it is more interesting to build a system that works fo= r hundreds of millions of people, with no central point of control and the = opportunity for ANYBODY to participate at any level. Permission-less innova= tion is what I find interesting.

And I think the current "demon= strably terrible" Bitcoin system is still INCREDIBLY interesting.

--
--
Gav= in Andresen
--001a11c33ffa35ed61051c7c0a6d-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FB3F8D4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:13:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f179.google.com (mail-wi0-f179.google.com [209.85.212.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C054D1A3 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:13:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so165867021wib.0 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:13:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=RnY3R4rIGJYyGijSsdX40RRDj9SdQNi74qXCdkxUm2A=; b=HQ37KxbC9+rhlbwVFffjz8NABxx0UOmmBv+HUIHBagcqP2y1GzckxbiZGyhlkdCChr kAzhv8hk9zgahoY5RjHd0eqLWUlKC1sgTZI4vQiqq5HjgkTY2mgvRMhuCWsXX0e34jOH C+wb1/24SA676A8pyXmZ2IPnv/N6uCS9pku7tbyYTgeUgeWS+uBJPVplyWtS59mmkE7T YAp6wdpp3CA5yczCNFXDasIxNBpfJuOdX62g8Kf1vTdKOAVeLmXtOBqj/A3Rv4fZeISt zvgfHEQu6l++mts1KqfJ90evEeFvbxwqmAjz4XKy4scbVdZ5uXXohvU5ZchfpJzHyjhc Fkww== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlw3OPlQopsOOvHzdILtJ0l6s3uXwKXJ4UVI5tg70fOGKevsDRRZZTS/K3A9NgMJuQYmnh4 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.122.97 with SMTP id lr1mr8016691wjb.26.1438694034431; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:13:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 06:13:54 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 15:13:54 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Hector Chu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:13:56 -0000 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 1:34 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > Things apparently aren't bad enough to prevent the majority from clamoring > for larger blocks. Nobody is preventing anyone from claiming anything. Some developers are encouraging users to ask for bigger blocks. Others don't want to impose consensus rule changes against the will of the users (even if they're 10% of the users). Still, "Things apparently aren't bad enough" is just your opinion. > If the majority agreed that things had got worse till this point, and that > this was to be blamed on the block size, they would be campaigning for the > other direction. Even yourselves aren't asking for a reduction in the block > size, as you know full well that you would be laughed out. 1) I don't care what the so-called "majority" thinks: I don't want to impose consensus rule changes against the will of a reasonable minority. 2) It doesn't matter who is to blame about the current centralization: the fact remains that the blocksize maximum is the only** consensus rule to limit mining centralization. 3) In fact I think Luke Dashjr proposed to reduced it to 400 KB, but I would ask the same thing: please create a simulation in which the change is better (or at least no much worse) than the current rules by ANY metric. Please read the point 2 with special attention because it's not the first time I say this in this thread. ** There's also the maximum block sigops consensus rule to limit mining centralization. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D079C8C7 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:28:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f44.google.com (mail-la0-f44.google.com [209.85.215.44]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2EF5A1C4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:28:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lady2 with SMTP id y2so3331720lad.0 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:28:54 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=QtP8eewUs9YOcDMjeH3YQ5XT/j9fG9HU3doqUqebnFo=; b=zbfmFceGp+wEptJewWoBzyg2RikuL/n/W3l5K04cNvc06fYQdEcU0hlFs7BDcofXfF /Wwu35HqisrrJx1o+TxZsQ6khPl1MboATr+KUcedCLDzdkg16B+NZ7kqRB2AnFQWIRf4 rfBfxtFFVyCZ99/AoZP6qm79I0ySWOOqoDAfdd+qttc0OlISoqd1PiYNnwLyjzoUnMAs 6WhNFxF5A8p+MLUudrTmC3FQW7xMQdZxjM4dEq2VQdBn6yjW8aDtHieRKuln0GvWstJY WgEjT1ozzNSxWvMggcyMJBcWYIsGywzPgsDlH/tBybXKiNixNH4o0NfswCKyiVRUtEDz DiFg== X-Received: by 10.152.182.194 with SMTP id eg2mr3430484lac.71.1438694934249; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:28:54 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 06:28:34 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Hector Chu Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:28:34 +0100 Message-ID: To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113491f27f072a051c7c44a8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:28:57 -0000 --001a113491f27f072a051c7c44a8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 4 August 2015 at 14:13, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > 2) It doesn't matter who is to blame about the current centralization: > the fact remains that the blocksize maximum is the only** consensus > rule to limit mining centralization. > Repeating a claim ad-nauseum doesn't make it necessarily true. A block size limit won't prevent miners in the future from buying each other out. --001a113491f27f072a051c7c44a8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On 4= August 2015 at 14:13, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> wr= ote:
2) It doesn't matter who is to b= lame about the current centralization:
the fact remains that the blocksize maximum is the only** consensus
rule to limit mining centralization.

Repeating a claim ad-nauseum doesn't make it nece= ssarily true. A block size limit won't prevent miners in the future fro= m buying each other out.=C2=A0
--001a113491f27f072a051c7c44a8-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7E8DD8D9 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:34:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22AE61A1 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:34:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 95F4520DFD for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 15:35:56 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55C0BF4B.3090100@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 20:34:03 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: OpenPGP: id=1CF07D66; url=pool.sks-keyservers.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:34:11 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/04/2015 07:19 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On 4 August 2015 at 12:59, Jorge Timón > wrote: > So if you say 8, I must ask, why not 9? Why 9 MB is not safe for > mining centralization but 8 MB is? > > > 8MB has simply been the focal point for this debate. 9MB is also > safe if 8MB is, but I suppose the opponents will be even less > happy with 9 than with 8, and we don't want to unnecessarily > increase the conflict. > Jorge will answer for himself, but you know that saying "9MB is also safe if 8MB is" blows your position. Do you, or me, or XT know that 8MB is "safe"? You say 9MB must then also be "safe" - there has been no fact for me to grasp and from which to tell a Bitcoin trading whale group: "here's the bottom line: this is what it means and these are the implications." They hold significant amounts of bitcoin and want to see a plan, and a strategy based on facts. I can assure you, they're not going to XT, it lacks both a strategy and the seasoned developers present here. > It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and > the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining > centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are > willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be > effectively any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably > fail in its decentralization goals. > > > A one-time increase to 8MB is safer than a dynamically growing > limit over time for exactly this reason. Admittedly whenever the > next debate to increase the block size over 8MB happens it will be > even more painful and non-obvious, but that is the safety check to > prevent unbounded block size increase. You're articulate and you raise valid issues, but your judgment of "safer" is not based on anything you or this list can refer to as a comparator. It seems you want 8MB for some ideological reason but if you examine your motive and compare it to the facts, you'll find that many people in this list are ultimately correct in saying that: Whatever blocksize is set to, demand will soon fill it. This is the nature of resource supply inflation - some business plan will spot the opportunity and exploit it, colonize it and then we deal with that, with some big-girls'-blouses exclaiming: "if we don't give them what they want they're all going to leave to XT or ZT!" Even though XT and ZT perfectly fulfill the needs of certain ambitious businesses, the creators would rather see it happen on Core's blockchain. Else why do they still come posit arguments here? Fortunately, unlike the principle that applies in finance capital, Bitcoin capacity supply doesn't have be increased on demand (not without rigorous testing and evaluation) plus there is no maxim here that "the customer is always right". The maxim is "be your own bank" - during some periods it might be a slow bank but it _will_ remain decentralized and it _will_ remain your own - not compromised to some big business or mining cartel. We want to compromise to science and reason, not profit motive or democratic lobbying, right? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVwL80AAoJEGwAhlQc8H1mTVsH/3mdA4XrrRaBx7m/SckufNUu OWJF/TPuEb0e3/A+OKNvYJgGtkZ9+8pQe2hQK2F1NxFG8QbbIPFXb4PYIiEnU8by LMMNuDFfZXq0MEyTXXHgNj+XBSR74QKceXD4KM3jVeuieXE2KXGOyeiUD7Tjx0Gv fyNAM4rhxmipGFu9kmnI6Bm25I4FBzif+ARQSWNmdZQn2bPkFrK0/Q4s/CyXngbb S/DiPJ7XZrBJ2ogQycVmA4QesOyz30FpQ+QMt5nFUWma3LpLoYEBPtJd8rsG773i acqSrOXxgfcGtNfbBU0xeTO/FOO4tXtbDVHBTKCBLZ5MgmBOYcm6OTLAwpeHlYY= =WhnR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 922948DD for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:37:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f180.google.com (mail-wi0-f180.google.com [209.85.212.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A2ABB1A6 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:37:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibud3 with SMTP id ud3so177640756wib.1 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:37:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=2EjMJr8mwiCDBReYHOmBXZz3FpfsWgC96TNDcl+7hpc=; b=gagQLMusbGNeG+xEmWpXhHH0ThqQpHvgXGdBerKUXYVxVAvb1Kj9QQieyyvp1PhYlL yrI8n2Qm6mbv+10nM+ANme7A1Fvf1i4eUU0qfpETDcyIOc2dt/wb72Fni1s/YCB2tjvI rslaq0uoLNhNXrCqlW02e5AUcW/YgIYTy6igIEhrMZebVMsbDoorf+joDAYoduoCvBrQ 93NL0XHb23upwqcOxCqyCBpG5l06O7CQAcYbA7muPXRFFuGpYOaz0jRVQEPFNF6gL1d5 3U+dlKytSvDRR8u1nlm9ggN5GAhaOUSZnKn8LtFhbCtrAJ7SmBvJVJCGTKs/tIdPS/po sTJQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlK60VAa3zAD28JJc89XHS9MYGl3gPM8jwiLvcoa1HFBLnKqR5T5MZIzXVXN1IKQIRG28CH MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.109.106 with SMTP id hr10mr46627906wib.58.1438695470186; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:37:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 06:37:49 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 15:37:49 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Hector Chu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:37:52 -0000 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 2:19 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > On 4 August 2015 at 12:59, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: >> >> That is not my position. Again, I don't know what the right blocksize >> for the short term is (I don't think anybody does). > > You have no position (i.e. neutral). In other words, keeping the existing > limit. No, I think 1 MB is just as arbitrary as any other size proposed. All I want is for consensus change proponents to try harder to convince other users (including me) >> Therefore how the change can affect mining centralization must be the >> main concern, instead of (also artificial) projections about usage >> growth (no matter how organic their curves look). > > > The degree of mining decentralization is only one of many concerns. Users= ' > main concern is timely confirmation of low-fee transactions. Miners' conc= ern > is the amount of profit they make. No, if the changed rule only serves to limit centralization, then how that limitation to centralization is affected should be the first thing to consider. If miners' concern was only the amount of profit they make they wouldn't mine free transactions already. You cannot possibly know what all users' are concern about, so I will just ignore any further claim in that direction. Talk for yourself: your arguments won't be more reasonable just because you claim that all users think like you do. >> Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily harmful and >> if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more >> harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB. > > > The limit won't even get to be hit, because all the users that get thrown > out of Bitcoin will have moved over to a system supporting a larger block > size. I disagree with this wild prediction as well. >> I don't know where you get your "majority" from or what it even means >> (majority of users, majority of the coins, of miners?) > > > The majority which the miners are beholden to is the economic majority. > https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Economic_majority And I assume the way that vaguely defined "economic majority" communicates with you through a crystal ball or something >> But there's something I'm missing something there...why my position >> doesn't matter if it's not a majority? > > > Your position is only one of many and it does not carry excess weight to = the > others. Individually it won't matter, because you can't control the > implementation that other people run. No more, but not less either. Nobody can't control the implementation that I (or other people concerned with centralization) run either. >> How is what the the majority has been told it's best an objective >> argument? > > > Don't fight the market. The way the system is designed, the miners will > follow along with what the economic majority have decided. How is allowing fees from rising above zero "fighting the market"? The system is currently designed with a 1 MB limit. I don't think that's sacred or anything, but I really don't feel like I'm fighting "the market" or "the way the system is designed". In any case, what do "the market" and "the way the system is designed" have to do with what the majority have been told it's best (which you seem to think should be a source of truth for some reason I'm still missing)? >> So if you say 8, I must ask, why not 9? >> Why 9 MB is not safe for mining centralization but 8 MB is? > > > 8MB has simply been the focal point for this debate. 9MB is also safe if = 8MB > is, but I suppose the opponents will be even less happy with 9 than with = 8, > and we don't want to unnecessarily increase the conflict. Why 9 MB is safe but 10 MB isn't? The "conflict" won't be resolved by evading hard questions... >> It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and >> the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining >> centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are >> willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectively >> any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its >> decentralization goals. > > > A one-time increase to 8MB is safer than a dynamically growing limit over > time for exactly this reason. Admittedly whenever the next debate to > increase the block size over 8MB happens it will be even more painful and > non-obvious, but that is the safety check to prevent unbounded block size > increase. Will there ever be a debate that results in "further blocksize increases at this point are very risky for mining centralization"? How will we tell then? Can't we use the same criteria now? From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E37AB8EA for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:42:41 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1A6961B4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:42:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DBD8F20E04; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 15:44:23 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55C0C146.7060101@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 20:42:30 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Hector Chu , Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:42:42 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/04/2015 08:28 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On 4 August 2015 at 14:13, Jorge Timón > wrote: > > 2) It doesn't matter who is to blame about the current > centralization: the fact remains that the blocksize maximum is the > only** consensus rule to limit mining centralization. > > > Repeating a claim ad-nauseum doesn't make it necessarily true. A > block size limit won't prevent miners in the future from buying > each other out. > It plays both ways, the technical list requires a proof of concept and simulation upon which to base judgment going forward, else we'll just be talking out our backsides (like certain people) without making any progress. The tools for simulation exist: Jorge Timon created a variable blocksize regtest PR here: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6382 No-one needs to postulate what different blocksizes imply - anyone can run a simulation and demonstrate what they're talking about. > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing > list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVwMFEAAoJEGwAhlQc8H1mo/EH/2USw5YUL/7sgFAsjpXdpcS+ 9XZ0M0AK4PNSo36GBBhjaF9rRa76FtK6Vt9nLe+7lgYmeHSkcQ65OLKfP47hCnsz 9XfVR0n7nv+0TqHQKPcjm+WNBoVndKRHGEwNQoQw//bAmO4LOcmQCMXAkk9RfaKm 4olay0nUmAFNqh/7wVOunOUFMJNIRpy/neAlFYxRAHBIJLcc0KQNiLqAHbzwPDZq e9kLjtIusWwLUCgHFvox01bIEOx+VYIxzjMVRz1MNGyRGwDweg7zk54WA48nYwmx 70Ggdde9kiLytPDwB2ey/IRE4mv/4KS2zivJy36XAsjPExTNeGKxGeGfBqXNwSI= =aya4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 63C9A8E4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:54:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f182.google.com (mail-ig0-f182.google.com [209.85.213.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFC1F1BF for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:54:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igk11 with SMTP id 11so93151428igk.1 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:54:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=wEbjTf9OB0WbBPkdn7u+0Cpw0+kkLqbUtiPSUWM8kSA=; b=Ly3mqV/lYsmJK5eUKr0wpDS3TncCG23iIjpE4EKVt45tIzNWXR13YCahcu89cx2i8a 8uARYw/WoLEgf7+EplyKLmnQUNCgVIY3wuOEROXW1wic2DrKOGow8muEJKeqn9/QUO1V itCMwCwHlaQG64g397UKHFJBOasVxLLsZtNdwL62yUGpp32uhKxLKpczNRDc2z3EnFlA jK+IziMlbjn2vAZpaUzMvychpZk1NpSXNFVN+gRVLiLls2pmdZEqs9Kmi0ahl8C1Nj7l rBf3HyWpLA4ZWNEmbKPFnk9axrm96oaFoxKwWQg9l2pMthttDvlOovr1osabJgRKcXDG i03A== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.93.69 with SMTP id cs5mr28164799igb.4.1438696487247; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 06:54:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 06:54:47 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 15:54:47 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01537ed80fe5e7051c7ca156 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 13:54:48 -0000 --089e01537ed80fe5e7051c7ca156 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 3:12 PM, Gavin Andresen wrote: > On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The mining >> landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depending on >> agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validation. >> > And that is a problem... why? > If miners need to form alliances of trusting each other's blocks without validation to overcome the inefficiencies of slow block propagation, I think we have a system that is in direct conflict with the word "permissionless" that you use later. > As Bitcoin grows, pieces of the ecosystem will specialize. Satoshi's > original code did everything: hashing, block assembly, wallet, consensus, > network. That is changing, and that is OK. > Specialization is perfectly fine. > > I believe that if the above would have happened overnight, people would > have cried wolf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "things kept > working". > > I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can "work" with > gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few blockchain validation > services, the same few online wallets, and mining is done by a cartel that > only allows joining after signing a contract so they can sue you if you > create an invalid block. Do you think people will then agree that "things > got demonstratebly worse"? > > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. > Why is what you, personally, find interesting relevant? > I find it interesting to build a system that has potential to bring about innovation. I understand you want to build an extremely decentralized system, where > everybody participating trusts nothing except the genesis block hash. > That is not true, I'm sorry if that is the impression I gave. I see centralization and scalability as a trade-off, and for better or for worse, the block chain only offers one trade-off. I want to see technology built on top that introduces lower levels of trust than typical fully centralized systems, while offering increased convenience, speed, reliability, and scale. I just don't think that all of that can happen on the lowest layer without hurting everything built on top. We need different trade-offs, and the blockchain is just one, but a very fundamental one. I think it is more interesting to build a system that works for hundreds of > millions of people, with no central point of control and the opportunity > for ANYBODY to participate at any level. Permission-less innovation is what > I find interesting. > That sounds amazing, but do you think that Bitcoin, as it exists today, can scale to hundreds of millions of users, while retaining any glimpse of permission-lessness and decentralization? I think we need low-trust off-chain systems and other innovations to make that happen. > And I think the current "demonstrably terrible" Bitcoin system is still > INCREDIBLY interesting. > I'm happy for you, then. -- Pieter --089e01537ed80fe5e7051c7ca156 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 3:12 PM, Gavin Andresen <g= avinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
=
=
On T= ue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

I would say that things already demo= nstrately got terrible. The mining landscape is very centralized, with appa= rently a majority depending on agreements to trust each other's announc= ed blocks without validation.

And that is a pro= blem... why?

If min= ers need to form alliances of trusting each other's blocks without vali= dation to overcome the inefficiencies of slow block propagation, I think we= have a system that is in direct conflict with the word "permissionles= s" that you use later.
=C2=A0
As Bitcoin grows, pieces of the ecosystem will specialize. Satoshi&#= 39;s original code did everything: hashing, block assembly, wallet, consens= us, network. That is changing, and that is OK.

Specialization is perfectly fin= e.

I believe= that if the above would have happened overnight, people would have cried w= olf. But somehow it happened slow enough, and "things kept working&quo= t;.

I don't think that this is a good criterion. Bitcoin can= "work" with gigabyte blocks today, if everyone uses the same few= blockchain validation services, the same few online wallets, and mining is= done by a cartel that only allows joining after signing a contract so they= can sue you if you create an invalid block. Do you think people will then = agree that "things got demonstratebly worse"?

Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.=

Why is what you, personally, find i= nteresting relevant?

I find it = interesting to build a system that has potential to bring about innovation.=

I understand you want to build an extremely decentralized = system, where everybody participating trusts nothing except the genesis blo= ck hash.

That is not true, I= 9;m sorry if that is the impression I gave.

I see central= ization and scalability as a trade-off, and for better or for worse, the bl= ock chain only offers one trade-off. I want to see technology built on top = that introduces lower levels of trust than typical fully centralized system= s, while offering increased convenience, speed, reliability, and scale. I j= ust don't think that all of that can happen on the lowest layer without= hurting everything built on top. We need different trade-offs, and the blo= ckchain is just one, but a very fundamental one.

I think it is= more interesting to build a system that works for hundreds of millions of = people, with no central point of control and the opportunity for ANYBODY to= participate at any level. Permission-less innovation is what I find intere= sting.

That sounds amazing,= but do you think that Bitcoin, as it exists today, can scale to hundreds o= f millions of users, while retaining any glimpse of permission-lessness and= decentralization? I think we need low-trust off-chain systems and other in= novations to make that happen.


And I think the current &q= uot;demonstrably terrible" Bitcoin system is still INCREDIBLY interest= ing.

I'm happy for you, the= n.

--
Pieter

--089e01537ed80fe5e7051c7ca156-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 889838F5 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:30:55 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9FEF61D4 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:30:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A366B20E0D; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 16:32:33 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55C0CC90.9040903@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 21:30:40 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Gavin Andresen , Bitcoin Dev References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 14:30:55 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/04/2015 08:12 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The > mining landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority > depending on agreements to trust each other's announced blocks > without validation. > > And that is a problem... why? > > As far as I can tell, [snip] It's a big problem. What are you dismissing it for? With Bitcoin in fledgling 0.x version state this is neither desirable nor encouraging. Development did not freeze at some time in the past and now we see how the userbase reacts. Miners, btw, are arguibly still a class of user as long as they are guaranteed coinbase. When they start making and proving themselves useful in a free floating fee market absent coinbase subsidy, we can revisit this topic, with the benefit of hindsight. > As Bitcoin grows, pieces of the ecosystem will specialize. > Satoshi's original code did everything: hashing, block assembly, > wallet, consensus, network. That is changing, and that is OK. [snip] > > And I think the current "demonstrably terrible" Bitcoin system is > still INCREDIBLY interesting. > Pieter never said it wasn't interesting, so this emphatic statement is strange - like someone is trying to convince an audience - but anyway... as you, a veritable spring-chicken by your actions and words, said the other day: having graduated in '88 you're "old" and speak from experience. Don't come with that jive, bossy man - bring facts and testing to the technical list. My finance readers, in one camp, and Bitcoin investors, in the other, want to see the XT 8MB hard-fork testing data that you mentioned for BIP100. "Being ignorant is not so much a shame, as being unwilling to learn." - - Benjamin Franklin > -- -- Gavin Andresen > Venzen Khaosan -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVwMyOAAoJEGwAhlQc8H1mho4IAKEHVxE4lAs3aIoLXa2fxLP8 3q7MhfM5vIW9QAM7rjz8YzheMg3Wj2CNfZPuUV7YDTVrLZPrIN/aMY6CIftr7GUS pjMI9nnwezFwYX5oyRU+gW51AMFhvexV6ITZYpiLRtWHgK1FZtXWMG13eO/6Jb5U Wjflub7suMDvg+ST2PplhQf7fFmnPHrLZg3ISDqK+hvgw20geW1rXC/wCChlewfd DqSt9fxqs+NIvbIzS2TgLTkIcHlbKNeI5AeqbaFoaIQtvYALD3Ojt2I/qoCJU1za rB8Il7UK0B5uf6xxgErGcYAHzjVpR6Zhsdzo6MiBF1j4ClfNPEQAlG49YjrRXpI= =4nai -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7229D8EB for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:43:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail.bihthai.net (unknown [5.255.87.165]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 20AEE1EF for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:43:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.8.0.6] (unknown [10.8.0.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: venzen) by mail.bihthai.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1085320E0A; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 16:44:58 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55C0CF79.9020605@mail.bihthai.net> Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 21:43:05 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Gavin Andresen , Bitcoin Dev References: <55C0CC90.9040903@mail.bihthai.net> In-Reply-To: <55C0CC90.9040903@mail.bihthai.net> OpenPGP: id=1CF07D66; url=pool.sks-keyservers.net X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <55C0CC90.9040903@mail.bihthai.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RDNS_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Re: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 14:43:14 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 correction: My finance readers, in one camp, and Bitcoin investors, in the other, want to see the XT 8MB hard-fork testing data that you mentioned for BIP101 (not 100). - -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 21:30:40 +0700 From: Venzen Khaosan via bitcoin-dev Reply-To: venzen@mail.bihthai.net Organization: Bihthai Bai Mai To: Gavin Andresen , Bitcoin Dev On 08/04/2015 08:12 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The > mining landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority > depending on agreements to trust each other's announced blocks > without validation. > > And that is a problem... why? > > As far as I can tell, [snip] It's a big problem. What are you dismissing it for? With Bitcoin in fledgling 0.x version state this is neither desirable nor encouraging. Development did not freeze at some time in the past and now we see how the userbase reacts. Miners, btw, are arguibly still a class of user as long as they are guaranteed coinbase. When they start making and proving themselves useful in a free floating fee market absent coinbase subsidy, we can revisit this topic, with the benefit of hindsight. > As Bitcoin grows, pieces of the ecosystem will specialize. > Satoshi's original code did everything: hashing, block assembly, > wallet, consensus, network. That is changing, and that is OK. [snip] > > And I think the current "demonstrably terrible" Bitcoin system is > still INCREDIBLY interesting. > Pieter never said it wasn't interesting, so this emphatic statement is strange - like someone is trying to convince an audience - but anyway... as you, a veritable spring-chicken by your actions and words, said the other day: having graduated in '88 you're "old" and speak from experience. Don't come with that jive, bossy man - bring facts and testing to the technical list. My finance readers, in one camp, and Bitcoin investors, in the other, want to see the XT 8MB hard-fork testing data that you mentioned for BIP100. "Being ignorant is not so much a shame, as being unwilling to learn." - - Benjamin Franklin > -- -- Gavin Andresen > Venzen Khaosan _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVwM93AAoJEGwAhlQc8H1mwcEH/RwxpWyvjlWBrPok5GNRed+/ 8O46a4G1T6+Y2+yKWDFQTqG0D2oFEqunHW1A+e7UYABrhijbr1Xwpv0Y//VSuY3p TnRXPj3+q3j4BdB607y5i0jCo61G4IrXaCUEHpBMzrD5T7SMDC1a31FLgAjx9WDM etKmT9doWn9aiWzxAl/q8SEY4M04RLyS5kijs95M9YMGp1KVw2jNDfJM37EhPDu2 qDUMQEvcq0qTPCeHn6tCaXC0rWzIpylE6Xaso3VMepmbdzf0Dea92asBmmE0ygsW Tcfx95UWW+Bb/h2JEO3TCjKpLCwdfiWP/2eXIMKkcdSJIVf/yE32gIxzqPx5ogU= =BwgG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB1128ED for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:45:39 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f180.google.com (mail-io0-f180.google.com [209.85.223.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 61CC51C8 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 14:45:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioii16 with SMTP id i16so19088057ioi.0 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 07:45:38 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=OxikNpD96DlvHj5JIB7r35VrlD8dsXMRzPuqytaPsv0=; b=LVS5V9usTxETu7QcZ3rC7WSS90QOjQNh56rMBKwaW2HPtwjqRAWPEwuPUk7PeDsYcr HO5NMReC5X0qPGs0KaS8M9eBcis0xBz9Zo77LIuZxPFb++eMhMcokVFRGyVRzWTEMIN6 wtF5c6NstxiVjynGKZuXPct3WXGOaZs7dls43EkRY11R3DHphorZSiTgPBYYM8lTNLfq 3gSmndCuyndi226BX+lqKU93LQ7PbP99Xqxt8D1n/BZnglRDXmpcYv52W0onlo9RGxK+ +CdLcs6cT1o2M++E1ZUZcid6xePlRuy4jXKT94PxOXCrbOzjoS1qi3zi/tcL00l+P+CF psgA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.3.224 with SMTP id e93mr4112069ioi.160.1438699538898; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 07:45:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.64.241.137 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 07:45:38 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 10:45:38 -0400 Message-ID: From: Alex Morcos To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113df88ef46666051c7d56c0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 14:45:40 -0000 --001a113df88ef46666051c7d56c0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 9:12 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The mining >> landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depending on >> agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validation. >> > And that is a problem... why? > > As far as I can tell, nobody besides miners running old and/or buggy > software lost money due to outsourced mining validation (please correct me > if I'm wrong-- I'm looking forward to Greg's post-mortem). The operators of > bitcoin.org seem to have freaked out and pushed the panic button (with > dire warnings of not trusting transactions until 20 confirmations), but > theymos was well known for using an old, patched version of Core for > blockexplorer.com so maybe that's not surprising. > > I'm also looking forward to Greg's post-mortem, because I had a completely different takeaway from the BIP66 mini-forks. My view is that despite the extremely cautious and conservative planning for the completely uncontentious fork, the damage could and would have been very significant if it had not been for several core devs manually monitoring, intervening and problem solving for other network participants. I don't believe thats the way the system should work. Participants in the Bitcoin community have come to rely on the devs for just making sure everything works for them. That's not sustainable. The system needs to be made fundamentally more secure if its going to succeed, not depend on the good will of any particular parties, otherwise it certainly will no longer be permissionless. The BIP66 fork was urgently required to fix an undisclosed consensus bug, unanimously agreed on and without technical objection, and it was still fraught with problems. That's the most clear cut example of when we should have a fork. A change to a consensus limit that a significant proportion of the community disagrees with for economic or technical reasons or both should be raising a sea of red flags. --001a113df88ef46666051c7d56c0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 9:12 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 A= M, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.li= nuxfoundation.org> wrote:
<= p dir=3D"ltr">I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. T= he mining landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority dependi= ng on agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validat= ion.

And that is a problem... why?
As far as I can tell, nobody besides miners running old and/or= buggy software lost money due to outsourced mining validation (please corr= ect me if I'm wrong-- I'm looking forward to Greg's post-mortem= ). The operators of bitcoi= n.org seem to have freaked out and pushed the panic button (with dire w= arnings of not trusting transactions until 20 confirmations), but theymos w= as well known for using an old, patched version of Core for blockexplorer.com so maybe that= 's not surprising.

<= div>
I'm also looking forward to Greg's post-mortem, = because I had a completely different takeaway from the BIP66 mini-forks.=C2= =A0 My view is that despite the extremely cautious and conservative plannin= g for the completely uncontentious fork, the damage could and would have be= en very significant if it had not been for several core devs manually monit= oring, intervening and problem solving for other network participants.=C2= =A0 I don't believe thats the way the system should work.=C2=A0 Partici= pants in the Bitcoin community have come to rely on the devs for just makin= g sure everything works for them.=C2=A0 That's not sustainable.=C2=A0 T= he system needs to be made fundamentally more secure if its going to succee= d, not depend on the good will of any particular parties, otherwise it cert= ainly will no longer be permissionless.

The BIP66 = fork was urgently required to fix an undisclosed consensus bug, unanimously= agreed on and without technical objection, and it was still fraught with p= roblems.=C2=A0 That's the most clear cut example of when we should have= a fork.=C2=A0 A change to a consensus limit that a significant proportion = of the community disagrees with for economic or technical reasons or both s= hould be raising a sea of red flags.


--001a113df88ef46666051c7d56c0-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6E9A186 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 17:59:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f175.google.com (mail-wi0-f175.google.com [209.85.212.175]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DC7F71F1 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 17:59:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicgj17 with SMTP id gj17so161268346wic.1 for ; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 10:59:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=U12v1nLPwTHoJD+aFfKrgisqKIB7DG0I6CsOHsIaHFI=; b=TDVSEF6Y9ZqFLtc/cqEzFzvsks7ugKlsY3PLzKIAU7mAHr3E1w5oeTgaoEKzOCco+r pnIrklQ48UrWiYnOlhfo3CYOmyolvCOUdMNsjV/yqwDBJXBEBl4bO+GVtao5F9h6sibV 0gwNTUsMAZM3l5xyi1ReBRGpyilmgko9bOoFffm7jqW9BXOMKCXHzMPDczAVaQY1VHSk M26TpoV39RUG1FTnueGyOQ1HvQrLuCSv1Szl/KJls+Dt3b/YCuEgsrfuxb4AVN+ZJ51C d6u2eh/N/l0PcELswXbagkKPuXx/rbFMj3ZvNqnN9XcrNlv4XidIi8XYcQ4Eu8azyC4M IMdw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkZcys+6G3QbqKgjDj8qOAZ2SI3xsR8f6cCbqZ6rVV+s2V2CJoS9vDXukWJhiuEQExp2Bmv MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.181.13.195 with SMTP id fa3mr10395252wid.7.1438711165415; Tue, 04 Aug 2015 10:59:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Tue, 4 Aug 2015 10:59:25 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 19:59:25 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Hector Chu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:59:27 -0000 On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 3:28 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > On 4 August 2015 at 14:13, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: >> >> 2) It doesn't matter who is to blame about the current centralization: >> the fact remains that the blocksize maximum is the only** consensus >> rule to limit mining centralization. > > > Repeating a claim ad-nauseum doesn't make it necessarily true. A block si= ze > limit won't prevent miners in the future from buying each other out. But reading it 10 times may help you understand the claim, you will never find out until you try. "Miners buying each other out" is not the only way in which mining centralization can get even worse. A Blocksize limit may not be able to prevent such a scenario, but it's still the only consensus tool to limit mining centralization. If you want to prove that claim wrong you need to find a counter-example of another consensus rule that somehow limits mining centralization. You could also prove that this rule doesn't help with mining centralization at all. But that's much more difficult and if you just claim it (and consequently advocate for the complete removal of the consensus rule) we will have already advanced a lot. But you denying that the limits serves limiting mining centralization and at the same time advocating for keeping a limit at all doesn't seem very consistent. If you don't want that rule to limit mining centralization pressures, what do you want it for? From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5843DFF for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 07:29:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f174.google.com (mail-io0-f174.google.com [209.85.223.174]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 808027C for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 07:29:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodd187 with SMTP id d187so40972122iod.2 for ; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 00:29:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=aRexV9FAGex++jenREhg5Sqd/6oRkCKykp9O0mjPanI=; b=IIyKlhv17OgagItZ0f4T86WN1wXTXDljLbWQZXxqPKA2wJvd4JezjzTQcdlAKQdHuk Ja8XxY+THdAm1F4QeRxI/jZf6rjEaKXvndw/+NgNXa9rXkmdVeyIMdHqOzxgnGjZXQXm +xg7tPXAKFWwGXFlciPcqswk/SZOFYzjJMi5T2cakm2YYXfkIfqkY3q1BXTA77MrL9/l jHiZ26ztPaduV0a9P+DeuE/vJND7kkVHm2YKSYvAZeacnK4TNfqU+aKtXK1Zhc1AOGud EXfHh4BzWSsj0euIYMpqJYZd2qMqM74CdwOXNehFL+2P3/HzxaRgIkFRkb6Y/4hid+/l scqA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.17.170 with SMTP id 42mr8716417ior.21.1438759790968; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 00:29:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.79.97.4 with HTTP; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 00:29:50 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 00:29:50 -0700 Message-ID: From: Elliot Olds To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113eca7e42064e051c8b5eb4 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_05,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2015 07:29:52 -0000 --001a113eca7e42064e051c8b5eb4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 4:59 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily harmful and > if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more > harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB. I don't think merely hitting the limit is bad. The level of tx fees in equilibrium give some clue as to the level of harm being done. If fees are at $5/tx at 1MB, it's about as bad as if fees are at $5/tx at 4MB. There is NO criterion based on mining centralization to decide between > 2 sizes in favor of the small one. > It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and > the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining > centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are > willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectively > any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its > decentralization goals. > I think its the proponents of a blocksize change who should propose > such a criterion and now they have the tools to simulate different > block sizes. > In the absence of harder data, it might be interesting to use these simulations to graph centralization pressure as a function of bandwidth cost over time (or other historical variables that affect centralization). For instance, look at how high centralization pressure was in 2009 according to the simulations, given how cheap/available bandwidth was then, compared to 2010, 2011, etc. Then we could figure out: given today's bandwidth situation, what size blocks right now would give us the same centralization pressure that we had in 2011, 2012, 2013, etc? Of course this doesn't mean we should blindly assume that the level of centralization pressure in 2012 was acceptable, and therefore any block size increase that results in the same amount of pressure now should be acceptable. But it might lead to a more productive discussion. > I want us to simulate many blocksizes before rushing into a decision > (specially because I disagree that taking a decision there is urgent > in the first place). IMO it is not urgent if the core devs are committed to reacting to a huge spike in tx fees with a modest block size increase in a relatively short time frame, if they judge the centralization risks of that increase to be small. Greg Maxwell posted on reddit a while back something to the effect of "the big block advocates are overstating the urgency of the block size increase, because if there was actually a situation that required us to increase block size, we could make the increase when it was actually needed." I found that somewhat persuasive, but I am concerned that I haven't seen any discussion of what the "let's wait for now" camp would consider a valid reason to increase block size in the short term, and how they'd make the tradeoff with tx fees or whatever else was necessitating the increase. Jorge, if a fee equilibrium developed at 1MB of $5/tx, and you somehow knew with certainty that increasing to 4MB would result in a 20 cent/tx equilibrium that would last for a year (otherwise fees would stay around $5 for that year), would you be in favor of an increase to 4MB? For those familiar with the distinction between near/far mode thinking popularized by Robin Hanson: focusing on concrete examples like this encourages problem solving and consensus, and focusing on abstract principles (like decentralization vs. usability in general) leads to people toward using argument to signal their alliances and reduce the status of their opponents. I think it'd be very helpful if more 1MB advocates described what exactly would make them say "OK, in this situation a block size increase is needed, we should do one quickly!", and also if Gavin/Mike/Jeff described what hypothetical scenarios and/or test results would make them want to stick with 1MB blocks for now. --001a113eca7e42064e051c8b5eb4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= ue, Aug 4, 2015 at 4:59 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <bitcoin= -dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily ha= rmful and
if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more
harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB.

I don't think merely hitting the limit is bad. The level of tx fees in= equilibrium give some clue as to the level of harm being done. If fees are= at $5/tx at 1MB, it's about as bad as if fees are at $5/tx at 4MB.=C2= =A0

There is NO criterion based on mining centralization to decide between
2 sizes in favor of the small one.
It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better&quo= t; and
the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining
centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are
willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectiv= ely
any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its
decentralization goals.
I think its the proponents of a blocksize change who should propose
such a criterion and now they have the tools to simulate different
block sizes.

In the absence of harder d= ata, it might be interesting to use these simulations to graph centralizati= on pressure as a function of bandwidth cost over time (or other historical = variables that affect centralization). For instance, look at how high centr= alization pressure was in 2009 according to the simulations, given how chea= p/available bandwidth was then, compared to 2010, 2011, etc. Then we could = figure out: given today's bandwidth situation, what size blocks right n= ow would give us the same centralization pressure that we had in 2011, 2012= , 2013, etc?

Of course this doesn't mean we sh= ould blindly assume that the level of centralization pressure in 2012 was a= cceptable, and therefore any block size increase that results in the same a= mount of pressure now should be acceptable. But it might lead to a more pro= ductive discussion.
=C2=A0
I want us to simulate many blocksizes before rushing into a decision
(specially because I disagree that taking a decision there is urgent
in the first place).

