public inbox for bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi@gmail•com>
To: "Martin Habovštiak" <martin.habovstiak@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 14:07:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <F8BA8BFA-94F3-4AD5-9A04-82193AD8B886@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALkkCJbk0czFj5mdMB6_0+Umw5V-fo-4tdBHgvg92zhyRZWiYQ@mail.gmail.com>

Martin,

Yes, the second signing could be done by a mobile device that I owned and controlled (I wasn't thinking that initially).  I was thinking that online services are popular because of convenience and there should be a better way to address security (privacy issues not withstanding).

I think these are practical approaches and just doing a sanity check.  Thanks for the vote of confidence.

Brian Erdelyi

Sent from my iPad

> On Feb 2, 2015, at 1:54 PM, Martin Habovštiak <martin.habovstiak@gmail•com> wrote:
> 
> Good idea. I think this could be even better:
> 
> instead of using third party, send partially signed TX from computer
> to smartphone. In case, you are paranoid, make 3oo5 address made of
> two cold storage keys, one on desktop/laptop, one on smartphone, one
> using third party.
> If it isn't enough, add requirement of another four keys, so you have
> three desktops with different OS (Linux, Windows, Mac) and three
> mobile OS (Android, iOS, Windows Phone), third party and some keys in
> cold storage. Also, I forgot HW wallets, so at least Trezor and
> Ledger. I believe this scheme is unpenetrable by anyone, including
> NSA, FBI, CIA, NBU...
> 
> Jokes aside, I think leaving out third party is important for privacy reasons.
> 
> Stay safe!
> 
> 2015-02-02 18:40 GMT+01:00 Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi@gmail•com>:
>> Another concept...
>> 
>> It should be possible to use multisig wallets to protect against malware.  For example, a user could generate a wallet with 3 keys and require a transaction that has been signed by 2 of those keys.  One key is placed in cold storage and anther sent to a third-party.
>> 
>> It is now possible to generate and sign transactions on the users computer and send this signed transaction to the third-party for the second signature.  This now permits the use of out of band transaction verification techniques before the third party signs the transaction and sends to the blockchain.
>> 
>> If the third-party is malicious or becomes compromised they would not have the ability to complete transactions as they only have one private key.  If the third-party disappeared, the user could use the key in cold storage to sign transactions and send funds to a new wallet.
>> 
>> Thoughts?
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,
>> sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
>> hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
>> leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
>> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development



  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-02-02 18:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-01-31 22:15 Brian Erdelyi
2015-01-31 22:38 ` Natanael
2015-01-31 23:04   ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-01-31 23:37     ` Natanael
2015-01-31 23:41       ` Natanael
2015-02-01 12:49         ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-01 13:31           ` Martin Habovštiak
2015-02-01 13:46             ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-01 13:54             ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-01 13:48           ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-01 14:28 ` mbde
2015-02-02 17:40   ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 17:54     ` Martin Habovštiak
2015-02-02 17:59       ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-02 18:02         ` Martin Habovštiak
2015-02-02 18:25           ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-02 18:35             ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 18:45               ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-02 19:58                 ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 20:57                   ` Joel Joonatan Kaartinen
2015-02-02 21:03                     ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 21:09                       ` Pedro Worcel
2015-02-02 21:30                         ` devrandom
2015-02-02 21:49                           ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 21:42                         ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 21:02                   ` Pedro Worcel
2015-02-03  7:38                   ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-02 18:10         ` Brian Erdelyi
2015-02-02 18:07       ` Brian Erdelyi [this message]
2015-02-02 18:05     ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-02 18:53       ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-02 22:54         ` Eric Voskuil
2015-02-03  0:41           ` Eric Voskuil

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=F8BA8BFA-94F3-4AD5-9A04-82193AD8B886@gmail.com \
    --to=brian.erdelyi@gmail$(echo .)com \
    --cc=bitcoin-development@lists$(echo .)sourceforge.net \
    --cc=martin.habovstiak@gmail$(echo .)com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox