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From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
To: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail•com>
Cc: "David A. Harding" <dave@dtrt•org>,
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] A Free-Relay Attack Exploiting RBF Rule #6
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 12:54:54 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

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On Wed, Mar 27, 2024 at 06:27:47AM +0000, Antoine Riard wrote:
> Hi Dave,
> > Could you tell us more about the disclosure process you followed?  I'm
> > surprised to see it disclosed without any apparent attempt at patching.
> > I'm especially concerned given your past history of publicly revealing
> > vulnerabilities before they could be quietly patched[1] and the conflict
> > of interest of you using this disclosure to advocate for a policy change
> > you are championing.
> In defense of Peter, I don't think there is a low-hanging fruit that could
> have
> been landed easily in Bitcoin Core. The most obvious ones could have been
> a) to reduce `MAX_STANDARD_TX_WEIGHT` or b) a new rule
> `max_replacement_bandwidth`
> or c) a new absolute-fee based penalty on bandwidth replacement cost.

To be clear, I _did_ disclose the issue on bitcoin-security and no-one had any
objections to disclosing it publicly.

> All hard to integrate in a covert fashion without attracting some attention
> from the
> community, which would certainly ask why we're changing the marginal
> bandwidth cost.
> Potentially, impacting unfavorably some use-cases.
> Certainly, Peter's report could have integrated a disclosure timeline at the
> example of CVE-2018-17144 [0], which I can recommend to anyone to follow
> doing
> security research or servicing as a security point of contact in our field.

Since this attack is just a relatively minor extension of existing, publicly
disclosed, attacks, I don't think there was any need for formal disclosure
timelines. It's interesting that the attack exists; it does not substantially
change the status quo.

I don't believe the other attacks in this attack class are even possible to
fix. We just have to live with the fact that a degree of free relay is always
going to be possible.

> I don't see the conflict of interest in the present disclosure ? It is
> public information
> that Peter is championing RBFR [1].  I'm not aware of any private interest
> unfavorably
> influencing Peter's behavior in the conduct of this security issue
> disclosure.

Well, there is a conflict of interest in trying to keep this issue under wraps:
Replace-By-Fee-Rate benefits from public discussion of the fact that many
different free-relay attacks are possible. The arguments against RBFR mainly
hinge on the idea that free-relay is preventable.

-- 'peter'[:-1]

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  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-27 12:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-18 13:21 Peter Todd
2024-03-19 12:37 ` Nagaev Boris
2024-03-19 13:46   ` Peter Todd
2024-03-23  0:29     ` Nagaev Boris
2024-03-22 23:18 ` [bitcoindev] " Antoine Riard
2024-03-27 13:04   ` Peter Todd
2024-03-27 19:17     ` Antoine Riard
2024-03-28 14:27       ` Peter Todd
2024-03-28 15:20         ` Peter Todd
2024-03-28 19:13         ` Antoine Riard
2024-03-28 19:47           ` Peter Todd
2024-03-29 20:48             ` Antoine Riard
2024-03-26 18:36 ` [bitcoindev] " David A. Harding
2024-03-27  6:27   ` Antoine Riard
2024-03-27 12:54     ` Peter Todd [this message]
2024-03-27 17:18 David A. Harding
2024-03-27 18:04 ` Peter Todd
2024-03-27 19:50   ` David A. Harding
2024-03-27 20:30     ` Peter Todd
2024-03-27 22:05       ` Steve Lee
2024-03-28 18:34         ` Antoine Riard
2024-03-28 19:16           ` Peter Todd

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