IMO it is not urgent i= f the core devs are committed to reacting to a huge spike in tx fees with a= modest block size increase in a relatively short time frame, if they judge= the centralization risks of that increase to be small. Greg Maxwell posted= on reddit a while back something to the effect of "the big block advo= cates are overstating the urgency of the block size increase, because if th= ere was actually a situation that required us to increase block size, we co= uld make the increase when it was actually needed." I found that somew= hat persuasive, but I am concerned that I haven't seen any discussion o= f what the "let's wait for now" camp would consider a valid r= eason to increase block size in the short term, and how they'd make the= tradeoff with tx fees or whatever else was necessitating the increase.=C2= =A0

Jorge, if a fee equilibrium developed at 1MB o= f $5/tx, and you somehow knew with certainty that increasing to 4MB would r= esult in a 20 cent/tx equilibrium that would last for a year (otherwise fee= s would stay around $5 for that year), would you be in favor of an increase= to 4MB?=C2=A0

For those familiar with the distinc= tion between near/far mode thinking popularized by Robin Hanson: focusing o= n concrete examples like this encourages problem solving and consensus, and= focusing on abstract principles (like decentralization vs. usability in ge= neral) leads to people toward using argument to signal their alliances and = reduce the status of their opponents. I think it'd be very helpful if m= ore 1MB advocates described what exactly would make them say "OK, in t= his situation a block size increase is needed, we should do one quickly!&qu= ot;, and also if Gavin/Mike/Jeff described what hypothetical scenarios and/= or test results would make them want to stick with 1MB blocks for now.






--001a113eca7e42064e051c8b5eb4-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E06489B for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 08:15:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4BAC3123 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 08:15:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibcd8 with SMTP id cd8so12607832wib.1 for ; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 01:15:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=user-agent:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding:content-type:subject:from:date:to:cc :message-id; bh=K5g+Lu+OSmOOy8fELTxbQIy06UIH7tBhzOUKY2qSlmc=; b=xJHlViZ8OuGXVUfSbodaSYN3zYvh8J4urJUDqX1bsiBurUVpgD35CJEyFd9Ujr55EW Yu2Va4aKJRBksSrUg1SiKwaPpzY+/nzHkaSyUbgl6zY8vVvbBfC2GMCDCMHW2T3iBGgi wfpZUhtFfIqZvn/40yRfMxQGoFE1UppYNf09yrGwYNhS/x//vOAE6j77YNLuRHkDFE55 k1lDDqdwLiIZJPWVKxmaPf8CeW/vVXmck03AenQGNmhUm3tZPf1Z8jCLi2JDPR6eH74X nWD1Q7WQLwbEWMM7zGh3VzFCGIZqmdG14rQ6X1ULzLrNK+KT94sDffyTszLaesEdcx6+ dsjQ== X-Received: by 10.194.23.194 with SMTP id o2mr17826133wjf.63.1438762545535; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 01:15:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.100.150.42] (chomsky.torservers.net. [77.247.181.162]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r19sm6336953wib.7.2015.08.05.01.15.40 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Wed, 05 Aug 2015 01:15:44 -0700 (PDT) User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 From: Gareth Williams Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2015 18:14:56 +1000 To: Gavin Andresen , Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev , Pieter Wuille Message-ID: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2015 08:15:48 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 4 August 2015 11:12:36 PM AEST, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: >On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < >bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> I would say that things already demonstrately got terrible. The >mining >> landscape is very centralized, with apparently a majority depending >on >> agreements to trust each other's announced blocks without validation. >> >And that is a problem... why? With all due respect Gavin, large-block advocates appear to hold the position that: * pushing individual economic actors away from running full nodes is a natural and unproblematic consequence of block size increase, as they're expected to rely on SPV You now also appear to hold the position that: * pushing miners to SPV mining is unproblematic Have I misunderstood? Is one of these not an expected outcome of large blocks? I can understand the validity of either argument alone -- the assertion that we can trust miners to validate and just trust most-POW ourselves, /or/ the assertion that lack of miner validation is safe under certain circumstances. But together? Who do you expect to actually validate large blocks if not miners, and what do you expect their incentive to do so to be? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: APG v1.1.1 iQFABAEBCgAqBQJVwcYAIxxHYXJldGggV2lsbGlhbXMgPGdhY3J1eEBnbWFpbC5j b20+AAoJEEY5w2E3jkVEEWQH/Aty47q71H/ZcMMX/6qcTpOumI9h/buUfsvYA2H+ J6Al5S8JvCy3/0yMFCLmqolHoxOdWu5jwtUf/w2fepgA1RJyZItFo1EG9cJB0Cpz JgM+2s4L/F3l4+Gea2ddjhvE5JqGS0Qh3EWaR/xy1bouq0FZjtDendmK7vFRj/oS Gowm+g5EFBiT1XwCQQXJc9k0RxzDpPQ0ouSOXWdPUuxfQAjPyX89eQBeQzgVDtEf zVfROZVHQuBu85rKTd32TdCNLQ0oEhAYmwgdtmJyLLgieeqHmNbaikBaVDEOvixn S+fmnfD8CVeeXo5zKdlLZXazc5geRx97H4NMBMjTyjPzR5k= =WG0I -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 30A84273 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 01:26:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f179.google.com (mail-wi0-f179.google.com [209.85.212.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F4271B4 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 01:26:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicne3 with SMTP id ne3so3699104wic.1 for ; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 18:26:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=Uor9j4Vz6YakoH1LM07oVkmyjzoEui3b2MrS5jUPGfw=; b=Cg/g1Rn+TuWovZCJcAx8obgMXxLxoU5mlY/+1lOA/ExoJYO++DJnIHwgaqwCgB+2sx 4KTb7jmf77POWju5BhLwkHaRlRZWsFn0k3hBUSxuj2gDtlMYaeWKjJf51l0Xzd8pO9Vy Pf0ie3YNTcKWZgkpKRgIhvkjwOkvhOBx+uYTxo7ij28YaKzerm/Vt20v3JNlJ7m71jTb t0QNyoMI1x3exXIpp6RN82lvf/ET57uh4JaPoGLzOFNUSN67wcw4otAQz4M89JJkSK1x uCpaJifsgudpvjM3cfNCdGB1Q+rzecHxqs839jrNuAibugFlUIzbvA83g8ORnHMAXnq1 pUwQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmBd6HQcY0AuzqFYOWeCqneZOq/eEyyvGfOWYy24KpeCJgwLSxtg1CZMBjFDQn93AaYE86J MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.109.106 with SMTP id hr10mr1261800wib.58.1438824369539; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 18:26:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 18:26:09 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 03:26:09 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Elliot Olds Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 01:26:12 -0000 On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 9:29 AM, Elliot Olds wrote: > On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 4:59 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n > wrote: >> >> Also I don't think "hitting the limit" must be necessarily harmful and >> if it is, I don't understand why hitting it at 1MB will be more >> harmful than hitting it at 2MB, 8MB or 8GB. > > > I don't think merely hitting the limit is bad. The level of tx fees in > equilibrium give some clue as to the level of harm being done. If fees ar= e > at $5/tx at 1MB, it's about as bad as if fees are at $5/tx at 4MB. This is a much more reasonable position. I wish this had been starting point of this discussion instead of "the block size limit must be increased as soon as possible or bitcoin will fail". If the only fear about not increasing the block size fast enough is that fees may rise, pieter wouldn't had to repeatedly explain that for any reasonable block size some use case may fill the blocks rapidly. >> There is NO criterion based on mining centralization to decide between >> 2 sizes in favor of the small one. >> It seems like the rationale it's always "the bigger the better" and >> the only limitation is what a few people concerned with mining >> centralization (while they still have time to discuss this) are >> willing to accept. If that's the case, then there won't be effectively >> any limit in the long term and Bitcoin will probably fail in its >> decentralization goals. >> I think its the proponents of a blocksize change who should propose >> such a criterion and now they have the tools to simulate different >> block sizes. > > > In the absence of harder data, it might be interesting to use these > simulations to graph centralization pressure as a function of bandwidth c= ost > over time (or other historical variables that affect centralization). For > instance, look at how high centralization pressure was in 2009 according = to > the simulations, given how cheap/available bandwidth was then, compared t= o > 2010, 2011, etc. Then we could figure out: given today's bandwidth > situation, what size blocks right now would give us the same centralizati= on > pressure that we had in 2011, 2012, 2013, etc? > > Of course this doesn't mean we should blindly assume that the level of > centralization pressure in 2012 was acceptable, and therefore any block s= ize > increase that results in the same amount of pressure now should be > acceptable. But it might lead to a more productive discussion. This sounds good overall but I'm afraid you are oversimplifying some things= . Centralization pressure not only comes from global average bandwidth costs and block propagation times is not the only concern. Here's an extreme example: [1] But anyway, yes, I agree, ANY metric would be better than nothing (the current situation). >> I want us to simulate many blocksizes before rushing into a decision >> (specially because I disagree that taking a decision there is urgent >> in the first place). > > > IMO it is not urgent if the core devs are committed to reacting to a huge > spike in tx fees with a modest block size increase in a relatively short > time frame, if they judge the centralization risks of that increase to be > small. Greg Maxwell posted on reddit a while back something to the effect= of > "the big block advocates are overstating the urgency of the block size > increase, because if there was actually a situation that required us to > increase block size, we could make the increase when it was actually > needed." I found that somewhat persuasive, but I am concerned that I have= n't > seen any discussion of what the "let's wait for now" camp would consider = a > valid reason to increase block size in the short term, and how they'd mak= e > the tradeoff with tx fees or whatever else was necessitating the increase= . Given that for any non-absurdly-big size some transactions will eventually be priced out, and that the consensus rule serves for limiting mining centralization (and more indirectly centralization in general) and not about trying to set a given average transaction fee, I think the current level of mining centralization will always be more relevant than the current fee level when discussing any change to the consensus rule to limit centralization (at any point in time). In other words, the question "can we change this without important risks of destroying the decentralized properties of the system in the short or long run?" should be always more important than "is there a concerning rise in fees to motivate this change at all?". > Jorge, if a fee equilibrium developed at 1MB of $5/tx, and you somehow kn= ew > with certainty that increasing to 4MB would result in a 20 cent/tx > equilibrium that would last for a year (otherwise fees would stay around = $5 > for that year), would you be in favor of an increase to 4MB? As said, I would always consider the centralization risks first: I'd rather have a $5/tx decentralized Bitcoin than a Bitcoin with free transactions but effectively validated (when they validate blocks they mine on top of) by around 10 miners, specially if only 3 of them could easily collude to censor transactions [orphaning any block that doesn't censor in the same manner]. Sadly I have no choice, the later is what we have right now. And reducing the block size can't guarantee that the situation will get better or even that fees could rise to $5/tx (we just don't have that demand, not that it is a goal for anyone). All I know is that increasing the block size *could* (conditional, not necessarily, I don't know in which cases, I don't think anybody does) make things even worse. On the other hand, I could understand people getting worried if fees where as high as $5/tx or even 20 cent/tx but we're very far away from that case. How can low subsidies (a certainty) be "too far in the future to worry about it" but $5/tx, 20 cent/tx or even 5 cent/tx an urgent concern? For all I know, 5 cent/tx may not happen in the next 25 years: it may never happen. And if it happens, to me it will be a symptom of Bitcoin success, even for others it means that Bitcoin has become a "high value settlement network". To the question - At which minimum mining fee rate will you urge others to change the consensus rules to increase the block size? I'm very sorry, but my answer is: - I honestly don't know, that may never happen. What I can tell you is this: I will never be worried about "too high fees" while the fees remain at 0 (null, zero, nothing, cero, nada, zilch). That's right, no matter what wallet's defaults chose for their users, no matter what the minimum relay fee policy does to the "fee market" and how much urgent transactions pay in fees; the fact remains that in practice non-urgent transactions usually (when the raw transaction's structure it's appropriate) don't have to pay fees. I'm still missing an answer from the "big blocks size side" to the following question (which I have insistently repeated with various permutations): If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? After the next subsidy halving? After 4 more subsidy halvings (ie about 13 years from now, subsidy =3D 1.5625 btc/block )? After your grandmother abandons her national currency and uses Bitcoin for everything? Never? ANY answer (maybe with the exception of the last one) would be less worrying than silence. > For those familiar with the distinction between near/far mode thinking > popularized by Robin Hanson: focusing on concrete examples like this > encourages problem solving and consensus, and focusing on abstract > principles (like decentralization vs. usability in general) leads to peop= le > toward using argument to signal their alliances and reduce the status of > their opponents. I really appreciate your efforts to mediate in this dispute and I honestly hope that my previous answer is useful as it is. > I think it'd be very helpful if more 1MB advocates > described what exactly would make them say "OK, in this situation a block > size increase is needed, we should do one quickly!", and also if > Gavin/Mike/Jeff described what hypothetical scenarios and/or test results > would make them want to stick with 1MB blocks for now. Just replace 1MB with ANY size. But, yes, please, when will you consider a size to be too dangerous for centralization? Why 20 GB would have been safe but 21 GB wouldn't have been (or the respective maximums and respective +1)? Note that "Never, 20GB was just a number closer to infinity than 1MB and I hoped that could had been voluntarily accepted by users. What I really want is to completely remove this consensus rule forever." is a perfectly valid answer. It just means that I will agree with people that think this way as explained in [1] (yes, not even after superluminal communication). As an less relevant note, I feel extremely uncomfortable about being included in the "1MB advocates" group. As I've tried to explain several times, 1 is to me an arbitrary number like any other (at most, the canonical arbitrary number), and so it is 1000000 (MAX_BLOCK_SIZE). I rarely like being grouped or labelled, but maybe something more accurate like "not-recklessly-change-consensus-rules advocates" would help. There's nothing special about 1MB apart from being the current rule, so I don't think the number is that much relevant to the discussion. Grouping anyone that has raised any concern about rising the consensus block size limit as "the 1MBers" is about as fair as grouping anyone that has ever proposed a rise in the maximum size as "the 20GBers" (specially when there's people that belong to both groups simultaneously, like Pieter Wuille who started this thread, and whose proposal we're supposed to be discussing). [1] http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/0099= 47.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF7A6895 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 13:40:42 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f51.google.com (mail-la0-f51.google.com [209.85.215.51]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 68B531D7 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 13:40:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labow3 with SMTP id ow3so49364483lab.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 06:40:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=yXabax6qVi6dpfxMHKQajaWX2hBHwDQUDDJRD5ZvAuA=; b=YGZh3d5zzba8G+hFZHFr25ES2xBSlYn+viyZYaZdQdP4m2/rhAiuBL5u+I/CERMy+G Z5xZHGUEIQEBPG4MRU/5e8LXfJnyT+ZYzyCJI5evtb1nMT/9jF8n5MDaXRrnWHecMv+e Juwqd6T7bZ1/qnLn2PAE+X0iwryuY3NiqB+jEjngaS2k406/4g11H1UrbVaY7+KUJj8w 1GCykaSx+Bs0u2se5Zsj13RQ5+t0+uTrKqAmNAEMbSHnwcL9vU4ObsFZ5Ub63H+VBeJX kdmnn3cwKD3FIOvLQrG8ooGDDoqw4Zg2oEx5lm/8c44YvWdeVF4VH3iLTCUZaIhYEtMo okfg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.2.41 with SMTP id 9mr1670733lar.65.1438868439642; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 06:40:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 06:40:39 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 09:40:39 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e013c6258393844051ca4aac3 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 13:40:42 -0000 --089e013c6258393844051ca4aac3 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > This is a much more reasonable position. I wish this had been starting > point of this discussion instead of "the block size limit must be > increased as soon as possible or bitcoin will fail". > It REALLY doesn't help the debate when you say patently false statements like that. My first blog post on this issue is here: http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent ... and I NEVER say "Bitcoin will fail". I say: "If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don=E2= =80=99t think that is likely=E2=80=93 it is more likely people just stop using Bitc= oin because transaction confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable." Mike sketched out the worst-case here: https://medium.com/@octskyward/crash-landing-f5cc19908e32 ... and concludes: "I believe there are no situations in which Bitcoin can enter an overload situation and come out with its reputation and user base intact. Both would suffer heavily and as Bitcoin is the founder of the cryptocurrency concept, the idea itself would inevitably suffer some kind of negative repercussions." ------------ So please stop with the over-the-top claims about what "the other side" believe, there are enough of those (on both sides of the debate) on reddit. I'd really like to focus on how to move forward, and how best to resolve difficult questions like this in the future. --=20 -- Gavin Andresen --089e013c6258393844051ca4aac3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On W= ed, Aug 5, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <bitcoin= -dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
This= is a much more reasonable position. I wish this had been starting
point of this discussion instead of "the block size limit must be
increased as soon as possible or bitcoin will fail".

It REALLY doesn't help the debate when you say patently fals= e statements like that.

My first blog post on this issue is here:

... and I NEVER say "Bitcoin will fail&= quot;.=C2=A0 I say:

"If the number of transactions waiting ge= ts large enough, the end result will be an over-saturated network, busy doi= ng nothing productive. I don=E2=80=99t think that is likely=E2=80=93 it is = more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction confirmation= becomes increasingly unreliable."

<= /div>
Mike sketched out the worst-case here:

... and concludes:

=
"I believe there are no situations in= which Bitcoin can enter an overload situation and come out with its reputa= tion and user base intact. Both would suffer heavily and as Bitcoin is the = founder of the cryptocurrency concept, the idea itself would inevitably suf= fer some kind of negative repercussions."


------------

So please sto= p with the over-the-top claims about what "the other side" believ= e, there are enough of those (on both sides of the debate) on reddit. I'= ;d really like to focus on how to move forward, and how best to resolve dif= ficult questions like this in the future.

--
--
Gavin Andresen
--089e013c6258393844051ca4aac3-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9D6ED8AD for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:06:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f170.google.com (mail-ig0-f170.google.com [209.85.213.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C49B312A for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:06:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iggf3 with SMTP id f3so11962637igg.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 07:06:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=74rwTrybUDG7nyHWvLsdruyT65VgbMxoMrsMG2S39Jw=; b=bEnUmzlrlCuC0yYqQgg29QOj+XhYOxJU1eeiXaZ1XXLHevkUJePbHbGCHy+NPtRLgj 6YsSJHbfO71jrg7Qw/1qGiOTX+5Y7GREScYkbHRFYl9ZN+PZ/HtzZyEyO/+3xneS8roP iqw0tv3Js4ga/f2SkUvlQMM8LWbk+thmkmdbxLVHQnOTKjwM5bMLXih3HHvORuv7czN5 EXgCcoML8QAcYxnb6IO6t1w+rBkVZEyFEvcSK158pp0ShV+Cs0XERexOOoRe34lfr5jZ f90Jvt+nFEuQJ53d6WMpun1n7NOtxA+AOuE+N/MtgrOz9Dg0FrfocbCIuSwfxWP3fPvn cAJQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.134.226 with SMTP id pn2mr4064707igb.21.1438869963648; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 07:06:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 07:06:03 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:06:03 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b2e148d0fb531051ca5055e X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 14:06:07 -0000 --047d7b2e148d0fb531051ca5055e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> This is a much more reasonable position. I wish this had been starting >> point of this discussion instead of "the block size limit must be >> increased as soon as possible or bitcoin will fail". >> > > It REALLY doesn't help the debate when you say patently false statements > like that. > > My first blog post on this issue is here: > http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent > > ... and I NEVER say "Bitcoin will fail". I say: > > "If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result > will be an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don= =E2=80=99t > think that is likely=E2=80=93 it is more likely people just stop using Bi= tcoin > because transaction confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable." > But you seem to consider that a bad thing. Maybe saying that you're claiming that this equals Bitcoin failing is an exaggeration, but you do believe that evolving towards an ecosystem where there is competition for block space is a bad thing, right? I don't agree that "Not everyone is able to use the block chain for every use case" is the same thing as "People stop using Bitcoin". People are already not using it for every use case. Here is what my proposed BIP says: "No hard forking change that relaxes the block size limit can be guaranteed to provide enough space for every possible demand - or even any particular demand - unless strong centralization of the mining ecosystem is expected. Because of that, the development of a fee market and the evolution towards an ecosystem that is able to cope with block space competition should be considered healthy." --=20 Pieter --047d7b2e148d0fb531051ca5055e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin= -dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jorge= Tim=C3=B3n <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org= > wrote:
This is a much more reasonable position. I wish this had been star= ting
point of this discussion instead of "the block size limit must be
increased as soon as possible or bitcoin will fail".

It REALLY doesn't help the debate when you say patent= ly false statements like that.

My first blog post on this issue is here:
=C2=A0=C2=A0http://gavina= ndresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent

... and I NEVER say= "Bitcoin will fail".=C2=A0 I say:

"If the number o= f transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be an over-sa= turated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don=E2=80=99t think that = is likely=E2=80=93 it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because= transaction confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable."
<= /blockquote>

But you seem to consider that a bad thing. = Maybe saying that you're claiming that this equals Bitcoin failing is a= n exaggeration, but you do believe that evolving towards an ecosystem where= there is competition for block space is a bad thing, right?

<= div>I don't agree that "Not everyone is able to use the block chai= n for every use case" is the same thing as "People stop using Bit= coin". People are already not using it for every use case.

Here is what my proposed BIP says: "No hard forking = change that relaxes the block size limit can be=20 guaranteed to provide enough space for every possible demand - or even=20 any particular demand - unless strong centralization of the mining=20 ecosystem is expected. Because of that, the development of a fee market=20 and the evolution towards an ecosystem that is able to cope with block=20 space competition should be considered healthy."

--
<= div>Pieter

--047d7b2e148d0fb531051ca5055e-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C59CF8C7 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:21:58 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f54.google.com (mail-la0-f54.google.com [209.85.215.54]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B0E83161 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:21:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labow3 with SMTP id ow3so50192785lab.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 07:21:55 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=OH9hxTUvygQ53NusVY2OoOJuusfUpPEqu7VM07Yfv+s=; b=EKgvd2G7B4jEnqoslWKNISarYE3LOiWgxpJCpH0ix5XojeX5KMAEaYMBdTJlGeQI8u eSu/Z6T8Q9S9K1ldmpkSSWcV2HtSsiQqeYG4ZJgRcLlGDknruA0rWvpjpE+pqQUrx/pf dR/HcdSeogYARj0FodhFNZ7CyyftGF4Je6GBiHEkCrxPhnqUyRcElSzc0kxY+J0DQvMo wcudcX4G36ZBjIkE8bSXZgXuUHONATtaMEK9LEcm86/diRqG+V45nlZcLm4uGObW5ILf HkIDn7chUL6CsAicQNZX2vZYJ0IbG3oVpX7NYtVbPTwEjbRfbBxvXvkTpjTMWVVy2hLZ Ufrw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.22.168 with SMTP id e8mr2079192laf.40.1438870914991; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 07:21:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 07:21:54 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 10:21:54 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0160bd70c40ad0051ca53d7a X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 14:21:58 -0000 --089e0160bd70c40ad0051ca53d7a Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > But you seem to consider that a bad thing. Maybe saying that you're > claiming that this equals Bitcoin failing is an exaggeration, but you do > believe that evolving towards an ecosystem where there is competition for > block space is a bad thing, right? > No, competition for block space is good. What is bad is artificially limiting or centrally controlling the supply of that space. -- -- Gavin Andresen --089e0160bd70c40ad0051ca53d7a Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
--089e0160bd70c40ad0051ca53d7a-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 58D648D7 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:53:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5E98EB for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:53:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodb91 with SMTP id b91so23530219iod.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 07:53:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=mLm0vxkxsi/DCq6ve3Ak0WXGshEZsNnn/rVHAr3FTeM=; b=TgDVN6M03GMVAUwA+Z0/QeXsSKDqXfoYQe04bY7PksMR8GS3lxv9gpA1hS+d6iUHWK A8RCngFzCi28eKgLOXW4T+pkP5/4SCUKJRwj1GBa/aa/g0C8kLcMKdleO1AeUXwj6yNq Yk1T3tqkdNGL+roCgmupez7Ei0x3F3OyfAEDrxHMOZ+dWdLDQxWnmKelUvDoKRryHnPa Zc8ME4feS4h44Jn/gkXXGv7Bj2Xx4qjvaI9Ks2pwfkyBYUfR8OLKquypEb5x4MP4xjpi 18TOWmRFFMe/LsQEHBwjo69xKvSzzSrwUi0H4ecFS6ox4ZzFVTAHTE60q7XaVtVj8IbV EUmg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.9.137 with SMTP id 9mr2639286ioj.50.1438872809248; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 07:53:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 07:53:29 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:53:29 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f8f14ac1ec4051ca5ae86 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 14:53:30 -0000 --001a113f8f14ac1ec4051ca5ae86 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 4:21 PM, Gavin Andresen wrote: > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Pieter Wuille > wrote: > >> But you seem to consider that a bad thing. Maybe saying that you're >> claiming that this equals Bitcoin failing is an exaggeration, but you do >> believe that evolving towards an ecosystem where there is competition for >> block space is a bad thing, right? >> > > No, competition for block space is good. > So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users (or settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay high fees (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block chain inaccessible for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium fee transactions (for any value of low, medium, and high), would you be ok with that? If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're a small constant factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of the system. I dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale" while technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It intentionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't think it is valuable. What is bad is artificially limiting or centrally controlling the supply of > that space. > It's exactly as centrally limited as the finite supply of BTC - by consensus. You and I may agree that a finite supply is a good thing, and may disagree about whether a consensus rule about the block size is a good idea (and if so, at what level), but it's a choice we make as a community about the rules of the system we want to use. -- Pieter --001a113f8f14ac1ec4051ca5ae86 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 4:21 PM, Gavin Andresen <g= avinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
=

What is bad is artificially limiting or centrally cont= rolling the supply of that space.

It's exactly as centrally limited as the finite supply of BTC = - by consensus. You and I may agree that a finite supply is a good thing, a= nd may disagree about whether a consensus rule about the block size is a go= od idea (and if so, at what level), but it's a choice we make as a comm= unity about the rules of the system we want to use.

--
Pieter

--001a113f8f14ac1ec4051ca5ae86-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8B57B8DD for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:25:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f169.google.com (mail-lb0-f169.google.com [209.85.217.169]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA94A168 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:25:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbtg9 with SMTP id tg9so7036403lbb.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 08:24:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=Olk01hg3oSLVJe3DVBZvi4asUYPZkbze2m6fZrO6js0=; b=Do1chewuS21rXDSjSuRT5+ra3I2svqnT6f9/ywmyQSY3+PA7jr9/4xSA1E6aKe4Dw7 yMtDT7j1ZMqPE2/M9l44ZSjAbyOIKOSCckO0ku7s9arOLnrsOScBPoTaXOttT/q7P5Y0 GqguFoan1C3BLk2Xl58i6B0YUGPsoAs3jiZAxXKGSfUJ31v5p+gR3+2Li3ZJPzqwb48X QZHRQ67L+5ssmEMTAFVIfY4s5fPrrcBjlKIiylQ7J4pyKKX6rQr7ajMJIvVJmX1pI61u CjWs7ybYGRg5EWo0QBDP9Q/uoV4J1OTIbeiS14RC61Ru1QjYPMIZ/Mb7jo4EM5jptA4C a4Eg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.139.131 with SMTP id qy3mr2629372lbb.4.1438874699020; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 08:24:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 08:24:58 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 11:24:58 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c33ffa4fc0ef051ca61f17 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 15:25:01 -0000 --001a11c33ffa4fc0ef051ca61f17 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users (or > settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay high fees > (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block chain inaccessible > for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium fee transactions (for > any value of low, medium, and high), would you be ok with that? Yes, that's fine. If the network cannot handle the transaction volume that people want to pay for, then the marginal transactions are priced out. That is true today (otherwise ChangeTip would be operating on-blockchain), and will be true forever. > If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're a small constant > factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of the system. "better is better" -- I applaud efforts to fundamentally improve the scalability of the system, but I am an old, cranky, pragmatic engineer who has seen that successful companies tackle problems that arise and are willing to deploy not-so-perfect solutions if they help whatever short-term problem they're facing. > I dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale" while > technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It > intentionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't think > it is valuable. I think consensus is against you on that point. -- -- Gavin Andresen --001a11c33ffa4fc0ef051ca61f17 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Aug 6, 201= 5 at 10:53 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>= wrote:
So if we would have 8 MB blocks, = and there is a sudden influx of users (or settlement systems, who serve muc= h more users) who want to pay high fees (let's say 20 transactions per = second) making the block chain inaccessible for low fee transactions, and u= nreliable for medium fee transactions (for any value of low, medium, and hi= gh), would you be ok with that?

Yes,= that's fine. If the network cannot handle the transaction volume that = people want to pay for, then the marginal transactions are priced out. That= is true today (otherwise ChangeTip would be operating on-blockchain), and = will be true forever.
=C2=A0
If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're = a small constant factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of th= e system.

"better is better&quo= t; -- I applaud efforts to fundamentally improve the scalability of the sys= tem, but I am an old, cranky, pragmatic engineer who has seen that successf= ul companies tackle problems that arise and are willing to deploy not-so-pe= rfect solutions if they help whatever short-term problem they're facing= .
=C2=A0
I = dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale" w= hile technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It inte= ntionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't think= it is valuable.

I think consensus is against = you on that point.

--
--
Gavin Andresen

--001a11c33ffa4fc0ef051ca61f17-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 788908E6 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:25:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 76DD2168 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:25:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so27325000wib.0 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 08:25:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=OwpAx6rvEgtZiGiOXSrOLU0zRm48K04j9fi5inKXUvI=; b=KhIMoLpMN2EOj7YcS03HG6gmRx+xkKgnIah0bYVGPst7JJ+JPWjDDLr9Jh8bhwXNyZ zUnH+a3pC5p2BzbyyuESA2v05krxP+K8g/FXmjio4H+fs4jM7m8A6yxiYtq7AyV3abZz Nsar4Km8PX0/hVffHcAEy7pxxjUj50OU7Z0ERAvlYVvRionC4HVLPr855uw9ftxzwHJf YugQGXQ/PebP8hQdyELwod34vVRiwOWbn8HMfyBcnepX4VXAuInGggTTq1zqO/kn4wBD CdIyffQ5b+I1FQnEfXU+U/fu7sGMLz9g819o33ZfDcztqKQ6V/ny53EiVWHvhNrD7OvP K9kQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmVLDYdd7SRdEfgruQvCQofSvglJCxIgN6i9ZOV+tQqs1mVTky+TCvsa4iLcCF9GZk/8erB MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.238.39 with SMTP id vh7mr4233713wjc.109.1438874748131; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 08:25:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 08:25:47 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:25:47 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 15:25:50 -0000 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Gavin Andresen wr= ote: > On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n > wrote: >> >> This is a much more reasonable position. I wish this had been starting >> point of this discussion instead of "the block size limit must be >> increased as soon as possible or bitcoin will fail". > > > It REALLY doesn't help the debate when you say patently false statements > like that. I'm pretty sure that I can quote Mike Hearn with a sentence extremely similar to that in this forum or in some of his blog posts (not in https://medium.com/@octskyward/crash-landing-f5cc19908e32 at a first glance...). But yeah, what people said in the past is not very important: people change their minds (they even acknowledge their mistake some times). What interests me more it's what people think now. I don't want to put words in your mouth and you are more than welcome to correct what I think you think with what you really think. All I'm trying to do is framing your fears properly. If I say "all fears related to not raising the block size limit in the short term can be summarized as a fear of fees rising in the short term". Am I correct? Am I missing some other argument? Of course, problems that need to be solved regardless of the block size (like an unbounded mempool) should not be considered for this discussion. > My first blog post on this issue is here: > http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent > > ... and I NEVER say "Bitcoin will fail". I say: > > "If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result > will be an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don= =E2=80=99t > think that is likely=E2=80=93 it is more likely people just stop using Bi= tcoin > because transaction confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable." If you pay high enough fees your transactions will be likely mined in the next block. So this seems to be reducible to the "fees rising" concern unless I am missing something. > So please stop with the over-the-top claims about what "the other side" > believe, there are enough of those (on both sides of the debate) on reddi= t. > I'd really like to focus on how to move forward, and how best to resolve > difficult questions like this in the future. I think I would have a much better understanding of what "the other side" thinks if I ever got an answer to a couple of very simple questions I have been repeating ad nausea: 1) If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? 2) When will you consider a size to be too dangerous for centralization? In other words, why 20 GB would have been safe but 21 GB wouldn't have been (or the respective maximums and respective +1 for each block increase proposal)? On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 4:21 PM, Gavin Andresen wr= ote: > What is bad is artificially limiting or centrally controlling the supply = of > that space. 3) Does this mean that you would be in favor of completely removing the consensus rule that limits mining centralization by imposing an artificial (like any other consensus rule) block size maximum? I've been insistently repeating this question too. Admittedly, it would be a great disappointment if your answer to this question is "yes": that can only mean that either you don't understand how the consensus rule limits mining centralization or that you don't care about mining centralization at all. If you really want things to move forward, please, prove it by answering these questions so that we don't have to imagine what the answers are (because what we imagine is probably much worse than your actual answers). I'm more than willing to stop trying to imagine what "big block advocates" think, but I need your answers from the "big block advocates". Asking repeatedly doesn't seem to be effective. So I will answer the questions myself in the worse possible way I think a "big block advocate" could answer them. Feel free to replace my stupid answers with your own: ----------------------- (FICTION ANSWERS [given the lack of real answers]) 3) Does this mean that you would be in favor of completely removing the consensus rule that limits mining centralization by imposing an artificial (like any other consensus rule) block size maximum? Yes, I would remove the rule because I don't care about mining centralizati= on. 2) When will you consider a size to be too dangerous for centralization? In other words, why 20 GB would have been safe but 21 GB wouldn't have been (or the respective maximums and respective +1 for each block increase proposal)? Never, as said I don't care about mining centralization. I thought users and Bitcoin companies would agree with a 20 GB limit hardfork with proper lobbying, but I certainly prefer 21 GB. >From 1 MB to infinity, the bigger the better, always. 1) If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? Never. Fees are just an excuse, the real goal is making Bitcoin centralized= . ------------------------ I'm quite confident that you will have better answers than those. Please, let me know what you think. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 25ABB8E6 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:26:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f178.google.com (mail-ig0-f178.google.com [209.85.213.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 92690169 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:26:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbpg9 with SMTP id pg9so13776086igb.0 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 08:26:12 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=vM51bwQKAvRw71brbYC06eZQTsfyW4/pkvu8/E4nZv0=; b=IUt+rXX+/zKjhgc7jzpd+Jr//PGXBtSGdcB9zGxg/Gri3e8vB06R3Xn0I742pFwnQj 0o+fTe67u35Zj+RpQm1NU5b39ay4tjV0/NzI5sTJWCLUV65gFl0R0qeOF6dnamd8dmH0 lZe37va65B+x11bNDs3sGtlG/WuO0/yczxNQk+Pgddsv7SKZ9wkiu9zoDIEcVDopCQvs a4k+OGZd5tzy/CrYTMOrJ5KeumG/zh/OUPN1dakU8XpkMdfU8fCFJ6kn7oxNtsFHt+NY n0jhr1umgt5Zdukt3aUYnllgis9FBumRKM5qQM3Se/0Paczgrgyzn2tK+PzgX/t0ne5/ TBLQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.93.69 with SMTP id cs5mr1780150igb.4.1438874772049; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 08:26:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 08:26:11 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:26:11 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01537ed8aa168e051ca6237c X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 15:26:13 -0000 --089e01537ed8aa168e051ca6237c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:06 PM, Gavin Andresen wrote: > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Pieter Wuille > wrote: > >> So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users >> (or settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay high >> fees (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block chain >> inaccessible for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium fee >> transactions (for any value of low, medium, and high), would you be ok with >> that? > > > Yes, that's fine. If the network cannot handle the transaction volume that > people want to pay for, then the marginal transactions are priced out. That > is true today (otherwise ChangeTip would be operating on-blockchain), and > will be true forever. > The network can "handle" any size. I believe that if a majority of miners forms SPV mining agreements, then they are no longer affected by the block size, and benefit from making their blocks slow to validate for others (as long as the fee is negligable compared to the subsidy). I'll try to find the time to implement that in my simulator. Some hardware for full nodes will always be able to validate and index the chain, so nobody needs to run a pesky full node anymore and they can just use a web API to validate payments. Being able the "handle" a particular rate is not a boolean question. It's a question of how much security, centralization, and risk for systemic error we're willing to tolerate. These are not things you can just observe, so let's keep talking about the risks, and find a solution that we agree on. > >> If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're a small constant >> factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of the system. > > > "better is better" -- I applaud efforts to fundamentally improve the > scalability of the system, but I am an old, cranky, pragmatic engineer who > has seen that successful companies tackle problems that arise and are > willing to deploy not-so-perfect solutions if they help whatever short-term > problem they're facing. > I don't believe there is a short-term problem. If there is one now, there will be one too at 8 MB blocks (or whatever actual size blocks are produced). > > >> I dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale" while >> technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It >> intentionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't think >> it is valuable. > > > I think consensus is against you on that point. > Maybe. But I believe that it is essential to not take unnecessary risks, and find a non-controversial solution. -- Pieter --089e01537ed8aa168e051ca6237c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:06 PM, Ga= vin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 a= t 10:53 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wr= ote:
So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users (or settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay high=20 fees (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block chain=20 inaccessible for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium fee=20 transactions (for any value of low, medium, and high), would you be ok=20 with that?

Yes, that's fine. If= =20 the network cannot handle the transaction volume that people want to pay for, then the marginal transactions are priced out. That is true today=20 (otherwise ChangeTip would be operating on-blockchain), and will be true forever.

Th= e network can "handle" any size. I believe that if a majority of m= iners=20 forms SPV mining agreements, then they are no longer affected by the=20 block size, and benefit from making their blocks slow to validate for=20 others (as long as the fee is negligable compared to the subsidy). I'll= =20 try to find the time to implement that in my simulator. Some hardware=20 for full nodes will always be able to validate and index the chain, so=20 nobody needs to run a pesky full node anymore and they can just use a=20 web API to validate payments.

Being able the "handle= " a particular rate is not a boolean question. It's a question of how much= =20 security, centralization, and risk for systemic error we're willing to= =20 tolerate. These are not things you can just observe, so let's keep=20 talking about the risks, and find a solution that we agree on.

=C2=A0
If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're a small constant= =20 factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of the system.

"better is better" -- I applaud efforts to fundamentally improve the=20 scalability of the system, but I am an old, cranky, pragmatic engineer=20 who has seen that successful companies tackle problems that arise and=20 are willing to deploy not-so-perfect solutions if they help whatever=20 short-term problem they're facing.
=

I don't believe there is a short-term problem. If there is one now, ther= e will be one too at 8 MB blocks (or whatever actual size blocks are=20 produced).
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
I dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale"= ; while technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It=20 intentionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't= =20 think it is valuable.

I think consensus is aga= inst you on that point.

= Maybe. But I believe that it is essential to not take unnecessary risks, an= d find a non-controversial solution.

--
Pieter
--089e01537ed8aa168e051ca6237c-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA2118A8 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:04:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f181.google.com (mail-lb0-f181.google.com [209.85.217.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ABDCB16F for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:03:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbtg9 with SMTP id tg9so7722411lbb.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:03:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=GsYN5Lw/r4M0GX2IGD3y7C14KhOREDyxs6UTDxDLdX0=; b=iP5ZZdyyYXi4k1+ro7SrGUPBwjAx3U1oyQ/Z420ycCJ7jRyjgT1hCrfJO5k3R0qC8B 6r/1sj9ACZ/ddNgAsI+eS4ZGLIQjFWXw6b8cpP1R1xNCwDd1u44nTdZvjy1B+L7SCYaW 5/eAR1ppjHhBp++d8VC5rArIewklkgjAOh2dMlrYfMoh39uT9mXwViZBigGBonnEA/Xn giR0fGdP/f3lhAfFin55XVs3jyrWM75T1FQEhwSNvmnF0qyXrMeLM++/G8KjyW3cCYb9 JF4cZDkYOqlOAx1m3EDNyiApsUCZmwZwIh8fcFX+RkV1xAYow+2itNxQhBEnI/p72Wav huLA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.43.41 with SMTP id t9mr2948423lal.4.1438877037848; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:03:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 09:03:57 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 12:03:57 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c27f40b77067051ca6aa9c X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 16:04:00 -0000 --001a11c27f40b77067051ca6aa9c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > 1) If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? > Fees are already above zero. See http://gavinandresen.ninja/the-myth-of-not-full-blocks > 2) When will you consider a size to be too dangerous for centralization? > In other words, why 20 GB would have been safe but 21 GB wouldn't have > been (or the respective maximums and respective +1 for each block > increase proposal)? > http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-cen= tralized 3) Does this mean that you would be in favor of completely removing > the consensus rule that limits mining centralization by imposing an > artificial (like any other consensus rule) block size maximum? > I don't believe that the maximum block size has much at all to do with mining centralization, so I don't accept the premise of the question. --=20 -- Gavin Andresen --001a11c27f40b77067051ca6aa9c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, Aug 6, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> wrote:
1) If "not now" when will it be a good= time to let fees rise above zero?

