Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security

From: alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail•com>
To: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 01:45:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dYLEcCTOYwMe7umkzbxdFz-sp5ZwqHU6DcpAg8M8p-ANg8QWSafISIzDXhbGiAHlV6eInfar2ll9oWviwox4SZ7QwfgqXkIbgq_fvcaUz0M=@protonmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAB3F3DuhMQn_fSiXqqzrUMhDm7D=AiKg4nSO71372WzJFCr9EQ@mail.gmail.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 11206 bytes --]

Hi Greg,

> The security of LN and other related systems are something like: "given proper fees offered, can a transaction be mined within N blocks?" You're simply not allowed to out-bid your attacker in certain circumstances due to today's miner incentive-incompatible relay policies.

It is not possible to guarantee that a transaction will be mined within N blocks irrespective of fees. It is vulnerable if a project's security relies on it,and should fix it by changing the security assumptions. Miners can try full-rbf or other policy without core so I won't consider opt-in as incentive-incompatible.

>> ... arguments about how many people RBF being sufficient or not ...
>
> The idea that we should only build robust systems after the broken ones are attacked is not a serious argument.

Its true and was even mentioned in PR #16171 that a policy is only useful if enough nodes and miners follow it. We should build robust systems but I don't think this change will help in doing it.

> This is a strawman.
>
> Full-RBF is a simple, obvious, incentive-compatible step to getting closer to more robust layer two systems.Fixing the rest of the holes is for future proposals which are a bit more involved and definitely less mature.

I do not have issues with multiple RBF policies being tried out and full-rbf being one of them. My disagreements are with rationale, lack of basic options in Bitcoin Core to employ/disable different RBF policies and a few arguments made in support for full-rbf. Whether it appears strawman or offtopic on github, there should be a place to share these disagreements.

> If Knots has these knobs, just use Knots rather than lobby all implementations to have miner incentive incompatible knobs?

Everyone can share options that would help users in the bitcoin implementation used by 90% nodes. I don't think this is reserved only for a few developers. I would personally use Knots and others are free to try the suggestion or continue using Bitcoin Core.

/dev/fd0

Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

------- Original Message -------
On Thursday, June 16th, 2022 at 6:32 AM, Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail•com> wrote:

