Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot. Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email. -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:04 AM UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:04 AM From: contact@taoeffect.com To: Kekcoin Anthony Towns , bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org You keep referring to 148 coinbase coins, what is the rationale behind this? Why would you prefer using 148 coinbases over legacy coinbases for this purpose? OK, maybe "post-UASF coinbase coins" is a better term? I just wanted to make it clear that this refers to coins that come from blocks generated after the UASF is activated. -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA. On Jun 6, 2017, at 4:59 PM, Kekcoin wrote: You keep referring to 148 coinbase coins, what is the rationale behind this? Why would you prefer using 148 coinbases over legacy coinbases for this purpose? Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com/) Secure Email.