Fees are already above zero. See=C2=A0http://gavinandresen.ninja/the-myth-of-not-= full-blocks
=C2=A0
2) When will you consider a size to be too dangerous for centralization? In other words, why 20 GB would have been safe but 21 GB wouldn't have<= br> been (or the respective maximums and respective +1 for each block
increase proposal)?


3) Does this mean= that you would be in favor of completely removing
the consensus rule that limits mining centralization by imposing an
artificial (like any other consensus rule) block size maximum?

I don't believe that the maximum block size has muc= h at all to do with mining centralization, so I don't accept the premis= e of the question.

--
--
Gavin Andresen
--001a11c27f40b77067051ca6aa9c-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 977FE8B4 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:11:42 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f173.google.com (mail-io0-f173.google.com [209.85.223.173]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE821A6 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:11:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodb91 with SMTP id b91so26040184iod.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:11:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=vinumeris.com; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=t54allgJlgpr9UfbP5/wORZ1AHlXjseRDqkbfFcCq/4=; b=LCJ3RKCSL12TZrdrewNUNHTjvKxJMWNM/B0KOZb3yJLcdk3xj9tncOZ5yfLPys68O4 dkeDsZ5quWXGhEiyhauu0snE46eEWVKFJn7bcpBsUFtXgXkHFTv+7DCMm8DAplinE4Ti VvS04g1sLver/uyvkj1q52WEYA74LylMgPoto= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=t54allgJlgpr9UfbP5/wORZ1AHlXjseRDqkbfFcCq/4=; b=S+V31CwG/0ae9yi9P9FFnEuG95EWXXG60RsRyrPTUHVCQDJSov1colH0wxOok3zWFc rIaIzUPRFsc+uWCF7unTFV6/S0+yaX2NryASmzGeX+O27UeKNYAvXzX7Beh7BwslicUH gOWy2JjGUCK14YzWTwLKPiy+aes9FuPP8753qp6vV4Dh4vHwAKhbp1deaVPeMN6p9Mf4 fS+8LkR1hpTuY81eyYZ55+QPt1d8v6qVv1ChCkKF6vc+OPOoWp51Q52y2I7ZzNZUElwS ZvQ5cXJiRxT+cGHoEsYCkSeH6869ttp1imX3NxQF3fobIRHr1ChmM+rv7OZ8miQA5Ph6 oIeQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnjRLuVGY+1qD3MqoH7PqAlawG4AUN7xrFs+cY4808NcX+/ayueUkJJulX2JuUAwFIxpg9y MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.36.134 with SMTP id k128mr3260778iok.113.1438877501369; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:11:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.50.108.111 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 09:11:40 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 18:11:40 +0200 Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1140ebae585238051ca6c61d X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 16:11:42 -0000 --001a1140ebae585238051ca6c61d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Whilst 1mb to 8mb might seem irrelevant from a pure computer science perspective payment demand is not really infinite, at least not if by "payment" we mean something resembling how current Bitcoin users use the network. If we define "payment" to mean the kind of thing that Bitcoin users and enthusiasts have been doing up until now, then suddenly 1mb to 8mb makes a ton of sense and doesn't really seem that small: we'd have to increase usage by nearly an order of magnitude before it becomes an issue again! If we think of Bitcoin as a business that serves customers, growing our user base by an order of magnitude would be a great and celebration worthy achievement! Not at all a small constant factor :) And keeping the current user base happy and buying things is extremely interesting, both to me and Gavin. Without users Bitcoin is nothing at all. Not a settlement network, not anything. It's actually going to be quite hard to grow that much. As the white paper says, "the system works well enough for most transactions". And despite a lot of effort by many people, killer apps that use Bitcoin's unique features are still hit and miss. Perhaps Streamium, Lighthouse, ChangeTip, some distributed exchange or something else will stimulate huge new demand for transactions in future ..... but if so we're not there yet. --001a1140ebae585238051ca6c61d Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Whilst 1mb to 8mb might seem ir= relevant from a pure computer science perspective payment demand is not rea= lly infinite, at least not if by "payment" we mean something rese= mbling how current Bitcoin users use the network.

If we define "payment"= ; to mean the kind of thing that Bitcoin users and enthusiasts have been do= ing up until now, then suddenly 1mb to 8mb makes a ton of sense and doesn&#= 39;t really seem that small: we'd have to increase usage by nearly an o= rder of magnitude before it becomes an issue again!

If we think of Bitcoin as a b= usiness that serves customers, growing our user base by an order of magnitu= de would be a great and celebration worthy achievement! Not at all a small = constant factor :)=C2=A0

And keeping the current user = base happy and buying things is extremely interesting, both to me and Gavin= . Without users Bitcoin is nothing at all. Not a settlement network, not an= ything.

It's actually going to be quite hard to grow that much. As the = white paper says, "the system works well enough for most transactions&= quot;. And despite a lot of effort by many people, killer apps that use Bit= coin's unique features are still hit and miss. Perhaps Streamium, Light= house, ChangeTip, some distributed exchange or something else will stimulat= e huge new demand for transactions in future ..... but if so we're not = there yet.
--001a1140ebae585238051ca6c61d-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A4E3C8CE for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:19:16 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f52.google.com (mail-pa0-f52.google.com [209.85.220.52]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 538321FB for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:19:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pabyb7 with SMTP id yb7so34036372pab.0 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:19:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=f4X/TD8watkzktENRP7S8AlGcn9g46PuAd97a1U4/wA=; b=QFJKMTJI9mVKb70GZL6Irysh4cZmhdgKBZlCDzZb15rvLRDFOD+fjYQSK3+sTjrzu3 MbULVTumQ/wVCocnuDRZnnH0RJQWTCH73GZ/dqHpH0bzIag0xldX+/TopCZZB2OoYtI6 4xIUXl4o2r7uLr4w6Ez/YJ6KF5WKKg6u37KBp93kaft+v7ySqooeceYiCQfcP/ZrXX6i UaEhFIolXP4uW2DjVHK/uR2VOJXlYZlhHoyj0/ozVs0gkkF9U9XJIEguXbgUUoc/Vq74 qfqYpuUG2M/cix+OTpag1uoZALt9Cd0gvxwohYYIoqqT2+ZX8lnzL5LWXZvkdmMjfBUf SMJg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlgQA/uvi5+L+fCr4+kdH+PFKR46ZoXrF1FNq4TMy+42Pguf8Qkax+3oMYWsPs8coCnocTQ X-Received: by 10.68.252.225 with SMTP id zv1mr4798887pbc.45.1438877956039; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:19:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.89] (99-8-65-117.lightspeed.davlca.sbcglobal.net. [99.8.65.117]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id fj6sm7076908pdb.21.2015.08.06.09.19.13 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 06 Aug 2015 09:19:14 -0700 (PDT) To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: From: Tom Harding X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <55C38901.8090608@thinlink.com> Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 09:19:13 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 16:19:16 -0000 On 8/6/2015 7:53 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users > (or settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay > high fees (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block > chain inaccessible for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium > fee transactions (for any value of low, medium, and high), would you > be ok with that? Gavin has answered this question in the clearest way possible -- in tested C++ code, which increases capacity only on a precise schedule for 20 years, then stops increasing. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2618489D for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:15:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f177.google.com (mail-wi0-f177.google.com [209.85.212.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2FA411C1 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:15:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibhh20 with SMTP id hh20so33249565wib.0 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 10:15:02 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=hOgNzwcP1T3/8ZIg7SFkrhf5NAYEykoBtRV+AAnVYjQ=; b=cwQOH2mR6qyRToQaOxOaEKM+ayWuVysWq8AVbFB5BbVu96Z4Zfx4y80rwmDWqUJc1k D8XYEVP2dhDyUeVFwOkmx30u5RRQEIZxxNIAKWn8RHfgAvJtRSSGXHzvFJkmzjLkb7vr H3fXMUcAcjJQarGJsDwZ3hmxuEhsimAfZcIlQXsgXvqDG2wBgmv5eVCh5e4mrPRHsMEn UHNQmDLFntNId6dchEnVVEsZ26OCyuBpnuTqGIxDBOvgys/siD5aYP9B2KcD05S80T0U rU5ub/BO0mbIDefR8FoOWhVV2H799rOfJTlPpt9Toy6h5iM3bg7rrs4MfvyBxgaiPTal ZN9Q== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQluBi7nn0NFzVb1YNRP2c6q69NlgbMHoTYUU5l+7tOX7Brly3k8egUNOOcoE2I1qPGAzb3B MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.230.199 with SMTP id ta7mr3453929wic.1.1438881302703; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 10:15:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 10:15:02 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 19:15:02 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 17:15:33 -0000 First of all, thank you very much for answering the questions, and apologies for not having formulated them properly (fortunately that's not an irreparable mistake). On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 6:03 PM, Gavin Andresen wr= ote: > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrot= e: >> >> 1) If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? > > > Fees are already above zero. See > http://gavinandresen.ninja/the-myth-of-not-full-blocks When we talk about "fees" we're talking about different things. I should have been more specific. Average fees are greatly influenced by wallet and policy defaults, and they also include extra fees that are included for fast confirmation. I'm not talking about fast confirmation transactions, but about non-urgent transactions. What is the market minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction? That's currently zero. If you don't want to directly look at what blocks contain, we can also use a fee estimator and define a "non-urgent period", say 1 week worth of blocks (1008 blocks). The chart in your link doesn't include a 1008 blocks line, but the 15 blocks (about 2.5 hours) line seems to already show zero fees: http://img.svbtle.com/p4x3s7fn52sz9a.png So I reformulate the question: 1) If "not now", when will it be a good time to let the "market minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction" rise above zero? >> 2) When will you consider a size to be too dangerous for centralization? >> In other words, why 20 GB would have been safe but 21 GB wouldn't have >> been (or the respective maximums and respective +1 for each block >> increase proposal)? > > > http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-necessarily-mean-more-c= entralized This just shows where the 20 GB come from, not why you would reject 21 GB. Let me rephrase. 2) Do you have any criterion (automatic or not) that can result in you saying "no, this is too much" for any proposed size? Since you don't think the consensus block size maximum limits mining centralization (as you later say), it must be based on something else. In any case, if you lack a criterion that's fine as well: it's never too late to have one. Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a criterion/test? >> 3) Does this mean that you would be in favor of completely removing >> the consensus rule that limits mining centralization by imposing an >> artificial (like any other consensus rule) block size maximum? > > > I don't believe that the maximum block size has much at all to do with > mining centralization, so I don't accept the premise of the question. Ok, this is an enormous step forward in the discussion, thank you. In my opinion all discussions will be sterile while we can't even agree on what are the positive effects of the consensus rule that supposedly needs to be changed. It's not that you don't care about centralization, it's that you don't believe that a consensus block size maximum limits centralization at all. This means that if I can convince you that the consensus block size maximum does in fact limit centralization in any way, you may change your views about the whole blocksize consensus rule change, you may even take back or change your own proposal. But let's leave that aside that for now. Regardless of the history of the consensus rule (which I couldn't care less about), I believe the only function that the maximum block size rule currently serves is limiting centralization. Since you deny that function, do you think the (artificial) consensus rule is currently serving any other purpose that I'm missing? If the answer is something along the lines of "not really, it's just technical debt", then I think you should be honest and consequent, and directly advocate for the complete removal of the consensus rule. I really think conversations can't really advance until we clarify the different positions about the discussed consensus rule current purpose. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C7648BA for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 18:43:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33DD915D for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 18:43:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicgj17 with SMTP id gj17so33812163wic.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 11:43:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=p6ghhFVsal2wL+0pv2H5yaq/BIYEqHATh2TGB7XGveM=; b=lbJLpIwri2v0jX/BgNq0GjaHKYGDtTb/loAsI19ZhHTL/t/4HrNf0fGK+pcYNdsMTi 6qnEVY0BHwIjFj1AeiR5EVaENimOfUtIKZv8J6+9ljECqpeWDqLvkbYCtpsvQVeQ3qEP HSJYcQMpw5JngNbLWhtkYFvSdARuBiSsTbcokT7I3IXWRI0IhQwmDCAQBDgrq0UfbPjT oD+UbQO3HJIZ1WOGZFpx1XzoGM/+hoKMA9UMzRh0bXvtzfK+e8YM7Ob6y+onnQlwtU6n 9t6mRBhEWNommgtYQTXp65FBfSlTbcDbbFLwB9zIU6q+BSGv9UfVoXp4AitRG34PBm/c 1YSg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.20.71 with SMTP id l7mr9245403wie.32.1438886623969; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 11:43:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.27.78.207 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 11:43:43 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 13:43:43 -0500 Message-ID: From: Michael Naber To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=bcaec53f2e271808d5051ca8e6fb X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 18:43:46 -0000 --bcaec53f2e271808d5051ca8e6fb Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 How many nodes are necessary to ensure sufficient network reliability? Ten, a hundred, a thousand? At what point do we hit the point of diminishing returns, where adding extra nodes starts to have negligible impact on the overall reliability of the system? On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:26 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:06 PM, Gavin Andresen > wrote: > >> On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Pieter Wuille >> wrote: >> >>> So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users >>> (or settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay high >>> fees (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block chain >>> inaccessible for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium fee >>> transactions (for any value of low, medium, and high), would you be ok with >>> that? >> >> >> Yes, that's fine. If the network cannot handle the transaction volume >> that people want to pay for, then the marginal transactions are priced out. >> That is true today (otherwise ChangeTip would be operating on-blockchain), >> and will be true forever. >> > > The network can "handle" any size. I believe that if a majority of miners > forms SPV mining agreements, then they are no longer affected by the block > size, and benefit from making their blocks slow to validate for others (as > long as the fee is negligable compared to the subsidy). I'll try to find > the time to implement that in my simulator. Some hardware for full nodes > will always be able to validate and index the chain, so nobody needs to run > a pesky full node anymore and they can just use a web API to validate > payments. > > Being able the "handle" a particular rate is not a boolean question. It's > a question of how much security, centralization, and risk for systemic > error we're willing to tolerate. These are not things you can just observe, > so let's keep talking about the risks, and find a solution that we agree on. > > >> >>> If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're a small constant >>> factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of the system. >> >> >> "better is better" -- I applaud efforts to fundamentally improve the >> scalability of the system, but I am an old, cranky, pragmatic engineer who >> has seen that successful companies tackle problems that arise and are >> willing to deploy not-so-perfect solutions if they help whatever short-term >> problem they're facing. >> > > I don't believe there is a short-term problem. If there is one now, there > will be one too at 8 MB blocks (or whatever actual size blocks are > produced). > > >> >> >>> I dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale" while >>> technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It >>> intentionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't think >>> it is valuable. >> >> >> I think consensus is against you on that point. >> > > Maybe. But I believe that it is essential to not take unnecessary risks, > and find a non-controversial solution. > > -- > Pieter > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --bcaec53f2e271808d5051ca8e6fb Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
How many nodes are necessary to ensure sufficient network = reliability? Ten, a hundred, a thousand? At what point do we hit the point = of diminishing returns, where adding extra nodes starts to have negligible = impact on the overall reliability of the system?=C2=A0

<= br>


On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:26 AM, Pieter Wuille = via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org= > wrote:
<= div>On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:06 PM, Gavin Andresen <= span dir=3D"ltr"><gavinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Pieter Wuille <= span dir=3D"ltr"><pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:
So if we would have 8 MB blocks, and there is a sudden influx of users (or settlement systems, who serve much more users) who want to pay high=20 fees (let's say 20 transactions per second) making the block chain=20 inaccessible for low fee transactions, and unreliable for medium fee=20 transactions (for any value of low, medium, and high), would you be ok=20 with that?

Yes, that's fine. If= =20 the network cannot handle the transaction volume that people want to pay for, then the marginal transactions are priced out. That is true today=20 (otherwise ChangeTip would be operating on-blockchain), and will be true forever.

=
The network can "handle" any size. I believe that if a majority of m= iners=20 forms SPV mining agreements, then they are no longer affected by the=20 block size, and benefit from making their blocks slow to validate for=20 others (as long as the fee is negligable compared to the subsidy). I'll= =20 try to find the time to implement that in my simulator. Some hardware=20 for full nodes will always be able to validate and index the chain, so=20 nobody needs to run a pesky full node anymore and they can just use a=20 web API to validate payments.

Being able the "handle= " a particular rate is not a boolean question. It's a question of how much= =20 security, centralization, and risk for systemic error we're willing to= =20 tolerate. These are not things you can just observe, so let's keep=20 talking about the risks, and find a solution that we agree on.

=C2=A0
<= blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px= #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> If so, why is 8 MB good but 1 MB not? To me, they're a small constant= =20 factor that does not fundamentally improve the scale of the system.

"better is better" -- I applaud efforts to fundamentally improve the=20 scalability of the system, but I am an old, cranky, pragmatic engineer=20 who has seen that successful companies tackle problems that arise and=20 are willing to deploy not-so-perfect solutions if they help whatever=20 short-term problem they're facing.
=

I don't believe there is a short-term problem. If there is one now, ther= e will be one too at 8 MB blocks (or whatever actual size blocks are=20 produced).
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
I dislike the outlook of "being forever locked at the same scale"= ; while technology evolves, so my proposal tries to address that part. It=20 intentionally does not try to improve a small factor, because I don't= =20 think it is valuable.

I think consensus is aga= inst you on that point.

Maybe. But I believe that it is essential to not take unnecessary ri= sks, and find a non-controversial solution.

--
Pieter


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--bcaec53f2e271808d5051ca8e6fb-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 022478D5 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 18:52:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f181.google.com (mail-ig0-f181.google.com [209.85.213.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 95491179 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 18:52:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbpg9 with SMTP id pg9so17575764igb.0 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 11:52:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=KdoUIddzmc64r7ynHXtzbdKlW2HGs+x6CC101ljMa6s=; b=QbEQKZ61q+66bsglKe9ntvOyg1DoxDpJ3J94DEvkszRkp4c0IdaAMqHoJPbPAeTnBM XdBPYP7+/6pGoLwlMME3FTLtiDQMC0+YsDNvg9Y3fZzWxhe0iHTNVbKCo346ES8xtz7m 5ldxrOiLWY9wu4IWl0ROGnMQu/ne43Q5Qn5JZYwk1h0oohIWKVUz4JDzypQdDJXRq2gs T2E5JbHIiPlxEsVau/yxkBoYL0Ug2skyMj4nSvhxM1XqYVvpaeX5C3MyoxZk6N/f1WXz NFE+zgkXaehoPoiJezSbqMzVq6OZk9+wvZLBOeMAC5VFdZcNS8GZQJBOOj4ixnQ2fH+L 4q/A== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.93.69 with SMTP id cs5mr3124932igb.4.1438887148996; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 11:52:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 11:52:28 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 20:52:28 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Michael Naber Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01537ed8634fab051ca905b5 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 18:52:30 -0000 --089e01537ed8634fab051ca905b5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Michael Naber wrote: > How many nodes are necessary to ensure sufficient network reliability? > Ten, a hundred, a thousand? At what point do we hit the point of > diminishing returns, where adding extra nodes starts to have negligible > impact on the overall reliability of the system? > It's not about reliability. There are plenty of nodes currently for synchronization and other network functions. It's about reduction of trust. Running a full node and using it verify your transactions is how you get personal assurance that everyone on the network is following the rules. And if you don't do so yourself, the knowledge that others are using full nodes and relying on them is valuable. Someone just running 1000 nodes in a data center and not using them for anything does not do anything for this, it's adding network capacity without use. That doesn't mean that the full node count (or the reachable full node count even) are meaningless numbers. They are an indication of how hard it is (for various reasons) to run/use a full node, and thus provide feedback. But they are not the goal, just an indicator. -- Pieter --089e01537ed8634fab051ca905b5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:43 PM, Michael Naber <mickeybo= b@gmail.com> wrote:
How many n= odes are necessary to ensure sufficient network reliability? Ten, a hundred= , a thousand? At what point do we hit the point of diminishing returns, whe= re adding extra nodes starts to have negligible impact on the overall relia= bility of the system?=C2=A0

It's = not about reliability. There are plenty of nodes currently for synchronizat= ion and other network functions.

It's about reduction= of trust. Running a full node and using it verify your transactions is how= you get personal assurance that everyone on the network is following the r= ules. And if you don't do so yourself, the knowledge that others are us= ing full nodes and relying on them is valuable. Someone just running 1000 n= odes in a data center and not using them for anything does not do anything = for this, it's adding network capacity without use.

T= hat doesn't mean that the full node count (or the reachable full node c= ount even) are meaningless numbers. They are an indication of how hard it i= s (for various reasons) to run/use a full node, and thus provide feedback. = But they are not the goal, just an indicator.

--
Piet= er

--089e01537ed8634fab051ca905b5-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A54C58EA for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 19:42:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f48.google.com (mail-la0-f48.google.com [209.85.215.48]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8C4E166 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 19:42:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labjt7 with SMTP id jt7so37862410lab.0 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 12:42:10 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=2O5Rtu2fojIjiFEmVQhCCXTPoiWJfK3b7b/iL5feY64=; b=hZrzwEwM0+dr5+XIPTQj69OvgpK1X1UxZp8sWU+VP4hQuOiLKHmzTpn4SVzIxm0chM H5Ujnga4yXWx1sWVEzI4UuThN8aHRRqWO+nTjA411ZTlZL0b2GRn9lvr201QMvEPKIQC Y3V8ch8/aRQvHIqmN83PEP27QPCZopHhHnC3KBi3ewI+PAUf08CKVsnKRcqxy1NRRwQd Tq/w9BZdg7Cr2oWszhpUywBGgsadA0OzjboJIxU1+UjcX0zGNM+Di+n3P1jDcLc0+Kj3 sFqJMe5pKirW5zjYCfRKFwIzM6ZHua1MPejLuKpm/KAcdKxTZRnPQXlip31tBEb0ls7U SzUg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.115.132 with SMTP id jo4mr4013453lab.113.1438890130610; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 12:42:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 12:42:10 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 15:42:10 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c366d21b1f07051ca9b756 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 19:42:13 -0000 --001a11c366d21b1f07051ca9b756 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 1:15 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > So I reformulate the question: > > 1) If "not now", when will it be a good time to let the "market > minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction" rise above zero? Two answers: 1. If you are willing to wait an infinite amount of time, I think the minimum fee will always be zero or very close to zero, so I think it's a silly question. 2. The "market minimum fee" should be determined by the market. It should not be up to us to decide "when is a good time." > 2) Do you have any criterion (automatic or not) that can result in you > saying "no, this is too much" for any proposed size? > Sure, if keeping up with transaction volume requires a cluster of computers or more than "pretty good" broadband bandwidth I think that's too far. That's where original 20MB limit comes from, otherwise I'd have proposed a much higher limit. > Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a > criterion/test? Although I've been very clear with my criterion, no, I don't think all blocksize increase proposals should have to justify "why this size" or "why this rate of increase." Part of my frustration with this whole debate is we're talking about a sanity-check upper-limit; as long as it doesn't open up some terrible new DoS possibility I don't think it really matters much what the exact number is. > Regardless of the history of the consensus rule (which I couldn't care > less about), I believe the only function that the maximum block size > rule currently serves is limiting centralization. > Since you deny that function, do you think the (artificial) consensus > rule is currently serving any other purpose that I'm missing? > It prevents trivial denial-of-service attacks (e.g. I promise to send you a 1 Terabyte block, then fill up your memory or disk...). And please read what I wrote: I said that the block limit has LITTLE effect on MINING centralization. Not "no effect on any type of centralization." If the limit was removed entirely, it is certainly possible we'd end up with very few organizations (and perhaps zero individuals) running full nodes. --=20 -- Gavin Andresen --001a11c366d21b1f07051ca9b756 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, Aug 6, 2015 at 1:15 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> wrote:
So I reformulate the question:=

1) If "not now", when will it be a good time to let the "mar= ket
minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction" rise above zero?

Two answers:

1. If you ar= e willing to wait an infinite amount of time, I think the minimum fee will = always be zero or very close to zero, so I think it's a silly question.=

2. The "market minimum fee" should be d= etermined by the market. It should not be up to us to decide "when is = a good time."
=C2=A0
2) Do you have any criterion (automatic or not) that can result in you
saying "no, this is too much" for any proposed size?

Sure, if keeping up with transaction volume require= s a cluster of computers or more than "pretty good" broadband ban= dwidth I think that's too far.=C2=A0 That's where original 20MB lim= it comes from, otherwise I'd have proposed a much higher limit.=C2=A0
=C2=A0
Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a
criterion/test?

Although I've been very= clear with my criterion, no, I don't think all blocksize increase prop= osals should have to justify "why this size" or "why this ra= te of increase." Part of my frustration with this whole debate is we&#= 39;re talking about a sanity-check upper-limit; as long as it doesn't o= pen up some terrible new DoS possibility I don't think it really matter= s much what the exact number is.
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
Regardless of the history of the consensus rule (which I couldn't care<= br> less about), I believe the only function that the maximum block size
rule currently serves is limiting centralization.
Since you deny that function, do you think the (artificial) consensus
rule is currently serving any other purpose that I'm missing?

It prevents trivial denial-of-service attacks (e= .g. I promise to send you a 1 Terabyte block, then fill up your memory or d= isk...).

And please read wh= at I wrote: I said that the block limit has LITTLE effect on MINING central= ization.=C2=A0 Not "no effect on any type of centralization."

If the li= mit was removed entirely, it is certainly possible we'd end up with ver= y few organizations (and perhaps zero individuals) running full nodes.

--
--
Gav= in Andresen
--001a11c366d21b1f07051ca9b756-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8219E8F4 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 20:01:55 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f169.google.com (mail-io0-f169.google.com [209.85.223.169]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DF14F166 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 20:01:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioeg141 with SMTP id g141so92231633ioe.3 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 13:01:54 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=sIS5j2cCMoFv31hjI570oPyllwFOg506+WmXrWqX0bI=; b=sV2877gG2ubYvN7KPoo6ZiSyESNAtE1LSTzbY4AHf1uDrn+v5njnoszitTDpQ+RFKA Mp8ONQij3x8uRSeB54d+oJWy2jtkvACUhtWdgcVQTZ7wpn5VFb7jXDciSYOkvs1IngeN nJ3mr/wyRugjtxMrLjDAPdGgr4HiLntXd3j8ywSl+jQcCqWfgPbsm+0Gg56hRtMiFuf5 5ZaE3yP/6TBOepQU9990yrmi8qYX4jDf1yZjRPaDf+I+2y3zdG2RSWBEtEX5pW5H3LE3 W56+aRDI+BDh0Fdnbt9imf4r4RfyWpVA/1WS2jBlhs/ygTIzjrSH3Zer9qBVPUfze7E5 DKMQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.9.137 with SMTP id 9mr4492509ioj.50.1438891314176; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 13:01:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 13:01:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 13:01:53 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 22:01:53 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f8f14a6ebb8051ca9fd6f X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 20:01:55 -0000 --001a113f8f14a6ebb8051ca9fd6f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Aug 6, 2015 9:42 PM, "Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: 2. The "market minimum fee" should be determined by the market. It should not be up to us to decide "when is a good time." I partially agree. The community should decide what risks it is willing to take, and set limits accordingly. Let the market decide how that space is best used. > >> >> Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a >> criterion/test? > > > Although I've been very clear with my criterion, no, I don't think all blocksize increase proposals should have to justify "why this size" or "why this rate of increase." Part of my frustration with this whole debate is we're talking about a sanity-check upper-limit; as long as it doesn't open up some terrible new DoS possibility I don't think it really matters much what the exact number is. It is only a DoS protection limit if you want to rely on trusting miners. I prefer a system where I don't have to do that. But I agree the numbers don't matter much, for a different reason: the market will fill up whatever space is available, and we'll have the same discussion when the new limit doesn't seem enough anymore. -- Pieter --001a113f8f14a6ebb8051ca9fd6f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Aug 6, 2015 9:42 PM, "Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linu= xfoundation.org> wrote:
2. The "market minimum fee" should be determined by the market. I= t should not be up to us to decide "when is a good time."

I partially agree. The community should decide what risks it= is willing to take, and set limits accordingly. Let the market decide how = that space is best used.

> =C2=A0
>>
>> Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such= a
>> criterion/test?
>
>
> Although I've been very clear with my criterion, no, I don't t= hink all blocksize increase proposals should have to justify "why this= size" or "why this rate of increase." Part of my frustratio= n with this whole debate is we're talking about a sanity-check upper-li= mit; as long as it doesn't open up some terrible new DoS possibility I = don't think it really matters much what the exact number is.

It is only a DoS protection limit if you want to rely on tru= sting miners. I prefer a system where I don't have to do that.

But I agree the numbers don't matter much, for a differe= nt reason: the market will fill up whatever space is available, and we'= ll have the same discussion when the new limit doesn't seem enough anym= ore.

