Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Detailed protocol design for routed multi-transaction CoinSwap appendium

From: ZmnSCPxj <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2020 13:31:58 +0000

Good morning Chris,

>
> Looking at these equations, I realize that the incentives against
> post-coinswap-theft-attempt still work even if we set K = 0, because the
> extra miner fee paid by Bob could be enough disincentive.

This made me pause for a moment, but on reflection, is correct.

The important difference here relative to v1 is that the mining fee for the collateralized contract transaction is deducted from the `Jb` input provided by Bob.

>     Unlike the v1 protocol, each CoinSwap party knows a different version of
>     the contract transactions, so the taker Alice always knows which maker
>     broadcast a certain set of contract transactions, and so can always ban
>     the correct fidelity bond.

Great observation, and an excellent property to have.

Will go think about this more.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj