I was told my arguments are a bit incoherent, so I'll try again:
Beyond being paternalistic the issue I see with your proposal is that
its contrary to miner income-- you"re asking miners to ignore these
spends that otherwise they could accept.
It is no more paternalistic than non BIP125 transactions. First of all, I'd like to emphasis we're talking about very small amounts of money, either way it's not going to matter too much as no one is going to care.
This seems unstable-- some
people would ignore your rule even if it were otherwise widely
adopted, leading to the network behavior having higher volatility.
Actually, I believe the opposite. The problematic unconfirmed BIP125 descendants tend to be low fee rate sweeps, that won't be mined any time soon anyway. Miners who ignored that, but instead took the replacement transaction would be able to put it in a block and make more money. The low fee rate sweep will eventually be recreated anyway, with a slightly different set of inputs.
Thus I believe miners who used my policy would make more than miners who didn't.
But the reality is that if my proposal was deployed, people would stop spending from bip125 outputs until they confirm, in the first place. There's no good reason to do so, so no incentive to try route around the network. The only reason people do so now is because they can, and there's no harm in doing so (for things like sweep transactions, where you don't care if you need to keep redoing it). My proposal would drastically simplify feebump logic, and make fee bumps actually predictable.
As a concrete example: bitcoin core's feebump command completely breaks when there exists descendant transactions, and for it it would would not only require a fair bit of logic but a change in interface (so the user can control how much they're willing to lose)
I believe this proposal offers a huge amount of benefits for users/services wanting to make use of bip125 for feebumping, which will result in a more stable fee market. While creating extremely little to no disadvantages.
Unless someone can think of a legitimate use case that spending unconfirmed bip125 transactions is useful?
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP proposal: No chaining off replaceable transactions
Local Time: July 2, 2017 3:56 PM
UTC Time: July 2, 2017 8:56 PM
From: greg@xiph.org
To: Rhavar <rhavar@protonmail.com>
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 8:35 PM, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> ==Abstract==
>
> BIP125 allows transactions to opt into replaceability with a primary use
> case
> of allowing users to increase the fees of unconfirming transactions, helping
> create
> a more efficient fee market place.
I don"t really see how this is desirable: Just replace it-- the
receiver foolishly spent it at its own peril, spending a unconfirmed
payment from a third party is something that Core never does, it"s
reckless unless you"re doing something like CPFPing it to yourself,
which is harmless (either it"ll work, or it"ll fail and you"ll be fine
with that).
Beyond being paternalistic the issue I see with your proposal is that
its contrary to miner income-- you"re asking miners to ignore these
spends that otherwise they could accept. This seems unstable-- some
people would ignore your rule even if it were otherwise widely
adopted, leading to the network behavior having higher volatility.
Instead, perhaps a BIP that very strongly advises parties to not spend
unconfirmed outputs from third parties while making a payment to third
parties would achieve your end?