--
Pieter

--001a113f8f14a6ebb8051ca9fd6f-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 041FB305 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 21:51:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C75DB118 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 21:51:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so41796127wib.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 14:51:00 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=UppBvbJbL+czVXo1Fyf/TVSGghCr5IfE9qtLPlkT5ak=; b=IXVCa6yZfAyTX0Q91GxpX8Olk3rZUW8SVaU1s48zK3WPG9KwvU+KOFgOuU6AQODFoG FGNe9t0vSN6Q0NGRasqx1G1vRhd6Y8YlaklmF42vgW6X6pmyxzzLzSJsb1h03vIeyhhJ pwSLyeiRzxXkcvoBZVSDRB2mSxJ+0jbJsThTg273q8QA10Y0JUM32gzsGjR5tTC9RY/I cuWLw0Pu0t9Lsm743J3wQCULv3YlJforDa5bPsxdrnBBMzegQOb57LeZdAwJRq964hFY aOeuafSUCD9bAHcqqNTorAVMR52enVbYdPaPZ2/FevIYm/DL6311GJzByX2XN+qZbWF0 46OQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlgTXJjjKbFlfJbYNf2ekCg8zVJu+zoH8m8WoExWP5dKrg/GTne10R31EB1qkWdTyo1cwn5 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.122.97 with SMTP id lr1mr7655209wjb.26.1438897860392; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 14:51:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 14:51:00 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 23:51:00 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 21:51:03 -0000 Really, thanks again for replying and not getting mad when I get your thoughts wrong. I believe that I've learned more about your position on the subject today than in months of discussion and blogs (that's not a critique to your blog post, it's just that they didn't answer to some questions that I personally needed responded). On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 9:42 PM, Gavin Andresen wr= ote: > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 1:15 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote= : >> >> So I reformulate the question: >> >> 1) If "not now", when will it be a good time to let the "market >> minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction" rise above zero? > > > Two answers: > > 1. If you are willing to wait an infinite amount of time, I think the > minimum fee will always be zero or very close to zero, so I think it's a > silly question. I'm very happy to have made the stupid question then. It has revealed another big difference in the fundamental assumptions we're using. My assumption is that for any reasonable size, free transactions will eventually disappear (assuming Bitcoin doesn't "fail" for some other reason). Maybe I'm being too optimistic about the demand side of the market in the long term. In contrast, your assumption seems to be (and please correct me on anything I get wrong) that... "The limit will always be big enough so that free transactions are mined forever. Therefore fees just allow users to prioritize their urgent transactions and relay policies to protect their nodes against DoS attacks. Well, obviously, they also serve to pay for mining in a low-subsidy future, but even with the presence of free transactions, fees will be enough to cover mining costs, or a new mechanisms will be developed to make a low-total-reward blockchain safe or expensive proof of work will be replaced or complemented with something else that's cheaper. The main point is that fees are not a mechanism to decide what gets priced out of the blockchain, because advancements in technology will always give as enough room for free transactions." - jtimon putting words in Gavin's mouth, with the only intention to understand him better. I'm using "free transactions" even though you said "zero or very close to z= ero". To you, "zero or very close to zero" may be the same thing, but to me zero and very close to zero are like...different galaxies. To me, entering the "very close to zero galaxy" is a huge step in the development of the fee market. I've been always assuming that moving from zero to 1 satoshi was precisely what "big block advocates" wanted to avoid. What they meant by "Bitcoin is going to become a high-value only network" and similar things. Knowing that for "big block advocates" zero and "very close to zero" are equally acceptable changes things. > 2. The "market minimum fee" should be determined by the market. It should > not be up to us to decide "when is a good time." I completely agree, but the block size limit is a consensus rule that doesn't adapt to the market. The market will adapt to whatever limit is chosen by the consensus rules. >> 2) Do you have any criterion (automatic or not) that can result in you >> saying "no, this is too much" for any proposed size? > > > Sure, if keeping up with transaction volume requires a cluster of compute= rs > or more than "pretty good" broadband bandwidth I think that's too far. > That's where original 20MB limit comes from, otherwise I'd have proposed = a > much higher limit. > >> Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a >> criterion/test? > > > Although I've been very clear with my criterion, no, I don't think all > blocksize increase proposals should have to justify "why this size" or "w= hy > this rate of increase." I would really like a more formal criterion, ideally automatic (like any other test, the parameters can be modified as technology advances). But fair enough, even though your criterion is too vague or not future-proof enough, I guess it is still a criterion. It seems that this is a matter of disagreements and ideal ways of doing things and not really a disagreement on fundamental assumptions. So it seems this question wasn't so interesting after all. > Part of my frustration with this whole debate is > we're talking about a sanity-check upper-limit; as long as it doesn't ope= n > up some terrible new DoS possibility I don't think it really matters much > what the exact number is. That's what you think you are discussing, but I (and probably some other people) think we are discussing something entirely different. Because we have a fundamentally different assumption on what the block size limit is about. I really hope that identifying these "fundamental assumption discrepancies" (FAD from now own) will help us avoid circular discussions so that everything is less frustrating and more productive for everyone. >> Regardless of the history of the consensus rule (which I couldn't care >> less about), I believe the only function that the maximum block size >> rule currently serves is limiting centralization. >> Since you deny that function, do you think the (artificial) consensus >> rule is currently serving any other purpose that I'm missing? > > > It prevents trivial denial-of-service attacks (e.g. I promise to send you= a > 1 Terabyte block, then fill up your memory or disk...). This could be prevented in some other ways. If this is the only concern, it doesn't need to be a consensus rule. > And please read what I wrote: I said that the block limit has LITTLE effe= ct > on MINING centralization. Not "no effect on any type of centralization." > > If the limit was removed entirely, it is certainly possible we'd end up w= ith > very few organizations (and perhaps zero individuals) running full nodes. Sorry, another try: You think the maximum block size rule serves to limit centralization by limiting how hard it is to run a full node. I agree with that, but I would add something more and you wouldn't: The maximum block size consensus rule limits how hard it is to be a competitive miner. In other words, you think the last statement is false or incorrect. Meta: I think we should try to collect and list more of this "FADs" (we have at least 2 of them already). If you think it can be useful, I'm more than happy to repeat this process in the opposite direction: you make the questions and I give the answers, you write what you think I think and I correct you in iterations. Probably we should finish with you correcting what I think you think first. I am really excited about understanding your point of view better. Stupid humor (hopefully not out of context and not offensive): I'm happy to discover that what I thought it was FUD was just FAD. More seriously, I'm really happy for your interest in understanding and being understood. Let's worry about where do we think differently first and about who is right on each point later. In the end, only the conclusions on each point will matter and not who claimed the final conclusions (in the points where we find them) first (if we get to final common conclusions on that point at all). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5CF307AD for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 21:56:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from outmail149115.authsmtp.co.uk (outmail149115.authsmtp.co.uk [62.13.149.115]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98EB9132 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 21:56:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-c235.authsmtp.com (mail-c235.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.235]) by punt18.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id t76LuSWA088394; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 22:56:28 +0100 (BST) Received: from [25.55.162.194] ([24.114.85.31]) (authenticated bits=0) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id t76LuJVj043437 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 6 Aug 2015 22:56:24 +0100 (BST) In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 From: Peter Todd Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 21:56:09 +0000 To: Gavin Andresen , Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev , Pieter Wuille Message-ID: X-Server-Quench: fca7039e-3c85-11e5-b398-002590a15da7 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR bgdMdgQUGUATAgsB AmMbWVZeVVt7W2Q7 aQ5PbARZfEJLQQZr T0xPR01TWkFvB2BE fHhEUh1xcwZBNn90 ZEBnECYIDUN6dk8o X00HHWgbZGY1bX1N U0lQagNUcgZDfk5E bwQuUz1vNG8XDSg5 AwQ0PjZ0MThBHWx/ RgYGLhoJQFQGVjA7 QxQFAjQpEgUZSi4z KRsiLVEdF08Vekoo NkQ9WTp/ X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1023:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 24.114.85.31/465 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 21:56:32 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 6 August 2015 10:21:54 GMT-04:00, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: >On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Pieter Wuille > >wrote: > >> But you seem to consider that a bad thing. Maybe saying that you're >> claiming that this equals Bitcoin failing is an exaggeration, but you >do >> believe that evolving towards an ecosystem where there is competition >for >> block space is a bad thing, right? >> > >No, competition for block space is good. > >What is bad is artificially limiting or centrally controlling the >supply of >that space. Incidentally, why is that competition good? What specific design goal is that competition achieving? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQE9BAEBCAAnIBxQZXRlciBUb2RkIDxwZXRlQHBldGVydG9kZC5vcmc+BQJVw9fn AAoJEMCF8hzn9Lnc47AH/idUy2rGlUCBTTU/jDpNjMy5VGYYRawx50lrnGBufvIJ 8ZbFleI+gbnFCaJiaPF9ZN0mTjFWv7YcFzlwoPam11UfhEYI2Cl1aGha+R7g/18t +1256i4Ykg0uEqrX9ITpYyzoBsVMaqsaOGBbJbUUtHoD1V1GCYBYi5JAl1msGjH/ 2o+/Gh7gBB1Ll6SPtgeM1cCudRXA7PJr3WTjkLy8oGKY7lmVsPUfQ7h3OBJMTwa5 B+i1KTpSWdWyciWk0a3z7cxNfaajd7Pj3jZYoeCzKJdZja7lnB7FzUnaPE3y0wse Bby6w48R4VeYsVhM+GolvRDVVSQN9XNfRSiRjuMW4Eg= =wzhz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 81BB68D3 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 23:09:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f177.google.com (mail-ig0-f177.google.com [209.85.213.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BEC28153 for ; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 23:09:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbij6 with SMTP id ij6so21018397igb.1 for ; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 16:09:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=DLO1RTjTqnDQyMtVwx5i+R+DoGRf0h2MyTd5/J0zSYY=; b=0lTonyVvnyshbYKXyt6vynXPu9kMCX8oVe7QJiu212JpAHn9CNiG8aacaQBuiZDcUx 9Jwm2wn8Qjn7tyRTmzNiZTgRWwd3CLmiVOM0BPBuILyEAjSurr910XF/Z7Q/BoNPWq8D c49HmHJ6lk10x4F3cy+qEEvokHjZYzjB02xLmsCeDgIZjnz/PQ/HmVgElQCKVJr96dfA Qs1SsioKDR8Mj76zCxbfChGtpvsvTh/hrT9jdGk0VeKz9Pa1frYRF/pyITgpGcvQU29j 38BJM1pgVcUaMxy1IA+34ZK3lI1Xex4In01ErdBwdMX/PZg0HU4l8jkalSYuM61uvaVn +nqw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.25.226 with SMTP id f2mr295615igg.87.1438902590277; Thu, 06 Aug 2015 16:09:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.79.97.4 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:09:49 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 16:09:49 -0700 Message-ID: From: Elliot Olds To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7bd75b40c29028051cac9d10 X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_40,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, URIBL_BLACK autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2015 23:09:52 -0000 --047d7bd75b40c29028051cac9d10 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote: > > > Given that for any non-absurdly-big size some transactions will > eventually be priced out, and that the consensus rule serves for > limiting mining centralization (and more indirectly centralization in > general) and not about trying to set a given average transaction fee, > I think the current level of mining centralization will always be more > relevant than the current fee level when discussing any change to the > consensus rule to limit centralization (at any point in time). > In other words, the question "can we change this without important > risks of destroying the decentralized properties of the system in the > short or long run?" should be always more important than "is there a > concerning rise in fees to motivate this change at all?". > I agree with you that decentralization is the most important feature of Bitcoin, but I also think we need to think probabilistically and concretely about when risks to decentralization are worthwhile. Decentralization is not infinitely valuable in relation to low fees, just like being alive is not infinitely valuable in relation to having money. For instance, people will generally not accept a 100% probability of death in exchange for any amount of money. However anyone who understands probability and has the preferences of a normal person would play a game where they accept a one in a billion chance of instant death to win one billion dollars if they don't die. Similarly we shouldn't accept a 100% probability of Bitcoin being controlled by a single entity for any guarantee of cheap tx fees no matter how low they are, but there should be some minuscule risk of decentralization that we'd be willing to accept (like raising the block size to 1.01 MB) if it somehow allowed us to dramatically increase usability. (Imagine something like the Lightning Network but even better was developed, but it could only work with 1.01 MB blocks). > > Jorge, if a fee equilibrium developed at 1MB of $5/tx, and you somehow > knew > > with certainty that increasing to 4MB would result in a 20 cent/tx > > equilibrium that would last for a year (otherwise fees would stay aroun= d > $5 > > for that year), would you be in favor of an increase to 4MB? > > As said, I would always consider the centralization risks first: I'd > rather have a $5/tx decentralized Bitcoin than a Bitcoin with free > transactions but effectively validated (when they validate blocks they > mine on top of) by around 10 miners, specially if only 3 of them could > easily collude to censor transactions [orphaning any block that > doesn't censor in the same manner]. Sadly I have no choice, the later > is what we have right now. And reducing the block size can't guarantee > that the situation will get better or even that fees could rise to > $5/tx (we just don't have that demand, not that it is a goal for > anyone). All I know is that increasing the block size *could* > (conditional, not necessarily, I don't know in which cases, I don't > think anybody does) make things even worse. > I agree that we don't have good data about what exactly a 4 MB increase would do. It sounds like you think the risks are too great / uncertain to move from 1 MB to 4 MB blocks in the situation I described. I'm not clear though on which specific risks you'd be most worried about at 4 MB, and if there are any risks that you think don't matter at 4 MB but that you would be worried about at higher block size levels. I also don't know if we have similar ideas about the benefits of low tx fees. If we discussed exactly how we were evaluating this scenario, maybe we'd discover that something I thought was a huge benefit of low tx fees is actually not that compelling, or maybe we'd discover that our entire disagreement boiled down to our estimate of one specific risk. For the record, I think these are the main harms of $5 tx fees, along with the main risks I see from moving to 4 MB: Fees of $5/tx would: (a) Prevent a lot of people who could otherwise benefit from Bitcoin's decentralization from having an opportunity to reap those benefits. Especially people in poor countries with corrupt governments who could get immediate benefit from it now. (b) Prevent developers from experimenting with new Bitcoin use-cases, which might eventually lead to helpful services. (c) Prevent regular people from using Bitcoin and experimenting with it and getting involved, because they think it's unusable for txns under many hundreds of dollars in value, so it doesn't interest them. Not having the public on our side could make us more vulnerable to regulators. Changing the block size to 4 MB would: (1) Probably reduce the number of full nodes by around 5%. Most of the drop in full nodes over the past few years is probably due to Bitcoin Core being used by fewer regular users for convenience reasons, but the extra HD space required and extra bandwidth would probably make some existing people running full nodes stop. (2) Not hinder low bandwidth miners significantly, because of the relay network. (3) Not introduce any tx verification issues, because processors are fast and tx processing is ridiculously cheap and we'd need way more than 4 MB of txs for it to be a bottleneck. So (1) is the only risk that gives me any significant concern, but I don't think that the number of full nodes now is at a dangerous level. Anyway, the point isn't for you and I to actually discuss this particular hypothetical in more detail (although I would be curious to see similar lists from you). I haven't studied the risks enough to actually put this forth to the list as a good argument for what to do in this situation. My main point is that being very specific and concrete both about our thought process and about the hypothetical situation results in much better discussions. There's one more piece of information that I can give you which will help you understand my position much better, and also force me to think really carefully about this. It's the point at which I would switch to the other side of the argument (either by varying the tx fee, or the block size). If tx fees would only rise to 60 cents or lower if we stayed at 1 MB, then I would be against a move to 4 MB. Or, keeping the hypothetical 1 MB fee at $5, I think moving to 12 MB or higher is the point at which I'd switch over to being a 1 MB advocate. Getting that same info from you tells me exactly how you weigh the risks in a way that just listing the factors can't. In this specific hypothetical scenario, what is the lowest block size increase that you'd accept? It can be extremely low, like 1.01 MB. If you tell me that you'd rather have $5 tx fees for the next year instead of changing the block size to 1.01 MB, I would be really surprised. Gavin is the only other person who I've seen who has defined at what block size he'd switch to the other side (maybe not with a concrete number, but with a rough range: the block size such that a normal person with a pretty good connection couldn't run a full node). > On the other hand, I could understand people getting worried if fees > where as high as $5/tx or even 20 cent/tx but we're very far away from > that case. How can low subsidies (a certainty) be "too far in the > future to worry about it" but $5/tx, 20 cent/tx or even 5 cent/tx an > urgent concern? I would say that in this case we know high tx fees could happen very soon because there is a clear mechanism. Bitcoin just needs to become more popular quickly for any number of reasons. Suppose the infrastructure for remittances starts falling into place within the next two months, and suddenly immigrants are clamoring to use Bitcoin to send money back to their home countries. This could result in $5 tx fees very soon (not that I think it's likely). Many of these immigrants would still use Bitcoin because it's still better than the alternative for remittances, which would price out a lot of people currently using Bitcoin for other reasons. As far as I know, there is no plausible way that subsidies could plummet in anywhere near that time frame, aside from the price of Bitcoin completely collapsing. But if that happens in the near term (specifically, with very low tx volume) a fee market won't help. > For all I know, 5 cent/tx may not happen in the next > 25 years: it may never happen. And if it happens, to me it will be a > symptom of Bitcoin success, even for others it means that Bitcoin has > become a "high value settlement network". > I would be extremely happy if Bitcoin could somehow sustain itself in the long run with 5 cent tx fees. I'm optimistic about Lightning to handle the cases where people need even cheaper txns. > I'm still missing an answer from the "big blocks size side" to the > following question (which I have insistently repeated with various > permutations): > > If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? > After the next subsidy halving? After 4 more subsidy halvings (ie > about 13 years from now, subsidy =3D 1.5625 btc/block )? After your > grandmother abandons her national currency and uses Bitcoin for > everything? Never? > > ANY answer (maybe with the exception of the last one) would be less > worrying than silence. > Before I answer, here's my reasoning about why we don't need to worry about a fee market now: There is nothing particularly special about a fee market in Bitcoin. We know how markets work, and we have no reason to suspect a fee market in Bitcoin will have any new properties of markets that we can't foresee. When demand becomes higher, there will be some equilibrium level of fee that people have to pay to give a certain probability of inclusion within a certain number of blocks. There will likely be some level of fee where if you don't pay it, your tx will never be confirmed. We have seen something like this working at various points in Bitcoin's history. Look at the recent "stress tests." To get your tx confirmed in a reasonable time frame, you had to bump your fee a little higher than the txns from whoever was flooding the network. If you did, everything worked fine. If you didn't, your tx didn't confirm (until the test ended, maybe?). So there's nothing complicated here. It doesn't require a decade long preparation to prove to ourselves that a fee market will work. Unless in the future mining is funded mostly by charity (I think there's only a 25% chance of that happening), we will need a fee market eventually. I'd be fine if one developed now. I think 10 cents per txn right now wouldn't be too bad, aside from the following reason. What concerns me about insisting on a fee market right now is that usage is so small and the block size is so limited that if demand increases just a little bit, fees could skyrocket. It's not the 10 cent fees that would worry me, but what they say about the potential for a huge spike. Fees could become $10 per tx or higher very quickly. Yes, that would show that big organizations find Bitcoin useful which is nice, but it'd also put decentralized money out of reach of many other people. While Bitcoin still has a lot of growth ahead of it, it's better to not set up roadblocks (for reasons other than preserving decentralization) in front of that growth which will make things very painful if that growth happens more suddenly than we expect. I think the best argument for having a fee market right now is that if we move to such a market suddenly in the future, wallets won't have time to make the user experience good, and full nodes might not be written in such a way that they gracefully handle a bunch of txns that might never confirm. I don't think the required software changes are that complex though, so it seems unnecessary to start adding friction for users now for something that might be an issue in 10+ years. So to answer your question: about two years before we think Bitcoin will need to rely heavily on txn fees for security, I'd be in favor of adjusting block size so that it resulted in enough total fees / security. Until that point, we should care a lot about Bitcoin being widely used so that when we do need a fee market, it's more like lots of people paying 5 cents per tx instead of fewer people paying $10/tx. I think the former situation is much more likely to sustainable, and we're more likely to get there if we encourage low fee use cases now. You've been arguing that 0 fee transactions will have to disappear someday, but this isn't necessarily true. As long as enough people care about having their txns confirm relatively quickly, there's no reason to make sure that people who pay 0 fees never have their txns confirmed. --047d7bd75b40c29028051cac9d10 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On W= ed, Aug 5, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> wrote:

Given that for any non-absurdly-big size some transactions will
eventually be priced out, and that the consensus rule serves for
limiting mining centralization (and more indirectly centralization in
general) and not about trying to set a given average transaction fee,
I think the current level of mining centralization will always be more
relevant than the current fee level when discussing any change to the
consensus rule to limit centralization (at any point in time).
In other words, the question "can we change this without important
risks of destroying the decentralized properties of the system in the
short or long run?" should be always more important than "is ther= e a
concerning rise in fees to motivate this change at all?".

I agree with you that decentralization is the most = important feature of Bitcoin, but I also think we need to think probabilist= ically and concretely about when risks to decentralization are worthwhile.= =C2=A0

Decentralization is not infinitely valuable= in relation to low fees, just like being alive is not infinitely valuable = in relation to having money. For instance, people will generally not accept= a 100% probability of death in exchange for any amount of money. However a= nyone who understands probability and has the preferences of a normal perso= n would play a game where they accept a one in a billion chance of instant = death to win one billion dollars if they don't die.=C2=A0
Similarly we shouldn't accept a 100% probability of Bitcoin= being controlled by a single entity for any guarantee of cheap tx fees no = matter how low they are, but there should be some minuscule risk of decentr= alization that we'd be willing to accept (like raising the block size t= o 1.01 MB) if it somehow allowed us to dramatically increase usability. (Im= agine something like the Lightning Network but even better was developed, b= ut it could only work with 1.01 MB blocks).

=C2=A0=
> Jorge, if a fee equilibrium developed at 1MB of $5/tx, and you somehow= knew
> with certainty that increasing to 4MB would result in a 20 cent/tx
> equilibrium that would last for a year (otherwise fees would stay arou= nd $5
> for that year), would you be in favor of an increase to 4MB?

As said, I would always consider the centralization risks first: I&#= 39;d
rather have a $5/tx decentralized Bitcoin than a Bitcoin with free
transactions but effectively validated (when they validate blocks they
mine on top of) by around 10 miners, specially if only 3 of them could
easily collude to censor transactions [orphaning any block that
doesn't censor in the same manner]. Sadly I have no choice, the later is what we have right now. And reducing the block size can't guarantee<= br> that the situation will get better or even that fees could rise to
$5/tx (we just don't have that demand, not that it is a goal for
anyone). All I know is that increasing the block size *could*
(conditional, not necessarily, I don't know in which cases, I don't=
think anybody does) make things even worse.

=
I agree that we don't have good data about what exactly a 4 MB inc= rease would do. It sounds like you think the risks are too great / uncertai= n to move from 1 MB to 4 MB blocks in the situation I described. I'm no= t clear though on which specific risks you'd be most worried about at 4= MB, and if there are any risks that you think don't matter at 4 MB but= that you would be worried about at higher block size levels. I also don= 9;t know if we have similar ideas about the benefits of low tx fees. If we = discussed exactly how we were evaluating this scenario, maybe we'd disc= over that something I thought was a huge benefit of low tx fees is actually= not that compelling, or maybe we'd discover that our entire disagreeme= nt boiled down to our estimate of one specific risk.=C2=A0

For the record, I think these are the main harms of $5 t= x fees, along with the main risks I see from moving to 4 MB:

=
Fees of $5/tx would:
(a) Prevent a lot of people who c= ould otherwise benefit from Bitcoin's decentralization from having an o= pportunity to reap those benefits. Especially people in poor countries with= corrupt governments who could get immediate benefit from it now.=C2=A0
(b) Prevent developers from experimenting with new Bitcoin use-cases= , which might eventually lead to helpful services.
(c) Prevent re= gular people from using Bitcoin and experimenting with it and getting invol= ved, because they think it's unusable for txns under many hundreds of d= ollars in value, so it doesn't interest them. Not having the public on = our side could make us more vulnerable to regulators.=C2=A0

<= /div>
Changing the block size to 4 MB would:
(1) Probably red= uce the number of full nodes by around 5%. Most of the drop in full nodes o= ver the past few years is probably due to Bitcoin Core being used by fewer = regular users for convenience reasons, but the extra HD space required and = extra bandwidth would probably make some existing people running full nodes= stop.=C2=A0
(2) Not hinder low bandwidth miners significantly, b= ecause of the relay network.
(3) Not introduce any tx verificatio= n issues, because processors are fast and tx processing is ridiculously che= ap and we'd need way more than 4 MB of txs for it to be a bottleneck.

So (1) is the only risk that gives me any significa= nt concern, but I don't think that the number of full nodes now is at a= dangerous level.

Anyway, the point isn'= t for you and I to actually discuss this particular hypothetical in more de= tail (although I would be curious to see similar lists from you). I haven&#= 39;t studied the risks enough to actually put this forth to the list as a g= ood argument for what to do in this situation. My main point is that being = very specific and concrete both about our thought process and about the hyp= othetical situation results in much better discussions.=C2=A0

There's one more piece of information that I can give y= ou which will help you understand my position much better, and also force m= e to think really carefully about this. It's the point at which I would= switch to the other side of the argument (either by varying the tx fee, or= the block size). If tx fees would only rise to 60 cents or lower if we sta= yed at 1 MB, then I would be against a move to 4 MB. Or, keeping the hypoth= etical 1 MB fee at $5, I think moving to 12 MB or higher is the point at wh= ich I'd switch over to being a 1 MB advocate. Getting that same info fr= om you tells me exactly how you weigh the risks in a way that just listing = the factors can't. In this specific hypothetical scenario, what is the = lowest block size increase that you'd accept? It can be extremely low, = like 1.01 MB. If you tell me that you'd rather have $5 tx fees for the = next year instead of changing the block size to 1.01 MB, I would be really = surprised.=C2=A0

Gavin is the only other person wh= o I've seen who has defined at what block size he'd switch to the o= ther side (maybe not with a concrete number, but with a rough range: the bl= ock size such that a normal person with a pretty good connection couldn'= ;t run a full node).
=C2=A0
On the other hand, I could understand people getting worried if fees
where as high as $5/tx or even 20 cent/tx but we're very far away from<= br> that case. How can low subsidies (a certainty) be "too far in the
future to worry about it" but $5/tx, 20 cent/tx or even 5 cent/tx an urgent concern?

I would say that in this ca= se we know high tx fees could happen very soon because there is a clear mec= hanism. Bitcoin just needs to become more popular quickly for any number of= reasons. Suppose the infrastructure for remittances starts falling into pl= ace within the next two months, and suddenly immigrants are clamoring to us= e Bitcoin to send money back to their home countries. This could result in = $5 tx fees very soon (not that I think it's likely). Many of these immi= grants would still use Bitcoin because it's still better than the alter= native for remittances, which would price out a lot of people currently usi= ng Bitcoin for other reasons. As far as I know, there is no plausible way t= hat subsidies could plummet in anywhere near that time frame, aside from th= e price of Bitcoin completely collapsing. But if that happens in the near t= erm (specifically, with very low tx volume) a fee market won't help.
=C2=A0
For all I know, 5 cent/= tx may not happen in the next
25 years: it may never happen. And if it happens, to me it will be a
symptom of Bitcoin success, even for others it means that Bitcoin has
become a "high value settlement network".
I would be extremely happy if Bitcoin could somehow sustain it= self in the long run with 5 cent tx fees. I'm optimistic about Lightnin= g to handle the cases where people need even cheaper txns.=C2=A0
=
=C2=A0
I'm still missing an answer from the "big blocks size side" t= o the
following question (which I have insistently repeated with various
permutations):

If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above z= ero?
After the next subsidy halving? After 4 more subsidy halvings (ie
about 13 years from now, subsidy =3D 1.5625 btc/block )? After your
grandmother abandons her national currency and uses Bitcoin for
everything? Never?

ANY answer (maybe with the exception of the last one) would be less
worrying than silence.

Before I answer,= here's my reasoning about why we don't need to worry about a fee m= arket now:

There is nothing particularly special a= bout a fee market in Bitcoin. We know how markets work, and we have no reas= on to suspect a fee market in Bitcoin will have any new properties of marke= ts that we can't foresee. When demand becomes higher, there will be som= e equilibrium level of fee that people have to pay to give a certain probab= ility of inclusion within a certain number of blocks. There will likely be = some level of fee where if you don't pay it, your tx will never be conf= irmed.=C2=A0

We have seen something like this work= ing at various points in Bitcoin's history. Look at the recent "st= ress tests." To get your tx confirmed in a reasonable time frame, you = had to bump your fee a little higher than the txns from whoever was floodin= g the network. If you did, everything worked fine. If you didn't, your = tx didn't confirm (until the test ended, maybe?). So there's nothin= g complicated here. It doesn't require a decade long preparation to pro= ve to ourselves that a fee market will work.

Unles= s in the future mining is funded mostly by charity (I think there's onl= y a 25% chance of that happening), we will need a fee market eventually. I&= #39;d be fine if one developed now. I think 10 cents per txn right now woul= dn't be too bad, aside from the following reason. What concerns me abou= t insisting on a fee market right now is that usage is so small and the blo= ck size is so limited that if demand increases just a little bit, fees coul= d skyrocket. It's not the 10 cent fees that would worry me, but what th= ey say about the potential for a huge spike. Fees could become $10 per tx o= r higher very quickly. Yes, that would show that big organizations find Bit= coin useful which is nice, but it'd also put decentralized money out of= reach of many other people. While Bitcoin still has a lot of growth ahead = of it, it's better to not set up roadblocks (for reasons other than pre= serving decentralization) in front of that growth which will make things ve= ry painful if that growth happens more suddenly than we expect.=C2=A0
=

I think the best argument for having a fee market right= now is that if we move to such a market suddenly in the future, wallets wo= n't have time to make the user experience good, and full nodes might no= t be written in such a way that they gracefully handle a bunch of txns that= might never confirm. I don't think the required software changes are t= hat complex though, so it seems unnecessary to start adding friction for us= ers now for something that might be an issue in 10+ years.=C2=A0
=
So to answer your question: about two years before we think = Bitcoin will need to rely heavily on txn fees for security, I'd be in f= avor of adjusting block size so that it resulted in enough total fees / sec= urity. Until that point, we should care a lot about Bitcoin being widely us= ed so that when we do need a fee market, it's more like lots of people = paying 5 cents per tx instead of fewer people paying $10/tx. I think the fo= rmer situation is much more likely to sustainable, and we're more likel= y to get there if we encourage low fee use cases now.

<= div>You've been arguing that 0 fee transactions will have to disappear = someday, but this isn't necessarily true. As long as enough people care= about having their txns confirm relatively quickly, there's no reason = to make sure that people who pay 0 fees never have their txns confirmed.=C2= =A0
=C2=A0
--047d7bd75b40c29028051cac9d10-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9E6E1486 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 16:12:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:06:03 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from manxnetsf05.manx.net (outbound.manx.net [213.137.31.12]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B347C89 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 16:12:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 195.10.99.101 (EHLO coldstorage.localnet) ([195.10.99.101]) by manxnetsf05.manx.net (MOS 4.4.5a-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id EFT72891; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 17:06:11 +0100 (BST) From: Thomas Zander To: Bitcoin Dev Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 18:06:09 +0200 Message-ID: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Mirapoint-Received-SPF: 195.10.99.101 coldstorage.localnet thomas@thomaszander.se 5 none X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=manxnetsf05.manx.net X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B0206.55C4D773.02FC, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A0B0206.55C4D773.02FC, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: f02ffc3b2fb7ead4ffeb73bd283e3060 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 16:12:18 -0000 On Thursday 6. August 2015 20.52.28 Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > It's about reduction of trust. Running a full node and using it verify your > transactions is how you get personal assurance that everyone on the network > is following the rules. And if you don't do so yourself, the knowledge that > others are using full nodes and relying on them is valuable. Someone just > running 1000 nodes in a data center and not using them for anything does > not do anything for this, it's adding network capacity without use. > > That doesn't mean that the full node count (or the reachable full node > count even) are meaningless numbers. They are an indication of how hard it > is (for various reasons) to run/use a full node, and thus provide feedback. > But they are not the goal, just an indicator. You make a logical fallacy; I would agree that nodes are there for people to stop trusting someone that they have no trust-relationship with. But your conclusion that low node count is an indication that its hard to run one discards your own point. You forget the point that running a node is only needed if you don't know anyone you can trust to run it for you. I'm pretty darn sure that this will have a bigger effect on nodecount than how hard it is. Or, in other words, without a need to run a node you can't judge the difficulty of why there aren't more running. >From another mail; On Thursday 6. August 2015 17.26.11 Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Maybe. But I believe that it is essential to not take unnecessary risks, > and find a non-controversial solution. This is a very political answer; it doesn't actually say anything since 'unnecessary' is a personal judgment. Everyone will agree with you, but that doesn't mean anything. -- Tom Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B038895 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 16:30:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f173.google.com (mail-ig0-f173.google.com [209.85.213.173]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C3ADC14B for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 16:30:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igk11 with SMTP id 11so34993967igk.1 for ; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 09:30:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=j7YtBs6PuW3PRG9dKwep8/YCbROC08wW8rlsAiKmZw0=; b=zIwMN/ofTU+xux++6eCDv4lZa4OZVfPsgzqD0+t20q89TNbgWbr1YHBUYACEy6+7zv vtJUIHV7gsrl1vEhRiKCSz67lDbxqRhYoWgkbNJ8i2+uxdDPphACMGU3bbG4asfElLYk NeDIiB0v6RC3e3ndYmvj2wmE/ZLShm0oEf6AT1eNXWDwHbgsTYauT4LfOwEWuVncok4h sLvGn8aV68qAckoSvV+AYniswiuEST1a/4P3DNrDggYYAs4KmbP1D5PxE3MLo8WGsnWt pyE06kUnZWglKFNI9XRYApSVDi0G16dcH/Bgb2w3AnRg76L0nf8/0vgb9LqO6OwXWkP9 vvfQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.117.65 with SMTP id kc1mr3796180igb.94.1438965029157; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 09:30:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 09:30:28 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> References: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 18:30:28 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Thomas Zander Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0118271e684054051cbb275f X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 16:30:31 -0000 --089e0118271e684054051cbb275f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > You make a logical fallacy; > > I would agree that nodes are there for people to stop trusting someone that > they have no trust-relationship with. > Yay, trust! > But your conclusion that low node count is an indication that its hard to > run > one discards your own point. You forget the point that running a node is > only > needed if you don't know anyone you can trust to run it for you. I'm > pretty > darn sure that this will have a bigger effect on nodecount than how hard it > is. > I never said it is the only factor that influences node count. Or, in other words, without a need to run a node you can't judge the > difficulty of why there aren't more running. > If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in the ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fundamental improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite trend, and that is worrying IMHO. -- Pieter --089e0118271e684054051cbb275f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On F= ri, Aug 7, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
You make a logical fallacy;

I would agree that nodes are there for people to stop trusting someone that=
they have no trust-relationship with.

Y= ay, trust!
=C2=A0
But your conclusion that low node count is an indication that its hard to r= un
one discards your own point.=C2=A0 You forget the point that running a node= is only
needed if you don't know anyone you can trust to run it for you.=C2=A0 = I'm pretty
darn sure that this will have a bigger effect on nodecount than how hard it=
is.

I never said it is the only factor = that influences node count.

Or, in other words, without a need to run a node you can't judge the difficulty of why there aren't more running.

<= /div>
If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against = the cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in = the ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fund= amental improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I bel= ieve that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolut= e terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposi= te trend, and that is worrying IMHO.

--
Pieter
--089e0118271e684054051cbb275f-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C93F847 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 17:00:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from manxnetsf05.manx.net (outbound.manx.net [213.137.31.12]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94C06137 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 17:00:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 195.10.99.101 (EHLO coldstorage.localnet) ([195.10.99.101]) by manxnetsf05.manx.net (MOS 4.4.5a-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id EFT85353; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 18:00:10 +0100 (BST) From: Thomas Zander To: Bitcoin Dev Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 19:00:08 +0200 Message-ID: <3197878.6zmtLAPm4L@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Mirapoint-Received-SPF: 195.10.99.101 coldstorage.localnet thomas@thomaszander.se 5 none X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=manxnetsf05.manx.net X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B0205.55C4E41A.017F, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A0B0205.55C4E41A.017F, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: f02ffc3b2fb7ead4ffeb73bd283e3060 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 17:00:14 -0000 On Friday 7. August 2015 18.30.28 Pieter Wuille wrote: > On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev < > > But your conclusion that low node count is an indication that its hard > > to run one discards your own point. You forget the point that running > > a node is only needed if you don't know anyone you can trust to run it > > for you. I'm pretty darn sure that this will have a bigger effect on > > nodecount than how hard it is. > > I never said it is the only factor that influences node count. You wrote; > They are an indication of how hard [node count] is (for various > reasons) to run/use a full node, and thus provide feedback. You clearly indicated that node count is an indicator of how hard it is to run a node. Thats like saying something is too expensive because we don't sell enough. It forgets to ask the question of need. Do people want it. Like in our case the need to run a node in the first place. > If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the > cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in the > ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fundamental > improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe > that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute > terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite > trend, and that is worrying IMHO. And you do the same thing again; you dismiss the need factor. Most merchants have no need for a node, most miners don't even want to run one anymore. Users don't make a significant amount of payments to care. Any conclusions with regards to difficulty of running a node based on max- blocksize is speculation without numbers; the only numbers you have is historical node count, and they don't mean shit because the need has not grown. For instance, merchants are told to trust someone like bitpay. Historical node-count says nothing. Anyone using it for the blocksize debate is speculating without basis. -- Thomas Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF3FC89D for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 17:09:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1E0391E7 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 17:09:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodd187 with SMTP id d187so117740008iod.2 for ; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=TJH5o+xOuzymzA60BQihQrjr1/tOcbKilkIBTv4+7qE=; b=aUJ7QFhmCUMfjHAL0v1O63nKZH8lnZaYGpBF/BsEPEmRdpYt+x+2fb7XbbxO4rOgJh tfhe/TsnZ2a/1EsKY80u67wH06w2JxKbnhtOzeXKCbO3W1KLbCKR0zf7f7jj6c/8op4b +VsxAUeHcHXvK7e6XQShbWLCU/VmFv6/pZaWRvpzNFEA4+N+COgBFk8EnkUdcYTKMmSf NCBObK9sEWLbjrTrBmuFhKxCEOqn/p9cySZswylZtHf1n6QIWVN5BBCtLImeLuyLYVNS ZrOQLLDy59KdYp0t5K0vCpbIjGLtvDWU1Bd152/hMLKlFoNYzH+9xCwgp2hIILHg9jMV akqw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.9.137 with SMTP id 9mr9400882ioj.50.1438967370612; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <3197878.6zmtLAPm4L@coldstorage> References: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> <3197878.6zmtLAPm4L@coldstorage> Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 19:09:30 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Thomas Zander Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f8f14f80471051cbbb2c8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 17:09:31 -0000 --001a113f8f14f80471051cbbb2c8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 7:00 PM, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the > > cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in > the > > ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's > fundamental > > improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe > > that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute > > terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite > > trend, and that is worrying IMHO. > > And you do the same thing again; you dismiss the need factor. > Of course there is a need. It's the primary mechanism that keeps Bitcoin secure and immune from malicious influence. Of course not everyone needs to run a node. But that leaves the responsibility on us - the community - to help the situation by not making it too hard to run a node. And I see the block size as the primary way through which we do that. If the impact of the system goes us, so should the - joint - incentives to keep it secure. And I think we're (slowly) failing at that. -- Pieter --001a113f8f14f80471051cbbb2c8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 7:00 PM, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-= dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> If the incentives for running= a node don't weight up against the
> cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in= the
> ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fun= damental
> improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believ= e
> that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolut= e
> terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opp= osite
> trend, and that is worrying IMHO.

And you do the same thing again; you dismiss the need factor.

Of course there is a need. It's the prima= ry mechanism that keeps Bitcoin secure and immune from malicious influence.=

Of course not everyone needs to run a node. But that lea= ves the responsibility on us - the community - to help the situation by not= making it too hard to run a node. And I see the block size as the primary = way through which we do that.

If the impact of the system= goes us, so should the - joint - incentives to keep it secure. And I think= we're (slowly) failing at that.

--
Pi= eter

--001a113f8f14f80471051cbbb2c8-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5A2D288B for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 17:50:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f53.google.com (mail-la0-f53.google.com [209.85.215.53]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94C0A165 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 17:50:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lagz9 with SMTP id z9so26182877lag.3 for ; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 10:50:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=iKZBiqtVg3PCFvE2drt8I6BakkScyX1zFHNS1V2Vlek=; b=v6FHPJxy/w7l12ExldtOsQNUn5Bm3p21CIy8QukuJKn6o1PcUsFSJDiHIsi557sRfx txvxu4ncsLriPsUx5L8m5m7QPe8z0I3UgsU/KduCKNm6RSX/C50kIrfPGnQJSda+jiBA +PceL3s/7vZbwoICbBkhCJA2giMMMFn0VnXoWFiNqHMuYyTijRSIr8hhiGc56LKwPrhB mZRC58qdXQ14bzEkNdWmcfNVggPbixyZDyZHG8lTjDgMQFnKEn1XpA3qJwSzYwofUd9X 4Lg5quTTt+WaFlzpv45EWhIQBGcRX+TLiPTyqJzz07APLcBJdDCfuBdFnVZiu7jqvcX7 FViw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.22.99 with SMTP id c3mr9434788laf.32.1438969801016; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 10:50:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.143.195 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 10:50:00 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 13:50:00 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0158b6c0d50c86051cbc4358 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 17:50:03 -0000 --089e0158b6c0d50c86051cbc4358 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the > cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in the > ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fundamental > improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe > that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute > terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite > trend, and that is worrying IMHO. Are you saying that unless the majority of people in the ecosystem decide to trust nothing but the genesis block hash (decide to run a full node) there is a problem? If so, then we do have a fundamental difference of opinion, but I've misunderstood how you think about trust/centralization/convenience tradeoffs in the past. I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosystem will choose different tradeoffs, and I believe that is OK-- people should be free to make those tradeoffs. And given that the majority of people in the ecosystem were deciding that using a centralized service or an SPV-level-security wallet was better even two or three years ago when blocks were tiny (I'd have to go back and dig up number-of-full-nodes and number-of-active-wallets at the big web-wallet providers, but I bet there were an order of magnitude more people using centralized services than running full nodes even back then), I firmly believe that block size has very little to do with the decision to run a full node or not. -- -- Gavin Andresen --089e0158b6c0d50c86051cbc4358 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

= On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
=
If the incentives for running a node don'= ;t weight up against the cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a m= ajority of people in the ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. = As Bitcoin's fundamental improvement over other systems is the lack of = need for trust, I believe that with increased adoption should also come an = increased (in absolute terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I= 9;m seeing the opposite trend, and that is worrying IMHO.

Are you saying that unless the majority of people in the ecosystem dec= ide to trust nothing but the genesis block hash (decide to run a full node)= there is a problem?

If so, then we do have a fundamental difference= of opinion, but I've misunderstood how you think about trust/centraliz= ation/convenience tradeoffs in the past.
I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosyste= m will choose different tradeoffs, and I believe that is OK-- people should= be free to make those tradeoffs.

And given that the majority of people in the ec= osystem were deciding that using a centralized service or an SPV-level-secu= rity wallet was better even two or three years ago when blocks were tiny (I= 'd have to go back and dig up number-of-full-nodes and number-of-active= -wallets at the big web-wallet providers, but I bet there were an order of = magnitude more people using centralized services than running full nodes ev= en back then), I firmly believe that block size has very little to do with = the decision to run a full node or not.

--
--
Gavin Andresen
--089e0158b6c0d50c86051cbc4358-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 009778A6 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 18:05:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f175.google.com (mail-wi0-f175.google.com [209.85.212.175]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 889D3212 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 18:05:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so70686593wib.0 for ; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 11:05:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=+zoaCT4gqG9hQIj5S4TYV8kFLdVEeRVsKOczGpB+Ay0=; b=nHdIRol+QdnCPlgw6PI0j9CwQ44DBHaLzXmXJYw10mx0Uzag6SIt8mJXmAuyQH/ffE 6mxtEyP8l8ASy5QgJv6rFVDz60WfQFaf4h7BqQJtBWcLRmM4aplo0n38TfZ7CB4j1DxH zlr4GQRUyiyHvqPBhMMFSWgphyv/dfD3t3fTGM7iIX77xIKg4hhsAeq1MInRyIB/dbRC R3EVO0Jr/RiUIu4ZmTC7fC2Bc3hH7meQw/FoODpArSwnCmGGG+M9+03j/mdLKfOkNmN5 KgsdkFcTSJXLkClTjUD2Xml9Wi3svjYicJYZ7bfmByqMcSaq7VDJijDRZxJcXB+az/sr TtZA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.218.195 with SMTP id pi3mr9263873wic.71.1438970729305; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 11:05:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.27.171.138 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 11:05:29 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 14:05:29 -0400 Message-ID: From: Jameson Lopp To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1134ce04299b31051cbc7be7 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 18:05:32 -0000 --001a1134ce04299b31051cbc7be7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Anecdotally I've seen two primary reasons posed for not running a node: 1) For enthusiasts who want to altruistically run a node at home, it's usually a bandwidth / quality of service problem. There are tools to help work around this, but most users aren't sysadmins and would prefer a simple configuration option in bitcoind and a slider / selector in the QT client to throttle the total bandwidth usage. This issue has been open for years: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/273 - if you want to make it easier for enthusiasts to run nodes, I'd start there. 2) For businesses, it's not so much an issue with the resources of installing / running / maintaining a node, it's an issue with the lack of indexing options offered by bitcoind. Thus the business will also need to run their own indexing solution - an out-of-the-box solution such as Insight or Toshi might work, but for more custom indexing you have to roll your own software - this is where it actually becomes expensive. Depending upon the query volume / latency needs of the business, it may not make sense to bother administering bitcoind instances, the indexing software, and its databases - using a third party API will probably be more efficient. - Jameson On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 1:50 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the >> cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in the >> ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fundamental >> improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe >> that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute >> terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite >> trend, and that is worrying IMHO. > > > Are you saying that unless the majority of people in the ecosystem decide > to trust nothing but the genesis block hash (decide to run a full node) > there is a problem? > > If so, then we do have a fundamental difference of opinion, but I've > misunderstood how you think about trust/centralization/convenience > tradeoffs in the past. > > I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosystem will choose different tradeoffs, > and I believe that is OK-- people should be free to make those tradeoffs. > > And given that the majority of people in the ecosystem were deciding that > using a centralized service or an SPV-level-security wallet was better even > two or three years ago when blocks were tiny (I'd have to go back and dig > up number-of-full-nodes and number-of-active-wallets at the big web-wallet > providers, but I bet there were an order of magnitude more people using > centralized services than running full nodes even back then), I firmly > believe that block size has very little to do with the decision to run a > full node or not. > > > -- > -- > Gavin Andresen > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a1134ce04299b31051cbc7be7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Anecdotally I've seen two primary reasons posed for no= t running a node:

1) For enthusiasts who want to altruis= tically run a node at home, it's usually a bandwidth / quality of servi= ce problem. There are tools to help work around this, but most users aren&#= 39;t sysadmins and would prefer a simple configuration option in bitcoind a= nd a slider / selector in the QT client to throttle the total bandwidth usa= ge. This issue has been open for years: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/273 - = if you want to make it easier for enthusiasts to run nodes, I'd start t= here.

2) For businesses, it's not so much an i= ssue with the resources of installing / running / maintaining a node, it= 9;s an issue with the lack of indexing options offered by bitcoind. Thus th= e business will also need to run their own indexing solution - an out-of-th= e-box solution such as Insight or Toshi might work, but for more custom ind= exing you have to roll your own software - this is where it actually become= s expensive.

Depending upon the query volume / lat= ency needs of the business, it may not make sense to bother administering b= itcoind instances, the indexing software, and its databases - using a third= party API will probably be more efficient.

- Jame= son

On= Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 1:50 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:30 PM= , Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.lin= uxfoundation.org> wrote:
If= the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the cost/dif= ficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in the ecosyste= m, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fundamental impr= ovement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe that wi= th increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute terms) inc= entive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite trend, an= d that is worrying IMHO.

Are you saying that u= nless the majority of people in the ecosystem decide to trust nothing but t= he genesis block hash (decide to run a full node) there is a problem?
If so, then we do have a fundamental difference of opinion, but I've = misunderstood how you think about trust/centralization/convenience tradeoff= s in the past.

I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosystem will choose different tr= adeoffs, and I believe that is OK-- people should be free to make those tra= deoffs.

And given that the majority of people in the ecosystem were deciding that= using a centralized service or an SPV-level-security wallet was better eve= n two or three years ago when blocks were tiny (I'd have to go back and= dig up number-of-full-nodes and number-of-active-wallets at the big web-wa= llet providers, but I bet there were an order of magnitude more people usin= g centralized services than running full nodes even back then), I firmly be= lieve that block size has very little to do with the decision to run a full= node or not.


