From: Michael Tidwell <michael@tidwell•io>
To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass
Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:01:09 -0700 (PDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c3b9617f-b419-4fc0-9a00-5d1866f80920n@googlegroups.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <db3d0ec4-90b8-44a4-b912-b98ec9083b10n@googlegroups.com>
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I'm much more in favor of this approach vs freezing/burning the coins.
Putting out some thoughts with the assumption this will one day be possible*
At least at a high level this has some interesting merits that should be
considered. Distribution of p2pk coins have pre-determined throttle rules
that don't lead to any clear bias. Like the BIP explains, deciding which
coins should be locked is a dangerous precedent. I'm more in favor of
cryptographic romanticism vs authoritarian UTXO adjudicating. Early p2pk
were not created with the idea that could be stolen. However imo, it is a
better in everyway: technical, cultural, moral to allow early, inactive
vulnerable coins to be naturally recycled without changing the unlocking
script.
From my search, there's roughly ~45,700 P2PK outputs. I don't think the
address count matters here. We're looking at nearly one year's worth of
UTXOs (~317 days), assuming a scenario where, once a key is cracked, there
will be roughly one cracked key per block thereafter.
Here are a few hypothetical scenarios to consider of many regarding mining
pools and QC sig producing entities:
- 1. Sigs become public:
QC sigs become easy to produce and commoditized, freely available for every
miner to pull from. Mining pools can arbitrarily select the most profitable
signatures for their blocks. Given the relatively shortish time window
between becoming available and being commoditized, I think this is unlikely.
- 2. Single Entity rush spends:
A single entity generates QC signatures and tries to rapidly flip the UTXOs
while having their first mover competitive edge. They either broadcast to
the mempool, partner with miners, or mine directly. This creates potential
miner collusion if P2PK fees remain low, pressuring the QC entity to raise
fees and incentivize miners before their competitive advantage expires and
others catch up.
- 3. Bidding war from multiple QC'ers:
QC sigs produced by multiple entities, leading to potential bidding wars as
suggested by BIP scenario. However, if the entities controlling the
signatures are few, collusion to keep fees low and maximize profits
elsewhere imo is likely to occur. This scenario would somewhat
counterbalance scenario (2) above.
- 4. Patient Miner:
A single QC capable entity, also operating as a miner or partners with a
miner, chooses to be patient, including P2PK transactions only in their own
blocks to maximize long-term profits.
I've discussed this idea off-band and heard concerns regarding MEV
specifically, (i.e. miners needing QC partnerships or capabilities to
remain competitive.)
Considering the approximately 1 year exploit window, and an unknown amount
of time in the future when this would occur, it's not clear that there
would be significant MEV concerns during or afterwards for the (post QC
phase). I consider 1 year in Bitcoin to be a relatively short time period
that could be stomached as a "phase". Due to potential market panic and
pressure from QC stakeholders, it's unlikely an entity would choose a
long-term approach (e.g., 3-4+ years) to exploit these transactions.
Instead, they'd likely pay fees promptly to outpace other people about to
make breakthroughs in QC.
On Tuesday, April 29, 2025 at 7:08:16 PM UTC-4 Hunter Beast wrote:
> This is a proposal to mitigate against potential mass liquidation of P2PK
> funds. The specification is pretty simple, but the motivation and
> justification for it is a bit longer.
>
> https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/hourglass/bip-hourglass.mediawiki
>
> Feedback welcome!
>
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-30 3:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-29 22:38 [bitcoindev] " Hunter Beast
2025-04-30 3:01 ` Michael Tidwell [this message]
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