From: "'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [bitcoindev] What's a good stopping point? Making the case for the capabilities enabled by CTV+CSFS
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 13:14:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <F5vsDVNGXP_hmCvp4kFnptFLBCXOoRxWk9d05kSInq_kXj0ePqVAJGADkBFJxYIGkjk8Pw1gzBonTivH6WUUb4f6mwNCmJIwdXBMrjjQ0lI=@protonmail.com> (raw)
There is excitement in the technical community about a CTV+CSFS soft fork as specified in BIP119 and BIP348. We think
this combination of opcodes offers desirable capabilities to scale Bitcoin payments and is worth considering to soft
fork into Bitcoin. There has been several objections to this proposal, which we can group into three categories:
exploration of alternatives, demonstration of usage, and design of the operations to achieve these capabilities.
In an attempt to help the proposal move forward we would like to kick-off a discussion about the first category:
alternatives. We will start by making the case that the capabilities "commit to the transaction spending this output"
and "verify a BIP340 signature for an arbitrary message" are a good stopping point for a Bitcoin soft fork. We invite
anyone to share objections in reply to this thread so they can be addressed or inform a better course of action.
Let's keep the discussion focused on the capabilities, not the specific way of designing operations to achieve them. For
the sake of this discussion `OP_CTV` would be equivalent to `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` (push the template hash on the stack) as
the capability "commit to the transaction to spend an output". `OP_TXHASH` would be separate, as a "programmable
transaction introspection" capability.
The ability to commit to the exact transaction spending an output is useful to reduce interactivity in second-layer
protocols. For instance it can reduce roundtrips[^0] in the implementation of LN-Symmetry, or make receiving an Ark
"vtxo" non-interactive[^1]. Additionally, it enables significant optimizations[^2] in the implementation of Discreet Log
Contracts.
The ability to verify a signature for an arbitrary message in Tapscript enables oracle attestations and a form of
delegation. Oracle attestation for instance significantly reduce[^3] the onchain footprint of BitVM. Reducing an
application's onchain footprint benefits all Bitcoin users by easing block space competition, and it's especially
important for applications that generate very large transactions, which could otherwise increase pressure toward mining
centralization[^4].
Together, these two features enable a third capability: rebindable transaction signatures. Rebindable signatures make
possible a new type of payment channels, LN-Symmetry ("Eltoo"), whose simplicity makes practical advanced constructs
such as multiparty channels. They also enable further interactivity reduction in second layer protocols, as illustrated
by the Ark variant "Erk"[^5] or the dramatic simplification[^6] they bring to upgrading today's Lightning (i.e. without
switching to LN-Symmetry) from HTLCs to PTLCs.
These capabilities are simple and modular. They are well understood and present a low risk of enabling unwanted
behaviour. They do not increase the cost of validation, have low implementation complexity and are unlikely to become
redundant, even if more powerful capabilities are added in the future. These capabilities improve existing
tried-and-proven protocols used daily by Bitcoin users, like the Lightning Network. They also make new ones possible
either at all or through realistic interactivity requirements. The new enabled protocols take a similar approach to
existing Bitcoin scaling solutions, only with different tradeoffs not previously available. We can therefore reasonably
expect they won't introduce new systemic incentives, while broadening the range of supported use cases.
The first alternative approach to address is doing nothing. Doing nothing is *the* valid schelling point in a system
where consensus changes must be agreed on by a supermajority of the economic activity, and ideally by all stakeholders
in the system. Unless there is a critical vulnerability being fixed, the onus is on the proposer to overcome the various
valid objections. Further, a number of smart contracts have been deployed on Bitcoin and more are incoming, with or
without consensus changes. No softforks on the horizon are known to generate asymptotic scaling, and what's more,
on-chain demand has not been high except on infrequent intervals.
As said prior, we believe the capabilities of CTV+CSFS reach an appropriate bar for consideration for activation. While
it will not achieve asymptotic scaling, it will enable significant reduction in complexity in already-deployed systems,
and is worth deploying for their specific benefits. Regardless, it's important to emphasize it again: the onus is on the
proposer to overcome objections.
Other alternative approaches to scaling Bitcoin payments have been proposed such as with validation rollups[^7], enabled
by the ability to verify a zero-knowledge proof directly in Bitcoin Script. These rollups are trustless and could
effectuate a modest factor throughput increase under realistic assumptions and transaction load. This approach, used on
altcoins but new to Bitcoin, has yet to reach consensus among the technical community and Bitcoin users more broadly.
Relative immaturity of many of the employed crypto-systems make designing a ZKP-specific primitive a difficult task.
Further, trustless composibility with interactive protocols like LN to achieve further scaling are speculative at the
time. Nonetheless, the capabilities that enable this alternative approach to scaling are neither exclusionary nor
redundant with those proposed here.
It makes sense to focus first on capabilities improving the tried-and-proven approach, as the newer approach
(and the capabilities enabling it) may come with different tradeoffs.
Yet another alternative is a set of more powerful capabilities, enabling the use cases that "commit to next transaction"
and "verify a BIP340 signature for an arbitrary message" enable and more. For instance replacing "commit to the exact
transaction which must spend this output" with "programmable introspection on the spending transaction's fields" has
been considered. However this approach increases implementation complexity and broadens the risk surface[^8], which
warrants a compelling demonstration that arbitrary transaction introspection does enable important use cases not
achievable with more minimal capabilities.
Finally, a more radical alternative is to focus efforts to make Bitcoin smart contracts more capable with a sane
re-design of its scripting language. Similarly to the alternative of more powerful Bitcoin Script capabilities, it
remains to be shown that more expressivity is both safe and desirable. Furthermore, it is unclear that such an
undertaking would be achievable with the (very) limited engineering resources currently allocated to extending Bitcoin
scripting capabilities.
In conclusion, we believe the bundle of capabilities "commitment to the transaction spending an output" and "BIP340
signature verification of arbitrary message" to be the best direction for Bitcoin to take. These are well-understood,
simple capabilities, substantially improving an existing well-understood approach to scaling Bitcoin payments. This
direction does not preclude research into more advanced capabilities, though questions remain about their overall
desirability.
Antoine Poinsot & Greg Sanders
[^0]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ln-symmetry-project-recap/359
[^1]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/the-ark-case-for-ctv/1528
[^2]: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/CAH5Bsr2vxL3FWXnJTszMQj83jTVdRvvuVpimEfY7JpFCyP1AZA@mail.gmail.com
[^3]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/how-ctv-csfs-improves-bitvm-bridges/1591
[^4]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/non-confiscatory-transaction-weight-limit/1732/8
[^5]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/evolving-the-ark-protocol-using-ctv-and-csfs/1602
[^6]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ctv-csfs-can-we-reach-consensus-on-a-first-step-towards-covenants/1509/18
[^7]: https://github.com/john-light/validity-rollups
[^8]: https://bluematt.bitcoin.ninja/2024/04/16/stop-calling-it-mev
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next reply other threads:[~2025-06-23 13:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-23 13:14 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List [this message]
2025-06-24 14:29 ` [bitcoindev] " Harsha Goli
2025-06-24 15:54 ` [bitcoindev] " Matt Corallo
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