--
--
Gavin Andresen


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--001a1134ce04299b31051cbc7be7-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F0D548C8 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 18:10:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2B2E7213 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 18:10:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioii16 with SMTP id i16so119336928ioi.0 for ; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 11:10:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=IluwGD6SxCBUgVx5aFOizG2tPNVuA3GZ77W6iJ7py50=; b=Mnv+MZekrdSwE7uPBA+ycZ7lIfABAuD6MXxIJ2OFWYS/kFkA2nRu2pUpfveKgxBpI8 UplST+zaQ16qAb6k47WxBMjIDkuOg/2sp0dTPhdgTkhB2yWfd7kRcCJNB/gsU7xfHXm9 +kwFsG884+1FZXCJEseaHs+34xepRU4/EIrfN/ZSt+la5rPpqeKd9GH715wYsI/eEFDx +h7pGaklAj4CBhOcZ4TZ1bNOMiTdL0kZ2Qqo05ft7BRuxTO/Inkj5Mg2mGjXFh0/A4xU XrryCau747MAw2n0MRpKeG/aCboNTq52xtSoS5fHLBtiq84Vr3LEgsYCgkvBu1cpvoip A6FA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.37.142 with SMTP id l136mr9850205iol.126.1438971049582; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 11:10:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 11:10:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 11:10:48 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <1542978.eROxFinZd4@coldstorage> Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 20:10:48 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1140269a40b14b051cbc8e17 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 18:10:51 -0000 --001a1140269a40b14b051cbc8e17 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Aug 7, 2015 7:50 PM, "Gavin Andresen" wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >> If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against the cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in the ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's fundamental improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I believe that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposite trend, and that is worrying IMHO. > > > Are you saying that unless the majority of people in the ecosystem decide to trust nothing but the genesis block hash (decide to run a full node) there is a problem? I shouldn't have said majority, sorry. But I do believe that as the odds at stake in the system go up, so should those who take an interest in verifying. That doesn't seem to be the case, and is a problem, where that is a result of the block chain size or not. > If so, then we do have a fundamental difference of opinion, but I've misunderstood how you think about trust/centralization/convenience tradeoffs in the past. > > I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosystem will choose different tradeoffs, and I believe that is OK-- people should be free to make those tradeoffs. I agree. Though I believe that the blockchain itself cannot offer many tradeoffs, and by trying to make it scale we hurt the whole system. The place to introduce tradeoffs is in layers on top - there you can build systems with various levels of trust without hurting others. > And given that the majority of people in the ecosystem were deciding that using a centralized service or an SPV-level-security wallet was better even two or three years ago when blocks were tiny (I'd have to go back and dig up number-of-full-nodes and number-of-active-wallets at the big web-wallet providers, but I bet there were an order of magnitude more people using centralized services than running full nodes even back then). That's inevitable, I'm sure. > I firmly believe that block size has very little to do with the decision to run a full node or not. Within certain limits, maybe not. Within certain limits, maybe it also does not incentivize trusted miner setups like SPV mining (which hurt the security of SPV nodes tremendously). But if the reason for increasing is because you fear a change of economics, then it means you prefer not dealing with that change. I believe you prefer not dealing with it ever, and would rather have a system where as much as possible happens on-chain, even when we unknowingly go beyond those limits. I think we don't do the ecosystem a service by promising that such a future is possible without compromises. So, I think the block size should follow technological evolution, and not reenforce the belief that the block size should follow demand. There will always be demand, and we should learn to deal with it. -- Pieter --001a1140269a40b14b051cbc8e17 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Aug 7, 2015 7:50 PM, "Gavin Andresen" <gavinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.lin= uxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> If the incentives for running a node don't weight up against t= he cost/difficulty using a full node yourself for a majority of people in t= he ecosystem, I would argue that there is a problem. As Bitcoin's funda= mental improvement over other systems is the lack of need for trust, I beli= eve that with increased adoption should also come an increased (in absolute= terms) incentive for people to use a full node. I'm seeing the opposit= e trend, and that is worrying IMHO.
>
>
> Are you saying that unless the majority of people in the ecosystem dec= ide to trust nothing but the genesis block hash (decide to run a full node)= there is a problem?

I shouldn't have said majority, sorry. But I do believe = that as the odds at stake in the system go up, so should those who take an = interest in verifying. That doesn't seem to be the case, and is a probl= em, where that is a result of the block chain size or not.

> If so, then we do have a fundamental difference of opin= ion, but I've misunderstood how you think about trust/centralization/co= nvenience tradeoffs in the past.
>
> I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosystem will choose different tradeo= ffs, and I believe that is OK-- people should be free to make those tradeof= fs.

I agree. Though I believe that the blockchain itself cannot = offer many tradeoffs, and by trying to make it scale we hurt the whole syst= em. The place to introduce tradeoffs is in layers on top - there you can bu= ild systems with various levels of trust without hurting others.

> And given that the majority of people in the ecosystem = were deciding that using a centralized service or an SPV-level-security wal= let was better even two or three years ago when blocks were tiny (I'd h= ave to go back and dig up number-of-full-nodes and number-of-active-wallets= at the big web-wallet providers, but I bet there were an order of magnitud= e more people using centralized services than running full nodes even back = then).

That's inevitable, I'm sure.

> I firmly believe that block size has very little to do = with the decision to run a full node or not.

Within certain limits, maybe not. Within certain limits, may= be it also does not incentivize trusted miner setups like SPV mining (which= hurt the security of SPV nodes tremendously).

But if the reason for increasing is because you fear a chang= e of economics, then it means you prefer not dealing with that change. I be= lieve you prefer not dealing with it ever, and would rather have a system w= here as much as possible happens on-chain, even when we unknowingly go beyo= nd those limits. I think we don't do the ecosystem a service by promisi= ng that such a future is possible without compromises.

So, I think the block size should follow technological evolu= tion, and not reenforce the belief that the block size should follow demand= . There will always be demand, and we should learn to deal with it.

--
Pieter

--001a1140269a40b14b051cbc8e17-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CFE028FE for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 21:35:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from manxnetsf05.manx.net (outbound.manx.net [213.137.31.12]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E84EB237 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 21:35:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 195.10.99.101 (EHLO coldstorage.localnet) ([195.10.99.101]) by manxnetsf05.manx.net (MOS 4.4.5a-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id EFU55295; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 22:35:26 +0100 (BST) From: Thomas Zander To: Bitcoin Dev Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 23:35:25 +0200 Message-ID: <2686935.vL4zPKxv2H@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: <3197878.6zmtLAPm4L@coldstorage> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Mirapoint-Received-SPF: 195.10.99.101 coldstorage.localnet thomas@thomaszander.se 5 none X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=manxnetsf05.manx.net X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B0203.55C5249E.0159, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A0B0203.55C5249E.0159, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: f02ffc3b2fb7ead4ffeb73bd283e3060 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 21:35:29 -0000 On Friday 7. August 2015 19.09.30 Pieter Wuille wrote: > > And you do the same thing again; you dismiss the need factor. > > Of course there is a need. It's the primary mechanism that keeps Bitcoin > secure and immune from malicious influence. I see a pretty big problem if this really is your insight, the need an individual has for running a node is a completely different concept than the need for nodes to exist. And, really, you are describing miners, not nodes. good thing is that you seem to agree with me as your continue with; > Of course not everyone needs to run a node. Thats the 'need' I was talking about. As we concluded in our previous email, the need to run a node is inversely proportional to the ability (or willingness) to trust others. And lets face it, practically everyone trusts others with their money today. > But that leaves the > responsibility on us - the community - to help the situation by not making > it too hard to run a node. And I see the block size as the primary way > through which we do that. That won't really have any influence, economics 101 says that it doesn't work that way. Lowering the cost on a product won't make it sell more without the people wanting or needing the product. > If the impact of the system goes u[p], so should the - joint - incentives to > keep it secure. And I think we're (slowly) failing at that. That is your opinion. At least, I don't see that conclusion supported by evidence. I'll defer to Gavins emails that countered this point better. -- Thomas Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A4D9A8FE for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 21:43:36 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from manxnetsf05.manx.net (outbound.manx.net [213.137.31.12]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B447E8 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 21:43:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 195.10.99.101 (EHLO coldstorage.localnet) ([195.10.99.101]) by manxnetsf05.manx.net (MOS 4.4.5a-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id EFU56742; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 22:43:33 +0100 (BST) From: Thomas Zander To: Bitcoin Dev Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 23:43:32 +0200 Message-ID: <2496856.hSTJ7hHSsK@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Mirapoint-Received-SPF: 195.10.99.101 coldstorage.localnet thomas@thomaszander.se 5 none X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=manxnetsf05.manx.net X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B0205.55C52685.0119, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A0B0205.55C52685.0119, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: f02ffc3b2fb7ead4ffeb73bd283e3060 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 21:43:36 -0000 On Friday 7. August 2015 20.10.48 Pieter Wuille wrote: > On Aug 7, 2015 7:50 PM, "Gavin Andresen" wrote: > > I believe people in the Bitcoin ecosystem will choose different > > tradeoffs, and I believe that is OK-- people should be free to make those > > tradeoffs. > > I agree. Though I believe that the blockchain itself cannot offer many > tradeoffs, and by trying to make it scale we hurt the whole system. The > place to introduce tradeoffs is in layers on top - there you can build > systems with various levels of trust without hurting others. Pieter, you either misunderstood or misquoted Gavin here. The tradeoffs Gavin talks about are about trusting your own node or using a centralized system (as the two extremes in a spectrum). Your answer talks about something completely different. Not sure how your answer fits in this conversation, although, you do seem to use these misunderstandings often to push your own position in a way that to the naive reader it sounds like others agree with you. Please try to be more concise and on-topic. -- Thomas Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.linuxfoundation.org (smtp2.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.36]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6EB7794F for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 22:05:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from manxnetsf05.manx.net (outbound.manx.net [213.137.31.12]) by smtp2.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AB4C61E2DC for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 22:05:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from 195.10.99.101 (EHLO coldstorage.localnet) ([195.10.99.101]) by manxnetsf05.manx.net (MOS 4.4.5a-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id EFU59079; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 23:00:51 +0100 (BST) From: Thomas Zander To: Bitcoin Dev Date: Sat, 08 Aug 2015 00:00:50 +0200 Message-ID: <32711466.zym5IOmH54@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Mirapoint-Received-SPF: 195.10.99.101 coldstorage.localnet thomas@thomaszander.se 5 none X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=manxnetsf05.manx.net X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B0205.55C52A93.00B6, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A0B0205.55C52A93.00B6, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: f02ffc3b2fb7ead4ffeb73bd283e3060 X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_50,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp2.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 22:05:54 -0000 On Friday 7. August 2015 20.10.48 Pieter Wuille wrote: > But if the reason for increasing is because you fear a change of economics, > then it means you prefer not dealing with that change. Let me quote yourself; On Thursday 6. August 2015 17.26.11 Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I believe that it is essential to not take unnecessary risks, > and find a non-controversial solution. You want to change the basic economics of Bitcoin itself. If anything is "unnecessary risks", that would be a clear contender. -- Thomas Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8DAE993D for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 22:53:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mout.perfora.net (mout.perfora.net [74.208.4.197]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2B5F7E8 for ; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 22:53:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-qk0-f172.google.com ([209.85.220.172]) by mrelay.perfora.net (mreueus001) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0MHqjD-1ZOfzw0CWT-003b48 for ; Sat, 08 Aug 2015 00:53:45 +0200 Received: by qkdg63 with SMTP id g63so42094032qkd.0 for ; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 15:53:43 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.55.51.15 with SMTP id z15mr17856768qkz.86.1438988023852; Fri, 07 Aug 2015 15:53:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.96.226.68 with HTTP; Fri, 7 Aug 2015 15:53:43 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <2686935.vL4zPKxv2H@coldstorage> References: <3197878.6zmtLAPm4L@coldstorage> <2686935.vL4zPKxv2H@coldstorage> Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 23:53:43 +0100 Message-ID: From: Adam Back To: Thomas Zander Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Provags-ID: V03:K0:bxn0pYRC+FKPomHBYGWj4UNPtpJWoJfF74mgiKR/m9j7TWzpOTB iv4guD/n0g6QtVhVrhmKnVZ++qNDDrHV9D2zS5jDuZUZZZDmGGcLn2fJrjzn94ObzMVrwMV bxJlKmgTCHWTg6ojsHGgoEN5zR99+1C/vjnC4IvssARnUUzyxQZxStPoeWhf17RDfM3K9Bk 4cJT3w2Y0pz8dYFKOrUcA== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V01:K0:NkZkqokQXRc=:GimjPAW3X6HjuKuMxOqHe0 GdfJSV6QstNrg2sx5Vmu5OfaaPLTHCj6gaKAmGqcT62ITf2OlGh0qfrE1JWz7R2EbBQnD3wT1 ULZmbHGdQ/0P0M7hYMp1RjIrz9c1TEBy5U1MoBU4Uc+bvxcafY+90VaYRACMuEYpbZWfyRNVu ba8aKMjVkhOsoPEBlVw4zstJhdlO1wY4TPVecMJITl7B/bVVbnya44lZbDdJEDZh5Px2w1WMc vepy7xYWeh4W6np3jQXN5nuoDWqQnLMNED9KJZwP8tEANGbRDNPBrpp+01wPCpOOsjcH0EMaT gxBPo70TauBEZ+DVZFsSI7ElOYDX2lFd3XC3d0WZstJhMBWBGI4kPTAZJKjbWsWgZEZFZVbJT aYPJU7rhCi2Ue7mSgoN+j5t+s4Z7LbIhI1KQ92GLNrReVjdVdZX7AhqOBpprHSBh73+eCdBm4 rLXqWxbs/MsMXYs0E1/qhGbKBvj3RaIAspr/KUoGCLSntvVxh2M6DMkagg6hDfYbU/oY7t+NH 1ZSHLgJWBIaxSCEQvrA4hUM0aktILYtWNsoF9jD5VZU2ZfH6XcHUiAJKkMbaP306+jV5umisS PDbg33Zyz/r85xnLPJhs7CIfYoQxwL1rFFjEnSt/L6j3+m8G6rruYUk9MPnYBJbgz3u1jc2XZ e49J+lTmD8tGJ25DDoPJkq4BGMXi52n9+TSuyvvvirz6puS2vllyEwv0h588rOx4iOs/X4v2M jnRk6FIyl1q0TSPn X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 22:53:46 -0000 On 7 August 2015 at 22:35, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev wrote: > the need an individual has for running a node is a completely different concept than the > need for nodes to exist. And, really, you are describing miners, not nodes. It's not as simple as trusting miners, Bitcoin security needs some reasonable portion of economic interest to be validating their receipt of coins against a full node they run. I do it myself because I dont want to lose money, as do many power users. Most bitcoin ecosystem companies do it. You dont have to run it all the time, just sync it when you want to check your own coin receipt with higher assurance. > As we concluded in our previous email, the need to run a node is inversely > proportional to the ability (or willingness) to trust others. Even if you are willing to trust others, trusting miners or random full nodes would be unsafe if not for the reasonable portion of economic interest validating their own received coins. That holds miners honest, otherwise they could more easily present fake information to SPV users. > And lets face it, practically everyone trusts others with their money today. Bitcoin's very reason for existence is to avoid that need. For people fully happy to trust others with their money, Bitcoin may not be as interesting to them. >> If the impact of the system goes u[p], so should the - joint - incentives to >> keep it secure. And I think we're (slowly) failing at that. > > That is your opinion. What Pieter said is an accurate summary and non-controversial. Adam From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5D0AB899 for ; Sat, 8 Aug 2015 16:54:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f171.google.com (mail-wi0-f171.google.com [209.85.212.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA6F3215 for ; Sat, 8 Aug 2015 16:54:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wijp15 with SMTP id p15so91266759wij.0 for ; Sat, 08 Aug 2015 09:54:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:content-type; bh=SySw8+xP9/Mrs0fooJmWSFcke8eXQtBOY3R2bBwHgiM=; b=lAcBPoBIBx2jlwu4l5oGpuHYIZ0Q7g72RkyMfIGobBIT4Aj8kZHBcbECQIyxLRY6Nt 5Q740yxRZp/LfN8RI74EAPeA4BEhD6q47lwcjihYGB+5eWTUUeD6WTgll35ATSOX+I+2 BjhYP/sIK0ipkGRscT/uo+grC6D0X5jdwqCCPtRtOCi4cJOBDIcfPXWE8EBBiGIk9pKG ck8YJ8GndQdMtDbF44DIa41/ZpECScMTPsTffjcIhLtrVTk0d44XI71r9DDZqFOtgJZE d5pOzy2L3xjz6CbXVYyrCSTdcDVM2/Oa7wEkSefWgSkH327+8AODrQr5cfL9AqTfUkW/ IIzg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.121.100 with SMTP id lj4mr27466129wjb.104.1439052844326; Sat, 08 Aug 2015 09:54:04 -0700 (PDT) Sender: dscotese@gmail.com Received: by 10.27.184.134 with HTTP; Sat, 8 Aug 2015 09:54:04 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <3197878.6zmtLAPm4L@coldstorage> <2686935.vL4zPKxv2H@coldstorage> Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2015 09:54:04 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: OglhqpG9C4l-DtdlJ6msWi-n8Bs Message-ID: From: Dave Scotese To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e011777b5996569051ccf9919 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 08 Aug 2015 16:54:07 -0000 --089e011777b5996569051ccf9919 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Bitcoin is an irreversible payment system. When you pay someone using its main selling point, which is removing the need for physical presence, you are trusting that person. Bitcoin doesn't obviate trust. It obviates authority. Centralization of trust is what creates the authority that we all recognize as bad for our species. It does this by making the authority's use of coercion acceptable. Bitcoin removes the need for authority, not trust. It replaces trust in a single body with trust in a majority. We want that majority to be healthy and varied (as opposed to largely co-opted by some authority). The replacement has two effects. 1) It is very difficult for any single body to become the (coercive) authority that everyone has to trust (like central banks). 2) It is very easy for a person to find a different single body to trust if they don't like the one they are trusting now - or even stop trusting one body and trust the majority instead, relying on #1 for protection, and taking on the responsibility of running a full node. The philosophical foundation of a thing is ultimately the basis of its value, so I thought it useful to point out the distinction between authority and trust in the bitcoin ecosystem. I welcome disagreements with my philosophical position, as that is how I learn. Dave. On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 3:53 PM, Adam Back via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On 7 August 2015 at 22:35, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > the need an individual has for running a node is a completely different > concept than the > > need for nodes to exist. And, really, you are describing miners, not > nodes. > > It's not as simple as trusting miners, Bitcoin security needs some > reasonable portion of economic interest to be validating their receipt > of coins against a full node they run. > > I do it myself because I dont want to lose money, as do many power > users. Most bitcoin ecosystem companies do it. You dont have to run > it all the time, just sync it when you want to check your own coin > receipt with higher assurance. > > > As we concluded in our previous email, the need to run a node is > inversely > > proportional to the ability (or willingness) to trust others. > > Even if you are willing to trust others, trusting miners or random > full nodes would be unsafe if not for the reasonable portion of > economic interest validating their own received coins. That holds > miners honest, otherwise they could more easily present fake > information to SPV users. > > > And lets face it, practically everyone trusts others with their money > today. > > Bitcoin's very reason for existence is to avoid that need. For people > fully happy to trust others with their money, Bitcoin may not be as > interesting to them. > > >> If the impact of the system goes u[p], so should the - joint - > incentives to > >> keep it secure. And I think we're (slowly) failing at that. > > > > That is your opinion. > > What Pieter said is an accurate summary and non-controversial. > > Adam > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > -- I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie? I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha). I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin. I also code for The Dollar Vigilante . "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto --089e011777b5996569051ccf9919 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Bitcoin is an irreversible payment system.= =C2=A0 When you pay someone using its main selling point, which is removing= the need for physical presence, you are trusting that person.=C2=A0 Bitcoi= n doesn't obviate trust.=C2=A0 It obviates authority.=C2=A0 Centralizat= ion of trust is what creates the authority that we all recognize as bad for= our species.=C2=A0 It does this by making the authority's use of coerc= ion acceptable.

Bitcoin removes the need for authority, not tr= ust.=C2=A0 It replaces trust in a single body with trust in a majority.=C2= =A0 We want that majority to be healthy and varied (as opposed to largely c= o-opted by some authority). The replacement has two effects.=C2=A0 1) It is= very difficult for any single body to become the (coercive) authority that= everyone has to trust (like central banks). 2) It is very easy for a perso= n to find a different single body to trust if they don't like the one t= hey are trusting now - or even stop trusting one body and trust the majorit= y instead, relying on #1 for protection, and taking on the responsibility o= f running a full node.

The philosophical foundation of a thing= is ultimately the basis of its value, so I thought it useful to point out = the distinction between authority and trust in the bitcoin ecosystem.=C2=A0= I welcome disagreements with my philosophical position, as that is how I l= earn.

Dave.

On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 3:53 PM, Adam Back via bitcoin-dev = <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> = wrote:
On 7 August 2015 at 22:35, Thomas = Zander via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> the need an individual has for running a node is a completely differen= t concept than the
> need for nodes to exist.=C2=A0 And, really, you are describing miners,= not nodes.

It's not as simple as trusting miners, Bitcoin security needs so= me
reasonable portion of economic interest to be validating their receipt
of coins against a full node they run.

I do it myself because I dont want to lose money, as do many power
users.=C2=A0 Most bitcoin ecosystem companies do it.=C2=A0 You dont have to= run
it all the time, just sync it when you want to check your own coin
receipt with higher assurance.

> As we concluded in our previous email, the need to run a node is inver= sely
> proportional to the ability (or willingness) to trust others.

Even if you are willing to trust others, trusting miners or random full nodes would be unsafe if not for the reasonable portion of
economic interest validating their own received coins.=C2=A0 That holds
miners honest, otherwise they could more easily present fake
information to SPV users.

> And lets face it, practically everyone trusts others with their money = today.

Bitcoin's very reason for existence is to avoid that need.=C2=A0= For people
fully happy to trust others with their money, Bitcoin may not be as
interesting to them.

>> If the impact of the system goes u[p], so should the - joint - inc= entives to
>> keep it secure. And I think we're (slowly) failing at that. >
> That is your opinion.

What Pieter said is an accurate summary and non-controversial.

Adam
___________________________________= ____________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev



--
I like to provide some work at no cha= rge to prove my value. Do you need a techie?=C2=A0
I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha).
I= 'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin.
I also code for = The Dollar Vigila= nte.
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules&= quot; - Satoshi Nakamoto
--089e011777b5996569051ccf9919-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C1D3825A for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 18:46:08 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f171.google.com (mail-pd0-f171.google.com [209.85.192.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 67ADF1BB for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 18:46:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdco4 with SMTP id o4so63148536pdc.3 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 11:46:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:from:subject:references:to:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=MEXp4O2hIOyN6knZeX35duEuM6dDvujPN1oZWepHEQU=; b=lMzCqsA77w1J7KvDuM6gAUzA/o6rra2Ho1yz7W3a1jnIoKt14/zGnWZiM7oXlSj/1B KHeefGXR461BJZT5b4WOUeyVF+0toIzDu3icygvFw8T3OrTrfOsXtot6NGta6XjYeHqc lq4UJ6TwgQ3ls3cf0snyKdtB97swggqXQjJ4qS/oIE2v7cGWypKsdUw1gCggwaBsok4X 0MABqrPU0fPTBnyZ1Yq5ZipXiXPWcyzYjtEYKN4SeHyxmZEI1b1i83Zq4T56TNDvH1Li jPh5pI7Mnc1f1+KwS5zQUbn5C/QpoOttQcTLVPnPiD1NpGU3jI5jYJhNEGbf8P8mIV0/ ZjPQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnb1Eh40T/YZkbK8C5Qu87BhGD1Xg8MQD0jaGqQUi9QnO0zTVv7Z4yxrQgRG/PntWF2Am7S X-Received: by 10.70.41.130 with SMTP id f2mr37116416pdl.86.1439145968073; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 11:46:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.89] (99-8-65-117.lightspeed.davlca.sbcglobal.net. [99.8.65.117]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id ip7sm228413pbc.68.2015.08.09.11.46.05 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 11:46:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Tom Harding References: X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 To: Bitcoin Dev Message-ID: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 11:46:08 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 18:46:08 -0000 On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network. Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is closed. There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. They can appear alone, or in combination: Funding Source (1) A deposit from Bob's payment hub Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the channel. Another name for this is "credit". This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the payment hub to do this. This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin. It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the current banking system. If a bank will not even open an account for Bob today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be paid through a Poon-Dryja channel? Funding Source (2) Bob's previous spends If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be re-increased. To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's banks. This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with many payment hubs. It is an incentive for centralization. With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and receive money effectively. *That* is uninteresting to me. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9BB177AD for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 18:54:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B92B41BC for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 18:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by iodb91 with SMTP id b91so91891156iod.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 11:54:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; bh=4QbNX4xas7zIoZyUuUKlTdzqYTWMfEavn+Gm9Y8r3Vo=; b=dCfNDliygEC8nDpEm6tHCqcdCg5Y7zIgBo2/nT9fK8JfvQ8b/YPqKB3kumqMM4towF 2PVMovUrOrHBFouz6ydnN2aXU5W5iXcBnHsWeBDpqnGhIgHUrl2kNhJxoYkHwKlXtr2M FVNYbsNC+00iEFRV0KGwyrGVDUCqzaRvwDVDrH3eC1Njhzcyc/xhQhc+oJKHdO2NSdyX hBLuQ849ClGhZj3rjJwK1snAQ5YakKqPf8MJlMF8MAjeCLo6bkod9fFn6nm2Lxfjdzgj kULwNMmTzuhJD45FHYhWvzZVBM6OtUGPIua5xg3DijH5aq6tbX718t36YDIe0OAtwHpG Ecbg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkY7UCxDo0K4Msy8I+GbGkFxQsLWuXvnZwTrLnwTsgy/nnS+iL6LA9Db9gBW7do0cjeqISl X-Received: by 10.107.35.138 with SMTP id j132mr20110291ioj.159.1439146465130; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 11:54:25 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.158.140 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 11:54:05 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [50.0.37.37] In-Reply-To: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> From: Mark Friedenbach Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 11:54:05 -0700 Message-ID: To: Tom Harding Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1140f4e6d59528051ce565bb X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.2 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 18:54:27 -0000 --001a1140f4e6d59528051ce565bb Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Tom, you appear to be misunderstanding how lightning network and micropayment hub-and-spoke models in general work. > But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the payment hub to do this. On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved. if the funds aren't already available for Bob to immediately claim his balance, the payment doesn't go through in the first place. On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. > > Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network. > > Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment > channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is closed. > > There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. > They can appear alone, or in combination: > > > Funding Source (1) > A deposit from Bob's payment hub > > Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the > channel. Another name for this is "credit". > > This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's > deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has > advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the > payment hub to do this. > > This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin. > It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the > current banking system. If a bank will not even open an account for Bob > today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be > paid through a Poon-Dryja channel? > > > Funding Source (2) > Bob's previous spends > > If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on > its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be > re-increased. > > To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate > spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's > banks. This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with > many payment hubs. It is an incentive for centralization. > > > With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and > receive money effectively. *That* is uninteresting to me. > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --001a1140f4e6d59528051ce565bb Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Tom, you appear to be misunderstanding how lightning = network and micropayment hub-and-spoke models in general work.

> = But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has
advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies).=C2=A0 Nothing requires t= he
payment hub to do this.

On the contrary the funds were advance= d by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved. i= f the funds aren't already available for Bob to immediately claim his b= alance, the payment doesn't go through in the first place.

On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 = at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@= lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote:

> Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.

Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network.

Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment
channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is closed.
There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. They can appear alone, or in combination:


Funding Source (1)
A deposit from Bob's payment hub

Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the
channel.=C2=A0 Another name for this is "credit".

This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's
deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has
advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies).=C2=A0 Nothing requires t= he
payment hub to do this.

This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin.
It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the
current banking system.=C2=A0 If a bank will not even open an account for B= ob
today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be
paid through a Poon-Dryja channel?


Funding Source (2)
Bob's previous spends

If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on
its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be
re-increased.

To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate
spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's banks.=C2=A0 This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with=
many payment hubs.=C2=A0 It is an incentive for centralization.


With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and
receive money effectively.=C2=A0 *That* is uninteresting to me.


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--001a1140f4e6d59528051ce565bb-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6072F898 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 20:15:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f181.google.com (mail-lb0-f181.google.com [209.85.217.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F7BEE2 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 20:15:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbtg9 with SMTP id tg9so47169815lbb.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 13:15:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=bGiiCXipoJvt3cerCH3YyUbHGpaDjFcCVn7G1255VNw=; b=M8KBgMqw6KPh0/t2mFIhZf3oh1Cg6Nqy4f3rWM6tfP+cK+xrBEPZcjvXK6Net2AF27 b77CBuIJE5YVbJHX6X16wA/s+JKIpgYMPj1QVLn2gdIdOBLu1zCn/IAJUougxnZ9SQ/t XDUpMI5hqLg5YYabUkafe9mFASsns2DyAKNWqBpLQ/NNEqXiF1+CHJIc5Do6vFJneppJ h/HfJQ2U8YBAgBDCeNGokxNNI/N3lozDD9RPRkSGHAzvT/rmF6PwzGlFiycU8x8X2wtH 2khKZZWPkwpXbkaTj7pT6+rbsO0K4/QIR5oE+U0KstfrOjaxBe45Apfud/HCeqCrZeUb Y01g== X-Received: by 10.112.161.40 with SMTP id xp8mr17218003lbb.71.1439151315097; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 13:15:15 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 13:14:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:14:55 +0100 Message-ID: To: Mark Friedenbach Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c25f52ea1faf051ce6861b X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 20:15:18 -0000 --001a11c25f52ea1faf051ce6861b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 In the Lightning network it is assumed that the balances can always be settled on the blockchain if any of the parties along the channel has a problem. What if the fee on the settlement transactions is not high enough to enter the blockchain? You can't do replace-by-fee after the fact. Do the fees always have to assume worst case scenarios on the Bitcoin fee market? On 9 August 2015 at 19:54, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Tom, you appear to be misunderstanding how lightning network and > micropayment hub-and-spoke models in general work. > > > But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has > advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the > payment hub to do this. > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the > channel. There is no credit involved. if the funds aren't already available > for Bob to immediately claim his balance, the payment doesn't go through in > the first place. > > On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> >> > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. >> >> Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network. >> >> Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment >> channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is closed. >> >> There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. >> They can appear alone, or in combination: >> >> >> Funding Source (1) >> A deposit from Bob's payment hub >> >> Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the >> channel. Another name for this is "credit". >> >> This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's >> deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has >> advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the >> payment hub to do this. >> >> This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin. >> It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the >> current banking system. If a bank will not even open an account for Bob >> today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be >> paid through a Poon-Dryja channel? >> >> >> Funding Source (2) >> Bob's previous spends >> >> If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on >> its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be >> re-increased. >> >> To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate >> spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's >> banks. This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with >> many payment hubs. It is an incentive for centralization. >> >> >> With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and >> receive money effectively. *That* is uninteresting to me. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11c25f52ea1faf051ce6861b Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
In the Lightning network it is assumed that the balances c= an always be settled on the blockchain if any of the parties along the chan= nel has a problem. What if the fee on the settlement transactions is not hi= gh enough to enter the blockchain? You can't do replace-by-fee after th= e fact. Do the fees always have to assume worst case scenarios on the Bitco= in fee market?

On 9 August 2015 at 19:54, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
=
Tom, you appear to be = misunderstanding how lightning network and micropayment hub-and-spoke model= s in general work.

> But neither can Bob receive= money, unless payment hub has
advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies).=C2=A0 Nothing requires t= he
payment hub to do this.

On the contrary the funds were = advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit invo= lved. if the funds aren't already available for Bob to immediately clai= m his balance, the payment doesn't go through in the first place.

=
On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via= bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, = Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote:

> Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.

Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network.

Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment
channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is closed.
There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. They can appear alone, or in combination:


Funding Source (1)
A deposit from Bob's payment hub

Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the
channel.=C2=A0 Another name for this is "credit".

This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's
deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has
advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies).=C2=A0 Nothing requires t= he
payment hub to do this.

This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin.
It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the
current banking system.=C2=A0 If a bank will not even open an account for B= ob
today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be
paid through a Poon-Dryja channel?


Funding Source (2)
Bob's previous spends

If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on
its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be
re-increased.

To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate
spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's banks.=C2=A0 This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with=
many payment hubs.=C2=A0 It is an incentive for centralization.


With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and
receive money effectively.=C2=A0 *That* is uninteresting to me.


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--001a11c25f52ea1faf051ce6861b-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C62AC68 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 20:49:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f180.google.com (mail-lb0-f180.google.com [209.85.217.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 225D212A for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 20:49:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lbbtg9 with SMTP id tg9so47366904lbb.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 13:49:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=L/Ak9H4W/cfXVUI6iIYrDMpmB7NF01bZKe85N4kjXJE=; b=1GMTA0ctk9Rv7Dm9kPg2rf2v41iohUbW0weRiMnNkQFMgrpAz4X0pkYeigMPxibd1P 9rd3DzQmXn3zKjaxFCDZlRHMzneUR+LRPpxjo3TUyL+fHRoqcsqcYe1CA5Ac4oX+Wzte gKYmDkSTmFg4OAE9t+CmzI0ldkXFfudPgMq52Yf62z43GmlU1pH+zi37u/Nspe+SVTRX LWWzFMuAClPXP7196mB/YYAYmXmVNKAmTPopd6taC2sy1uA4rEtr6B/op/+4hjMx69FX TSnR/tt0182NL89CzyQw3ZeC+iCdRB+Pe8R15K/SR+Zfjh/0QYZBRyjTL5VEvmSxsCXQ Bokg== X-Received: by 10.112.137.164 with SMTP id qj4mr17331847lbb.105.1439153341391; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 13:49:01 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 13:48:41 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:48:41 +0100 Message-ID: To: Mark Friedenbach Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0115fd1cb0ebcc051ce6ff8f X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 20:49:04 -0000 --089e0115fd1cb0ebcc051ce6ff8f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Thanks Mark. Ok next obvious question (apologies for all of these but it seems you are the authority on Lightning here). Is the Lightning system limited in the number of hops there can be in the payment channel? I am looking at the initial Lightning slides presented in February and it looks like the locktime decrements by 1-day along each hop. So the more hops there are the longer my bitcoins are potentially locked up for? On 9 August 2015 at 21:18, Mark Friedenbach wrote: > Child pays for parent, and potentially future sighash modes implemented in > the checksig2 operator lightning needs anyway which enable adding inputs to > provide additional fee. > On Aug 9, 2015 1:15 PM, "Hector Chu" wrote: > >> In the Lightning network it is assumed that the balances can always be >> settled on the blockchain if any of the parties along the channel has a >> problem. What if the fee on the settlement transactions is not high enough >> to enter the blockchain? You can't do replace-by-fee after the fact. Do the >> fees always have to assume worst case scenarios on the Bitcoin fee market? >> >> On 9 August 2015 at 19:54, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> Tom, you appear to be misunderstanding how lightning network and >>> micropayment hub-and-spoke models in general work. >>> >>> > But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has >>> advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the >>> payment hub to do this. >>> >>> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of >>> the channel. There is no credit involved. if the funds aren't already >>> available for Bob to immediately claim his balance, the payment doesn't go >>> through in the first place. >>> >>> On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>>> >>>> > Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. >>>> >>>> Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network. >>>> >>>> Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment >>>> channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is >>>> closed. >>>> >>>> There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. >>>> They can appear alone, or in combination: >>>> >>>> >>>> Funding Source (1) >>>> A deposit from Bob's payment hub >>>> >>>> Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the >>>> channel. Another name for this is "credit". >>>> >>>> This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's >>>> deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has >>>> advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing requires the >>>> payment hub to do this. >>>> >>>> This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin. >>>> It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the >>>> current banking system. If a bank will not even open an account for Bob >>>> today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be >>>> paid through a Poon-Dryja channel? >>>> >>>> >>>> Funding Source (2) >>>> Bob's previous spends >>>> >>>> If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on >>>> its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be >>>> re-increased. >>>> >>>> To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate >>>> spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's >>>> banks. This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with >>>> many payment hubs. It is an incentive for centralization. >>>> >>>> >>>> With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and >>>> receive money effectively. *That* is uninteresting to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >>> >> --089e0115fd1cb0ebcc051ce6ff8f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks Mark.
Ok next obvious question (apologies for a= ll of these but it seems you are the authority on Lightning here). Is the L= ightning system limited in the number of hops there can be in the payment c= hannel? I am looking at the initial Lightning slides presented in February = and it looks like the locktime decrements by 1-day along each hop. So the m= ore hops there are the longer my bitcoins are potentially locked up for?

On 9 Aug= ust 2015 at 21:18, Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

Child pays for pa= rent, and potentially future sighash modes implemented in the checksig2 ope= rator lightning needs anyway which enable adding inputs to provide addition= al fee.

On Aug 9, 2015 1:15 PM, "Hector Chu" &= lt;hectorchu@gmail= .com> wrote:
=
In the Lightning network it is assumed that the balances c= an always be settled on the blockchain if any of the parties along the chan= nel has a problem. What if the fee on the settlement transactions is not hi= gh enough to enter the blockchain? You can't do replace-by-fee after th= e fact. Do the fees always have to assume worst case scenarios on the Bitco= in fee market?

On 9 August 2015 at 19:54, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
=
Tom, you appear to be = misunderstanding how lightning network and micropayment hub-and-spoke model= s in general work.

> But neither can Bob receive money, unl= ess payment hub has
advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies).=C2=A0 Nothing requires t= he
payment hub to do this.

On the contrary the funds were = advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit invo= lved. if the funds aren't already available for Bob to immediately clai= m his balance, the payment doesn't go through in the first place.

On = Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev = wrote:

> Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please.

Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network.

Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment
channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is closed.
There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased claim. They can appear alone, or in combination:


Funding Source (1)
A deposit from Bob's payment hub

Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to the
channel.=C2=A0 Another name for this is "credit".

This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment hub's
deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has
advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies).=C2=A0 Nothing requires t= he
payment hub to do this.

This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old bitcoin.
It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is worse than the
current banking system.=C2=A0 If a bank will not even open an account for B= ob
today, why would a payment hub lock up hard bitcoin to allow Bob to be
paid through a Poon-Dryja channel?


Funding Source (2)
Bob's previous spends

If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim on
its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim can be
re-increased.

To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate
spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with today's banks.=C2=A0 This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have accounts with=
many payment hubs.=C2=A0 It is an incentive for centralization.


With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send and
receive money effectively.=C2=A0 *That* is uninteresting to me.


