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From: Elden Tyrell <tyrell.elden@gmail•com>
To: bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] does "stubbing" off Merkle trees reduce initial download bandwidth?
Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2012 17:39:09 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <jdtm7t$4ed$1@dough.gmane.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgTOZKM9c=UvfVW1rajnPQVQMNS4mR5KUqq8p0HreG=vuQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 2012-01-02 14:41:10 -0800, Gregory Maxwell said:
> make this possible: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=21995.0

Neat!  I had a similar idea but you've clearly beat me to [a big part of] it.


> Er, no—  if a node controls the private keys for a transaction, and
> that transaction makes it into the chain then it can safely assume
> that its unspent (at least once its buried a few blocks into the
> chain).

I'm not so sure about that.  If you accept X successor blocks as proof 
that none of the transactions in a block re-used an output, then the 
cost of attacking is X*50BTC since the hashpower needed for the attack 
could have earned that much reward.

However, an attacker could use the same faked X-block sequence to 
attack multiple clients by putting several double-spend transactions in 
the first faked block.  This would spread out the cost over more than 
one attack.  So simply checking that the value of the transaction is 
less than X*50 isn't necessarily enough, although the logistics of the 
attack aren't exactly easy.

There's also the question of knowing what the difficulty for those X 
blocks ought to be.  If the attacker controls your network connection 
(e.g. your ISP attacks you) you wouldn't be able to get a second 
opinion on how high the difficulty ought to be, and might get fooled by 
X very-low-difficulty blocks that were each produced with a lot less 
than 50BTC worth of hashpower.

  - e





  reply	other threads:[~2012-01-03  1:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-01-02  5:04 Elden Tyrell
2012-01-02 13:31 ` Christian Decker
2012-01-02 22:23   ` Elden Tyrell
2012-01-02 22:41     ` Gregory Maxwell
2012-01-03  1:39       ` Elden Tyrell [this message]
2012-01-05 23:30         ` Mike Hearn

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