Good Afternoon, It is worth reconsidering the value accumulated in dust. Speculatively, when the value of 1 BTC reaches US$ 1,000,000.00 then the value of one satoshi will be US$ 0.01 so, for 1 satoshi to be of any substantial value the value of Bitcoin will have to rise substantially higher. I ask what then should the value of fees be? Is there not a future case foreseeable at least in consideration of Bitcoin's comparison with Gold that the value may be so high as to allow that 1 satoshi may cover the mining cost of any transaction despite the reduction in sat/B for including the additional transaction. Is it not that we can foresee the dust has value and that the wealthy may have in fact millions of dust transactions that are inheritable, though I hesitate to make my business collecting them I may set up a website. The current reason for excluding dust is because it costs more to the transaction to add the dust than its value but that does not say that will always be the case. KING JAMES HRMH Great British Empire Regards, The Australian LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH (& HMRH) of Hougun Manor & Glencoe & British Empire MR. Damian A. James Williamson Wills et al. Willtech www.willtech.com.au www.go-overt.com and other projects earn.com/willtech linkedin.com/in/damianwilliamson m. 0487135719 f. +61261470192 This email does not constitute a general advice. Please disregard this email if misdelivered. ---- ________________________________ From: bitcoin-dev on behalf of shymaa arafat via bitcoin-dev Sent: Friday, 27 August 2021 7:07 PM To: Billy Tetrud ; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Cc: lightning-dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Removing the Dust Limit Allow me to ask: -Untill you find a mitigation that consolidate all dust UTXOS, why don't you separate them and all probably Unspendable UTXOS in a different partition? -I'm talking at the real UTXO storage level (to be kept in secondary storage), and at the Merkleization level in any accumulator design Utreexo or what so ever(putting them in one or two subtree/forest with hardly changing roots according to the categorization will reduce the proof size, even if slightly) -This will also help things like Bloom filters, assume UTXOs,...etc when about 10% with almost zero probability are trimmed from the pool you are withdrawing from. . -The paper I mentioned earlier says in Feb 2018, there was about 2.4m UTXOS less than 1000 Satoshi, of which ~824,892 holds exactly 1 Satoshi -I don't think any of those were spent since that time, in fact there could be a possibility that the numbers may have increased -As the last previous reply mentioned you have to consider the long run effect on the UTXO set forever, this is a straight forward improvement that comes with almost no effort . Ps. -If there is something wrong, something I missed in this idea please explain it to me -Or do you find the improvement itself a "dust" that doesn't worth the effort??? . Regards & thank you all for your time in reading & replying Shymaa M. Arafat On Fri, Aug 27, 2021, 00:06 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev > wrote: One interesting thing I thought of: the cost of maintenance of the dust creates a (very) small incentive to mine transactions that *use* dust outputs with a slightly lower fee that contain dust, in order to reduce the future maintenance cost for themselves. However, the rational discount would likely be vanishingly small. It would be interesting to add something to the consensus rules to decrease the vbytes for a transaction that consumes dust outputs such that the value of removing them from the system (saving the future cost of maintenance) is approximately equal to the amount that the fee could be made lower for such transactions. Even measuring this as a value over the whole (future) bitcoin network, I'm not sure how to evaluate the magnitude of this future cost. On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 8:12 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev > wrote: Good morning Jeremy, > one interesting point that came up at the bitdevs in austin today that favors remove that i believe is new to this discussion (it was new to me): > > the argument can be reduced to: > > - dust limit is a per-node relay policy. > - it is rational for miners to mine dust outputs given their cost of maintenance (storing the output potentially forever) is lower than their immediate reward in fees. > - if txn relaying nodes censor something that a miner would mine, users will seek a private/direct relay to the miner and vice versa. > - if direct relay to miner becomes popular, it is both bad for privacy and decentralization. > - therefore the dust limit, should there be demand to create dust at prevailing mempool feerates, causes an incentive to increase network centralization (immediately) > > the tradeoff is if a short term immediate incentive to promote network centralization is better or worse than a long term node operator overhead. Against the above, we should note that in the Lightning spec, when an output *would have been* created that is less than the dust limit, the output is instead put into fees. https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/03-transactions.md#trimmed-outputs Thus, the existence of a dust limit encourages L2 protocols to have similar rules, where outputs below the dust limit are just given over as fees to miners, so the existence of a dust limit might very well be incentivize-compatible for miners, regardless of centralization effects or not. Regards, ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev