From: Prayank <prayank@tutanota•de>
To: Ryan Grant <bitcoin-dev@rgrant•org>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Mock introducing vulnerability in important Bitcoin projects
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 2021 11:19:37 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ml-IIuL--3-2@tutanota.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMnpzfrNZ0vpiMVoH=0KW9jy1-vppudX3D7Z+aXpSp4h_7s=zw@mail.gmail.com>
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This looks interesting although I don't understand few things:
> The scheme should include public precommitments collected at ceremonial intervals.
How would this work? Can you explain with an example please.
> Upon assignment, the dev would have community approval to opportunistically insert a security flaw
Who is doing the assignment?
--
Prayank
A3B1 E430 2298 178F
Oct 2, 2021, 01:45 by bitcoin-dev@rgrant•org:
> Due to the uneven reputation factor of various devs, and uneven review
> attention for new pull requests, this exercise would work best as a
> secret sortition.
>
> Sortition would encourage everyone to always be on their toes rather
> than only when dealing with new github accounts or declared Red Team
> devs. The ceremonial aspects would encourage more devs to participate
> without harming their reputation.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_team
>
> The scheme should include public precommitments collected at
> ceremonial intervals.
>
> where:
> hash1 /* sortition ticket */ = double-sha256(secret)
> hash2 /* public precommitment */ = double-sha256(hash1)
>
> The random oracle could be block hashes. They could be matched to
> hash1, the sortition ticket. A red-team-concurrency difficulty
> parameter could control how many least-significant bits must match to
> be secretly selected. The difficulty parameter could be a matter of
> group consensus at the ceremonial intervals, based on a group decision
> on how much positive effect the Red Team exercise is providing.
>
> Upon assignment, the dev would have community approval to
> opportunistically insert a security flaw; which, when either caught,
> merged, or on timeout, they would reveal along with the sortition
> ticket that hashes to their public precommitment.
>
> Sortition Precommitment Day might be once or twice a year.
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-02 9:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-27 1:52 Prayank
2021-09-27 10:13 ` ZmnSCPxj
2021-09-27 23:19 ` Prayank
2021-09-30 20:36 ` Ruben Somsen
2021-10-01 3:03 ` Prayank
2021-10-01 12:27 ` ZmnSCPxj
2021-10-01 15:55 ` Prayank
2021-10-01 20:15 ` Ryan Grant
2021-10-02 9:19 ` Prayank [this message]
2021-10-03 9:11 ` Manuel Costa
2021-10-03 21:33 ` Luke Dashjr
2021-10-04 3:59 ` ZmnSCPxj
2021-11-18 20:29 ` Prayank
2022-08-19 3:09 ` Anthony Towns
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