Re: [bitcoin-dev] Improving RBF policy

From: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail•com>
To: Bram Cohen <bram@chia•net>,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Improving RBF policy
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 19:42:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALZpt+HdN9G-a7U2ff7OQQ=BZTV9Fr57w7aFaTRidX0y6syPGQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHUJnBA7AtX_osJUJQyKmc5QBknH5U0TKU3hiyxzpPv4TN88JQ@mail.gmail.com>

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> Is it still verboten to acknowledge that RBF is normal behavior and
disallowing it is the feature, and that feature is mostly there to appease
some people's delusions that zeroconf is a thing? It seems a bit overdue to
disrespect the RBF flag in the direction of always assuming it's on.

If you're thinking about the opt-in flag, not the RBF rules, please see
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-June/019074.html
The latest state of the discussion is here :
https://gnusha.org/bitcoin-core-dev/2021-10-21.log
A gradual, multi-year deprecation sounds to be preferred to ease adaptation
of the affected Bitcoin applications.

Ultimately, I think it might not be the last time we have to change
high-impact tx-relay/mempool rules and a more formalized Core policy
deprecation process would be good.

Le lun. 31 janv. 2022 à 18:15, Bram Cohen via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> a écrit :

> Gloria Zhao wrote:
>
>>
>> This post discusses limitations of current Bitcoin Core RBF policy and
>> attempts to start a conversation about how we can improve it,
>> summarizing some ideas that have been discussed. Please reply if you
>> have any new input on issues to be solved and ideas for improvement!
>>
>
> Is it still verboten to acknowledge that RBF is normal behavior and
> disallowing it is the feature, and that feature is mostly there to appease
> some people's delusions that zeroconf is a thing? It seems a bit overdue to
> disrespect the RBF flag in the direction of always assuming it's on.
>
>
>> - **Incentive Compatibility**: Ensure that our RBF policy would not
>>   accept replacement transactions which would decrease fee profits
>>   of a miner. In general, if our mempool policy deviates from what is
>> economically rational, it's likely that the transactions in our
>> mempool will not match the ones in miners' mempools, making our
>> fee estimation, compact block relay, and other mempool-dependent
>> functions unreliable. Incentive-incompatible policy may also
>> encourage transaction submission through routes other than the p2p
>> network, harming censorship-resistance and privacy of Bitcoin payments.
>>
>
> There are two different common regimes which result in different
> incentivized behavior. One of them is that there's more than a block's
> backlog in the mempool in which case between two conflicting transactions
> the one with the higher fee rate should win. In the other case where there
> isn't a whole block's worth of transactions the one with higher total value
> should win. It would be nice to have consolidated logic which handles both,
> it seems the issue has to do with the slope of the supply/demand curve
> which in the first case is gentle enough to keep the one transaction from
> hitting the rate but in the second one is basically infinite.
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