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev



--089e0115fd1cb0ebcc051ce6ff8f-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C90E58A7 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:27:25 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f180.google.com (mail-wi0-f180.google.com [209.85.212.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 997F4EA for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:27:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicja10 with SMTP id ja10so16391387wic.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:27:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=82gUo3WHiczM491bC1LKb7G80/25O6R1uRqzYnPWxlw=; b=RNb7PG94ueoHU91krWA3F5PPvNxoR7ZcuHD0+u8nV0nNih5sqsGahTNKg2IL+t+5M0 vQGQYPpgw9SNFMKbCsaq+jn3Vpfb5namUo+M9pG5F+NNZMY7TSy/cPfUEEdn1zwHQAi6 2ryKCQKpC6dAloNyry590BCR0iTRTwLP23Mb34FH/nbNJnZ9JZxSDa/zpKCM/PVd0U6X M++xXgydBuyeiPJ1wJvCuXVkG9AwW8a7M2QI87AHCaokpHZ2t0RWy06A1cCKkUklCYwd RRLd23OqoHjeYoUNoekifQx9JbgFJmMo8GpKGiLLaCzmzyZO3lvriGWNIlCK4e6xzm7t Lrbg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkyf3AqFrsLBbOY279q6fSx8O3ijLnZX0IFJMnhtdrji68RjIYltc8V/t5jfGaVNvIkj/Cl MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.109.97 with SMTP id hr1mr37643281wjb.38.1439155643165; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:27:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.28.30.143 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 14:27:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.28.30.143 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 14:27:22 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 14:27:22 -0700 Message-ID: From: Tom Harding To: Mark Friedenbach Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01494b38e34a75051ce78861 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.2 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:27:25 -0000 --089e01494b38e34a75051ce78861 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved. That's a chuckle. As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it. We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there. I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees. Can you guess it? --089e01494b38e34a75051ce78861 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on t= he creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle.=C2=A0

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and= if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds= , whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends o= n the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for = these kinds of fees.=C2=A0 Can you guess it?

--089e01494b38e34a75051ce78861-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE53E892 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:40:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f178.google.com (mail-io0-f178.google.com [209.85.223.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CBDDEA for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:40:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioeg141 with SMTP id g141so153414038ioe.3 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:40:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=V4p513LE4jad6faf9uyAgwPytlSd7GI3SnJnfmnNieg=; b=kT5+VcXgX2VwMeNcPbI8edYF5N9cEg0aIzVyk+9xOrttq4DHsNpLIYITsjPmHNICqI VasGYXMdUYk+Y5TwfqphKLba02Xubu761OXgTEwpQztLvgI1/5V4Ht0zPS44PGMDVIny 7Fc5wAPin6k9Il7PDwBRQMcViqA7b8x5apRu5IQ6rkNKMFtlc/8sWZZ9Jlir6vYfcJeS Maugnxt0P5kUv5+HcDP7g3+d2zDpnUmazHTh1pt1RdM61GSRxtUYgtFlX8XoA8UYUIz0 HCNYen0Pz+iHyrhsRNFlUg81WGJSFipIfKkEaCesB2Tqbi3bG8KkmADlcN/2BInvVTt+ kJVg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.47.219 with SMTP id v88mr16541899iov.78.1439156449685; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:40:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.144.196 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 14:40:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.144.196 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 14:40:49 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 17:40:49 -0400 Message-ID: From: Chris Pacia To: Tom Harding Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c14e92f5ba02051ce7b818 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:40:51 -0000 --001a11c14e92f5ba02051ce7b818 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I'm glad Tom is bringing these points up. There seems to be an assumption by many that LN will be automatically awesome by virtue of it being technically feasible with having considered whether it is economically feasible or desirable. So much stock has been placed in LN as the solution to the block size debate, yet it could turn out that it sucks in practice. Then what? On Aug 9, 2015 5:27 PM, "Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: > > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of > the channel. There is no credit involved. > > That's a chuckle. > > As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, > Bob can expect to pay for it. > > We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee > depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of > time it stays there. > > I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees. > Can you guess it? > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11c14e92f5ba02051ce7b818 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I'm glad Tom is bringing these points up. There seems to= be an assumption by many that LN will be automatically awesome by virtue o= f it being technically feasible with having considered whether it is econom= ically feasible or desirable.

So much stock has been placed in LN as the solution to the b= lock size debate, yet it could turn out that it sucks in practice. Then wha= t?

On Aug 9, 2015 5:27 PM, "Tom Harding via bi= tcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, = "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on t= he creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle.=C2=A0

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and= if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds= , whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends o= n the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for = these kinds of fees.=C2=A0 Can you guess it?


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--001a11c14e92f5ba02051ce7b818-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4471A8A7 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:45:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f52.google.com (mail-la0-f52.google.com [209.85.215.52]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 92F99183 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:45:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lahi9 with SMTP id i9so14449957lah.2 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:45:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=upgvaK9KkSwEhY2IVQPW6v2xUHj8Nj2Cj4zlWzNkfgo=; b=ta2w685Tp714nk5mSbKs8/AhiK37QHvFf1r0RTxnPLWvd/VdgEPG9HFE1Tg1fDPfC0 ESDDbr05citd5LqZmT9ynNzfyR2gK4PXSChAG9XLKDFGdA/j92GrprP/6mvIZ+GfgWFl 7sCgkeGXNWnb/GNkg2CaC/NT6HuYCLC9KTMaripOCkh0HqDldHA+ENmjk1b1V/DnMqsC Ufluj2SGeFOTgio92Ju+fpqpaJygJp0XLuzeVny3rWeXdgHTCD2v3ZmiHFv9uVFUhb9T djdCLZMziHw94tLNKyVOsVxv4SuM3lHDfmdzOq20U2aNZzR2k/tkORBn6JX7IL2Ao+iW toWw== X-Received: by 10.152.36.226 with SMTP id t2mr17563087laj.6.1439156742835; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:45:42 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 14:45:23 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:45:23 +0100 Message-ID: To: Tom Harding Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0158b5e66ed76d051ce7ca6c X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:45:46 -0000 --089e0158b5e66ed76d051ce7ca6c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub always sums to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment hub to anyone. Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other tricks to pay for the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin fees do not play a part in the payment channel balances. So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to the clients of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds in a payment channel (time value of money). The lost interest or opportunity cost on those funds would need to be paid for by its clients as well. And don't forget normal running costs such as networking and electricity. On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: > > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of > the channel. There is no credit involved. > > That's a chuckle. > > As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, > Bob can expect to pay for it. > > We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee > depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of > time it stays there. > > I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees. > Can you guess it? > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --089e0158b5e66ed76d051ce7ca6c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited fr= om a payment hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub= or the person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment = hub always sums to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment = hub to anyone.

Given Mark's previous answer of using= CPFP and other tricks to pay for the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assu= me that Bitcoin fees do not play a part in the payment channel balances.

So, the interesting question is what are the costs o= f running a payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay t= o settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to the clien= ts of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds in a paymen= t channel (time value of money). The lost interest or opportunity cost on t= hose funds would need to be paid for by its clients as well. And don't = forget normal running costs such as networking and electricity.
=

On 9 August 2015 = at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lis= ts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Fri= edenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on t= he creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle.=C2=A0

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and= if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds= , whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends o= n the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for = these kinds of fees.=C2=A0 Can you guess it?


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--089e0158b5e66ed76d051ce7ca6c-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 433EC8A7 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:58:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f174.google.com (mail-pd0-f174.google.com [209.85.192.174]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 528F416F for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:58:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdbfa8 with SMTP id fa8so23944403pdb.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:58:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:disposition-notification-to:date:from:user-agent :mime-version:to:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type; bh=7SPlazOgn7tB+Sp3NR8I8vzwZ8B0aE9i7SuSUidaknU=; b=W3GxabwBWPDcPr6IfTpvqr7Mykz3D4eyL1G1bIoGeSxt5j9pyfhiXIu3PRFVYpVaBw JEN4UX5e6AKrzUpfzyBufqlIyiMBXX0xUtldVItC9tszz2G4A6vUgn890fXHMjFZlQy/ wyBCAuoVZdUsJReKeVz7cUlVep8rGAjvzwbqeZiXEg/2Iyp0F5tspyYlwW2hSIQaj0tV v2FvPwqZoFP4xiAgYJix5zKvNnTNuGcyW1qN1EKGo2pon+KGI1uoh/VDRpZCuFyArtYQ SHFur+cHFXmVq3mgx6eyNcej/767tmlTkIdmOoi9JnHx4iYIup+5nNscFEwFW8QOle7a GElw== X-Received: by 10.70.53.225 with SMTP id e1mr38922095pdp.23.1439157480061; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:58:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.45.134.100] (c-67-188-9-126.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.9.126]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id ft7sm12772058pdb.58.2015.08.09.14.57.59 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:57:59 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55C7CCE5.10208@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 14:57:57 -0700 From: Patrick Strateman User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------060207020406040308000002" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:58:01 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------060207020406040308000002 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The costs of operating a hub are as follows: Time value of the funds the Hub has locked up in payment channels. Enhanced risk of loss of control of private keys (the keys necessarily need to be on an internet connected system). Operating costs (I expect this will be minimal). The hub can charge a fee for it's services to recoup these costs. On 08/09/2015 02:45 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment > hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the > person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub > always sums to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment > hub to anyone. > > Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other tricks to pay for > the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin fees do not > play a part in the payment channel balances. > > So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a > payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to > settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to the > clients of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds > in a payment channel (time value of money). The lost interest or > opportunity cost on those funds would need to be paid for by its > clients as well. And don't forget normal running costs such as > networking and electricity. > > On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" > wrote: > > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit > involved. > > That's a chuckle. > > As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it > does, Bob can expect to pay for it. > > We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether > the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on > the amount of time it stays there. > > I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of > fees. Can you guess it? > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --------------060207020406040308000002 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The costs of operating a hub are as follows:

Time value of the funds the Hub has locked up in payment channels.
Enhanced risk of loss of control of private keys (the keys necessarily need to be on an internet connected system).
Operating costs (I expect this will be minimal).

The hub can charge a fee for it's services to recoup these costs.

On 08/09/2015 02:45 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub always sums to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment hub to anyone.

Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other tricks to pay for the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin fees do not play a part in the payment channel balances.

So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to the clients of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds in a payment channel (time value of money). The lost interest or opportunity cost on those funds would need to be paid for by its clients as well. And don't forget normal running costs such as networking and electricity.

On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle. 

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees.  Can you guess it?


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




_______________________________________________
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bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--------------060207020406040308000002-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BCC7E8A7 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:04:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f47.google.com (mail-la0-f47.google.com [209.85.215.47]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7AB8016F for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:04:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lalv9 with SMTP id v9so2223068lal.0 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:04:10 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=ts/ULI81nUOLuMLDQ5BsLkoPsFdyta1zESdJmWRdbEc=; b=fROQ7ET5xwKGGsTp4voOyvecRM/zzeUvCtC4+5CDRRQKIxQNRYNC16tsLrGCXOpYwC wo2APU10SzxMIv1Faw81T8kQGb5dXuBbTvtVEOSNBCBU2lZQwO9qzM3M9oXKXHsBqf/u bnsoyejzRSMAre5I8soRBUrx75BDioapF4DdlADAebf+3geXrikoQ5zSX+moL1EM6G9O zDZ1qP1L6cn8Dd4yZWbtYBYoxSoUvjq3+v44KYGOSrMIuLnvboJyQbY1xRuMkVjPb/9v oTMNb2gRl4L49yDpLMjjJYbOX7yoqyTQkdaBhMybq2yD6Xpo63N4nPxQFvYCK/BYjn1d w4sw== X-Received: by 10.112.129.104 with SMTP id nv8mr3367949lbb.63.1439157849980; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:04:09 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 15:03:50 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <55C7CCE5.10208@gmail.com> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CCE5.10208@gmail.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 23:03:50 +0100 Message-ID: To: Patrick Strateman Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3a8bee6c87b3051ce80cbb X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:04:13 -0000 --047d7b3a8bee6c87b3051ce80cbb Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Ok good. We have established it to be a non-trivial cost. Now, what is the growth complexity of the total cost of the network in terms of number of connections each hub has to other hubs? And then, consider a payment channel with many hops in it. The end-to-end users would have to swallow all the costs of the hubs in the channel. On 9 August 2015 at 22:57, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > The costs of operating a hub are as follows: > > Time value of the funds the Hub has locked up in payment channels. > Enhanced risk of loss of control of private keys (the keys necessarily > need to be on an internet connected system). > Operating costs (I expect this will be minimal). > > The hub can charge a fee for it's services to recoup these costs. > > > On 08/09/2015 02:45 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment hub > is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the person > making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub always sums > to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment hub to anyone. > > Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other tricks to pay for the > Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin fees do not play a > part in the payment channel balances. > > So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a payment > hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to settle its Bitcoin > transactions would be passed on as a cost to the clients of the payment > hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds in a payment channel (time > value of money). The lost interest or opportunity cost on those funds would > need to be paid for by its clients as well. And don't forget normal running > costs such as networking and electricity. > > On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: >> >> > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of >> the channel. There is no credit involved. >> >> That's a chuckle. >> >> As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, >> Bob can expect to pay for it. >> >> We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee >> depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of >> time it stays there. >> >> I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees. >> Can you guess it? >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing listbitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.orghttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --047d7b3a8bee6c87b3051ce80cbb Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Ok good. We have established it to be a non-trivial cost.<= div>Now, what is the growth complexity of the total cost of the network in = terms of number of connections each hub has to other hubs? And then, consid= er a payment channel with many hops in it. The end-to-end users would have = to swallow all the costs of the hubs in the channel.

On 9 August 2015 at 22:57, = Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.l= inuxfoundation.org> wrote:
=20 =20 =20
The costs of operating a hub are as follows:

Time value of the funds the Hub has locked up in payment channels.
Enhanced risk of loss of control of private keys (the keys necessarily need to be on an internet connected system).
Operating costs (I expect this will be minimal).

The hub can charge a fee for it's services to recoup these costs.


On 08/09/2015 02:45 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub always sums to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment hub to anyone.

Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other trick= s to pay for the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin fees do not play a part in the payment channel balances.

So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to the clients of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds in a payment channel (time value of money). The lost interest or opportunity cost on those funds would need to be paid for by its clients as well. And don't forget normal running costs such as networking and electricity.

On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoun= dation.org> wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbac= h" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle.=C2=A0

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is= a name for these kinds of fees.=C2=A0 Can you guess it?


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundat= ion.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoi=
n-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--047d7b3a8bee6c87b3051ce80cbb-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C7B4C8D7 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:06:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f170.google.com (mail-pd0-f170.google.com [209.85.192.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3ACD916F for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:06:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdbfa8 with SMTP id fa8so23985310pdb.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:06:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:disposition-notification-to:date:from:user-agent :mime-version:to:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type; bh=t4oHeCSR8wYD0B8KwkM+UogH/NdRnV6NHLsr0t/gzIg=; b=mC9wtKo0o8WzugN3JRq1ZeFkLeWbSjld/aYgU52FcDbpPiVOj+GN3AvVdbf/+0L0v+ oieioufmtlEruikyPnOoQ+NMkG8r7JDC5NSAoSbL6emUPCYlMKcCjQVBAjAtqpJyHljc 8wOQnIUASo9GeC0A0yrneB8Z+hZb8A8390I3JOCgBVxSWUWCB2Tj6jCxzZPPz924w/Un bkv1mUw7QmRPwXjGB4mw1dggIXkO+jO1RG/Hr2KheTq5ZSP1UpovteZ7PEuCl4o58pzi 7W5RGwQ5pxLuTl7bsX5VAEqUongEAcPGIiWhjIEFpnYpHKbgAufgg2EntCQGCibADkQD P9ig== X-Received: by 10.70.55.229 with SMTP id v5mr37823508pdp.136.1439157963995; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:06:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.45.134.100] (c-67-188-9-126.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.9.126]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id q1sm17607059pap.20.2015.08.09.15.06.03 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:06:03 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:06:03 -0700 From: Patrick Strateman User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------090309080505070909050109" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:06:05 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------090309080505070909050109 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms. The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels. The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channels open with other hubs/users. If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees. A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to other hubs/merchants is useless. On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" > wrote: > > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation > of the channel. There is no credit involved. > > That's a chuckle.=20 > > As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it > does, Bob can expect to pay for it. > > We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the > fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the > amount of time it stays there. > > I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of > fees. Can you guess it? > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --------------090309080505070909050109 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms.

The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels.

The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channels open with other hubs/users.

If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees.

A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to other hubs/merchants is useless.

On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle. 

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees.  Can you guess it?



_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--------------090309080505070909050109-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3031E8B4 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:10:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f48.google.com (mail-la0-f48.google.com [209.85.215.48]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5660616F for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:10:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lahi9 with SMTP id i9so14564903lah.2 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:09:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=PJ02+NAeUBbCP/P8Lhiy3B6tebMyDUQ7R+OKHiJAlho=; b=FLLdnEcK5HCH87uDky7zIxFGKdgBj/98A4ENIOZt+FW/AkSbHh3Yh0TYpay4AUbUK0 OAprCDSHAFLJ/Qii64XpJNhcIaLxocvVOpRyWZvK1nUH30hT0yXOiBejy7jshTByUyJi 8EoDMqVjgiBkQeY66JX3HGzZ5b7iFebKGQEwm2C6gTovLDBwC0ZI3HyYNkkkyB6ZnZOt EUBHzdxYkz1gD9AS9WDwPfN3R2nM5Ez1L0WQlQnsFJw9Jf15ki54AhGg/yJs5Vf4VP// siUIKsXAZP62++g5Iw8/BGa1lTl9shrwRNTBveZh12rze+5j0vi2UBuMA+6s4oEhMYKF jsHA== X-Received: by 10.152.8.130 with SMTP id r2mr17629725laa.17.1439158198896; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:09:58 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 15:09:39 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 23:09:39 +0100 Message-ID: To: Patrick Strateman Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0158b8e4389035051ce8219c X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:10:01 -0000 --089e0158b8e4389035051ce8219c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Right, you've stated a bunch of facts, but how does it answer my concerns of the exploding cost of the network the more interconnected it it? On 9 August 2015 at 23:06, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms. > > The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels. > > The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channels open > with other hubs/users. > > If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users > have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees. > > A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to other > hubs/merchants is useless. > > > On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: > > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of > the channel. There is no credit involved. > > That's a chuckle. > > As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, > Bob can expect to pay for it. > > We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee > depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of > time it stays there. > > I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees. > Can you guess it? > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing listbitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.orghttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --089e0158b8e4389035051ce8219c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Right, you've stated a bunch of facts, but how does it= answer my concerns of the exploding cost of the network the more interconn= ected it it?

On 9 August 2015 at 23:06, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
=20 =20 =20
I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms.

The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels.

The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channel= s open with other hubs/users.

If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees.

A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels = to other hubs/merchants is useless.


On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" = <mark@friedenb= ach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle.=C2=A0

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a nam= e for these kinds of fees.=C2=A0 Can you guess it?



___________________________________=
____________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoi=
n-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--089e0158b8e4389035051ce8219c-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 24A1A8D9 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:27:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f179.google.com (mail-pd0-f179.google.com [209.85.192.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8777E18C for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:27:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdbfa8 with SMTP id fa8so24086661pdb.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:27:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:disposition-notification-to:date:from:user-agent :mime-version:to:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type; bh=k4OuaCfX62GihR8rQ1hQR115qiAnv3qh20ic2Tsk6R4=; b=ZyB1kq+CoEL895oEQIZSpnuAjD1wZ2iehcnWWkxRwVUHx8sfDR334wVqSx4bHoBa2Z 23pVRieldHQu6mCAduIj7wOOB+6EH1DjISr78HkpMXzHWPoL16sQytoXs9zt87y4uMHi JXHbLyi1vuDtX2UdXdIJUzrHDmEQic32KIESWKSy5D4KEPFtKoawQ9pZBfHR9P5NQzHP xRIcV1XUTZvuCxoH8UQ123/qu9fhsJbKdUn5L4yJoK370pHJOOTbZEAH8X0ZzPvdofm1 9RRupZ79iVJ37xVH8f0qQ9LUG/eOxt1NEQ80GtA4cPoUufZaZKb39Vl4mOj0qV+iq3vB VQIw== X-Received: by 10.70.47.232 with SMTP id g8mr13874757pdn.67.1439159221294; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:27:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.45.134.100] (c-67-188-9-126.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.9.126]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id kx11sm7694616pab.13.2015.08.09.15.27.00 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:27:00 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55C7D3B4.90004@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:27:00 -0700 From: Patrick Strateman User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bitcoin Dev References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------060801070505080704000103" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:27:02 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------060801070505080704000103 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit That was not in reply to you. On 08/09/2015 03:09 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > Right, you've stated a bunch of facts, but how does it answer my > concerns of the exploding cost of the network the more interconnected > it it? > > On 9 August 2015 at 23:06, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms. > > The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels. > > The hub's entire business is centered around having payment > channels open with other hubs/users. > > If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the > users have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees. > > A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to > other hubs/merchants is useless. > > > On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> >> On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" > > wrote: >> >> > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the >> creation of the channel. There is no credit involved. >> >> That's a chuckle. >> >> As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if >> it does, Bob can expect to pay for it. >> >> We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether >> the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends >> on the amount of time it stays there. >> >> I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of >> fees. Can you guess it? >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --------------060801070505080704000103 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit That was not in reply to you.

On 08/09/2015 03:09 PM, Hector Chu wrote:
Right, you've stated a bunch of facts, but how does it answer my concerns of the exploding cost of the network the more interconnected it it?

On 9 August 2015 at 23:06, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms.

The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels.

The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channels open with other hubs/users.

If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees.

A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to other hubs/merchants is useless.


On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle. 

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees.  Can you guess it?



_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev



--------------060801070505080704000103-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0EB178D9 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:30:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f46.google.com (mail-la0-f46.google.com [209.85.215.46]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 104AF1A2 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:30:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lalv9 with SMTP id v9so2341171lal.0 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:30:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=Q75+ieYLgoDNIdMoDFPAQbO8dnHElSEohqQSS5H8BBw=; b=NgJ9wahN6iE2JkK+/79k8UkMe1FfxaFWvF7kYxTNLfEk/w+OYkAS3ObAIuKR6gOvF4 R30Li/lTTDfV8VW7Q07PSbbJ//XkgfybObMo5Fd/9midT8bnTHPsS6IfmjHNnxFTg29t 29IFtV3e6rT04FJghhU+qMuBgWi7xLo7u4HZt3Lb3nk8UDnGEsUbMdCna0IAoa+SxpT6 892V9zR8K7kevl5PkEYbJ06/xWn4MP/ET2ZHXNhDEvxG+EtAGijEHWgaAhdOa9C6BPUP THFHDg2kQ6hj0kHCtOmcOiBeERkP0BhEfxQi7cz+SbncefOLgaAW/dYkFqZkIkzsihsi U01g== X-Received: by 10.152.36.226 with SMTP id t2mr17661433laj.6.1439159429131; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:30:29 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 15:30:08 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <55C7D3B4.90004@gmail.com> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> <55C7D3B4.90004@gmail.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 23:30:08 +0100 Message-ID: To: Patrick Strateman Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0158b5e68c73a3051ce86a6a X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:30:32 -0000 --089e0158b5e68c73a3051ce86a6a Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sorry about that Patrick. Gmail hides previous messages including sender names. Regardless, no worries. On 9 August 2015 at 23:27, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > That was not in reply to you. > > > On 08/09/2015 03:09 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > > Right, you've stated a bunch of facts, but how does it answer my concerns > of the exploding cost of the network the more interconnected it it? > > On 9 August 2015 at 23:06, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms. >> >> The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels. >> >> The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channels open >> with other hubs/users. >> >> If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users >> have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees. >> >> A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to other >> hubs/merchants is useless. >> >> >> On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> >> On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" wrote: >> >> > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of >> the channel. There is no credit involved. >> >> That's a chuckle. >> >> As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, >> Bob can expect to pay for it. >> >> We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee >> depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of >> time it stays there. >> >> I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees. >> Can you guess it? >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing listbitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.orghttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --089e0158b5e68c73a3051ce86a6a Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sorry about that Patrick. Gmail hides previous messages in= cluding sender names. Regardless, no worries.

On 9 August 2015 at 23:27, Patrick Strate= man via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation= .org> wrote:
=20 =20 =20
That was not in reply to you.


On 08/09/2015 03:09 PM, Hector Chu wrote:
Right, you've stated a bunch of facts, but how d= oes it answer my concerns of the exploding cost of the network the more interconnected it it?

On 9 August 2015 at 23:06, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists= .linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I suspect there is some amount of confusion here on terms.

The hub is essentially swapping funds between payment channels.

The hub's entire business is centered around having payment channels open with other hubs/users.

If the hub requires user funds to open these channels... then the users have no reason to pay the hub anything in fees.

A hub that doesn't use it's own funds to open payment channels to other hubs/merchants is useless.


On 08/09/2015 02:27 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle.=C2=A0

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee = for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." = There is a name for these kinds of fees.=C2=A0 Can you guess i= t?



_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoi=
n-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundat= ion.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
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https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


--089e0158b5e68c73a3051ce86a6a-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 685128E6 for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:36:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f179.google.com (mail-pd0-f179.google.com [209.85.192.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8FFDA14B for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:36:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdrh1 with SMTP id h1so46143868pdr.0 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:36:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:disposition-notification-to:date:from:user-agent :mime-version:to:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type; bh=guTdthlDqJl3fzJ/+wSJ8PddavPtDuJILiaZUKvylvY=; b=OGJhxJB/eWylZ8JF75FDM7zfMMOMAY7t6h6Xu0/bE2TYFuROlHcbsgZKH6TdYV0b3+ /idB3L5h3DPDB4/Gh76UdiO8i3gGSl90TBwt53F2lK1Uxlf9DV/MEUIwhVDQTOrWdKyr g7hRWE6qEBeJZiZIz4fSZlS+FLHhzhB14NwBz7pY36sBXZDYw/soNilOgViPv2RQyrz8 Z4uhKRlxlVThmFVzc4fptgjixeKSFfyRq6NLTGzHwlmH3yPR6Vw0NgElZ3LJty47JuEH knepDBnrkU6Bjca1ys3R3CEVdDhKH3B/ELlkTgiYJyFr7bjrifUSAG6QggiLPmdi3uF4 Or5A== X-Received: by 10.70.134.134 with SMTP id pk6mr27937332pdb.143.1439159789291; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:36:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.45.134.100] (c-67-188-9-126.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.9.126]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id v9sm17535990pdr.96.2015.08.09.15.36.28 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:36:28 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55C7D5EC.3000204@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:36:28 -0700 From: Patrick Strateman User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bitcoin Dev References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CCE5.10208@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------040803070508020405080607" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:36:30 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------040803070508020405080607 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On the contrary those costs are clearly very low. Both the time value of money and operating expenses will be trivial with even a small volume of transactions. The true cost of operating a hub is clearly in the enhanced risk of loss.= It's clear that risk of loss will be moderated by market forces. The hubs which are better at securing their systems will reduce their risk of loss and obtain a competitive advantage. It's also important to note that the risk of loss is the same whether the hub is doing 1 transaction/second or 1 million transactions/second. At 1 transaction/second the cost (but not necessarily the fees) is going to be quite high. At 1 million transactions/second the cost is going to be very very low. On 08/09/2015 03:03 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > Ok good. We have established it to be a non-trivial cost. > Now, what is the growth complexity of the total cost of the network in > terms of number of connections each hub has to other hubs? And then, > consider a payment channel with many hops in it. The end-to-end users > would have to swallow all the costs of the hubs in the channel. > > On 9 August 2015 at 22:57, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > The costs of operating a hub are as follows: > > Time value of the funds the Hub has locked up in payment channels. > Enhanced risk of loss of control of private keys (the keys > necessarily need to be on an internet connected system). > Operating costs (I expect this will be minimal). > > The hub can charge a fee for it's services to recoup these costs. > > > On 08/09/2015 02:45 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a >> payment hub is simultaneously credited from either another >> payment hub or the person making the payment, so that the net >> funds flow at a payment hub always sums to zero. So no, there is >> no credit advanced by the payment hub to anyone. >> >> Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other tricks to >> pay for the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin >> fees do not play a part in the payment channel balances. >> >> So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a >> payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to >> settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to >> the clients of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking >> up funds in a payment channel (time value of money). The lost >> interest or opportunity cost on those funds would need to be paid >> for by its clients as well. And don't forget normal running costs >> such as networking and electricity. >> >> On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev >> > > wrote: >> >> On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" >> > wrote: >> >> > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the cr= eation of the channel. >> There is no credit involved. >> >> That's a chuckle.=20 >> >> As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and >> if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it. >> >> We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, >> whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether >> it depends on the amount of time it stays there. >> >> I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds >> of fees. Can you guess it? >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev= >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --------------040803070508020405080607 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On the contrary those costs are clearly very low.

Both the time value of money and operating expenses will be trivial with even a small volume of transactions.

The true cost of operating a hub is clearly in the enhanced risk of loss.

It's clear that risk of loss will be moderated by market forces.

The hubs which are better at securing their systems will reduce their risk of loss and obtain a competitive advantage.

It's also important to note that the risk of loss is the same whether the hub is doing 1 transaction/second or 1 million transactions/second.

At 1 transaction/second the cost (but not necessarily the fees) is going to be quite high.

At 1 million transactions/second the cost is going to be very very low.

On 08/09/2015 03:03 PM, Hector Chu wrote:
Ok good. We have established it to be a non-trivial cost.
Now, what is the growth complexity of the total cost of the network in terms of number of connections each hub has to other hubs? And then, consider a payment channel with many hops in it. The end-to-end users would have to swallow all the costs of the hubs in the channel.

On 9 August 2015 at 22:57, Patrick Strateman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
The costs of operating a hub are as follows:

Time value of the funds the Hub has locked up in payment channels.
Enhanced risk of loss of control of private keys (the keys necessarily need to be on an internet connected system).
Operating costs (I expect this will be minimal).

The hub can charge a fee for it's services to recoup these costs.


On 08/09/2015 02:45 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub always sums to zero. So no, there is no credit advanced by the payment hub to anyone.

Given Mark's previous answer of using CPFP and other tricks to pay for the Bitcoin transaction fees, we can assume that Bitcoin fees do not play a part in the payment channel balances.

So, the interesting question is what are the costs of running a payment hub? The tx fees that a payment hub would have to pay to settle its Bitcoin transactions would be passed on as a cost to the clients of the payment hub. Also there is a cost to locking up funds in a payment channel (time value of money). The lost interest or opportunity cost on those funds would need to be paid for by its clients as well. And don't forget normal running costs such as networking and electricity.

On 9 August 2015 at 22:27, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On Aug 9, 2015 11:54 AM, "Mark Friedenbach" <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:

> On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation of the channel. There is no credit involved.

That's a chuckle. 

As I said, nothing requires the hub to advance anything, and if it does, Bob can expect to pay for it.

We'll see whether hubs assess a fee for depositing funds, whether the fee depends on the amount deposited, and whether it depends on the amount of time it stays there.

I predict "all of the above." There is a name for these kinds of fees.  Can you guess it?


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
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https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev



--------------040803070508020405080607-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 15F648DD for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:44:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f46.google.com (mail-la0-f46.google.com [209.85.215.46]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7B27514B for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:44:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labd1 with SMTP id d1so31464442lab.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:44:08 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=koYXJRJsFh39NvXKA5ntqAV/i7JrsZ0ywjwSNlov+2w=; b=mI3F18jqc7DeyDBdudAGs+zKMgryaoK8orXQz/K4s1ywumBsfoiPZ0rYRAycVwGrAF dtEXiV/xc+92I3XfFZOY6A12tOvYQXG6vEXEFQgTNr4OseZ+ItxKzvjig/3rAkZBHsem 4SVq+itXXQn4VyqJl6FivSvl77VZy67TRMISqWBNIHQkCZODcxj/qehFUJREArLd9C0A ekgtg249ke7RS44Qbw6Lgrd+8dsn05ZQkhxN6ALROmQDdZuy0OC6qaDY0P7jpOczanGd DnZTEPyje0sxmfMS7zhtN9+2QvVyCniCK8f+XAOfpjc9JvQxEQEMDCbZvHzG1FacRPS4 T3Pw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.147.201 with SMTP id tm9mr17665380lbb.40.1439160248629; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:44:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.25.62.14 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 15:44:08 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 18:44:08 -0400 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: Hector Chu Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b34391a6501be051ce89b13 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:44:11 -0000 --047d7b34391a6501be051ce89b13 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 While we're on the subject of payment hubs / lightning network... I'd love to see somebody write up a higher-level description of what the user experience is like, what communication happens underneath, and what new pieces of infrastructure need to get built to make it all work. A use-case to start with: A customer starts with eleven on-chain bitcoin. They want to pay for a nice cup of tea. Walk me through what happens before/during/after the transaction, assuming I have a lightning-enabled wallet on my iPhone and the tea shop has a lightning-enabled cash register. Assume neither the customer nor the tea shop are technically sophisticated -- assume the customer is using an SPV wallet and the tea shop is using a service similar to Bitpay. -- -- Gavin Andresen --047d7b34391a6501be051ce89b13 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
While we're on the subject of payment hubs / lightning= network...

I'd love to see somebody write up a high= er-level description of what the user experience is like, what communicatio= n happens underneath, and what new pieces of infrastructure need to get bui= lt to make it all work.

A use-case to start with:<= /div>

A customer starts with eleven on-chain bitcoin. Th= ey want to pay for a nice cup of tea. Walk me through what happens before/d= uring/after the transaction, assuming I have a =C2=A0lightning-enabled wall= et on my iPhone and the tea shop has a lightning-enabled cash register.

Assume neither the custome= r nor the tea shop are technically sophisticated -- assume the customer is = using an SPV wallet and the tea shop is using a service similar to Bitpay.<= /div>