>> If something relies on a policy which can be changed without breaking consensus rules, how is it secure in any case with or without full rbf?
>
> The security of LN and other related systems are something like: "given proper fees offered, can a transaction be mined within N blocks?" You're simply not allowed to out-bid your attacker in certain circumstances due to today's miner incentive-incompatible relay policies.
>
> There is also a time-value dimension to this with other simpler systems where your funds can be locked up for potentially weeks for similar reasons.
>
>> ... arguments about how many people RBF being sufficient or not ...
>
> The idea that we should only build robust systems after the broken ones are attacked is not a serious argument.
>
>> I am not opposed to full-rbf; rather, I am opposed to the notion that full-rbf will solve all problems
>
> This is a strawman.
>
> Full-RBF is a simple, obvious, incentive-compatible step to getting closer to more robust layer two systems. Fixing the rest of the holes is for future proposals which are a bit more involved and definitely less mature.
>
>> would suggest users to try Bitcoin Knots instead
>> Developers should provide basic RBF policy options rather than attempting to define what constitutes a good policy and removing the ability to disable something when necessary.
>
> If Knots has these knobs, just use Knots rather than lobby all implementations to have miner incentive incompatible knobs?
>
> Cheers,
> Greg
>
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 8:27 PM alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Antoine,
>>
>> Thanks for opening the pull request to add support for full-rbf in Bitcoin Core. I have a few disagreements with the approach and questions.
>>
>>> Recent discussions among LN devs have brought back on the surface concerns about the security of multi-party funded transactions (coinjoins, dual-funded LN channels, on-chain DLCs, ...). It turns out there is a low-fruit, naive DoS vector playable against the funding flow of any such construction due to the lack of existent full-rbf transaction-relay topology on today's p2p network [0] [1].
>>
>> 1)If something relies on a policy which can be changed without breaking consensus rules, how is it secure in any case with or without full rbf? If I write a python script that expects user to enter char 'a' or 'b' but user can enter 'c' and there is no code to handle exceptions or other chars, will it be secure?
>>
>> 2)full-rbf is not default in the 2 open pull requests, so this experiment still relies on users changing RBF policies manually. If majority of nodes use default opt-in policy, how would this affect vulnerable projects?
>>
>>> If you're a mining operator looking to increase your income, you might be interested to experiment with full-rbf as a policy.
>>
>> Miners can only increase their income if users replace transactions. 2-3% transactions are replaced with opt-in RBF, if someone did not replace earlier why would they do it with full RBF? Or even if we add some users in it who could not signal for some reasons, do you think it would be anything above 5%?
>>
>>> If you're a Bitcoin user or business and you don't like full-rbf, please express an opinion on how it might affect your software/operations. I'm always interested to learn more about mempool and transaction-relay interactions with upper-layers and applications and to listen to feedback in those areas, and I guess a lot of other Bitcoin researchers/devs too. I know there have been a lot of concerns about full-rbf in the past, however I believe the Bitcoin ecosystem has matured a lot since then.
>>
>> I am not opposed to full-rbf; rather, I am opposed to the notion that full-rbf will solve all problems and the lack of basic options in Bitcoin Core to employ/disable different RBF policies. There is also a speculation about making full RBF default in an year which isn't relevant to discuss at this point without trying different RBF policies.
>>
>> I would suggest users to try Bitcoin Knots instead which already has an option to disable all RBF policies if required, opt-in and full RBF policy. This can also be done using GUI if not familiar with config optionmempoolreplacement.
>>
>> The rationale in PR #16171 was insufficient to justify removing it in the first place, had 2 NACKs and was reopened to merge it. Why bother with a few lines of code that may allow someone disable it if required in local mempool since it's only useful when a big percentage of miners utilize it and essentially underused according to the PR author? Developers should provide basic RBF policy options rather than attempting to define what constitutes a good policy and removing the ability to disable something when necessary.
>>
>> /dev/fd0
>>
>> Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.
>>
>> ------- Original Message -------
>> On Tuesday, June 14th, 2022 at 5:55 AM, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi list,
>>>
>>> Recent discussions among LN devs have brought back on the surface concerns about the security of multi-party funded transactions (coinjoins, dual-funded LN channels, on-chain DLCs, ...). It turns out there is a low-fruit, naive DoS vector playable against the funding flow of any such construction due to the lack of existent full-rbf transaction-relay topology on today's p2p network [0] [1]. While it does not consist in a direct loss of funds, if exploited well I think it's annoying enough to inflict significant timevalue loss or fee-bumping waste
>>> to the future providers or distributed swarm of users doing multi-party funded transactions. Of course, it can be fixed one layer above by introducing either fidelity bonds or a reliable centralized coordinator, though at the price of an overhead per-participant ressources cost and loss in system openness [1].
>>>
>>> For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing of multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subset of the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest multi-party transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signaling double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that direction, I've submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to turn on full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stays **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I've started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15.
>>>
>>> If you're a node operator curious to play with full-rbf, feel free to connect to this node or spawn up a toy, public node yourself. There is a ##uafrbf libera chat if you would like information on the settings or looking for full-rbf friends (though that step could be automated in the future by setting up a dedicated network bit and reserving a few outbound slots for them).
>>>
>>> If you're a mining operator looking to increase your income, you might be interested to experiment with full-rbf as a policy. Indeed, in the future I believe the multi-party transactions issuers who need full-rbf to secure their funding flow should connect by default to full-rbf peers. One can conjecture that their transactions are likely to be more compelling in their feerate as their liquidity needs are higher than the simple transaction. For today, I think we have really few standards and bitcoin softwares relying on multi-party funded transactions [4].
>>>
>>> If you're a Bitcoin user or business and you don't like full-rbf, please express an opinion on how it might affect your software/operations. I'm always interested to learn more about mempool and transaction-relay interactions with upper-layers and applications and to listen to feedback in those areas, and I guess a lot of other Bitcoin researchers/devs too. I know there have been a lot of concerns about full-rbf in the past, however I believe the Bitcoin ecosystem has matured a lot since then.
>>>
>>> Any mistakes or missing context is my own.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Antoine
>>>
>>> [0] For more info about replace-by-fee, see https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/replace-by-fee/
>>>
>>> [1] For more details about the DoS vector, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html
>>>
>>> [2] E.g I think it does not affect the Lightning Pool service, as there is a preliminary step where the participant funds are locked first in a 2-of-2 with the coordinator before being committed in the multi-party batch transaction.
>>>
>>> [3] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25353
>>>
>>> [4] E.g DLCs : https://github.com/discreetlogcontracts/dlcspecs/blob/master/Transactions.md ; Lightning dual-funded channel : https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/851
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 19537 bytes --]