Yes, sorry, reading fail on my part (somehow missed that you were explicitly referring to grinding in the comment).

Still don't think the 12% figure is a good one though? in (P,R,s) it's 8 out of 96 (and as discussed, worse if whole tx is (realistically) included), 1/4 the rate you get from direct key leakage. (Plus the perhaps trivial point that it does actually require work, which might conceivably matter at scale?). I'm not sure why one would not include P in the measure?

Even an explicit multisig that does not sacrifice control of the output would be of the order of double the embedding rate, without having to do work. (P,R,s x 2 = 192 and embed 32 for a 1/6 rate; vs. grinding all 4 P,R values for a 1/12 rate).



On Thursday, October 2, 2025 at 6:59:41 PM UTC-3 Greg Maxwell wrote:
I just meant in the purely grinding non-key leaking case you could get 4 bytes into the nonce pretty easily and 4 bytes into either the pubkey or signature out of a 64 byte signature.  Obviously the delivered embedding rate in a whole txn will be lower, but maybe not that much thanks to multisig outputs.


On Thu, Oct 2, 2025 at 4:17 PM waxwing/ AdamISZ <ekag...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >  12% embedding rate
> Where do you get that number from? 33% for embedding 256 bits in (P, R, s) (but as per this discussion, according to me, at the cost of key leakage). If we include the other bytes in a (taproot anyway) utxo that's not much less, I guess 30% ish. I could try to guess but it'd be easier if you told me :)

Thinking about it again: to publish data, you have to publish a transaction! I guess the most economical, paying taproot to taproot, is about 192 bytes with script path plus the posited extra 64 for the (R,s) in the output, so yeah that'd be 32 out of 256, 12.5%. Isn't the figure a bit different for key path though, because no control block? Well it hardly matters, it's some small fraction in that range.

An interesting mechanical detail in this near-absurd scenario is that if you wanted to repeatedly publish off the same (presumably a few multiples of dust level) output, you couldn't also do the leak single key thing, since you'd lose control to re-spend. So that'd place us in the "explicit multisig" scenario that Greg mentioned, which I think would only make sense with legacy script? Kind of a different scenario, also it would be really weird to update legacy script to take into account a new "you must sign the pubkeys" rule. Though I guess in this fictional scenario, it might happen like that. If you did do it with legacy, you'd be publishing bare 2 of 2 multisig. If you did it with taproot due to how that works, the script is not published until the output is spent, so I think that's outside what I was considering ("data in utxo set"). (I guess you could also use something like a hash lock which might be more efficient). So anyway if you wanted to do this repeatedly and minimize cost, for whatever strange reason, you'd be adding another 50-100 bytes each time bringing that % down to like 10% or less.

But that all became way too hypothetical to even analyze properly :)

Anyway just to reemphasize I certainly wasn't advocating this sig-attaching system, but it seems important to know what the result of it would be: we would still not have changed the obvious reality that embedding data in witness gives more space for data, and is more economical, and we would only reduce by a big factor how much can be embedded in outputs (anything from 8% to 15% embedding rate seems possible depending on the hypothetical details), while having to screw up much of Bitcoin's functionality in the process.

Cheers,
AdamISZ/waxwing

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