--
--
Gavin Andre= sen

--047d7b34391a6501be051ce89b13-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 97DFC8DD for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:52:10 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yk0-f175.google.com (mail-yk0-f175.google.com [209.85.160.175]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1A15114B for ; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 22:52:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykdz80 with SMTP id z80so15132907ykd.2 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:52:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=DZRhY6AvQktn6MN5jg97GpFV3WXL2DyBxIUnKg4418Y=; b=eDE0fG5lILc4zvcAFOZOs3Xtr2ue6/uyf1H1xJElNaqfhJWVigvEAY9AYizCK24A/U AyTMlp/GkaO1UqHA2dXUEY/92SVdAORuaaFK5eewxxeIPkhr/epIUOVyVEa5+cif3qfW UZyJvCp3CFvj1St25WAw9RzWRvqN0kIc6bgXlbrXWsN/nnrl0MSzZcJbTaEX0sdRdwEG 1E5gqqblMa/LsCm7XJEdW+H2Zws0MKX9ryNyT8yg04xIBi9j23bCmf0xnjHuj2F3Omyj S1X760b1jTL3wnUzDZQVKRlZQUuG7pud4WbgrVFlXyA7nwx/0XVHzQWHCY6kOk/qV80H Yebw== X-Received: by 10.13.247.3 with SMTP id h3mr19002038ywf.142.1439160729408; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 15:52:09 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.37.94.132 with HTTP; Sun, 9 Aug 2015 15:51:50 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> From: Btc Drak Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 23:51:50 +0100 Message-ID: To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c0802a00d1b7a051ce8b884 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HK_RANDOM_ENVFROM, HK_RANDOM_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 22:52:10 -0000 --94eb2c0802a00d1b7a051ce8b884 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I thought it's worth mentioning there is a specific Lightning Network development mailing list at http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev and already some pretty interesting explanations in the archives. --94eb2c0802a00d1b7a051ce8b884 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I thought it's worth mentioning there is a specific Li= ghtning Network development mailing list at http://lists.linuxfoundation.o= rg/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev and already some pretty interesting e= xplanations in the archives.
--94eb2c0802a00d1b7a051ce8b884-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8C58D847 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:52:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f175.google.com (mail-pd0-f175.google.com [209.85.192.175]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BD23176 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:52:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdrh1 with SMTP id h1so47422807pdr.0 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 18:52:21 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:references:from:to:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=zXLFiRMiRbmkzMBSlfNwzaGPGJL20rCBfiW8B5WV4qw=; b=V7EAvLoFz/55k6sWDqsrfYobHSrV3/ot28GIjvQtxilMwO3fh8fO3LnyQrTqVZ9YlJ 1x+zr5tq4jHi7OQec3qBqrkvllR0rSjujzJZlsgkZWeQ5IwfFPdR+LbFbqo7Ga42wjoB anNfHIvhnMu+AVBBCgct7vWuHEYNsSJz0JNKbRiB1/VZZYl1qiZ4pVTELvVmiCMo7AAG 2d1uKf1Nbf2IePWblj0FkuQHXFYWn7YTOKIa02LhGlrHlTyX1frWwGGapiKrE1vMc2GY BfdAoz+oA8LIejUObWICFbNXw+TMH6d19lqw3tUEuc4scXRKb/SkcP+zWx/0C/bWPdFt Hy6g== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlYU5o9UthNVWWa/o7OsMR1Uzsqb4/K9Uwp1qPcugmxbBX5fBER8usnmfk3XoX2uzJzxSxk X-Received: by 10.70.47.3 with SMTP id z3mr9954578pdm.120.1439171540908; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 18:52:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.89] (99-8-65-117.lightspeed.davlca.sbcglobal.net. [99.8.65.117]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id le8sm17774683pbc.24.2015.08.09.18.52.19 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 18:52:19 -0700 (PDT) References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> From: Tom Harding X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 To: Bitcoin Dev Message-ID: <55C803D6.7070706@thinlink.com> Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 18:52:22 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:52:21 -0000 On 8/9/2015 2:45 PM, Hector Chu wrote: > Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment > hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the > person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub > always sums to zero. That describes the steady-state dynamics. I refer to the hub funding required to initiate and maintain the ability to receive payments. If Bob opens a channel at his hub, doesn't use it for spending, and Alice sends 1 BTC to the channel, her payment can only be applied if the hub has funded the channel with at least 1 BTC. Yes, the hub receives an offsetting payment (from Alice, ultimately) in another channel. But to make this work, it must subject 1 BTC to shared control with Bob and forfeit the use of that money for other purposes (opportunity cost) while the channel is open. The opportunity cost is likened to gold lease rates in the LN paper. I would be surprised if the rates charged to consumers for BTC credit aren't much closer to today's BTC borrowing rates. We'll see. Burying this cost in general fees might not work very well, because different Bobs may want different maximum payment amounts, and channels open for different lengths of time. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80C97884 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 03:31:58 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f53.google.com (mail-pa0-f53.google.com [209.85.220.53]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2F12D1B0 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 03:31:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pawu10 with SMTP id u10so130101998paw.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 20:31:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:disposition-notification-to:date:from:user-agent :mime-version:to:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=RgS4ZXq3t8bgo2M3Q8n492eEwI4NyQsuvoKgKeNhPj8=; b=vtwvTlhFe6z5NOUq2GrnYUNCKgfMHC7ks9vFAIxjUJWgv+KYPUSTTzdzxhmk+nMaRe 2vRsLQA55jErFYmb14mQcTrUo+EiYmD0dFL0BXkHi37yTvS3XLE2JAiazhU5c3RcfBI1 G6vU8durGl6sDGTEQt8092lVohvoiErOqW3DKn4r5S306WlU6dyJjnECOEmyuv3SmPyF sE/68MHvm2e5UJvlBlHmvz135Rmc7BBWvG3U0k7z5RjyCxsMSChB0BkvRq7gjBHGAsKR 12FuGIXFFQbRmAMwbGtLSH04xXVNB/LwdzKEGsNkxcjF/YAZlrQR3Bv6jsJQWd/szuWQ //7A== X-Received: by 10.68.105.163 with SMTP id gn3mr18682850pbb.86.1439177517826; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 20:31:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.45.134.100] (c-67-188-9-126.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.9.126]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id qf6sm5045018pbb.64.2015.08.09.20.31.57 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 20:31:57 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55C81B2C.2010100@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2015 20:31:56 -0700 From: Patrick Strateman User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C803D6.7070706@thinlink.com> In-Reply-To: <55C803D6.7070706@thinlink.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 03:31:58 -0000 > I would be surprised if the rates charged to consumers for BTC credit aren't much closer to today's BTC borrowing rates. The borrowing rates you're talking about involve the risk of default. In lightning the hubs funds are not at risk so long as they maintain control of the private keys. The rates charged by hubs will almost certainly be orders of magnitude below the rates charged on the various p2p lending sites.... But that seems fairly obvious... did I miss something? On 08/09/2015 06:52 PM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On 8/9/2015 2:45 PM, Hector Chu wrote: >> Tom, my understanding is that the money that is debited from a payment >> hub is simultaneously credited from either another payment hub or the >> person making the payment, so that the net funds flow at a payment hub >> always sums to zero. > > That describes the steady-state dynamics. I refer to the hub funding > required to initiate and maintain the ability to receive payments. > > If Bob opens a channel at his hub, doesn't use it for spending, and > Alice sends 1 BTC to the channel, her payment can only be applied if the > hub has funded the channel with at least 1 BTC. > > Yes, the hub receives an offsetting payment (from Alice, ultimately) in > another channel. But to make this work, it must subject 1 BTC to shared > control with Bob and forfeit the use of that money for other purposes > (opportunity cost) while the channel is open. The opportunity cost is > likened to gold lease rates in the LN paper. I would be surprised if > the rates charged to consumers for BTC credit aren't much closer to > today's BTC borrowing rates. We'll see. > > Burying this cost in general fees might not work very well, because > different Bobs may want different maximum payment amounts, and channels > open for different lengths of time. > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 36251826 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:39:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f45.google.com (mail-pa0-f45.google.com [209.85.220.45]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B999E107 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:39:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pacrr5 with SMTP id rr5so94679302pac.3 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:39:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lightning.network; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=6MuSyIWDFTbey2Zd0r9h7nuMj/vlL+nzPaF+mJQ+Hcg=; b=E2/YuYhzkC2nAg3xtZ4KU0Q3tYMqutvs4UcQgv9PmYoXjTa36g7E2/vVbo7TAnl6CR g6VAkDPqYFFwVgPc0Iov0t06qT0i7sTIiY+B5AO+6SMRHsuxHmH2tfkddDGQP+fDOeC/ p1P9DR6QXHhSTQfa7GqbEwb6qgLAUYHHCV380= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=6MuSyIWDFTbey2Zd0r9h7nuMj/vlL+nzPaF+mJQ+Hcg=; b=gYaQ6vFxY5t7Eks6IuW3hRFPWg5PW1jAHVzczu+jAiw4F3za9n0DSwTg87NzJOBr42 UXbUuh1NnDAc88ODqPVYpuj4Iw+RtzHLRgu/onqvemhR3bcH7KwG69cJYFEofA1NYUF0 8Cf4N/AzUM0xzdjEFlWTH72Gs/9MVOFFLS3vp8EdVBxpeFoMvlc46oQsZIo0KRmj1PtM TVCwt7V+qvD2oJgAQYL+2U/13CjD7CTkZglVvMKWqWrF/EfCQwEmXd/uG138Eqn79oE5 tun1tUo5sR6CYRfSI7jRhjVqqRy7fARTpRN6+XmuBe6k9e2vp4cJKkJI9+oxklEI1Vs8 4NLw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmIj/V2Ze4MIboo/Z5VHLWRk/hsfcEyST48wNmas2ul8aC0b3gxwyVmpGJhkcGNV28h8a4l X-Received: by 10.66.66.163 with SMTP id g3mr40991348pat.85.1439181568440; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:39:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([209.141.33.28]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j4sm18153561pdo.62.2015.08.09.21.39.27 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:39:27 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:39:13 -0700 From: Joseph Poon To: Gavin Andresen Message-ID: <20150810043913.GB1758@lightning.network> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:39:29 -0000 Hi Gavin, On Sun, Aug 09, 2015 at 06:44:08PM -0400, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I'd love to see somebody write up a higher-level description of what the > user experience is like, what communication happens underneath, and what > new pieces of infrastructure need to get built to make it all work. I'm writing a (hopefully more accessible) summary on Lightning currently. It might not go into too much detail with infrastructure, but is a bit more UX focused. > A customer starts with eleven on-chain bitcoin. They want to pay for a nice > cup of tea. Walk me through what happens before/during/after the > transaction, assuming I have a lightning-enabled wallet on my iPhone and > the tea shop has a lightning-enabled cash register. > > Assume neither the customer nor the tea shop are technically sophisticated > -- assume the customer is using an SPV wallet and the tea shop is using a > service similar to Bitpay. It's a bit of a tangent, but I see it as necessary that all Lightning services/wallets support on-chain payments for a multitude of reasons, including usability and long-term security/fungibility. For that reason, the UX flow for payment after channels are established should not be significantly different than Payment Protocol based payment flows (with the only exception being a possible additional fee dialog box/alert when the fees will be higher than expected/on-chain). -- Joseph Poon From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EF8808C7 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:48:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f42.google.com (mail-pa0-f42.google.com [209.85.220.42]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9807913B for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:48:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pawu10 with SMTP id u10so131413122paw.1 for ; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:48:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lightning.network; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=QG+XdeaWkPhVg14yzcFUx92vxCVFyWSipuChEKFPfrk=; b=XKJqzY0tSY4zvN1h2EKuyRrWBLDjqbREo5fp975ye9F2h7VhB80sVaKNQjaEJHjDTC X47YtlvBRrPMVflCkWYHHVBsNXEYf3MVy5cxXUHvRvqNAxPsJWyeLf7uWW9pYd/HB2ad vGcsiYxbQ6Ue+ZluXZjcy5GJKXdv5OWgviQ/w= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=QG+XdeaWkPhVg14yzcFUx92vxCVFyWSipuChEKFPfrk=; b=Dzy2dLnFEPMZgxPG5iuBwGLzqHhDdv8rRhSKGa0I7MbhIlncd7gkqtsHDeMi+0/BjA IDjZPKXXRvwVj0XhgMaaCPnWKOba3jmee5lxj77BChsblEtIT6d4zBnO+gKdRBCZ68AX WibLDknd66aXm3OUeAcUDF2HkyV0pf6oAWSG6q1fUfpItluZ8k49jtpP7Sw4pTCCFaE2 rhZrb7kS7phe6DDxL/vjKbqjzzy1z/Jg3RmML0c8Xs2sLdczli6+K6UT1BX0oHqLJOiD IYZqn+UqvWxB62bqYedkphMfTljzLvNQxW2kyi4iTp8oNsUAKzJ0w+p3SL3dZ/8aXCL1 tWPQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnBOzoZIoc0xHM8n0eAztd6Py4PSii1mpmRBKYkekOhmkDRxOCY0sh5HXAd46EjvUAkYf+v X-Received: by 10.68.205.232 with SMTP id lj8mr41264922pbc.116.1439182123329; Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:48:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([209.141.33.28]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id bd5sm18107070pbb.85.2015.08.09.21.48.42 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 09 Aug 2015 21:48:42 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 21:48:28 -0700 From: Joseph Poon To: Hector Chu Message-ID: <20150810044828.GC1758@lightning.network> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:48:44 -0000 Hi Hector, On Sun, Aug 09, 2015 at 09:48:41PM +0100, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Is the Lightning system limited in the number of hops there can be in > the payment channel? I am looking at the initial Lightning slides > presented in February and it looks like the locktime decrements by > 1-day along each hop. So the more hops there are the longer my > bitcoins are potentially locked up for? The hops are limited to the time-value which the sender wishes to pay and the minimum acceptable timeout between each hop. It should be relatively cheap if you game it out, though (I don't forsee me opening a 1 BTC channel and being able to make $5 per month...) 1-day is used as a convenience. However, the time between hops should be somewhat long, as the intermediate steps can be extended further when you want to offload the HTLCs to others who have a channel open with both counterparties. E.g. Alice sends a payment to Dave through Bob and Carol. Bob has a channel with Carol and has an HTLC with it, but that channel seems to be used a lot. Erin has a relationship to both Bob and Carol, she can offload the payment so that the payment actually goes to A->B->E->C->D. B<->C is now completely clear. > > On Aug 9, 2015 1:15 PM, "Hector Chu" wrote: > >> In the Lightning network it is assumed that the balances can always > >> be settled on the blockchain if any of the parties along the > >> channel has a problem. What if the fee on the settlement > >> transactions is not high enough to enter the blockchain? You can't > >> do replace-by-fee after the fact. Do the fees always have to assume > >> worst case scenarios on the Bitcoin fee market? How do you send coins if you wanted to send funds below the current IsStandard value? It should be no different. If your wallet can't send funds below the IsStandard value on-chain today, then I don't think it should be able to to in the future, right? If you send funds *at* the minimum IsStandard value today, you're probably paying really high fees, this is a problem that exists today. -- Joseph Poon From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8CF7E86 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 08:27:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from manxnetsf05.manx.net (outbound.manx.net [213.137.31.12]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B190610D for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 08:27:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from adsl92.39.203.140.manx.net (EHLO coldstorage.localnet) ([92.39.203.140]) by manxnetsf05.manx.net (MOS 4.4.5a-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id EGC07398; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 09:27:50 +0100 (BST) From: Thomas Zander To: Bitcoin Dev Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:27:49 +0200 Message-ID: <4010040.Hquya5FF38@coldstorage> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.1 (Linux/3.16.0-4-amd64; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Mirapoint-Received-SPF: 92.39.203.140 coldstorage.localnet thomas@thomaszander.se 5 none X-Junkmail-Status: score=10/50, host=manxnetsf05.manx.net X-Junkmail-Signature-Raw: score=unknown, refid=str=0001.0A0B0203.55C86086.0112, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32, mode=multiengine X-Junkmail-IWF: false X-Mirapoint-Virus-RAPID-Raw: score=unknown(0), refid=str=0001.0A0B0203.55C86086.0112, ss=1, re=0.000, recu=0.000, reip=0.000, cl=1, cld=1, fgs=0, ip=0.0.0.0, so=2014-07-29 09:23:55, dmn=2013-03-21 17:37:32 X-Mirapoint-Loop-Id: e19130f03700fcf20ca2c09712716a88 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 08:27:53 -0000 On Sunday 9. August 2015 23.51.50 Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I thought it's worth mentioning there is a specific Lightning Network > development mailing list at > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev and already > some pretty interesting explanations in the archives. While that is interesting, and I'll surely check it out, I think this list should get a good idea of what the limitations are. Where does it NOT make sense to use LN, where would it be better to put the transaction directly on the blockchain? This is what I'd like to know. Gavins usecase is useful, I'm also wondering about remittances and allowing international payments and global economy (company in Nairobi buys stock from company in Spain). -- Thomas Zander From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E9EC7F for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 08:36:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f47.google.com (mail-pa0-f47.google.com [209.85.220.47]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3279B7D for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 08:36:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pawu10 with SMTP id u10so135620498paw.1 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:36:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:disposition-notification-to:date:from:user-agent :mime-version:to:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=lxkoswAT7UKC4H4ObSRv1q40Zb4dF3FBdK3ky1B/NSM=; b=sRp7SkLTJ8r4X+GG3UFyXpSF5/hvncmw3SfaBMNjGrL1Inbe/D+838Ktd9rfkehlAs 0JlzKoaArQQXQS7Z0g7KXyvXwP6bJHA6hLbS6B0P3IyAoiJRQMKpK4OOM1PBTtMuPiSN GF+tYvG73GUahsvscIeCg5g2SvZcRCsbLdmajLE15VX5deFcPkUBwbwHYykh+MfgPYa3 iTw9keqOrN0ktRAvjPgMdnE0cCq4Vik1T1DOCaGk3uHQcBGt7aTBvehSEYSOjZZfqKAq yoV1J9e3xPK2gcS+ihYXZl1wzDkKiNwXRb9lvnGgcyJzr9RzP4f09LtTR5NSbjOiAEUT UvcA== X-Received: by 10.68.231.5 with SMTP id tc5mr22662587pbc.54.1439195810917; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:36:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.45.134.110] (c-67-188-9-126.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.9.126]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id z8sm11158822pas.42.2015.08.10.01.36.50 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:36:50 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55C862A1.8030007@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 01:36:49 -0700 From: Patrick Strateman User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org References: <4010040.Hquya5FF38@coldstorage> In-Reply-To: <4010040.Hquya5FF38@coldstorage> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 08:36:52 -0000 If a path cannot be built to the recipient through the lightning network then a standard transaction should be used. On 08/10/2015 01:27 AM, Thomas Zander via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Sunday 9. August 2015 23.51.50 Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> I thought it's worth mentioning there is a specific Lightning Network >> development mailing list at >> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev and already >> some pretty interesting explanations in the archives. > While that is interesting, and I'll surely check it out, I think this list > should get a good idea of what the limitations are. > > Where does it NOT make sense to use LN, where would it be better to put the > transaction directly on the blockchain? > > This is what I'd like to know. > > Gavins usecase is useful, I'm also wondering about remittances and allowing > international payments and global economy (company in Nairobi buys stock from > company in Spain). From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94D3D67 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:03:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D93B41AB for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:03:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from cotinga.riseup.net (unknown [10.0.1.161]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK)) by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55205C2097; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:03:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak; t=1439226210; bh=cHv+y+n/epFKoxNIoGHPX1Ez3iXLxf0UXTk2mC5O7Kw=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Kwhzg3x9hiNw8TKiUG0mxWLz6Xr307lAU6gM/9OdSk0n7iuIjfKeH2I5ac3BrLoj+ HX+qSBStE2jA/sWFWvdtkwCpKZW7mrcnv7A+ivtSOJMFziNOMHezHsZrXs6j/v4z1b vqHX4KOuz1DQWwIP2uYlonFmKysnD3fHUm3p7Lfc= Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (Authenticated sender: odinn.cyberguerrilla) with ESMTPSA id C0B731C03A9 Message-ID: <55C8D960.607@riseup.net> Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:03:28 -0700 From: odinn User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Hector Chu , Mark Friedenbach References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at mx1.riseup.net X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAD_CREDIT,BAYES_00, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY,URIBL_DBL_ABUSE_REDIR autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:03:31 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello, If I understand this correctly, Lightning only requires transaction malleability to be fixed to be able to work ~ I believe that was going to happen in a release of (bitcoind), but I'm not sure if that is correct on timing ( note also, this wiki seems to be out of date on infos about bitcoind https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bitcoind ) I have also heard it said that bitcoin should support relative locktime opcodes so that long-lived micropayment channels would be able to be created, such that there would be Lightning functionality beyond the basic microhop channels (which would be short-lived in nature at the basic level). This would be nice, but it seems like such discussions would take a while to get done as basic development issues right now aren't even wrapping up (e.g. blocksize debate related stuff.) Note that I've been in favor of going ahead with Cameron Garnham's dynamic softfork proposal right now, which can be seen at http://is.gd/DiFuRr - testing it out, seeing how that works, and at the same time making preparations for moving forward with Garzik's BIP 100 (which could be tailored or refined based on additional data gathered, without being turned into a controversial fork (e.g. needs to make sure to avoid inclusion of XT, for example). Garnham's proposal and Garzik's proposal are not mutually exclusive, imho, and I don't see why the matter can't simply be resolved, it seems to be just an endless pile of argumentation that will go on forever and ever. This needs to, like, stop. Also, it strikes me that unless and until certain changes can be made in bitcoin that would reduce fees and cost to transact, solutions such as Lightning are going to fill the gap whether or not you want them to; users have a choice in the market, and as the billions of unbanked are gradually excluded from straight bitcoin, people will seek other services which offer them lesser fees to transact, or they will seek other coins which offer them lesser cost to transact. It is, after all, an open market. I have made this point before elsewhere albeit with more emphasis (and data to back up my point): ( On Github at Pull Request #6201: http://is.gd/8bW0zq ) In making and successfully defending such points on Github, the following conclusions were drawn: As the cost to transact goes higher and higher based on this observable trend (due to all the factors mentioned in the thread on github), then people who are affected by these rising costs to transact will do one of three things with respect to bitcoin (and virtual currencies generally): 1) Ignore bitcoin (an unlikely possibility, but it is one that would occur), 2) adopt alts which are more inclined to allow people to perform microtransactions, 3) and/or use bitcoin increasingly off-chain, which is likely to come with its own set of problems for the network. Regarding donation or microdonation use cases, To keep it all on-chain, wallets can be designed to accumulate donation micro-amounts according to donation settings of a user (in voluntary donation use cases such as in ABIS -- http://abis.io ) as an internal accounting feature, for example, and when enough donation value is accumulated, it can be sent to the recipient by piggybacking on one of the user's daily transactions. This is one method doing so in a manner which is on-chain; depending on the cryptocurrency under consideration, the feasibility of doing this in a wallet will be greater or lesser. - -O On 08/09/2015 01:14 PM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > In the Lightning network it is assumed that the balances can always > be settled on the blockchain if any of the parties along the > channel has a problem. What if the fee on the settlement > transactions is not high enough to enter the blockchain? You can't > do replace-by-fee after the fact. Do the fees always have to assume > worst case scenarios on the Bitcoin fee market? > > On 9 August 2015 at 19:54, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > Tom, you appear to be misunderstanding how lightning network and > micropayment hub-and-spoke models in general work. > >> But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment hub has > advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). Nothing > requires the payment hub to do this. > > On the contrary the funds were advanced by the hub on the creation > of the channel. There is no credit involved. if the funds aren't > already available for Bob to immediately claim his balance, the > payment doesn't go through in the first place. > > On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Tom Harding via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > On 8/4/2015 4:27 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote: > >> Don't turn Bitcoin into something uninteresting, please. > > Consider how Bob will receive money using the Lightning Network. > > Bob receives a payment by applying a contract to his local payment > channel, increasing the amount payable to him when the channel is > closed. > > There are two possible sources of funding for Bob's increased > claim. They can appear alone, or in combination: > > > Funding Source (1) A deposit from Bob's payment hub > > Bob can receive funds, if his payment hub has made a deposit to > the channel. Another name for this is "credit". > > This credit has no default risk: Bob cannot just take payment > hub's deposit. But neither can Bob receive money, unless payment > hub has advanced it to the channel (or (2) below applies). > Nothing requires the payment hub to do this. > > This is a 3rd-party dependency totally absent with plain old > bitcoin. It will come with a fee and, in an important way, it is > worse than the current banking system. If a bank will not even > open an account for Bob today, why would a payment hub lock up hard > bitcoin to allow Bob to be paid through a Poon-Dryja channel? > > > Funding Source (2) Bob's previous spends > > If Bob has previously spent from the channel, decreasing his claim > on its funds (which he could have deposited himself), that claim > can be re-increased. > > To avoid needing credit (1), Bob has an incentive to consolidate > spending and income in the same payment channel, just as with > today's banks. This is at odds with the idea that Bob will have > accounts with many payment hubs. It is an incentive for > centralization. > > > With Lightning Network, Bob will need a powerful middleman to send > and receive money effectively. *That* is uninteresting to me. > > > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing > list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing > list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing > list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > - -- http://abis.io ~ "a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good" https://keybase.io/odinn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVyNlfAAoJEGxwq/inSG8CTvgH/3b4wyoU+hQtQ7Ewk4n1UK/Q gBezGVfv6v9D8uRU+8gR37gG6TpiG3VS37g47fkAbqTTUzY16qGRXMV8mi0FVz/3 8Hqz7rWZEllYfeYrV9MUoNftrFmjy1PucPgd95BYmWaHoZRxBwhr+YpkZS5lfEqK p1byEdqXW04sc3UBdNlirYNOBJA0wOPgco45G2S3gFBh5XQZ9YCLB+x/IN8rW1mS wQ3FrXRdEKfGMZ83xij1zOVpwi3bPJ5XrUzEV3sdGUdj6jWi0Pa05tRD+0qt7dpZ oPq4p6aLj2z5/mwyiaW6T14CNY1Mp46tMgAv+BOJ/M3HA350isTGxG2X+73KeH0= =xX4u -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B6AF374 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:14:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f172.google.com (mail-io0-f172.google.com [209.85.223.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 37DEC189 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:14:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ioii16 with SMTP id i16so176094047ioi.0 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:14:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=VduOlvkcwzKHrQXQzRbQneLi8CnVQcZRgXLcOiExAKQ=; b=IDqtKgWwdnW3JmAgJh55KpE+hBX2j9gdcj4X2qsL4ZLcelxKP1jNeWeg5GYVuiKVrv 8cq+SKptuNMKualC919Y5jdFNmsPrEF//Ak0gWHwn3pG/As/DFpIECuTAKcEzalRquZ4 CrYqWzS9te+d9FVdviDhhKmd3INDzATGjqARxrd+moisvB/JKSJNGi6v4Bfgiwh2RRvw 953WyzuiK12Nb9EfTuy6Lu+F4jXKSLpF8OzRli+66B+6OV09XxvCDc8RnrxyFHtzD7O+ EXw1jIDZVsLVHJyyQM2lzguUHQ2zCIBZInmHWCxpBAnRZ6hchxVRAgNkJBfe3x6RoJ/J xIWg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.9.137 with SMTP id 9mr22018277ioj.50.1439226867531; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:14:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:14:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.77.201 with HTTP; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:14:26 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <55C8D960.607@riseup.net> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C8D960.607@riseup.net> Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 19:14:26 +0200 Message-ID: From: Pieter Wuille To: Colin Gallagher Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f8f1430c90b051cf81e76 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, URIBL_DBL_ABUSE_REDIR autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:14:28 -0000 --001a113f8f1430c90b051cf81e76 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Aug 10, 2015 7:03 PM, "odinn via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: Note that I've > been in favor of going ahead with Cameron Garnham's dynamic softfork > proposal right now, which can be seen at http://is.gd/DiFuRr No offence, but I think that anyone who claims a block size limit change can be done as a soft fork has some basic reading to do first. Also, please keep this thread about Lightning. -- Pieter --001a113f8f1430c90b051cf81e76 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


On Aug 10, 2015 7:03 PM, "odinn via bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Note that I've
> been in favor of going ahead with Cameron Garnham's dynamic softfork
> proposal right now, which can be seen at http://is.gd/DiFuRr

No offence, but I think that anyone who claims a block size limit change can be done as a soft fork has some basic reading to do first.

Also, please keep this thread about Lightning.

