Sure, but what is questionable here is the use of SOCKS proxy, for Tor I think as the main purpose, making it dangerous for the "whole bitcoin world" while it's something like of zero interest/use (or please let me know what it is beside Tor)

The Tor network is very centralized and not designed at all to handle p2p networks (which bitcoin is still not), it is designed to be used via the Tor Browser to browse the web and to hide web servers, not bitcoin nodes, and there are a lot of misbehaving/dangerous nodes there, there is no encryption in bitcoin protocol, an exit node can fake whatever it likes, this seems to be a use case as far as I can see, but even if the initiator is configured to connect to a hidden bitcoin node, I don't see the point

I have advertised recentlty the open sourcing of node-Tor (https://github.com/Ayms/node-Tor) here

This one is designed for p2p, not over the Tor network but using the Tor protocol, as simple as bitcoin.pipe(node-Tor), or <any protocol>.pipe(node-Tor), which is the finality of the project as far as I see it since years (maybe see http://www.peersm.com/Convergence.pdf even if I would modify some parts now)

Inside servers or browsers acting as servers also (WebRTC or WebSockets), bitcoin peers (servers/browsers) relaying the bitcoin anonymized protocol using the Tor protocol (and not the Tor network) between each others, there is no story of exit nodes here and rdv points would not apply for bitcoin use, this "just" adds the internal missing encryption and anonymity layer to the bitcoin protocol

Personally I would remove the socks proxy interface from bitcoin core, independently of Tor this can be misused too and offers absolutely zero security


Le 08/11/2019 à 18:03, LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
It goes without saying in that all privately known CVE should be handled so professionally but, that is, well done team.

Regards,
LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH


CVE-2017-18350 is a buffer overflow vulnerability which allows a malicious
SOCKS proxy server to overwrite the program stack on systems with a signed
`char` type (including common 32-bit and 64-bit x86 PCs).

The vulnerability was introduced in 60a87bce873ce1f76a80b7b8546e83a0cd4e07a5
(SOCKS5 support) and first released in Bitcoin Core v0.7.0rc1 in 2012 Aug 27.
A fix was hidden in d90a00eabed0f3f1acea4834ad489484d0012372 ("Improve and
document SOCKS code") released in v0.15.1, 2017 Nov 6.

To be vulnerable, the node must be configured to use such a malicious proxy in
the first place. Note that using *any* proxy over an insecure network (such
as the Internet) is potentially a vulnerability since the connection could be
intercepted for such a purpose.

Upon a connection request from the node, the malicious proxy would respond
with an acknowledgement of a different target domain name than the one
requested. Normally this acknowledgement is entirely ignored, but if the
length uses the high bit (ie, a length 128-255 inclusive), it will be
interpreted by vulnerable versions as a negative number instead. When the
negative number is passed to the recv() system call to read the domain name,
it is converted back to an unsigned/positive number, but at a much wider size
(typically 32-bit), resulting in an effectively infinite read into and beyond
the 256-byte dummy stack buffer.

To fix this vulnerability, the dummy buffer was changed to an explicitly
unsigned data type, avoiding the conversion to/from a negative number.

Credit goes to practicalswift (https://twitter.com/practicalswift) for
discovering and providing the initial fix for the vulnerability, and Wladimir
J. van der Laan for a disguised version of the fix as well as general cleanup
to the at-risk code.

Timeline:
- 2012-04-01: Vulnerability introduced in PR #1141.
- 2012-05-08: Vulnerability merged to master git repository.
- 2012-08-27: Vulnerability published in v0.7.0rc1.
- 2012-09-17: Vulnerability released in v0.7.0.
...
- 2017-09-21: practicalswift discloses vulnerability to security team.
- 2017-09-23: Wladimir opens PR #11397 to quietly fix vulernability.
- 2017-09-27: Fix merged to master git repository.
- 2017-10-18: Fix merged to 0.15 git repository.
- 2017-11-04: Fix published in v0.15.1rc1.
- 2017-11-09: Fix released in v0.15.1.
...
- 2019-06-22: Vulnerability existence disclosed to bitcoin-dev ML.
- 2019-11-08: Vulnerability details disclosure to bitcoin-dev ML.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

-- 
Move your coins by yourself (browser version): https://peersm.com/wallet
Bitcoin transactions made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-transactions
Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms