If there is a benefit in producing larger more-fee blocks if they propagate slowly, then there is also a benefit in including high-fee transactions that are unlikely to propagate quickly through optimized relay protocols (for example: very recent transactions, or out-of-band receoved ones). This effect is likely an order of magnitude less important still, but the effect is likely the same.
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 01:21:46PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> Nice work, Pieter. You're right that my simulation assumed bandwidth for
> 'block' messages isn't the bottleneck.
>
> But doesn't Matt's fast relay network (and the work I believe we're both
> planning on doing in the near future to further optimize block propagation)
> make both of our simulations irrelevant in the long-run?
Then simulate first the relay network assuming 100% of txs use it, and
secondly, assuming 100%-x use it.
For instance, is it in miners' advantage in some cases to sabotage the
relay network? The analyse say yes, so lets simulate that. Equally even
the relay network isn't instant.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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