--
Pieter

--001a113f8f1430c90b051cf81e76-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32AF97F for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:45:10 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9610D1DE for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:45:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from piha.riseup.net (unknown [10.0.1.162]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK)) by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 261FEC21C9; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:45:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak; t=1439228709; bh=BrkVtfmdFe9SLHRmxajPmHLD9LaQUv2Gw8YFGuNIRVQ=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=j+nbBvk0EwUGgGSkUIAVXkrLuMH/ndGODRiTfT5oMKaGYwh+YJFhNoUH1z3Lbp+qi A8gDQyM7eU3tedKlV7GuuYSpaWLJR+e4FJF1hkHD2WQseb6+KLUqgbjopGpU0qnTAU 3RLsS52BFsPWSAG6qUW8e5M7sK8AI8CZlb+pnskA= Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (Authenticated sender: odinn.cyberguerrilla) with ESMTPSA id A1F03140994 Message-ID: <55C8E323.6070201@riseup.net> Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 10:45:07 -0700 From: odinn User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Pieter Wuille References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C8D960.607@riseup.net> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at mx1.riseup.net X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY, URIBL_DBL_ABUSE_REDIR autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:45:10 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Replying because. On 08/10/2015 10:14 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > > On Aug 10, 2015 7:03 PM, "odinn via bitcoin-dev" > > wrote: Note that > I've >> been in favor of going ahead with Cameron Garnham's dynamic >> softfork proposal right now, which can be seen at >> http://is.gd/DiFuRr > > No offence, but I think that anyone who claims a block size limit > change can be done as a soft fork has some basic reading to do > first. Technically, my proposal has been thus: "Note that I've been in favor of going ahead with Cameron Garnham's dynamic softfork proposal right now, which can be seen at http://is.gd/DiFuRr - testing it out, seeing how that works, and at the same time making preparations for moving forward with Garzik's BIP 100 (which could be tailored or refined based on additional data gathered, without being turned into a controversial fork" To have quoted it only in part was unfair. > > Also, please keep this thread about Lightning. Agreed. > > -- Pieter > - -- http://abis.io ~ "a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good" https://keybase.io/odinn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVyOMjAAoJEGxwq/inSG8CmAQIAI5XrAIa8VrkFYLtJ8s0CHqj kZrMatH2oVGGaENVChVDU7u4SGnMQdiJF32QY5Olih3ia1rAx9n43tiyPyUp8y0S iLudwFfyvmzSyRdoLnTRbDYkiNUnuy9lppZsL+AtQWCpMLxBIObs1NnzP7je4Qn2 a8lWklMf9mmlCyhyah7kJPdZzECwfpz2ARk68iUUAuqqLcFM2afmzcgLh2PuDRhU 6Hjw7crTXA5AhPSeNNz1az0cq5MTUv46SAr3mbAiMjFwz7tFWSWEGMTaTdQ/Igwe JeMARTJuxY7QL1XHAmKgfHUEi6mmW2LiG0vm6xp8XnRfsUNfDVZ8IsmYky7kDLM= =5Aay -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BAF48267 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 19:28:51 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f169.google.com (mail-wi0-f169.google.com [209.85.212.169]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3C2F91A4 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 19:28:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicja10 with SMTP id ja10so39222189wic.1 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 12:28:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=ciL9I8HnwqwgeHVrJlgmeo03cEMNcdIfbnhPLBnmyKs=; b=GBA1JaAZ4oFCNVoJK3kZlctc+yexu8p8M4Lpjx+Y+wHQW13EOqJAj68R6yaP+21wv2 tM30uMDxBl8PopGJ+QF21Etoezb46rHiRGpWrrBXNmsurlnZPIuIGh11ToL78Fiau5ud aHhO3M4+rHtuoo5IbhNm50dZoq+1K5h7KXyYW9HIbO+FaKzpbSb9/dNvZyLqkNZlrZEX egSvJcI5pOgupOe913erwhLnmoJk3Ps1NCm6iFkcDKAEwm9pJjG3pa5R4xyG1sbEkpUh SD2epJlBGYVeeC2n+Sz3keHRzZamnWcQSJUNWAd34KsvSnF6mVvRYlU+IG3R5XH34mdw WXig== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmqlGU8ip9zZu+RS72zj3F8v2zttjusBLvnYgDIJmPM0f2TTVzbnkXd6jyPdo2SRjOHfWb+ MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.120.198 with SMTP id le6mr47076575wjb.133.1439234928809; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 12:28:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.31.230 with HTTP; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 12:28:48 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:28:48 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Elliot Olds Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 19:28:51 -0000 On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 1:09 AM, Elliot Olds wrote: > On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote= : > I agree with you that decentralization is the most important feature of > Bitcoin, but I also think we need to think probabilistically and concrete= ly > about when risks to decentralization are worthwhile. > > Decentralization is not infinitely valuable in relation to low fees, just > like being alive is not infinitely valuable in relation to having money. > [...] > Similarly we shouldn't accept a 100% probability of Bitcoin being control= led > by a single entity for any guarantee of cheap tx fees no matter how low t= hey > are, but there should be some minuscule risk of decentralization that we'= d > be willing to accept (like raising the block size to 1.01 MB) if it someh= ow > allowed us to dramatically increase usability. (Imagine something like th= e > Lightning Network but even better was developed, but it could only work w= ith > 1.01 MB blocks). Agreed. I would just like that there was an attempt to automatically estimate those risks before taking those risks. Some function we're trying to optimize with simulations (based on #6382 ) to find an ideal (according to that imperfect metric) maximum consensus block size. Maybe the function/simulations just take some minimum hardware specifications and returns an block size, I don't know. > I agree that we don't have good data about what exactly a 4 MB increase > would do. It sounds like you think the risks are too great / uncertain to > move from 1 MB to 4 MB blocks in the situation I described. I'm not clear > though on which specific risks you'd be most worried about at 4 MB, and i= f > there are any risks that you think don't matter at 4 MB but that you woul= d > be worried about at higher block size levels. I also don't know if we hav= e > similar ideas about the benefits of low tx fees. If we discussed exactly = how > we were evaluating this scenario, maybe we'd discover that something I > thought was a huge benefit of low tx fees is actually not that compelling= , > or maybe we'd discover that our entire disagreement boiled down to our > estimate of one specific risk. The most important thing to understand in this discussion is that it is about a trade-off between lower fees (more maximum tx volume) and mining (and general) centralization. I don't know what the costs and gains curves are here (for 4MB, 1 MB or any other number, and I don't think anybody does). But if we can't even agree on what the advantages and disadvantages of increasing the consensus block size maximum, it is very hard that we can agree on a universally acceptable point or range in this trade-off rect. > For the record, I think these are the main harms of $5 tx fees, along wit= h > the main risks I see from moving to 4 MB: > > Fees of $5/tx would: > (a) Prevent a lot of people who could otherwise benefit from Bitcoin's > decentralization from having an opportunity to reap those benefits. > Especially people in poor countries with corrupt governments who could ge= t > immediate benefit from it now. > (b) Prevent developers from experimenting with new Bitcoin use-cases, whi= ch > might eventually lead to helpful services. > (c) Prevent regular people from using Bitcoin and experimenting with it a= nd > getting involved, because they think it's unusable for txns under many > hundreds of dollars in value, so it doesn't interest them. Not having the > public on our side could make us more vulnerable to regulators. This is all probably right, but IMO we're very far away from $5/tx. My main point about fees is that minimum mining fees rising above zero (theri current level) is not necessarily a bad thing or an urgent concern. On the other hand, we have much more data about current mining centralization, which should be very relevant information when discussing a block size increase. > Changing the block size to 4 MB would: > (1) Probably reduce the number of full nodes by around 5%. Most of the dr= op > in full nodes over the past few years is probably due to Bitcoin Core bei= ng > used by fewer regular users for convenience reasons, but the extra HD spa= ce > required and extra bandwidth would probably make some existing people > running full nodes stop. As Pieter has explained repeatedly, a big block count is not a goal in itself, just a metric. And if you ask me, I don't think it's all that interesting as a metric. For all I know there could be a lot more full nodes being run that for whatever reason are not seen by people collecting this data. The block size maximum consensus rule limits mining centralization, not just full node centralization. Gavin, for example, disagrees with this. Fortunately I believe at least 2 mathematical proofs can be produced to demonstrate Gavin and those who think like him are wrong. > (2) Not hinder low bandwidth miners significantly, because of the relay > network. I believe that even with the relay network, and even assuming all miners are connected using something like IBLT, a mathematical proof can be constructed to demonstrate that bigger block sizes can prevent the worse connected miners from being profitable. It is important to note that the worse connected miners aren't necessarily those with less bandwidth: maybe you have the best bandwidth but you are poorly connected to the majority of the hashrate (for example, because the majority of the hashrate is within the same country but that country is not very well connected to the rest of the world). > (3) Not introduce any tx verification issues, because processors are fast > and tx processing is ridiculously cheap and we'd need way more than 4 MB = of > txs for it to be a bottleneck. We're certainly far away from this being a concern in practice. But I'm working on a mathematical proof that at some scale CPU requirements could become a discriminating factor making the smallest mining operations unprofitable. > So (1) is the only risk that gives me any significant concern, but I don'= t > think that the number of full nodes now is at a dangerous level. I don't think there's such a thing as a "dangerous full node count level". It's just data that can be useful to build centralization metrics. Probably hashrate distribution by pool is much more interesting (and if you ask me that looks really bad right now without increasing the block size consensus maximum). > Anyway, the point isn't for you and I to actually discuss this particular > hypothetical in more detail (although I would be curious to see similar > lists from you). I haven't studied the risks enough to actually put this > forth to the list as a good argument for what to do in this situation. My > main point is that being very specific and concrete both about our though= t > process and about the hypothetical situation results in much better > discussions. I agree. > There's one more piece of information that I can give you which will help > you understand my position much better, and also force me to think really > carefully about this. It's the point at which I would switch to the other > side of the argument (either by varying the tx fee, or the block size). I= f > tx fees would only rise to 60 cents or lower if we stayed at 1 MB, then I > would be against a move to 4 MB. Or, keeping the hypothetical 1 MB fee at > $5, I think moving to 12 MB or higher is the point at which I'd switch ov= er > to being a 1 MB advocate. Getting that same info from you tells me exactl= y > how you weigh the risks in a way that just listing the factors can't. In > this specific hypothetical scenario, what is the lowest block size increa= se > that you'd accept? It can be extremely low, like 1.01 MB. If you tell me > that you'd rather have $5 tx fees for the next year instead of changing t= he > block size to 1.01 MB, I would be really surprised. Great. I don't think that minimum mining fees will rise above 1 usd cent/tx anytime soon even if we maintain the limit of 1MB. Maybe that's why I'm not worried at all about "hitting the limit". But I'm sorry, I don't have those concrete numbers because it is a trade-off I don't think we've studied in enough detail. Well, I can also say I wouldn't be worried at all about moving to, say, 1.01 MB (because the difference in centralization pressure should be minimal) and I would just take it as a "let's proof hardforks are possible" change similar to the one proposed in bip99. > Gavin is the only other person who I've seen who has defined at what bloc= k > size he'd switch to the other side (maybe not with a concrete number, but > with a rough range: the block size such that a normal person with a prett= y > good connection couldn't run a full node). That would be interesting to read and I have totally missed it. Do you have a link? > I would say that in this case we know high tx fees could happen very soon > because there is a clear mechanism. Bitcoin just needs to become more > popular quickly for any number of reasons. Suppose the infrastructure for > remittances starts falling into place within the next two months, and > suddenly immigrants are clamoring to use Bitcoin to send money back to th= eir > home countries. This could result in $5 tx fees very soon (not that I thi= nk > it's likely). Many of these immigrants would still use Bitcoin because it= 's > still better than the alternative for remittances, which would price out = a > lot of people currently using Bitcoin for other reasons. As far as I know= , > there is no plausible way that subsidies could plummet in anywhere near t= hat > time frame, aside from the price of Bitcoin completely collapsing. And for any size something similar could happen with some use case. But this is a great example of a situation where I would understand people panicking and clamoring to change the consensus rule as soon as possible. Even with much lower fees, say 1 usd/tx. I think it would be a great problem to have and admittedly I'm not worried about having it in the short term. And if it happened overnight we could always deploy an emergency hardfork. > But if > that happens in the near term (specifically, with very low tx volume) a f= ee > market won't help. I think it's helping by determining who is to be served first, and that is those who benefit more from Bitcoin (and are therefore willing to pay higher costs for using it), in this case, people doing international remittances. > I would be extremely happy if Bitcoin could somehow sustain itself in the > long run with 5 cent tx fees. I'm optimistic about Lightning to handle th= e > cases where people need even cheaper txns. Agreed. >> I'm still missing an answer from the "big blocks size side" to the >> following question (which I have insistently repeated with various >> permutations): >> >> If "not now" when will it be a good time to let fees rise above zero? >> After the next subsidy halving? After 4 more subsidy halvings (ie >> about 13 years from now, subsidy =3D 1.5625 btc/block )? After your >> grandmother abandons her national currency and uses Bitcoin for >> everything? Never? >> >> ANY answer (maybe with the exception of the last one) would be less >> worrying than silence. > > > Before I answer, here's my reasoning about why we don't need to worry abo= ut > a fee market now: > > There is nothing particularly special about a fee market in Bitcoin. We k= now > how markets work, and we have no reason to suspect a fee market in Bitcoi= n > will have any new properties of markets that we can't foresee. When deman= d > becomes higher, there will be some equilibrium level of fee that people h= ave > to pay to give a certain probability of inclusion within a certain number= of > blocks. There will likely be some level of fee where if you don't pay it, > your tx will never be confirmed. This is what I mean by "market minimum fee". > We have seen something like this working at various points in Bitcoin's > history. Look at the recent "stress tests." To get your tx confirmed in a > reasonable time frame, you had to bump your fee a little higher than the > txns from whoever was flooding the network. If you did, everything worked > fine. If you didn't, your tx didn't confirm (until the test ended, maybe?= ). > So there's nothing complicated here. It doesn't require a decade long > preparation to prove to ourselves that a fee market will work. I think the code that miners use to select which transactions to include first needs a lot of work. As said miners are subsidizing free transactions, increasing their own costs for nothing in exchange. Also, yes, there is something special about this market: it is supposed to pay for most of the global hashrate in the not-so-far future. If we take too long to start moving away from total seigniorage subsidy dependence, it may be too late when we do. > Unless in the future mining is funded mostly by charity (I think there's > only a 25% chance of that happening), we will need a fee market eventuall= y. > I'd be fine if one developed now. I think 10 cents per txn right now > wouldn't be too bad, aside from the following reason. What concerns me ab= out > insisting on a fee market right now is that usage is so small and the blo= ck > size is so limited that if demand increases just a little bit, fees could > skyrocket. It's not the 10 cent fees that would worry me, but what they s= ay > about the potential for a huge spike. Fees could become $10 per tx or hig= her > very quickly. Yes, that would show that big organizations find Bitcoin > useful which is nice, but it'd also put decentralized money out of reach = of > many other people. While Bitcoin still has a lot of growth ahead of it, i= t's > better to not set up roadblocks (for reasons other than preserving > decentralization) in front of that growth which will make things very > painful if that growth happens more suddenly than we expect. > > I think the best argument for having a fee market right now is that if we > move to such a market suddenly in the future, wallets won't have time to > make the user experience good, and full nodes might not be written in suc= h a > way that they gracefully handle a bunch of txns that might never confirm.= I > don't think the required software changes are that complex though, so it > seems unnecessary to start adding friction for users now for something th= at > might be an issue in 10+ years. I think you are underestimating the software costs. And you not only have to adapt the software that we have now, but also the software that hasn't been written yet and will be written assuming free transactions and an underdeveloped market. Also you are over-estimating the costs: you could hit the limit but then rise the block size maximum as soon as you reach, say 0.00001 usd/tx. Even if minimum fees go again to zero after rising the block size maximum, the software improvements will remain there. > So to answer your question: about two years before we think Bitcoin will > need to rely heavily on txn fees for security, I'd be in favor of adjusti= ng > block size so that it resulted in enough total fees / security. And when do you think "Bitcoin will need to rely heavily on txn fees for security"? How many more halvings is that? > You've been arguing that 0 fee transactions will have to disappear someda= y, > but this isn't necessarily true. As long as enough people care about havi= ng > their txns confirm relatively quickly, there's no reason to make sure tha= t > people who pay 0 fees never have their txns confirmed. That's not what I've been arguing, I've just being saying that I would be completely ok with minimum fees rising above zero (say, to 1 satoshi/tx) tomorrow. I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing (in fact, it has some advantages) and certainly not something we should fear to the point of rushing hardforks to avoid it. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A4F27AD for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:02:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f172.google.com (mail-wi0-f172.google.com [209.85.212.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9BA9F15D for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:02:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibhh20 with SMTP id hh20so167747772wib.0 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:02:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=sender:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=6pKUccZ2X3hgFJL6jFQj+T8uDoTKG4dQOHHwn8m0p1M=; b=ZGA/3PQGvCJuM2CCDoC1e1mjiCoETJMIRu7G5UCa7opYvdY+a9tszLdKeNBuXf8pCs n7WOxc7SZRPU1YyIo7JCGXBAgAhyThOpp3H9B35FuJ0UyvJUeUyemdREqzMqphXCPL/p yZoZarn0Ot91mrAGhT7IcqQJeGx2lZtS7Cy/dS0YNAJlr9XLN9G3VkeMwkRMyUR5XGom GF8tReXcAEXav8aA9/f8KEr0WcIBQRfjaMeY17YvtYOQq80G+D6r1LWGBcw+ru9V8bnM oYAxUQr3jAb9fCGF+PAdJUHy6QQ+5EBXF5CdHZVi0uMjbONCL4iuJ60RXvTgMq6GGec9 Ys6A== X-Received: by 10.180.8.135 with SMTP id r7mr28674848wia.58.1439240563460; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:02:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from erisian.com.au (tmo-102-58.customers.d1-online.com. [80.187.102.58]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id lu5sm31273119wjb.9.2015.08.10.14.02.41 (version=TLS1 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:02:42 -0700 (PDT) Sender: Anthony Towns Received: by erisian.com.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:02:40 +0800 Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:02:40 +0800 From: Anthony Towns To: Gavin Andresen Message-ID: <20150810210240.GC12450@navy> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:02:45 -0000 On Sun, Aug 09, 2015 at 06:44:08PM -0400, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I'd love to see somebody write up a higher-level description of what the > user experience is like, what communication happens underneath, and what > new pieces of infrastructure need to get built to make it all work. > > A use-case to start with: > > A customer starts with eleven on-chain bitcoin. They want to pay for a nice > cup of tea. IMO: 1. User swipes their phone over merchant's NFC device (or scans a QR code displayed by the register or whatever) 2. Dialog pops up on phone: "Pay Infinitea $5.20? [yes] [no]" 3. User presses [yes] 4. Brief pause 5. "Payment confirmed" appears on both user's phone and merchant's POS device The backend bits that need to happen: 1. Merchant passes on their identity and public key, an amount, and a hash for the payment. 2. User's phone goes online to see if a route to the vendor can be worked out, and to work out what lightning network fees are needed. Also translates the bitcoins requested into the user's preferred currency so they don't have to do maths in their head. 3. User's phone prepares a lightning transaction to the vendor, signed with the corresponding lightning channel keys, using the hash the merchant provided, and sends it through one of the channels the user already has open and funded (at >$5.20 worth of bitcoins). 4. The transaction makes its way through the lightning network, and the confirmation makes its way back. It's not clear to me how long this realistically takes (either how many hops are likely, or how long a single hop will actually take; I assume it should be a couple of seconds). 5. UIs at both ends update. User gets a nice cup of tea. There's a few potential problems with this: - what if the merchant says "no you didn't pay me, your phone is lying, you're a liar, I hate you, no tea for you" despite your phone saying you paid? a) you could mitigate this by having the payments be incremental (here's 1c, 520 times) with both terminals visibly updating; but that would take up to 520x longer than sending a single transaction, and mightn't really be any better anyway b) you could also have the initial negotiation involve signing something that could be adjudicated independently later (hey, here's a QR code saying he owed me a tea, here's a QR code showing I paid for it, and here's a video of him saying "no tea for you"). c) Or maybe you just bite the $5 and never shop there again; just as you would if you handed over $5.20 in cash and then they told you you hadn't paid them. - what if the transaction's unroutable? then you get a "service unavailable" notice on your phone and pay by other means -- blockchain, cash, etc. Same as if your credit card won't register. ditto if your phone can't get on the internet. - what if the fees are large? (eg, the coffee costs $5, and the fees are 20c?) a) I think they'll actually be small -- even for a 10% pa interest rate denominated in bitcoin, the time-value of $5.20 in bitcoin for 7 days is just under 1c (.35%). If so, that's noise, and the user legitimately doesn't care. OTOH, it does get multiplied by number of hops, and maybe the user cares about $5.20 vs $5.26. b) Alternatively, the app could just indicate the fees ("Pay $5.20 + <1c in fees") and/or the user could have an explicit setting for fee info ("Only warn me when fees are greater than either 5c/1%") c) Or you could have some UI magic, so the vendor's POS device initially says "advertised price is $5.20, but I actually expect just $5.05, call the rest a discount", the phone says "fees are 5c, so I'll display "Pay just $5.10 for a $5.20 cup of coffee!". That's closer to how Visa/Mastercard do it and might be reasonable in many cases. - what happens if the user presses "yes" but the lightning transaction then fails? you don't want to wait for the 7 day timeout to know if you can have a cup of tea; and you don't want the payment to go through after you've paid for your tea in cash, drank it, and gone home. a) Maybe the lightning network hubs just reply early cancelling the transactions, and your phone can say "failed". You can't force them to do this, but maybe the incentives work out okay so that they'll want to anyway. (I think they will) If so, everything's fine. As far as the merchant's concerned, you may as well have just pressed "No". b) The vendor could issue a conditional refund, eg an on-blockchain transaction for the amount of the coffee from them to you, payable if you ever receive the hash token. (And if you don't, redeemable by them after a timeout). That doesn't work real well if the fee for a blockchain txn is more than the price of a cup of tea of course. > Assume neither the customer nor the tea shop are technically sophisticated > -- assume the customer is using an SPV wallet and the tea shop is using a > service similar to Bitpay. IMHO, most of the complexity isn't in doing the transaction, it's in maintaining the channels. For example: - what if the tea shop has a sudden run of customers, and all their payment channels fill up? - how do you close the till at the end of the day (ie, put your earnings into a cold wallet so they can't be hacked as easily and clear your channel so you can accept more payments tomorrow?) Do you do this on the blockchain or do you have a different lightning network channel to your "bank account"? - inversely; if you do all your weekly shopping and impulse buys (tea, coffee, beer, meals, groceries, fuel, road tolls, ...) on lightning, how do you reset your channels once a day/week/fortnight/month with some money from your salary/savings, so they don't run out? - do refunds work, even after the original txn has finished? ("Oh, actually we're out of tea") - you have to watch the blockchain once a week or so in case your counterparty tries stealing your balance by replaying old states and hoping you don't notice - how do you keep the channel keys/secrets sufficiently available and secure? - how do you figure out who to make channels with in the first place, and if/when to change them? - what happens if your phone breaks, is stolen or gets lost; have you lost your channel secrets, and potentially all the coins in your balance? - etc. (I don't think they're unsolvable or anything, though) Cheers, aj From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 381D34D3 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:19:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f173.google.com (mail-wi0-f173.google.com [209.85.212.173]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D782416F for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:19:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicja10 with SMTP id ja10so42728830wic.1 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:19:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=sender:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=PXvSzCxZcILw4pg8vlKtNs1FD0ywpmnoWk7I5MV8/Tw=; b=r8pSoKBVw2gc6an9lRHAd/UYfsNLPX25UR06NMWaqfnCoYVowur9gp8YDMtVaMwgZU XQMpEGemE2IlkxHE4Ts39CLZQy3Su04b40Km2YHwGh8b7+E1XPBmFwKdHWhfe1BXnKhd mlI05gGpK0TcGED6VDKtgMQoORXnFeAKz0hfo02vbqnQPkmSDO/jq+HPMuNo75iX6dna P3rzUA5iaeoEHBWzNjA8lb6OWwSxqhdCNeMBFEsh78x+CUGbNvXKNNrJ8bkR13wJmbcH OA6+9hhmb7kwBFJAC5q1ydfR4yHBzrikX9+DQjYi0k9zKkvzIas+Ue+lomUziNT/0rOa daZw== X-Received: by 10.180.75.9 with SMTP id y9mr28963477wiv.67.1439241544605; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:19:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from erisian.com.au (tmo-102-58.customers.d1-online.com. [80.187.102.58]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id yu4sm31293818wjc.43.2015.08.10.14.19.02 (version=TLSv1 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:19:03 -0700 (PDT) Sender: Anthony Towns Received: by erisian.com.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:19:01 +0800 Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:19:01 +0800 From: Anthony Towns To: Gavin Andresen Message-ID: <20150810211901.GD12450@navy> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> <20150810210240.GC12450@navy> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20150810210240.GC12450@navy> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:19:07 -0000 On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 05:02:40AM +0800, Anthony Towns wrote: > On Sun, Aug 09, 2015 at 06:44:08PM -0400, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > I'd love to see somebody write up a higher-level description of what the > > user experience is like, what communication happens underneath, and what > > new pieces of infrastructure need to get built to make it all work. > > > > A use-case to start with: > > > > A customer starts with eleven on-chain bitcoin. They want to pay for a nice > > cup of tea. Sigh, kanzure on irc points out I misread this -- I read "on-channel" not "on-chain". In that case, I think the answer is "the customer doesn't pay for tea via lightning". They have to setup a channel with someone first, and to do that, they'll need a "sufficiently confirmed" anchor transaction, and I don't think zero confirmations would be enough for that. So: -1 "Oh, how did that guy pay for tea with his phone? That's cool!" "Scan the QR code, yeah, where the lightning logo is" "Cool, I'll try it tomorrow" 0 go home, "open a lightning channel", sleep, look forward to getting tea tomorrow For step 0, I guess it's: 0.1 "Choose a hub to connect to" (could be randomly selected) 0.2 "Choose an amount to fund the channel" (0.5 btc would be a lot) 0.3 "Are you sure?" 0.4 [wait briefly while counterparty signs] 0.5 [wait for 10 confirmations?] I don't think it's at all clear how 0.1 works in practice yet -- routing has barely been spitballed, and without knowing how routing works, it's hard to say who to connect to. Hard to say how much to put in in step 0.2 too -- if it takes a while to refresh funds in a channel (you have to do a blockchain txn eg), then that you should put more in; if you have multiple channels for whatever reason, maybe you can put less in each. The "Are you sure?" might require some legal T&Cs in practice. You need to have some realtime communication with your channel counterpary when creating the anchor; but that should be fairly quick. You also need to establish some random numbers and keys, but those could be done in advance. I think you (or your counterparty) will want to wait for a few confirmations before your channel is actually usable. So I think it'll take over an hour for a channel to be "open" in even the best case. Cheers, aj From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5BCFB4D3 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:43:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mout.perfora.net (mout.perfora.net [74.208.4.197]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E764817D for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:43:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-qg0-f51.google.com ([209.85.192.51]) by mrelay.perfora.net (mreueus003) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0MY5hO-1ZKbMp0sdc-00Unxy for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 23:43:23 +0200 Received: by qgeg42 with SMTP id g42so90924001qge.1 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:43:22 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.141.28.11 with SMTP id f11mr44091521qhe.78.1439243002313; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:43:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.96.226.68 with HTTP; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:43:22 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150810211901.GD12450@navy> References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> <20150810210240.GC12450@navy> <20150810211901.GD12450@navy> Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:43:22 +0100 Message-ID: From: Adam Back To: Anthony Towns Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Provags-ID: V03:K0:8Zcja1os7Q2ci+ohittppSq0aSZkySg5+hz6R0+bqQPBCr9IyzW DH/HnhNdS7Ih1khIIBAWxGQbI+F7d3+NMNAESmKrIGbeL6lwMqKG+rWC6O2TXpT1zR3PFxk LEdYtLkwVLz0DlyXL72OINITeB98l+Re39W7RGLV6AVHrUBBUFz4lFKiTs0BuDZK9dNEeQ8 y7Kt6AFKXxEkYl/73bBSw== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V01:K0:rgj6ElLlNys=:9mYmQuiNuR7kCN09OLomgs H015TPBfkoVosWAn0qoQsN8kovBgMO16pTCXpJhzxQlDJRKoXjsdm+MgF90QpuEn+y+MlQ2J5 q/Jchuoo1KPFsVk7M39+WM163Lk0+1BmInCjqGTDkQ/zM0BZBgvnfjZkmAMjryzGP1epR/YNE EuVEbnj1WwNhmp9bG1JTnGW/H8meGNmt6AJA8bfbZk+inATGcmeJyDebilKuxNi+7hVMXisKB EVozKRGK7LP0w3WEOXFiEN7l3MxzPBudeT3MomwGlCxLVpBw64IQ+RdL7OezJCB2kL1Z+lpII gLyzBHHi7XUmtLdKrSHlisYtnzY/FkcfudALqwC249/DOZYAqvYzvenHjFK13OIgH2C7+JhKP qYONy+iNYdPdCEs0JebJhXcxxNUjQ/ekg9eSFtMm2tZQx+pa62cVC92hrecJ4hYsMZw9YgDiH X39KM/tjoTNUMw3+9rqhotzwnSLsV1opqbLEWK38m5D4MwzWON5J/KJjhCtcEds/EGw6Cs/Xr PkUJGPEJH4GtUxfibj7kxmI244sTKqwJwlXndt6mTi8jVd4XqL3RMlUQe32iL9CFJszLjKgaZ gWCJb4j9EKg+qSN1v4MKiFwm9GkLc8NCCr+eYos0TAY+ZtZc/2JDmgT/tfHa6xqNj7teshy4s aOqNpgzGSDufoig/98fTNQxPDdy0EFFl3K6+i1MwVoVYBtWGwKxaosuPJZUr5F/emd8qG8/R+ aKR9oz1yjIPoV+CY X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 21:43:24 -0000 In terms of usage I think you'd more imagine a wallet that basically parks Bitcoins onto channels at all times, so long as they are routable there is no loss, and the scalability achieved thereby is strongly advantageous, and there is even the potential for users to earn fees by having their wallets participate in channel rebalancing (where hubs pay users to rebalance channels - end up with the same net position but move funds from one user-owned channel to another.) Exchange deposit, withdrawal, payments, even in-exchange trades can usefully happen in lightning for faster, cheaper more scalable transactions. Adam From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BCCFA4D3 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:48:19 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f176.google.com (mail-ig0-f176.google.com [209.85.213.176]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 01D8B106 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:48:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbjg10 with SMTP id jg10so15365923igb.0 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:48:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=PmZPoURKcZPEtILMz1n565kRUsfkIZQWk/MSrQrDjpQ=; b=s4xOpc+tyTGxBNtf/5MlNCSocpNSg0DR7d4MENvNP/PCyKR8Rl4cW60bT3gpjEvylI OLMdrhW0hklS0TttnLuTr1pk2+L7Jx/Jj/nriV24pI806di45mAxJpRlaBgWf2izc7mK MNx0wxaseuT7C8gufxrXagSQ7I+6Yq2ywMk5mHSEaOAbOhuK58k+LUwRHyVkVPgmNXHH 1TFajHAIhLeUmJcwcteBpzZyVgq90xDWsaklokSSVsU9/KZrqWt0R7Ydyp77Y0OZV36a Lrw6Y+c0XPWs9Y6wVr034QKinX19LPVVbrzqMl588LrO4szXGzPj2m/UXWLwXT+dBEi3 cxZg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.78.98 with SMTP id a2mr12510884igx.87.1439272097452; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:48:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.79.97.135 with HTTP; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:48:17 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 22:48:17 -0700 Message-ID: From: Elliot Olds To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0122edba1a98ea051d02a62c X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: timon@jtimon.cc Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size following technological growth X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 05:48:19 -0000 --089e0122edba1a98ea051d02a62c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 12:28 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote= : > I would just like that there was an attempt to automatically > estimate those risks before taking those risks. > I agree. > My main point about fees is that minimum mining fees rising above zero > (theri current level) is not necessarily a bad thing or an urgent > concern. > Yes, it only gets bad when fees become "high." I'll skip over the discussion of the pros/cons I listed since that mostly appeared for illustrative purposes and I don't have a strong disagreement with anything you said. > Great. I don't think that minimum mining fees will rise above 1 usd > cent/tx anytime soon even if we maintain the limit of 1MB. > Maybe that's why I'm not worried at all about "hitting the limit". > My sense is that the people arguing for a hard fork now tend to envision "hitting the limit" as tx fees being fairly high, and those arguing against a hard fork envision tx fees staying low when 1 MB blocks start to get full. Which of those occurs depends on how quickly and in what manner Bitcoin gains popularity. Even if I thought there's an 95% chance that there would be no sudden jump in Bitcoin tx demand, I would want to have some rough plan in place for that other 5% when some previously difficult use case becomes viable and demand spikes. Do those arguing for the "wait and see" approach not think that a quick increase in demand is even likely enough to warrant discussing what we'd do in that case? Greg Maxwell mentioned doubling the max block size if there was ever a standing backlog = ( http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/007880.html -- I think fee level is a better metric than size of tx backlog), but I haven't seen other devs comment on it. > But I'm sorry, I don't have those concrete numbers because it is a > trade-off I don't think we've studied in enough detail. > The question is about what you'd do in the absence of those details that you don't have. Imagine that fees spiked to $5/tx tomorrow. You have some model of the situation that allows you to say that 1.01 MB is something you'd support, and that's the model that I'm trying to understand. The answers I gave are not ones I'm confident about. I'm sure if I studied this for a week they'd change. I sense that devs are reluctant to answer this question because it could be taken out of context or held against them later. Or maybe they just don't like saying things that they don't have a high level of confidence about on principle. IMO this reluctance contributes to a lack of understanding of each other's positions. We all have these imperfect models in our heads that we're basing our disagreements on, but we won't show each other these models. > > Gavin is the only other person who I've seen who has defined at what > block > > size he'd switch to the other side (maybe not with a concrete number, b= ut > > with a rough range: the block size such that a normal person with a > pretty > > good connection couldn't run a full node). > > That would be interesting to read and I have totally missed it. > Do you have a link? Sorry, I see how what I wrote was misleading. You've seen the email I'm referring to. I was talking about when he defined the criteria he used qualitatively and suggested that's how he arrived at 20 MB: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/009971.h= tml. I think he talks about it in a little more detail elsewhere. I inferred from that that he wouldn't support 40 MB or 80 MB, but that may be wrong. I should also have given credit to Pieter, as he even more explicitly specified a level where he'd turn into a hard fork advocate, via his own hard fork proposal. Neither of these statements specifies exactly where the switch-over point is, but they're the closest I've seen. > > I would say that in this case we know high tx fees could happen very so= on > > because there is a clear mechanism. Bitcoin just needs to become more > > popular quickly for any number of reasons. Suppose the infrastructure f= or > > remittances starts falling into place within the next two months, and > > suddenly immigrants are clamoring to use Bitcoin to send money back to > their > > home countries. This could result in $5 tx fees very soon (not that I > think > > it's likely). Many of these immigrants would still use Bitcoin because > it's > > still better than the alternative for remittances, which would price ou= t > a > > lot of people currently using Bitcoin for other reasons. As far as I > know, > > there is no plausible way that subsidies could plummet in anywhere near > that > > time frame, aside from the price of Bitcoin completely collapsing. > > And for any size something similar could happen with some use case. > But this is a great example of a situation where I would understand > people panicking and clamoring to change the consensus rule as soon as > possible. > Even with much lower fees, say 1 usd/tx. > I think it would be a great problem to have and admittedly I'm not > worried about having it in the short term. > And if it happened overnight we could always deploy an emergency hardfork= . > Don't you think the devs should have some rough plan that they discuss ahead of time about what to do in the situation of high fees? Even if it happened gradually -- suppose fees crept to 20 cents, then 50 cents, then 75 over the next year -- I don't think I've ever seen a discussion of how that should be handled, and what sort of fees people regard as high enough to justify considering a hard fork. I think it would prevent many people from supporting an urgent hard fork if they knew how the core devs would handle that situation (assuming there was some willingness to increase the block size if fees got too high). > > We have seen something like this working at various points in Bitcoin's > > history. Look at the recent "stress tests." To get your tx confirmed in= a > > reasonable time frame, you had to bump your fee a little higher than th= e > > txns from whoever was flooding the network. If you did, everything work= ed > > fine. If you didn't, your tx didn't confirm (until the test ended, > maybe?). > > So there's nothing complicated here. It doesn't require a decade long > > preparation to prove to ourselves that a fee market will work. > > [...] > Also, yes, there is something special about this market: it is > supposed to pay for most of the global hashrate in the not-so-far > future. > If we take too long to start moving away from total seigniorage > subsidy dependence, it may be too late when we do. > I see that 'special' feature of this market as more strongly supporting the need to encourage fast adoption. Let's say block rewards are $7000 per block, and we think this gives a good level of security (as Bitcoin grows, we'll probably want a lot more). Suppose a 1MB block can hold 2000 txns. Then to pay for the same level of security we have right now with only tx fees, assuming 1 MB blocks, the average tx fee would have to be $3.50. Now suppose blocks are 100 MB in the future. The average tx fee is then only 3.5 cents. I think the former situation will not actually work, and the only way that Bitcoin can survive is to eventually get into something more like the later situation. Let me know if you want me to delve into why. I'll just note that even Lightning doesn't work well when tx fees are that high, because channels need to be opened and closed pretty often and if my counterparty is uncooperative, his making me pay $3.50 starts to actually hurt. So if we accept that, we need to end up in a situation where we eventually have lots of people making on-blockchain txns, and paying relatively small fees. Encouraging lots of use and experimentation of Bitcoin between now and then seems pretty important for reaching that goal. We're in a race with the block reward halving schedule, to see if we can get usage high enough to pay for security (while maintaining enough decentralization) before all of the security burden falls on transactions. If there aren't enough transactions at that time, the burden will be too high (or security will be too low) and people will find other solutions. We seem to disagree about how hard it'll be to change wallet and node software to cope with a fee market. As I've said I don't see very small nonzero fees (for instance one tenth of a cent) as a problem though. So if a solution that traded off usage and decentralization in a way that I agreed with could be modified to ensure a fee market developed soon with very low fees, I'd still support it. > > > Unless in the future mining is funded mostly by charity (I think there'= s > > only a 25% chance of that happening), we will need a fee market > eventually. > > I'd be fine if one developed now. I think 10 cents per txn right now > > wouldn't be too bad, aside from the following reason. What concerns me > about > > insisting on a fee market right now is that usage is so small and the > block > > size is so limited that if demand increases just a little bit, fees cou= ld > > skyrocket. It's not the 10 cent fees that would worry me, but what they > say > > about the potential for a huge spike. Fees could become $10 per tx or > higher > > very quickly. Yes, that would show that big organizations find Bitcoin > > useful which is nice, but it'd also put decentralized money out of reac= h > of > > many other people. While Bitcoin still has a lot of growth ahead of it, > it's > > better to not set up roadblocks (for reasons other than preserving > > decentralization) in front of that growth which will make things very > > painful if that growth happens more suddenly than we expect. > > > > I think the best argument for having a fee market right now is that if = we > > move to such a market suddenly in the future, wallets won't have time t= o > > make the user experience good, and full nodes might not be written in > such a > > way that they gracefully handle a bunch of txns that might never > confirm. I > > don't think the required software changes are that complex though, so i= t > > seems unnecessary to start adding friction for users now for something > that > > might be an issue in 10+ years. > > I think you are underestimating the software costs. > And you not only have to adapt the software that we have now, but also > the software that hasn't been written yet and will be written assuming > free transactions and an underdeveloped market. > Also you are over-estimating the costs: you could hit the limit but > then rise the block size maximum as soon as you reach, say 0.00001 > usd/tx. > Even if minimum fees go again to zero after rising the block size > maximum, the software improvements will remain there. > > > So to answer your question: about two years before we think Bitcoin wil= l > > need to rely heavily on txn fees for security, I'd be in favor of > adjusting > > block size so that it resulted in enough total fees / security. > > And when do you think "Bitcoin will need to rely heavily on txn fees > for security"? > How many more halvings is that? > > > You've been arguing that 0 fee transactions will have to disappear > someday, > > but this isn't necessarily true. As long as enough people care about > having > > their txns confirm relatively quickly, there's no reason to make sure > that > > people who pay 0 fees never have their txns confirmed. > > That's not what I've been arguing, I've just being saying that I would > be completely ok with minimum fees rising above zero (say, to 1 > satoshi/tx) tomorrow. > I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing (in fact, it has some > advantages) and certainly not something we should fear to the point of > rushing hardforks to avoid it. > --089e0122edba1a98ea051d02a62c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On M= on, Aug 10, 2015 at 12:28 PM, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> wrote:
I would just like that there = was an attempt to automatically
estimate those risks before taking those risks.

I agree.
=C2=A0
My main point about fees is that minimum mining fees rising above zero
(theri current level) is not necessarily a bad thing or an urgent
concern.

Yes, it only gets bad when fee= s become "high."=C2=A0

I'll skip ove= r the discussion of the pros/cons I listed since that mostly appeared for i= llustrative purposes and I don't have a strong disagreement with anythi= ng you said.
=C2=A0
Great. I= don't think that minimum mining fees will rise above 1 usd
cent/tx anytime soon even if we maintain the limit of 1MB.
Maybe that's why I'm not worried at all about "hitting the lim= it".

My sense is that the people a= rguing for a hard fork now tend to envision "hitting the limit" a= s tx fees being fairly high, and those arguing against a hard fork envision= tx fees staying low when 1 MB blocks start to get full. Which of those occ= urs depends on how quickly and in what manner Bitcoin gains popularity. Eve= n if I thought there's an 95% chance that there would be no sudden jump= in Bitcoin tx demand, I would want to have some rough plan in place for th= at other 5% when some previously difficult use case becomes viable and dema= nd spikes. Do those arguing for the "wait and see" approach not t= hink that a quick increase in demand is even likely enough to warrant discu= ssing what we'd do in that case? Greg Maxwell mentioned doubling the ma= x block size if there was ever a standing backlog (http://list= s.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/007880.html -- I t= hink fee level is a better metric than size of tx backlog), but I haven'= ;t seen other devs comment on it.
=C2=A0
But I'm sorry, I don't have those concrete numbers because it is a<= br> trade-off I don't think we've studied in enough detail.

The question is about what you'd do in the abs= ence of those details that you don't have. Imagine that fees spiked to = $5/tx tomorrow. You have some model of the situation that allows you to say= that 1.01 MB is something you'd support, and that's the model that= I'm trying to understand. The answers I gave are not ones I'm conf= ident about. I'm sure if I studied this for a week they'd change. I= sense that devs are reluctant to answer this question because it could be = taken out of context or held against them later. Or maybe they just don'= ;t like saying things that they don't have a high level of confidence a= bout on principle. IMO this reluctance contributes to a lack of understandi= ng of each other's positions. We all have these imperfect models in our= heads that we're basing our disagreements on, but we won't show ea= ch other these models.
=C2=A0
> Gavin is the only other person who I've seen who has defined at wh= at block
> size he'd switch to the other side (maybe not with a concrete numb= er, but
> with a rough range: the block size such that a normal person with a pr= etty
> good connection couldn't run a full node).

That would be interesting to read and I have totally missed it.
Do you have a link?

Sorry, I see how what I= wrote was misleading. You've seen the email I'm referring to. I wa= s talking about when he defined the criteria he used qualitatively and sugg= ested that's how he arrived at 20 MB:=C2=A0=C2=A0http:/= /lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/009971.html. I think he talks about it in a little more detail elsewhere. I inferred = from that that he wouldn't support 40 MB or 80 MB, but that may be wron= g.



> I would say that in this case we know high tx fees could happen very s= oon
> because there is a clear mechanism. Bitcoin just needs to become more<= br> > popular quickly for any number of reasons. Suppose the infrastructure = for
> remittances starts falling into place within the next two months, and<= br> > suddenly immigrants are clamoring to use Bitcoin to send money back to= their
> home countries. This could result in $5 tx fees very soon (not that I = think
> it's likely). Many of these immigrants would still use Bitcoin bec= ause it's
> still better than the alternative for remittances, which would price o= ut a
> lot of people currently using Bitcoin for other reasons. As far as I k= now,
> there is no plausible way that subsidies could plummet in anywhere nea= r that
> time frame, aside from the price of Bitcoin completely collapsing.

And for any size something similar could happen with some use case.<= br> But this is a great example of a situation where I would understand
people panicking and clamoring to change the consensus rule as soon as
possible.
Even with much lower fees, say 1 usd/tx.
I think it would be a great problem to have and admittedly I'm not
worried about having it in the short term.
And if it happened overnight we could always deploy an emergency hardfork.<= br>


> We have seen something like this working at various points in Bitcoin&= #39;s
> history. Look at the recent "stress tests." To get your tx c= onfirmed in a
> reasonable time frame, you had to bump your fee a little higher than t= he
> txns from whoever was flooding the network. If you did, everything wor= ked
> fine. If you didn't, your tx didn't confirm (until the test en= ded, maybe?).
> So there's nothing complicated here. It doesn't require a deca= de long
> preparation to prove to ourselves that a fee market will work.

[...]
Also, yes, there is something special about this market: it is
supposed to pay for most of the global hashrate in the not-so-far
future.
If we take too long to start moving away from total seigniorage
subsidy dependence, it may be too late when we do.

<= /div>
Let's say block rewards are $7000 per block, and we think thi= s gives a good level of security (as Bitcoin grows, we'll probably want= a lot more).

Suppose a 1MB block can hold 2000 tx= ns. Then to pay for the same level of security we have right now with only = tx fees, assuming 1 MB blocks, the average tx fee would have to be $3.50. N= ow suppose blocks are 100 MB in the future. The average tx fee is then only= 3.5 cents. I think the former situation will not actually work, and the on= ly way that Bitcoin can survive is to eventually get into something more li= ke the later situation. Let me know if you want me to delve into why. I'= ;ll just note that even Lightning doesn't work well when tx fees are th= at high, because channels need to be opened and closed pretty often and if = my counterparty is uncooperative, his making me pay $3.50 starts to actuall= y hurt.=C2=A0

So if we accept that, we need to end= up in a situation where we eventually have lots of people making on-blockc= hain txns, and paying relatively small fees. Encouraging lots of use and ex= perimentation of Bitcoin between now and then seems pretty important for re= aching that goal.

We're in a race with the blo= ck reward halving schedule, to see if we can get usage high enough to pay f= or security (while maintaining enough decentralization) before all of the s= ecurity burden falls on transactions. If there aren't enough transactio= ns at that time, the burden will be too high (or security will be too low) = and people will find other solutions.

We seem to d= isagree about how hard it'll be to change wallet and node software to c= ope with a fee market. As I've said I don't see very small nonzero = fees (for instance one tenth of a cent) as a problem though. So if a soluti= on that traded off usage and decentralization in a way that I agreed with c= ould be modified to ensure a fee market developed soon with very low fees, = I'd still support it.



=C2=A0

> Unless in the future mining is funded mostly by charity (I think there= 's
> only a 25% chance of that happening), we will need a fee market eventu= ally.
> I'd be fine if one developed now. I think 10 cents per txn right n= ow
> wouldn't be too bad, aside from the following reason. What concern= s me about
> insisting on a fee market right now is that usage is so small and the = block
> size is so limited that if demand increases just a little bit, fees co= uld
> skyrocket. It's not the 10 cent fees that would worry me, but what= they say
> about the potential for a huge spike. Fees could become $10 per tx or = higher
> very quickly. Yes, that would show that big organizations find Bitcoin=
> useful which is nice, but it'd also put decentralized money out of= reach of
> many other people. While Bitcoin still has a lot of growth ahead of it= , it's
> better to not set up roadblocks (for reasons other than preserving
> decentralization) in front of that growth which will make things very<= br> > painful if that growth happens more suddenly than we expect.
>
> I think the best argument for having a fee market right now is that if= we
> move to such a market suddenly in the future, wallets won't have t= ime to
> make the user experience good, and full nodes might not be written in = such a
> way that they gracefully handle a bunch of txns that might never confi= rm. I
> don't think the required software changes are that complex though,= so it
> seems unnecessary to start adding friction for users now for something= that
> might be an issue in 10+ years.

I think you are underestimating the software costs.
And you not only have to adapt the software that we have now, but also
the software that hasn't been written yet and will be written assuming<= br> free transactions and an underdeveloped market.
Also you are over-estimating the costs: you could hit the limit but
then rise the block size maximum as soon as you reach, say 0.00001
usd/tx.
Even if minimum fees go again to zero after rising the block size
maximum, the software improvements will remain there.

> So to answer your question: about two years before we think Bitcoin wi= ll
> need to rely heavily on txn fees for security, I'd be in favor of = adjusting
> block size so that it resulted in enough total fees / security.

And when do you think "Bitcoin will need to rely heavily on txn= fees
for security"?
How many more halvings is that?

> You've been arguing that 0 fee transactions will have to disappear= someday,
> but this isn't necessarily true. As long as enough people care abo= ut having
> their txns confirm relatively quickly, there's no reason to make s= ure that
> people who pay 0 fees never have their txns confirmed.

That's not what I've been arguing, I've just being sayin= g that I would
be completely ok with minimum fees rising above zero (say, to 1
satoshi/tx) tomorrow.
I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing (in fact, it has some<= br> advantages) and certainly not something we should fear to the point of
rushing hardforks to avoid it.

--089e0122edba1a98ea051d02a62c-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2F0797AD for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 09:01:36 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f48.google.com (mail-la0-f48.google.com [209.85.215.48]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4053B132 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 09:01:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lahi9 with SMTP id i9so36850831lah.2 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 02:01:33 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=Bt0/9CuYoGfDHBhUhpIfkTwuvDQLFjBZE74nwVn1FlY=; b=HcHquNNRS3HkuaGnooiENzDQj6zWjw1X9WpAgpjtzkynOVveE4s6yoN1M9LfToUcvG pTiRsYwk2PPShU2z1ZPA/AZCum9bfxKeOUCM4PDVr2rqYOg/Jv+y6ovzSk6PQFztBozv Z4FUMOdZd16u5ZFwy9szVmWVE4h4I2muwPXhpY9REVFGFLMKA/8SIoYrg4DN2gNNJ27w V4hMPyrpJZWmAPYML0tSISFv4gsklCwA151AevGUyqmJ9tamDdhbHEICfhUuIArJ0wgj FR8I2MNoEetTR8xM4ugzFfc0sMmISK5MsbdpJfBvjZE5/JGCi6wnajQwFqEpwMdvRpL4 WBDg== X-Received: by 10.112.129.104 with SMTP id nv8mr10818615lbb.63.1439283693502; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 02:01:33 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 02:01:13 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> <20150810210240.GC12450@navy> <20150810211901.GD12450@navy> From: Hector Chu Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 10:01:13 +0100 Message-ID: To: Adam Back Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3a8bee484796051d05593e X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 09:01:36 -0000 --047d7b3a8bee484796051d05593e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Lightning will never catch on as it basically demands that everyone who uses it to become a speculator. Payment hubs and merchants will be at the mercy of the bitcoin price while their funds stay locked up in payment channels. This idea is a dead-end. On 10 August 2015 at 22:43, Adam Back via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > In terms of usage I think you'd more imagine a wallet that basically > parks Bitcoins onto channels at all times, so long as they are > routable there is no loss, and the scalability achieved thereby is > strongly advantageous, and there is even the potential for users to > earn fees by having their wallets participate in channel rebalancing > (where hubs pay users to rebalance channels - end up with the same net > position but move funds from one user-owned channel to another.) > Exchange deposit, withdrawal, payments, even in-exchange trades can > usefully happen in lightning for faster, cheaper more scalable > transactions. > > Adam > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --047d7b3a8bee484796051d05593e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Lightning will never catch on as it basically demands that= everyone who uses it to become a speculator. Payment hubs and merchants wi= ll be at the mercy of the bitcoin price while their funds stay locked up in= payment channels. This idea is a dead-end.

On 10 August 2015 at 22:43, Adam Back via b= itcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org&= gt; wrote:
In terms of usage I thi= nk you'd more imagine a wallet that basically
parks Bitcoins onto channels at all times, so long as they are
routable there is no loss, and the scalability achieved thereby is
strongly advantageous, and there is even the potential for users to
earn fees by having their wallets participate in channel rebalancing
(where hubs pay users to rebalance channels - end up with the same net
position but move funds from one user-owned channel to another.)
Exchange deposit, withdrawal, payments, even in-exchange trades can
usefully happen in lightning for faster, cheaper more scalable
transactions.

Adam
___________________________________= ____________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

--047d7b3a8bee484796051d05593e-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A7D0697 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 17:18:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pd0-f172.google.com (mail-pd0-f172.google.com [209.85.192.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 07B41109 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 17:18:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: by pdrh1 with SMTP id h1so67690384pdr.0 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 10:18:05 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to :cc:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=8LbyORnFncDHVKkcbeOx7/SO6PyTNZDo9ZQ/tda7ohU=; b=NfjOhj47D3oKeoTKv44VFzlJda9O9StTLZlo47XW4ifudz/BP/o5pERNTaL/fodIkd MjuASL56uO6J7nqpA7N72c/os/fEHPW8Yv4ZiD4XN1w1pahBzQpWqAWNk5EV0adF3Jhw vwrooKawnXJ7JpYkPauu1Y0uP0o7E3hMYHHyrGUjodMnDG5tucGcRHoRFUvJMSh65Eg8 ksWa5zhW0ZcsHOItqBaitmXzalVurIYiEQBA4DyOiWX1gzSQTY0Xm4b111p2FZqATn2l /W65kjOQaCnkzQRWtp2zgk8iab4EWJC/4PV2WYl2Sklw2p8tJU9oAf52uiI7Xyz66Cjt Nq0w== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmqkgt5i9WyvWdeR+o+P8bjom3z94B8GsB2PjrtzOqp0qZRa+1lhOzvvkwiAsJa0H8MZxfn X-Received: by 10.70.39.34 with SMTP id m2mr54145798pdk.148.1439313485737; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 10:18:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.2.17] (c-24-5-43-190.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [24.5.43.190]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id gh5sm3338070pbc.87.2015.08.11.10.17.58 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 11 Aug 2015 10:17:59 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55CA2E46.3040608@bitcartel.com> Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 10:17:58 -0700 From: Simon Liu User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Hector Chu , Adam Back References: <55C79FF0.8040100@thinlink.com> <55C7CECB.7050905@gmail.com> <20150810210240.GC12450@navy> <20150810211901.GD12450@navy> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What Lightning Is X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 17:18:06 -0000 There's also an interesting question posted over at Reddit - will Lightning payment hubs be treated as money transmitters in the US? https://www.reddit.com/r/bitcoin_uncensored/comments/3gjnmd/lightning_may_not_be_a_scaling_solution/ A payment hub operator working with brand name merchants like Disney and Gap would most likely adopt any licensing and AML/KYC regulations. Some folk might thus find themselves forced to use anonymous hubs with strict routing requirements to avoid commercial hubs. Given the reduced number of available channels, this could drive up lightning network fees for those folk. Of course, two parties can avoid any intermediary by using a regular on-chain transaction, but it might not be feasible if Bitcoin is operating as a settlement network with high transaction fees. On 08/11/2015 02:01 AM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Lightning will never catch on as it basically demands that everyone who > uses it to become a speculator. Payment hubs and merchants will be at > the mercy of the bitcoin price while their funds stay locked up in > payment channels. This idea is a dead-end. > > On 10 August 2015 at 22:43, Adam Back via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > In terms of usage I think you'd more imagine a wallet that basically > parks Bitcoins onto channels at all times, so long as they are > routable there is no loss, and the scalability achieved thereby is > strongly advantageous, and there is even the potential for users to > earn fees by having their wallets participate in channel rebalancing > (where hubs pay users to rebalance channels - end up with the same net > position but move funds from one user-owned channel to another.) > Exchange deposit, withdrawal, payments, even in-exchange trades can > usefully happen in lightning for faster, cheaper more scalable > transactions. > > Adam > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >